JUDGMENT 1. - This is a second appeal by plaintiff Goidhan Singh (since dead and now represented by his widow Sint Ghewar Kanwar) against the appellate decree of the District Judge Pratapgarh dated July 2', 1975 confirming the decree of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh dated August 18, 1969 whereby Civil Suit No. 58 of 19.)3 filed by appellant Gordhansing for possession and mandatory injunction was dismissed. 2. Facts leading to the filing of this second appeal are that Gordhan Singh plaintiff filed Civil Original Suit No. 58 of 190 in the court of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh on March 28, 1963 against Daulatsingh and 13 others illeging that he was Jagirdar of mauza Peepal Khedi, Tehsil Pratapgarh and he held 37~ highas land in the said mauza in his Jagir Lalpura was an adjoining Jagir village to mauza Peepal Khedi. Devisingh deceased was Jagirdar of village Lalpura. It was alleged that land comprised in Kh isra No. 174 measuring I bigha biswas was in the Jagir area of plaintiff Gordhan Singh. The corresponding old Khasra number of this land was 74. Devisingh, Jagirdar of Lalpura, during his life time had committed trespass over laud comprised in Khasra No. 74 (old) corresponding to new Knasra No. 174. Consequently in the year 1949, plaintiff Gordhansingh instituted a Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 (1949 AD) in the court of Assistant Collector, Pratapgaih against Devi Singh of Lalpura for recovery of possession of the said land which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the legal representatives of Devisingh an December 3, 1954 by the revenue court. It was further stated that during the pendency of Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006, Devisingh transferred some portion of the land comprising Khasra No. 74 (old) in favour of defendants Nos. Ito 4 in this suit on April 15. 1951 and instigated them to interfere in the plaintiff's possession over this land. Consequently, plaintiff was compelled to file another Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 against defendants Nos. I and 2. namely, Daulat Singh and Sajjan Singh and Harisingh father of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. Ito 4 in this suit on April 15. 1951 and instigated them to interfere in the plaintiff's possession over this land. Consequently, plaintiff was compelled to file another Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 against defendants Nos. I and 2. namely, Daulat Singh and Sajjan Singh and Harisingh father of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. However, this subsequent Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 was ordered to be consigned to record on August 11, 1951 on the ground that the decision of that suit depended upon the decision of the earlier Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 and as such Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 would be taken up after the earlier Revenue Suit No. 100 of 2006 was decided. The plaintiff proceeded further on to state that some time in the year 1952 defendant No 5 Shava, who was tenant of Jagirdar of Lalpura, took possession of a part of the above land at the instance of Devi Singh, Jagirdar of Lalpura and constructed house thereon Further during the year 195.1 and 1960 defendant No. 1 Daulat Singh raised conjunction of his double-storeyed house on the disputed land. Likewise in the year 1955 defendants Nos. 2,3 and 4 also raised certain constructions. In 1958 defendant respondents Nos. 6 and 7 raised the constructions. De#enda,its Nos. 8, 4 and 0 encroached upon a part of this land and started placing 'rodies' over it and in 1959 defendant No. 11 constructed Kelu-roofed house on the land. Similarly, defendants Nos. 12, 13 and 14 also raised 'kacha' huts. All this it was alleged. was done by these defendants at the instance or instigation of Devi Singh, Jagirdar of Lalpura. Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2(06 was decided by the Revenue Court on December 3, 1954 and that suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the legal representatives of Devi Singh named Jaskanwar and Takhatsingh. Plaintiff eventually filed an application for execution of the decree in Revenue quit No. 100 of 2006, being Execution Case No. 12 of 1958 of the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh, but the Sub-Divisional Officer did not deliver possession over the land encroached upon in execution of the decree. Plaintiff eventually filed an application for execution of the decree in Revenue quit No. 100 of 2006, being Execution Case No. 12 of 1958 of the court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh, but the Sub-Divisional Officer did not deliver possession over the land encroached upon in execution of the decree. This execution application was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on August 23, 1960 in collusion with the judgment-debtors and the plaintiff was directed to file suit against the defendants and the plaintiff had to file an appeal against the dismissal of execution application before the Revenue Appellate Authority which was stated to he pending. Since a number of complications had been created in revenue proceedings, the plaintiff filed the present Civil Original Suit No. 58 of 1963 in the court of Civil Judge, Pratapgarh. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants in the suit be declared to be trespassers on the land and a declaration may be made to the effect that the defendants were bound by the decree obtained by the plaintiff against Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006. The plaintiff claimed possession of the land after removal of the trespass or encroachments committed by the defendants over land comprised in Khasra No. 174 (new). It may have to be noted that when Civil Suit No. 58 of 1963 was pending before the trial court, the plaintiff as per proceedings dated September 20, IM withdrew the suit as against defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely, Sajjan Singh, Chen Singh and Jaswant Singh, Defendants Nos. 6, 7, 11 and 12 remained absent despite service of summons and were proceeded exparte. Defendants Nos. 13 and 14, after filing a written statement to the effect that they had left the village Lalpura and had started living in village Kanora, became exparte. The suit was contested by defendants Nos. 1, 5, 8, 9 and 10 only and they filed the written statement on August 7, 1973. 3. The case set up by the contesting defendants was that the disputed land did not belong to the plaintiff. It was also denied that these defendants were transferees or aliences from Devisingh Jagirdar of Lalpura. They asserted that they were not bound by the decree obtained by the plaintiff in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 on December 3, 1954 against Devi Singh from the court of the Assistant Collector. It was also denied that these defendants were transferees or aliences from Devisingh Jagirdar of Lalpura. They asserted that they were not bound by the decree obtained by the plaintiff in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 on December 3, 1954 against Devi Singh from the court of the Assistant Collector. These defendants alleged that they were in possession of the disputed land since the time of their ancestors and were not trespassers. It was also pleaded that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. Jurisdiction of the trial court to try the suit was also challenged on the ground that it related to agricultural land. One more ground was taken by the defendants that as a result of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act 1952, all Jagirs and Maufi lands were resumed by the State Government and vested in it. It was also pleaded by the defendants that the land on which their houses were situate was situated within Lalpura village. It was also stated that on July 24, 1959 the defendant No. I obtained a patta of the land of the way leading to Kajli measuring 26 yds. x 9 yds 2 ft. Lastly, it was said that neither the plaintiff nor the Jagirdar of Lalpura had any right over Abadi land because the Abadi land of both the villages vested in Gram Panchayat. 4. On 20th September, 1963, Gordhan Singh plaintiff filed a rejoinder to the written statements of defendants Nos, r, 5, 8, 9 and 10 wherein he stated that the land in question was not liable to resumption as it was exempt from the operation of the Jagir Abolition Act of 1952 by virtue of the provisions contained in section 2 of the Act. With regard to the Abadi land in village Lalpura it was asserted that its Khasra number was 75 after leaving the disputed land. The Khasra number of Abadi land of Lalpura village was 75 and it measured about 3 Bighas 10 biswas. The plaintiff alleged that land comprised in Khasra No. 74 Sold) was his 'khud kart' land over which he used to grow crops according to his domestic necessity. Neither Jagirdar of Lalpura nor the Settlement Department had any right to convert this land into Abadi land without the sanction of the State Government. 