Judgment Satyeshwar Roy J. Defendant No 2 is the appellant. A suit was filed by respondent No. 1 for the eviction of the appellant and respondent Nos. 2 to 7 from a piece of land. The land was leased out to Latifur Rahman by a registered lease dated 16-1-1958 for a period of ten years. This was mar ked Ext. 4. During that period Latifur Rahman-sub-let the land to the appellant. After the expiry of ten years the appellant continued to possess the land. The rent was paid and it was accepted by respondent No. 1 On 30-11-1972 a notice to quit was given by respondent No. to the appellant as also to respondent nos. 2 to 7 This was marked Ext. 7. 2. As the appellant and Latifur Rahman did not vacate the premises, a suit was filed. The suit was not contested by Latifur Rahman.A written statement was filed by the appellant, lessee of Latifur Rahman i.e. sub- lessee of 1 respondent No. l. Inter alia it was stated in the written staement that it was holding over the lease hold property after the expiry of the leaase by paying rent. No notice terminating tenancy was received by it. The validity of notice was also challenged. 3. The trial court held that the lease was not extended for a fixed period of five years in absence of any written instrument. It further held that the notice Ext. 7 was not valid so far as service of notice on Latifur Rahman was concerned. It further held that no notice was required to be served on the appellant. In view of its finding. the trail court dismissed the suit. 4. The lower appellate Court, however, held that in terms of Ex'. 4 the period of lease was extended for five years and on the expiry of that period responded No- I was entitled to file a suit for eviction without serving any notice terminating the tenancy in terms of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, (Shortly the Act). 5. On 2-11-1983 while admitting the appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated:- (i) Can there be extension of a lease for the stipulated period, after the expiry of the original lease, under a registered document, without any document executed for the said purpose as found by the court of appeal below? 5. On 2-11-1983 while admitting the appeal, the following substantial questions of law were formulated:- (i) Can there be extension of a lease for the stipulated period, after the expiry of the original lease, under a registered document, without any document executed for the said purpose as found by the court of appeal below? (ii) Whether a tenant continuing to live upon a land leased under a registered document even after the expiry of the period of tenancy, continues to be a statutory tenant or a new tenancy is created if the rent is paid and accepted by the landlord after the expiry of the original tenancy?" After hearing learned counsel for parties, the questions of law were re- formulated as under :- (a) In absence of any registered instrument executed by both the parties i.e. the lessor and the lessee after the period stipulated in Ext. 4 i.e. the period of ten years, it can be said that the lease was extended automatically for a period of five years in terms of Ext. 4 or whether the lessee was holding the suit property as tenancy from month to month? (b) If the first part of question.(a) is held in negative and second part in the affirmative, as a consequence of which it must be held that the lease was required to be determined, whether the notice as contained in Ext. 7 validly terminated the lease of the lessee? 6. Admittedly the lessee came in possession of the property under Ext. 4, the deed of lease dated 16-1-1958. The lease was for a period of ten years with a light of renewal for a further period of five years. Admittedly after the expiry of ten years, no instrument was executed by the parties and the lessee continued to remain in possession of the suit property. The lessor accepted the rent and allowed the lessee to continue. Learned• counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that in absence of a registered instrument for the period beyond ten years, the lessee was holding the property as a month to month tenant, According to respondent No. I, in view of the stipulation in Ext. 4, it was not necessary for the parties to execute a fresh deed of lease for a further period of five years and on the expiry of five years, respondent No. 1 was entitled to file the suit. 4, it was not necessary for the parties to execute a fresh deed of lease for a further period of five years and on the expiry of five years, respondent No. 1 was entitled to file the suit. 7. Section 107 of the Act, is how leases are made. A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by it registered instrument. The lease according to respondent No. 1 was for a further period of five years. In view of paragraph I of section 107 of the Act, since the lease was for a period exceeding one year, it could have been done only by a registered instrument executed by both the lessor and the lessee. In absence of registered instrument, the lease shall be deemed to be "lease from month to month." It was urged on behalf of the respondent that there is no precedent in support of this proposition. The language of section 107 of the Act, is so clear that ho precedent is necessary. Therefore, it must be held that as the lease for more then one year could be created only by register-ed instrument, the lessee, sub-lessee in this case continued to remain in possession of the property on payment of rent as a tenant month to month. The finding of the court below that the lessee was holding the property for a fixed period of five years cannot be sustained. 8. Submissions were also made with reference to section 116 of the Act, and it was contended on behalf of respondent No.1 that it was not a case of holding over but continuation of the old tenancy for a period of five years. In view of the finding above, the second part of the submission is devoid of merit. 9. So far as the first part of the submission is concerned, section 116 of the Act, provides that if lessee or under lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts. 9. So far as the first part of the submission is concerned, section 116 of the Act, provides that if lessee or under lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts. rent from the lessee or under-lessee, Or otherwise assents to his continuing- in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month 10 month according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106 of the Act. With reference to the words occuring in section 116 of the Act, "in absence of an agreement to the contrary", it was contended that the lease was for a period of five years. If that is accepted, then that will be doing violance to section 107 of the Act. In the present case, the tenancy was automatically determined on the expiry of ten years which was stipulated in Ext.4. Thereafter the lessee continued to hold the property and the lessor accepted the rent. The lease, therefore, was renewed from month to month because It was not the case of respondent No, 1 that it was for agricultural purposes. It must, therefore be held that in absence of a registered instrument covering the period after the expiry of the lease covered under Ext. 4, the lessee continued to possess the property 'as a tenant month to month. This answers question No, 1. 10. In view of the above finding, the lease could have been terminated by respondent No.1 only by giving notice. The notice was given as evidenced by Ext 7, The court below has held that the notice was not valid so far as Latifur Rahman was concerned and it was not necessary to give any notice to the appellant, lessee of Latifur Rahman. 11. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that by Ext