5. The plaintiff alleged that land comprised in Khasra No. 74 Sold) was his 'khud kart' land over which he used to grow crops according to his domestic necessity. Neither Jagirdar of Lalpura nor the Settlement Department had any right to convert this land into Abadi land without the sanction of the State Government. 5. The trial court framed 13 issues in the case on 15th October, 1963. Thereafter two more issues were framed on 24Th August, 1965 and 1st September, 1966. It may be mentioned here that one additional issue No. 16 was framed on 27th October, 1967 by the Civil Judge Pratapgarh. Issue No. 16 was to the effect as to whether after the enactment of Rajasthan Act No. 4 of 1952, had the plaintiff right to file the suit. The Civil Judge, Pratapgarh heard and decided this additional issue No. 16 on November 18, 1967 as preliminary issue. According to him, the Jagir of the plaintiff Gordhan Singh stood resumed. He held that the Resumption Act of 1952 applied fully to the disputed land inspite of the fact that it had been turned into abadi land. No adjudication was obtained by the plaintiff from the Jagir Commissioner that this land continued to belong to the plaintiff by virue of section 23 of the Resumption Act of 1952 On this basis, he held that the plaintiff had no lucus standi to bring the suit. Accordingly Civil Judge, Pratapgarh dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 18th November 1967. The plaintiff filed an Appeal No. 73 of 1967 before the District .fudge. Pratapgarh against the dismissal of his suit by the Civil Judge on account of the decision of issue No. 16 against the plaintiff. The District Judge allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff on 23rd January, 1969. The District Judge held that decision of the trial court on issue no. 16 based on wrong assumption could not be sustained and the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on the basis of the trial Court's decision on issue No. 16 was wrong and could not be maintained. The District Judge held that decision of the trial court on issue no. 16 based on wrong assumption could not be sustained and the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on the basis of the trial Court's decision on issue No. 16 was wrong and could not be maintained. The District Judge concluded that the right, title and interest if any, acquired by the State of Rajasthan in the suit land as a consequence of the resumption of plaintiff's jagir was not to be affected by the decision of the suit as the State Government was not a party to the suit and would. therefore, not be bound by it, and the plaintiff's suit shall be deemed to have been decided, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time when the cause of action arose to the plaintiff as against the defendants. The District Judge consequently set aside the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh dated 18th November 1967 and remanded the suit to him with the direction that he shall hear the arguments of the parties and their counsels on all the 15 issues (excepting issue No. 9 which had already been decided by the Civil Judge on 23rd March, 1965 in favour of the plaintiff) and then decide the suit afresh on the basis of the findings on those issues. It appears that after the remand of the case, the defendants had filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the written statement by pleading that the disputed land was not a 'khud kast' land of the plaintiff. This application for amendment was dismissed by the Civil Judge on 29th April, 1969 because it was made after delay of six years from the date of the filing of the suit. 6. plaintiff was in cultivatory possession of the land. He h ,,Id that the plaintiff had to stand on his own legs and he cannot take advantage of the weakness in defendant's version. The plaintiff having failed to prove his right, title or interest in the suit land he was not entitled to any relief. Aggrieved by the decree of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarb, the plaintiff filed First Appeal No. 91 of 1969 before the District Judge, Pratapgarh. The plaintiff having failed to prove his right, title or interest in the suit land he was not entitled to any relief. Aggrieved by the decree of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarb, the plaintiff filed First Appeal No. 91 of 1969 before the District Judge, Pratapgarh. The District Judge held that there was absolutely no evidence on record to show that the contesting defendants entered over the land as aliences of Devi Singh Jagirdar and that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendants had committed trespass at the instance of Devi Singh. However, the District Judge, Pali stated that in all probabilities Khasra No. 174 belonged to the plaintiff. But the contesting defendants were not bound by the decision of the Revenue Court given against Devi Singh since they were not parties in that revenue suit. It was stated by the District Judge that Devi Singh dispossessed the plaintiff in the year 1944 and the plaintiff was compelled to file Revenue Suit No. 10 of Samvat 2006 against Devi Singh It was also admitted position that during the pendency of the plaintiff's revenue suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006, the contesting defendants took possession and raised structures upon the disputed land. The plaintiff tiled the present suit on March 28, 1963 which according to the District Judge was barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Old Limitation Act as the plaintiff was out of possession for more than 12 years preceding the institution of the present Civil Suit No.: 8 of 1963. 7. It was contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant that the District Judge, Pratapgarh was utterly wrong in holding that the plaintiff's suit No. 58 of 1963 was barred by limitation. It has already been stated above that the District Judge, Pratapgarh held the suit of the plaintiff as barred by limitation on the ground that Devi Singh. Jagirdar of Lalpura had, according to the allegations of the plaintiff himself in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006, dispossessed the plaintiff in the year 1944 and during the pendency of that revenue suit, the contesting defendants had taken possession of the suit land. On the basis of these findings the District Judge held that the plaintiff was out of possession since more than 12 years. On the basis of these findings the District Judge held that the plaintiff was out of possession since more than 12 years. It may be mentioned in this connection that it was plaintiff's case in para No. 3 of the plaint Devi Singh former Jagirdar of Lalpura had transferred some portion out of the suit land to Daulat Singh defendant No. I on April IN 1951 and Devi Singh instigated Daulat Singh (defendant No. 1) and defendants Nos. 2 to 4 to interfere in the land. On this aspect of the matter, it may be stated that the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh while giving findings on issue No. I held that it was not established by the plaintiff that defendant No. 1 Daulat Singh had purchased the portion of the land from Devi Singh on April 15, 1951 as nu sale-deed in that respect had been produced. On the basis it was found that Daulat Singh was not bound by the Decree which the plaintiff bad obtained in revenue suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 against Jagirdar of Lalpura Devi Singh. The theory that Daulat Singh dispossessed the plaintiff at the instigation of Devi Singh was not accepted on the ground that the plaintiff had admitted that he had no knowledge abaut the instigation. The District Judge Pratapgarh also while dealing with points Nos. 1 and 2 in his judgment held that there was absolutely no evidence on record to show that defendant Nos. I to 14 entered into possession of the land in question as alienees of Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura. Be it noted that it was wrongly written by the District Judge that Devi Singh was Jagirdar of Peepal Khedi. He was Jagirdar of Lalpur. The District Judge proceeded further on to State that the plaintiff was unable to point out a sing piece of evidence on the basis of which it could be held that defendants were holding the land on behalf of Devi Singh. 8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended on the basis of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurvinder Singh v. Lal Singh reported in A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 1553 , that there can be jural relationship between two independent trespassers. 8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended on the basis of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurvinder Singh v. Lal Singh reported in A.I.R. 1965 S. C. 1553 , that there can be jural relationship between two independent trespassers. Therefore, where a defendant in possession of the property is sued by a person who has title to it, but is out of possession, what he had to show in defence is that he or any one through whom he claims had been in possession for more than the statutory period. An independent trespasser not being such a person, the defendants were not entitled to tack on the previous possession of that person to his own possession. It is necessary to state the facts in Gurbinjer Singh's case. Mst. Raj Kaur was in possession of 851 Kanals 18 marlas of land situate in village Dhaipai in the former State of Faridkot. Out of this land 481 Kanals 3 marlas was in his possession as occupancy tenant, the landlord being the Raja of Faridkot while the remaining land was held by Smt. Raj Kaur as Adna Malik, the Ala Malik again being the Raja of Faridkot. In 1898 A. D. Smt. Rajkaur who had two daughters Prem Kaur and Mohan Kaur, adopted Prem Kaur's sou Bakshi Singh and put him in possession of the whole of the land. Bakshi Singh transferred part of the land to Pratap Singh, second son of Mohan Kaur. Mohan Kaur had one more son Lai Singh In the year 1915 Raja of Faridkot filed a suit against Bakshi Singh and Rajkaur for a declaration that the adoption of Baksi Singh was invalid. That suit was decreed on 9.2.1916. Rajkaur died on 14.8 1930. On 19.2.1934 Raja of Faridkot filed two suits against Ba cshi Singh and Pratap Singh for possession of the lands, one pertaining to the land of which Rajkaur was occupancy tenant and the other for that of the land of which she was Adna Malik. These suits were decreed on March 12, 1938 and in execution the Raja of Faridkot took possession of the entire land in October 1938. On 7.4.1948 Raja of Faridkot sold the entire land along with some other land to one Kehar Singh. These suits were decreed on March 12, 1938 and in execution the Raja of Faridkot took possession of the entire land in October 1938. On 7.4.1948 Raja of Faridkot sold the entire land along with some other land to one Kehar Singh. Thereupon Girbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh, who were appellants before the Supreme Court, obtained a decree of pre-emption in their favour and against Kehar Singh In execution of the decree of pre-emption, Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh got possession of the land on 22 6.1950. On 20.10.1948 Prem Kaur instituted a suit for possession of the entire land on the ground that she was the legal heir of Mst. Rajkaur against Kehar Singh and Raja of Faridkot. Later she impelled Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh appellants as defendants to the suit and discharged Raja of Faridkot. On 17.2.1950 Lal Singh son of Mohan Kanwar filed a suit for possession of the entire land against the Raja of Faridkot and Kehar Singh. To that suit, he joined Prem Kaur and Pcatap Singh ; s defendants. Later, however, Pratap Singh was transposed as a plaintiff. Both these suits were consolidated and were tried together. Suit of Prem Kaur was dismissed by the trial court but that of Lalsingh and Pratap Singh sons of Mohan Kaur was decreed to the extent of half share in the property. Premkaur, Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh filed appeals before the District Judge but that court dismissed both the appeals. A second appeal was taken by Gurbinder Singh and Balbir Singh as well as by Prem Kaur to the High Court and cross-objections were preferred by Lal Singh and Pratap Singh. The High Court dismissed the appeals as well as cross-objections. Gurbirder Singh and Balbinder Singh filed a appeal by certificates before the Supreme Court. Preen Kaur did not he appeal before the Supreme Court The Supreme Court was, there to consider the claim of Lalsingh and Pratapsingh sons of Mohan Kaur. Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh had pressed only one ground that the suit of Lal Singh and Pratap Singh instituted on 17.2.1950 was barred by limitation. According to the appellants Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh, the suit of respondents was governed either by Article 142 or by Article 144 of the old Limitation Act. Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh had pressed only one ground that the suit of Lal Singh and Pratap Singh instituted on 17.2.1950 was barred by limitation. According to the appellants Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh, the suit of respondents was governed either by Article 142 or by Article 144 of the old Limitation Act. According to plaintiffs-respondents Lalsingh and Pratapsingh, Article 142 had no application and that the suit was governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act. Appt hunts also relied on Article 144 in the alternative. 9. His Lordship Mudholkar J, speaking for the Court, observed that in order that Arucl. 142 is attracted the plaintiff must initially have in possession of the property and should have been dispossessed by the defendants or some one through whom the defendants claim or alternatively the plaintiff should have discontinued possession. It was no one's case that Lal Singh ever was in possession of the property. It was true that Pratap Singh was in possession of part of the property by reason of a transfer thereof in his favour of Bakshi Singh son of Prem Kaur. But in the suit filed on 17 2.50 both Lalsingh and Pratap Singh asserted their claim to the property by succession in accordance with the rules contained in the 'dastur-ul-amal' whereas the possession of Pratap Singh for some time was under a different titlt. altogether. Thus Lalsingh and Pratap Singh plaintiff-respondents were never in possession as heirs of Mst. Rajkaur and consequently Article 142 of the Limitation Act would not be attracted. Their Lordships, therefore. considered whether under Article 144, the suit was barred by time. Rajkaur had died on 14.8.1930 and on her death according to 'dastur-ul-amal' her daughters Prem Kaur and Molian Kaur became entitled to the possession of the land as absolute estate. At the time of death of Rajkaur, Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh were in possession of the entire land belonging to Rajkaur. Ignoring their relationship with Rajkaur, they were adversely in possession to the true owners i. e. Prem Kaur and Mohan Kaur, daughters of Rajkaur as from 14 8.1930. Before, however, Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh could prefect their title against the two daughters of Rajkaur, the Raja of Faridkot, instituted a suit for possession against Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh and obtained dual possession in October, 1938 in execution of the decree obtained by him. Before, however, Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh could prefect their title against the two daughters of Rajkaur, the Raja of Faridkot, instituted a suit for possession against Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh and obtained dual possession in October, 1938 in execution of the decree obtained by him. Though Raja of Faridkot obtained, possession under a decree of the court, he was in the eye of law nothing but a trespasser in so far as Prem Kaur and Mohan Kaur, heirs of Rajkaur, were concerned. Mohan Kaur had died on 13.7.1938 before Raja of Faridkot obtained possession. Possession of Raja Faridkot, therefore, became adverse to Premkaur and to the respondents Lalsingh and Pratapsingh (sons of Mohan Kaur) since October. 1938. Keharsingh was a transferee from the Raja and stood in Raja's position. Similarly, Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh who had pre-empted these lands under the pre-emption decree against Kehar Singh got advantage of adverse possession of Raja of Faridkot and also that of Kehar Singh. The sum total of the adverse possession of Raja of Faridkot, Keharsingh and the defendant-appellants were less than 12 years because Lalsingh had filed suit for possession on 12 2.1950 and so the suit of the respondents could not be said to be barred by limitation under Article 144 of the Old Limitation Act. 10. On behalf of the defendants-appellants an argument was advanced before the Supreme Court that if persons entitled to immediate possession of land are somehow kept out of possession-may be by different trespassers for a period of 12 years or over-their suit will be barred by time. It was urged that from the death of Rajkaur on 14.8.1930, her two daughters, through one of whom, the plaintiffs-respondents claimed, were kept out of possession by trespassers and that from the date of Rajkaur's death right upto the date of their suit, that is, for a period of nearly 20 years trespassers were in possession of Mohan Kaur's share and after her death, the respondent's share in the land and the suits of Lal Singh and Pratap Singh must be regarded as barred by time. In other words, the defendants wanted to tack on the adverse possession of Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh to the adverse possession of Raja of Faridkot and those who claimed through the Raja. In other words, the defendants wanted to tack on the adverse possession of Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh to the adverse possession of Raja of Faridkot and those who claimed through the Raja. His Lordship Mudholkar J., observed : "This is a suit to which Article 144 is attracted and the burden was on the defendant to establish that he was in adverse possession for 12 years before the date of suit and for computation of this .period he can avail of the adverse possession of any person or persons through whom he claims but not the adverse possession of independent trespassers. In the case before us what is being sought to be tacked on to the possession of the Raja and those who claim through him is the possession of Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh. The Raja in his suit against Bakshisingh challenged the right of Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh to possession on the ground that they were trespassers. As it has turned out, the possession of the Raja, thougt obtained under the decree of a Civil Court, was in itself a trespass on the rights of the person who were in law entitled to possession of property. Thus this is a case of one trespasser trespassing against another trespasser. There is connection between the two and, therefore, in law their possession cannot be tacked on to one another. As pointed out by Varadanchariar J. Rajagopal Naidu v. Rama Subramania Ayyar, A.IR. 1935 Mad. 499 : "Further the doctrine of independent trespassers will cone only when the second man trespasses upon the possession of the first or, the first man abandons possession" Where it applies the principle laid down in Agency Co's case (1888) 13 AC 793, would apply and preclude the tacking of possession of successive trespassers. The following observations of Lord Machaghten in that case are pertinent and runs thus: They are of opinion that if a person enters upon the land of another and holds possession for a time, and then without having acquired title under the statute, abandons possession, the rightful owner, on the abandonment, is in the same position in all respects as he was before the instruction took place. There is no one against whom he can bring an action. He cannot make any entry upon himself. There is no one against whom he can bring an action. He cannot make any entry upon himself. There is no positive enactment, nor is there any principle of law, which requires him to do any act, to issue any notice or to perform any ceremony in order to rehabilitate himself. No new departure is necessary. The possession of the intruder, ineffectual for the purpose of transforming title, ceases upon its abandonment to be effectual for any purpose. It does not leave behind it any cloud on the title of the rightful owner, or any secret process at work for the possible benefit in time to come of some casual inter pole or lucky vagarant There is not, in their Lordship's opinion, any analogy between the case supposed and the case of successive disabilities mentioned in the statute. There the statute 'continues to court' because there is a person in possession in whose favour it is running." This view has not been departed from in any case. At any rate none was brought to our notice where it has not been followed. Apart from that what we are concert ed with is the language used by the legislator in the third column of Article 144. The starting point of limitation, there stated is the date when the possession of the defendant became advers to that plaintiff. The word 'defendant' includes any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be suedNo doubt, this is an inclusive definition but the gist of it is the existence of a aural relationship between different persons. 1h.-re can be no jural relationship between two independent trespassers. Therefore. where a defendant in possession of property is sued by a person who has title to it but is out of possession what he has to show in his defence is that he or any one through whom he claims has been in possession for more than the statutory period. An independent trespasser not bring such a person the defendant is not entitled to tack on the previous possession of that person to his own possession. An independent trespasser not bring such a person the defendant is not entitled to tack on the previous possession of that person to his own possession. In our opinion therefore, the respondents' suit is within t me and has been rightly decreed by the courts below"In Gurbinder Singh's case, reliance was placed on behalf of the defendants- appellants on the decision of the Madras High Court in 2) Ramayya v. Kotamnta (I. I. R (4) Mad. 370=A. I.R. 1922 Mad. 59) . With respect to Ramayya's case, his Lordship Mudholkar J., observed : "From the facts of the case it will be clear that what was tacked on was not the possession of independent trespassers at all .. ........... Subbarayudu would be a presumptive reversioner on the death of hi; mother and there was evidence to show that she was a consenting party to Subbaraudu's enjoying the properties after Punnayya's death. It is under these circumstances that the High Court found it difficult to hold that there Has a fresh trespass by Subarayudu after the death of Punniyya. On the other hand, according to them, there was a continuity of possession because the person who continued to hold possession was the presumptive heir of the deceased" In the case before me, it is true that Gordhan Singh plaintiff pleaded that Devi Singh had transferred some portion of the disputed land to defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and instigated them to interfere in plaintiff's possession. As already stated, so far as defendants Nos. 2. 3 and 4 were concerned the plaintiff relinquished his claim as against them by removing their names from the array of defendants. It was not the case of the defendants that defendants Nos 8, 9 and 10 were transferees from Devi Singh. So far as defendants Nos. 1, 5, 8, 9 and 10 are concerned they denied that they derived any right through Devi Singh. On the otter hand, they asserted that they were not bound by the decree obtained by Gordhan Singh as against Devi Singh in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 10. 6. All of them claimed their possession since the time of their ancestors. Both the courts below have found it as a fact that there is no evidence to show that any c.f the defendants were transferees of the disputed land from Devi Singh. 6. All of them claimed their possession since the time of their ancestors. Both the courts below have found it as a fact that there is no evidence to show that any c.f the defendants were transferees of the disputed land from Devi Singh. Daulat Singh defendant No. I stated in his examination-in-chief that he had neither obtained the land from Devi Singh or his son Takhat Singh and nor he was their heir. Thus the defendants themselves asserted that their possession was independent from Devi Singh and not on behalf or under Devi Singh. That is why they pleaded that they were not bound by the decree for possession which had teen obtained by Gordhan Singh from the revenue court in revenue Suit No. 10 of Samvat 2006. It is thus clear that in case the defendants are proved to have trespassed over portions of the suit land, their trespass was quite independent of the trespass by Devisingh. They being not persons claiming through or under Devi Singh. there was no aural relationship between Devi Singh and the defendants. Had these defendants would have been claiming under Devi Singh they would have immediately become bound by the decree for possession which Gordhan Singh plaintiff had obtained for possession against Devi Singh in Revenue Suit No. 10 of Samvat 2006 in relation to land bearing old Khasra No 74 corresponding to new Khasra No. 174. So far as possession of Devi Singh's legal representatives was concerned it was disturbed when in execution of the decree obtained by Gordhan Singh against them, symbolic possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 174 measuring I bigha 5 biswas was delivered to Gordhan Singh under the writ for delivery of possession Ex. II issued by the revenue court on 2 th January, 1966 as per report of the Naib Tehsildar dated 10-2-1966 on Ex. 11. At that time Devisingh was not in possession of the land, but there were Kachcha or Pucca houses of the defendants as is clear from Ex. 11 as well as Ex. 12. In these circumstances, the contesting defendants are not entitled to tack on the possession of independent trespasser Devisingh to their on possession. 11. 11. At that time Devisingh was not in possession of the land, but there were Kachcha or Pucca houses of the defendants as is clear from Ex. 11 as well as Ex. 12. In these circumstances, the contesting defendants are not entitled to tack on the possession of independent trespasser Devisingh to their on possession. 11. As already stated, that the defendants were not claiming through Devi Singh, Daulat Singh and other contesting defendants pleaded in pars 2 of their written statement that they had their houses in muaza Lalpura since the time of their ancestors. They denied that the suit land belonged to the plaintiff. They showed ignorance of the litigation between the plaintiff and Devi Singh. They denied the allegations contained in para 3 of the plaint. In para 10 of the additional pleas to the written statement, it was pleaded that Daulat Singh respondent No. I on June 24, 1959 obtained a patta with respect to land measuring 26 Yds x 9 Yds 2 feet for Rs. 70/11 on the way to Kejali and that neither plaintiff Gordhansingh nor Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura had any right over the abadi land in dispute. 12. As to the title of the land comprised in Khasra (Old) No. 74 corresponding to new Khasra No. 174, the District Judge, Pratapgarlt while deciding point No. I framed by him held that the decision in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 (Ex. 1), though not binding on the defendants in this case, was valuable piece of evidence to show that the plaintiff owned old khasra No. 74 which was converted into new Khasra No. 174. It was in the evidence of plaintiff that old Khasra No. 174 was altered to new Khasra No. 74. The District Judge stated that EX. I suggested that in all probabilities the new khasra number Of old Khasra No 74 was 174 and that it belonged to the plaintiff. It was on point No, 2 framed by him that he held that since it was not established that the defendants were alienees and transferees from Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura, they were not bound by the judgment of the Revenue Court Ex. 1. While concluding his findings on point No. 1, he again stated that in all probabilities Khasra No. 174 belonged to the plaintiff. 1. While concluding his findings on point No. 1, he again stated that in all probabilities Khasra No. 174 belonged to the plaintiff. As to the defendants' title, the District Judge observed that the defendants have not led any documentary evidence to establish their title to the land. The judgment Ex.l may not operate as res judicata between the plaintiff and the defendants in this suit. However, it is relevant under section 13 of the Evidence Act which inter alia provides that where the question as to the existence of any right any in transaction by which the right in question was created, modified, recognised, asserted or denied are relevant. Plaintiff Gordhan Singh had in Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 asserted his rights to old Khasra No. 74 which corresponds to new Khasra No. 174 against Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura and his rights in the land comprised in the said Khasra number were recognised by the Revenue Court. Section 43 of the Evidence Act states that judgment, order of decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order of decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant in some other provisions of the Evidence Act. As already stated. the judgment Ex. I is relevant under section 13 of the Evidence Act. The finding of the District Judge on the question of title, is, therefore, based on relevant evidence. It is well settled that a finding of fact cannot be interfered in second appeal. It has been held in Mukarcmdas Mannudas and others v. Chhagan Kishan Bhawas and others reported in A I.R. 1959 Bom. 491 , in pars 8 of the reported judgment that the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit property b; longed to a 'math' which was a public institution and trust property, is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered in second appeal. From the side of the defendants there is no evidence that the disputed land belonged to them because according to Daulat Singh. he had obtained a 'patta' Ex.A.2 from Gram Panchayat. Peelu on December 19, 1960. Had the land already belonged to Daulat Singh defendant No, 1. there was no necessity for him to obtain patta from the Gram Panchayat. From the side of the defendants there is no evidence that the disputed land belonged to them because according to Daulat Singh. he had obtained a 'patta' Ex.A.2 from Gram Panchayat. Peelu on December 19, 1960. Had the land already belonged to Daulat Singh defendant No, 1. there was no necessity for him to obtain patta from the Gram Panchayat. The assertion of title by the defendant No. I is negatived by the very fact that he himself was seeking title even in the year 19(0 from the Gram Panchayat. 13. It my also be stated that the plaintiff had produced certain documents which are Ex. 14 to Ex. 1 6 which go to show that there had been a Iona, standing dispute between Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura and certain Ravs of Peepal Khedi about the extent of land which was of Jagirdar of Lalpura and that which was in the share of Ravs of Peepal Khedi and that dispute was resolved by these documents from Mehkama Khas of formerly Princely State of Pratapgarh. In the earlier Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 20th, reliance had been placed by the Assistant Collector Pratapgarh on the decision of the Mahkama Khas dated February 17, 1966 and it was held that from the documents including the reports of the Commissioners and the order of Mehkama Khas it did not appear that the suit land was entered into the Jager area of Lalpura. On the other hand, it appeared from the report of the Commissioners that this land was a part of Jagir of Peepal Khedi. On this basis the revenue suit of the plaintiff as against Devi Singh was decreed. Devi Singh had filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner Udaipur against the judgment of the Assistant Collector, Pratapgarh Ex. I but his appeal was dismissed by the Additional Commissioner Udaipur on July 22, 1957 by appellate judgment Ex. 2. These documents have also been produced and proved as Ex. 14 to Ex. It. It appears that trouble arose on account of the fact that in the Khasra Girdavari of Samat 2017 to 2020, the lands comprising Khasra Nos. 173 and 174 were mentioned as abadi Lalpura and this seems to have been done because in the Settlement Jamabandi of Samvar 2010 (Ex. A 3), land comprised in Khasra Nos. 14 to Ex. It. It appears that trouble arose on account of the fact that in the Khasra Girdavari of Samat 2017 to 2020, the lands comprising Khasra Nos. 173 and 174 were mentioned as abadi Lalpura and this seems to have been done because in the Settlement Jamabandi of Samvar 2010 (Ex. A 3), land comprised in Khasra Nos. 173 and 174 measuring in ad 4 bighas and 15 Biswas were entered as Bilanam 'Gair Kabil Kast Abadi'. It is pertinent to note that in the Jamabandi of Settlement Department (Ex. A. 3) while giving the names of villages both Lalpura and Peepal Khedi are mentioned. Had the land bearing present Khasra No. 174 would have been of village Lalpura as alleged by the defendants, there was no question of mentioning the village Peepal Khedi in settlement Jamabandi of Samvat 2010 Ex. :i, therefore also, supports the case of the plaintiff and that land comprised in Khasra No. 174 belonged to him as it formed part of his Jagir. The entry in Khasra Girdawari Ex. A. I should not have introduced in it some thing which was not Ex. A. 3. In Ex. A. I (Khasra G:rdawari) it is nowhere recorded that the Abadi was of Lalpura But in Khasra Girdavari while in the heading names of both Lalpura and Peeepal Khedi are given, but in the class of the land Abadi Lalpura was mentioned which was against jamabandi entry which was record of rights. It may be stated that entry in Khasra Girdavari is not on record of rights and cannot be used as evidence of title. Khasra Girdavari is prepared only for fiscal purpose and not as annual register or record of rights under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 14. The main ground on which the District Judge, Pratapgarh dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff was that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was in possession of the disputed land within 12 years of the filing of the suit. The observations of the District Judge on this point are that even according to the plaintiff, he was ousted from possession in the year 1944 by Devi Singh and he filed a revenue suit against Devi Singh and before the same could be decided the defendants entered into possession of the land. The observations of the District Judge on this point are that even according to the plaintiff, he was ousted from possession in the year 1944 by Devi Singh and he filed a revenue suit against Devi Singh and before the same could be decided the defendants entered into possession of the land. Subsequently he filed another Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 against Devi Singh, Sajjan Singh and father of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 and allowed that suit to be consigned to record room subject to the condition that the same may he revived when the suit against Devi ingh was disposed of. It has been stated by the District Judge that plaintiff hid not shown that he took steps for revival of the suit, He slept over the matter and eventually brought the present suit in the year 1963 On the basis of these facts, the District Judge held that the plaintiff was out of possession for more than 12 years preceding the institution of the present suit and. therefore, the present suit was barred by limitation. It may be mentioned in this connection that the District Judge, Pratapgarh himself found on point No 2 which had been framed by him for consideration in the first appeal that the contesting defendants were not bound by the decision of the Revenue Court in the First Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 and that it was not established that the defendants were holding the land on behalf of Devi Singh. This finding of the District Judge, Pratapgarh on point No. 2 framed by him itself goes to show that 1)aulat Singh and other defendants had committed independent trespass over the disputed land and both the courts below disbelieved the version of the plaintiff that they were transferees from Devi Singh. The defendants Nos. 1, 5, 8, 9 and 10 in their written statement denied the plaintiff's assertion that Devi Singh Jagirdar of Lalpura had transferred some portion of the land comprised in Khasra No 174 in favour of defendants Nos. I to 4. We are not concerned in this appeal with defendants Nos. 2 to 4 who have already been given up by the plaintiff. We are only concerned with defendants Nos. 1. 5, 8, 9 and 10 who have contested the suit. So far as defendants Nos. 5. I to 4. We are not concerned in this appeal with defendants Nos. 2 to 4 who have already been given up by the plaintiff. We are only concerned with defendants Nos. 1. 5, 8, 9 and 10 who have contested the suit. So far as defendants Nos. 5. 8, 9 and 10 are concerned, the plaintiffs had alleged that they had trespassed over portion of the disputed land in 1952. 1953, 1955, 1958 and 1959 and in years subsequent to that. For defendants Nos. 8, 9 and 10, it was stated that they had placed "rodies" on the land in dispute. It may also be mentioned that in para I of the additional pleas of his written statement, the defendant No. I Daulat Singh stated that he had obtained a patta from Gram Pa nchayat which is Ex A. 2 on the record This patta was granted on December 19, 1960 and the application for the grant of patta was pending before the Gram Panchayat since February 24, 19.9. It cannot therefore, be said that the defendant No. I had trespassed over the portion of the land more than 12 years before the institution of the suit. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. I had trespassed over a portion of the land on April 15, 1951. The suit had been filed by the plaintiff on March 18, 1963 which, according to the averments in his plaint, was within 12 years. In the second Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 which had been instituted by the plaintiff against defendant No. 1, Sayan Singh and Hari Singh on June 1, 1951, he had alleged that the defendant No. I had trespassed over the land 2 months before the filing of that suit which also comes to April I, 1951. If that date is taken as the date of trespass, then also the present suit was filed within 12 years of the trespass by the defendant No I. The plaintiff's version finds support from Ex. 6 and Ex. 7. Ex. 6 is the certified copy of the reply filed by defendant No. I on June 11, 1951 to the application for temporary injunction which had been made by the plaintiff in his Revenue Suit No. 10 of 1951 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh. In paras Nos. 6 and Ex. 7. Ex. 6 is the certified copy of the reply filed by defendant No. I on June 11, 1951 to the application for temporary injunction which had been made by the plaintiff in his Revenue Suit No. 10 of 1951 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh. In paras Nos. 2 and 5 of the reply filed by the defendant No. 1 on June 11, 1951 to the application for temporary injunction, he admitted that construction of his house was going on. He also tiled an affidavit Ex. 7 on June 26, 1951 and in para 5 of that affidavit also he stated that he was constructing a house on the land. Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 have been proved by the evidence of plaintiff, Deepchand P W. 7 and Mukat Ram P. W. 8. Thus Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 also support the plaintiff's version that the defendant No. 1 had trespassed over the land in April 1951 as alleged by the plaintiff. That was why the plaintiff applied for a temporary injunction in the revenue suit as against defendant No. I Hari Singh and Sallan Singh and a temporary injunction had been issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh on June 5, 1951 as appears from the certified copy of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pratapgarh which had been filed in the case. Even the defendant No I himself in his statement recorded on March 23, 1967 in the trial court stated that he had constructed the house about 13 or 14 years back which came to the year 1953. His witnesses Takhat Singh D. W 3 whose statement was recorded on March 23, 1967 stated that the defendant No. I had constructed the house about 15 years back. It may be that *he defendant No. I has also an ancestral house in Lalpura but the fact lies that he made some constructions in or about the year alleged by the plaintiff and that was a new construction on the disputed land. Thus the averments made by the defendant No. 1 in para I of the additional pleas of the written statement coupled with his own reply and affidavit Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 and his own reply and affidavit Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 and his own statement and that of Takhat Singh D. W. ? Thus the averments made by the defendant No. 1 in para I of the additional pleas of the written statement coupled with his own reply and affidavit Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 and his own reply and affidavit Ex. 6 and Ex. 7 and his own statement and that of Takhat Singh D. W. ? leave no room for doubt that the plaintiff's version is correct that the defendant No. 1 base trespassed over the disputed land some time in April 1951 and not before that. So far as defendants Nos. 5, 8, 9 and 10 are concerned they have not appeared in the witness box to deny the plaintiff's evidence' It will, therefore, be held that these defendants had trespassed over the suit land not beyond 12 years of the present suit but within 12 years. 15. It has already been mentioned that Devi Singh's previous possession by trespass cannot be tacked to the independent trespass committed by the defendants Nos. 5. 8, 9 and 10. Consequently the period of previous possession of Devi Singh cannot be taken advantage of by the respondents. If Devi Singh entered upon the land of the plaintiff and before having acquired title by prescription was sued by Gordhan Singh and Gordhan Singh obtained decree for possession against him, it cannot be said that Devi Singh's possession continued adversely despite the decree and obtaining of symbolical possession by the plaintiff. By filing Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 20 6 and obtaining a decree for possession therein, the plaintiff stopped Devi Singh's possession becoming adverse to him, Devi Singh's possession did not, therefore, leave any cloud on the title of the rightful owner or any secret process at work for the possible benefit in time to come of some casual interpoler or lucky vagarant as stated by Lord Macknaghten in (4) Agency Co's case (1888) 13 AC 793. Consequently Devi Singh's possession was merely that of an intruder ineffectual for the purpose of transferring title or possession in favour of the respondents and specially Daulat Singh deceased defendant No. I (now represented by respondents Nos. 1/(i). (ii), (iii)]. The District judge was, therefore, wrong in holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. 16. Two more things remain for consideration. 1/(i). (ii), (iii)]. The District judge was, therefore, wrong in holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation. 16. Two more things remain for consideration. The first is that the contesting defendants had raised a plea in para No. I of their written statement that the rights of the plaintiff had terminated on account of resumption of his Jagir under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagir Act. 192. With regard to this, it has already been stated that an additional issue No-16 had been framed by the trial court to the effect whether the plaintiff was not entitled to sue after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Act No. 4 of 1952. This additional issue had been decided by the Civil Judge. Pratapgarh on November 18, 1967 against the plaintiff and his suit was dismissed. The plaintiff tiled Civil First Appeal No. 73 of 1967 before the District Judge, Pratapgarh. The District Judge, for reasons mentioned in his order dated January 2 t. 1969, held the decision of the trial cot it on issue No, 6 to be wrong on the ground that "in the plaint or the written statement it was not pleaded that the suit land was or was not 'khudkast' land of the plaintiff. In the rejoinder tiled by the plaintiff to the written statement, he had pleaded that the disputed land was his personal property. There was no issue on that point that the parties did not lead any evidence whether the property was 'khudkast' or not Had such a question been raised, the Civil Judge would have had no alternative 1-ft with him except to make a reference under section 23(2) of the Resumption Act of 195-1 to the Jagir Commissioner for decision. But this did not happen in the suit. It was only on the. completion of the trial that the Civil Judge suo moto framed additional issue No. 16 and decided it on the assumption that the disputed land was not a 'khudkast' land inspite of the fact that the plaintiff claimed to be his personal property. But this did not happen in the suit. It was only on the. completion of the trial that the Civil Judge suo moto framed additional issue No. 16 and decided it on the assumption that the disputed land was not a 'khudkast' land inspite of the fact that the plaintiff claimed to be his personal property. He held that in view of the position explained by the plaintiff in his rejoinder the defendant did not produce any evidence to disprove the plaintiff's version." The District Judge in ultimate conclusion held that in the absence of any decision of the Jagir Commissioner regarding the nature of the suit land, the Civil Judge had no basis to assume that the land was not a 'khud-kast' land. He thus reversed the findings of the Civil Judge on additional issue No. 16 and also the dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff based on the findings of the Civil Judge on issue No. 16. After accepting the appeal filed by the plaintiff and setting aside the decree dated November 18, 1967 of the Civil Judge, Pratapgarh, the District Judge remanded the case back to the Civil Judge with the direction that he shall hear arguments of tho parties and their counsels on all the 15 issues (except issue No. 9 already decided on March 23, 196-) and then shall decide the suit afresh on the basis of the findings on those issues. It is clear from this remand order of the District Judge, Pratapgarh that he reversed the finding of the Civil Judge on additional issue No. 16 and required the Civil Judge to decide only the remaining 15 issues excluding issue No.9 which had already been decided on March 23, 1955. 17. Question arises whether the contesting defendants can question the correctness of the findings of the District Judge, Pratapharh on additional issue No. 16 howsoever wrong and erroneous it may be. Section 105 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I) where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, be shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. Section 105 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I) where any party aggrieved by an order of remand from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, be shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness. The order of remand passed by the District Judge Pratapgarh on January 23, 1969 in Civil First Appeal No. 73 of 1967 was an order of remand under Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to Order 43 Rule 1(u), which was previously Order 41 Rule 3 (I) (r), an appeal lay from an order of remand under rule 23 of Order 41 remanding a case where an appeal would lie from the decree of the appellate court. A second appeal obviously would have laid from the decree of the District Judge, Pratapgarh and, therefore, the order of remand passed by him was appealable under the aforesaid provision. It is well settled that in respect of appealable orders of remand under 41 Rule 23 and order 43 Rule I (u) of the Code of Civil Procedure, sub-section (2) of section 105 of the Code makes it clear that the policy of the legislature is to treat an order of remand as a special case and to give a finality to it implying thereby that where an appealable order of remand has not been appealed against, the propriety or correctness thereof or any of the individual findings and decisions which are a material part of the basis of that order cannot be challenged in appeal from the final decree or even before the lower court. 18. On this point, reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee and others reported in A.I.R. 1970 S. C. 997 . Facts of that case were that Nain Singh was Jagirdar of the suit property. One Bhagirath was his tenant. He left two daughters who were living at the time o' his death. After Bhagirath's death, defendants Nos. I to 5, who were his distant relations, took possession of the suit property and got the revenue record changed in their names. Facts of that case were that Nain Singh was Jagirdar of the suit property. One Bhagirath was his tenant. He left two daughters who were living at the time o' his death. After Bhagirath's death, defendants Nos. I to 5, who were his distant relations, took possession of the suit property and got the revenue record changed in their names. Thereupon Nain Singh filed a suit seeking a declaration that he was the owner of the properties and for quashing the order of the Tehsildar transferring the khan in the name of defendants Nos 1 to 5 and for position The t I court d stnissed the suit upholding the contention of the defendants of -wo issue firstly that the civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit trod secondly, that in view of the abolition of the Jagirs and the vesting of the suit property in the State, Nain Singh Jagirdar could not claim any to ief. The First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial court on these issues. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It further be d that though in view of the abolition of the Jagirs, the suit properties had vested in the State, it was for the State to get itself impleaded if it was interested in the legislation and as the State had not chosen to get it impleaded, it was open to the plaintiff to press the suit. In view of these conclusions, the First Appellate Court set aside the decree of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's suit and remanded the suit to the trial court for deciding the other issues left undecided. That is exactly what has happened in this case before me and the facts of the present case and the case before the Supreme Court are almost identical, After the remand, the trial court negatived every contention taken by the defendants and decreed the suit of the plaintiff and the first appellate court confirmed the decree. In second appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that in view of the abolition of the Jagirs under the Jagir Abolition Act, the plaintiff had lost his title to the suit property and therefore, he could not get decree for possession of the suit properties. In second appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that in view of the abolition of the Jagirs under the Jagir Abolition Act, the plaintiff had lost his title to the suit property and therefore, he could not get decree for possession of the suit properties. The High Court rejected the contention of the plaintiff that the issue on this matter stood concluded by the decision of the First Appellate Court and made before the remand because no appeal had been filed against the remand order. The trial Court opined, that the court had inherent power to consider the correctness of that order. The Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and dismissed the Jagirdar's suit. His Lordship Hedge J , speaking for the Supreme Court. held that the trial court had erred in holding that the correctness of the remand order was open to review by it. it held i hit the remand order was made under Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of (evil Procedure. that order was appealable under Order 43 of the Code, but, it was not appealed against. Consequently, its correctness was no more open to examination in view of section 1(15 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. His Lordship further observed that the High Court misconceived the scope of its inherent powers because under those powers a Court has no power to do with which it is prohibited by the court to do. In other words, the Court cannot make u a of section 151 of the Code where a party who had a remedy by an appeal under Order 43 of the Code neglected to avail himself of the same. Moreover powers under section 151 of the Code could not be exercised as an appellate power. Consequently, their Lordships held that the High Court was not right in holding that in view of the abolition of the Jagirs the plaintiff had lost all rights in the suit property. The decision in Nain Singh's case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 19. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Goyal v. Smkhnanddi Dayal reported in A.I.R. 1972 S. C. 1612 . The decision in Nain Singh's case squarely applies to the facts of the present case. 19. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Goyal v. Smkhnanddi Dayal reported in A.I.R. 1972 S. C. 1612 . In Sitaram's case the Munsif had dismissed the application which had been filed by the appellant for execution of a decree as barred by limitation. In appeal the District Judg' after specifically recording the date from which period ,f limitation is to be computed remanded the proceedings to the trial court for investigation into the truth of the compromise as well as the payments claimed to have been made by the appellant. After remind, the Munsif held that the last payment was made on June 16, 1960 and, therefore, in view of the direction contained in the remand order, the application filed by the appellant was within limitation. The respondent filed an appeal before the District Judge and a further appeal before the High Court. It was held that when the D strict Judge disagreed with the trial court on the question of limitation and remanded the proceedings, an appeal lay against the order of remand under Order 43 Rule I Clause (u) C. P. C. from the remand order of the appellate court. The respondent should have filed an appeal against the remand order but he did not file any appeal. His Lordship Vaidyalingam J.. stated that the consequence of an omission to file an appeal against the order of remand is contained in section 105 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the respondents were precluded from disputing the correctness of the remand order of the District Court. In view of these two decisions of the Supreme Court and also the express language of section 105 (2) C. P. C.. the respondents are precluded from disputing the findings given by the District Judge Pratapgarh in Civil First lppeal No. 73 of 1967 on January 23, 1969 on issue No 16. Same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bool Chand v. Ayodhya Lal reported in A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 36 . 20. the respondents are precluded from disputing the findings given by the District Judge Pratapgarh in Civil First lppeal No. 73 of 1967 on January 23, 1969 on issue No 16. Same view has been taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Bool Chand v. Ayodhya Lal reported in A.I.R. 1987 Rajasthan 36 . 20. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya Dhyan v. Smt. Deo Rajin Devi reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 941 is concerned, it is clear from para 16 of the reported judgment that in that case appeal did not lie from the order of remand because the order was an inter-locutory order which had not been appealed for the reason that no appeal lay or even though in appeal lay and appeal was not taken, it could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order. The reason was that even under section 105 (2) the correctness of an order of remand can be challenged in appeal against final decision provided the order of remand was not appealable. Moreover when section 105 (2) of the Code did not apply to the Privy Council, it could have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court for the reason that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or to the Supreme Court against an order of remand. The same was the position in the case of Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, reported in A.I.R. 1981 S. C. 707 . In that case also, it was observed in para 5 of the reported judgment that it was true that the plaintiff did not come in appeal before the Supreme Court against the first judgment of the High Court obviously because the order passed by the High Court was not a final order but was in the nature of an inter-locutory order as the case had been remanded to the Judicial Commissioner and if the said Court had affirmed the finding of the trial court, no question of filing a further appeal to the High Court could have arisen Their Lordships followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Satya Dhvan Goshal v. Stilt. Deo Rajin Devi, (A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 941) (supra). Deo Rajin Devi, (A.I.R. 1961 S. C. 941) (supra). Thus both these decisions were concerned with inter-locutory orders where an appeal did not lay against the remand order and also the remand orders were made by the High Court and not by First appellate court. In this view of the matter, the decision reported in AIR 1970 S. C. 997 and AIR 1972 S. C. 1612 apply to the present case and the respondents are precluded from disputing the correctness of the findings of the District Judge, Pratapgarh dated January 23, 1969 in Civil First Appeal No. 73 of 1967 on issue No. In when they did not file any appeal against this remand order, they cannot now question the findings of the District Judge, Pratapgarh on issue No. 16 in this second appeal. 21. There remains, one more point to be dealt with. This point is that Gordhan Singh plaintiff had instituted revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 against defendants Nos.1 and 2 and father of defendants Nos 3 and 4 in this suit So far as defendants Nos z and 4 are concerned, as already stated, the plaintiff had already removed them from the array of defendants even in the trial court.. There remains, therefore, only Daulat Singh defendant No.1 who was party in Revenue Suit No. 3ti of 1941 (sic 1951) instituted by Gordhan Singh against him in the Revenue Court on June 1, 1951 by Ex. 3. That revenue Suit No. 10 of I9I was stayed under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure having instituted a previous Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 against Devi Singh and he was alleging that Devi Singh had transferred the portion of the land out of Khasra No. 174 to Daula Singh defendant No. 1. 3. That revenue Suit No. 10 of I9I was stayed under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure having instituted a previous Revenue Suit No. 100 of Samvat 2006 against Devi Singh and he was alleging that Devi Singh had transferred the portion of the land out of Khasra No. 174 to Daula Singh defendant No. 1. When Gordhan Singh filed the present ( evil Suit No. 58 of 9r3 impleading Daulat Singh as defendant No. 1, Daulat Singh ,r any of the contesting defendants did not raise any plea what sover in their written statement that this Civil Suit No. 58 of 1963 should be stayed under section (N) of the Code of Civil Procedure because of the peadency of the Revenue Suit No. 30 of 1951 instituted on June I, 1951 against Daulat Singh It was for Daulat Singh to have made an application before the trial court under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to stay Civil Suit No. 58 of 1963 till the Revenue Suit No. ;0 of 1951 was decided by the Revenue Court. No such application was made and no such plea was taken by him in the written statement. No issue on the point was framed that Civil Suit No. 58 of 1963 was barred on account of the pendency of an earlier suit and that it should be stayed. Even no such objection was taken before the first appellate court. In such circumstances, the decision in Munnilal v. Sarvajeet reported in A.I.R. 1984 Rajasthan 22= 1983 RLR 408 , will apply. In that case it was held that section IC of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to trial of suit and is not attracted in proceedings in appeal. As the trial of the subsequent instituted suit is over and the objection under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been waived at the trial of the suit, the same cannot be entertained either by the first appellate court and much less by the second appellate court. In view of the above finding on all the relevant points, this second appeal filed by Gordhan Singh deserves to be allowed. 22. I, therefore, allow this second appeal set aside the decree of the District Judge, Pratapgarh dated July 28, 1975 and decree the plaintiff's suit against respondents Nos. I (i) to (iii). In view of the above finding on all the relevant points, this second appeal filed by Gordhan Singh deserves to be allowed. 22. I, therefore, allow this second appeal set aside the decree of the District Judge, Pratapgarh dated July 28, 1975 and decree the plaintiff's suit against respondents Nos. I (i) to (iii). 5, 8 and 9 to 14 for possession of those parts of the land comprised in Khasra No. 174 corresponding to old Khasra No. 74 over which these respondents have trespassed and have constructed pucca and kucha houses or collected "rodics" and also pass a decree for mandatory it junction for demolition of the buildings or houses constructed by them on the II nd comprised in the said khasra number. The appellant will get costs throughout from these defendants-respondents. 23. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents prays for leave to appeal. Leave is granted.Appeal allowed with costs leave to appeal granted. *******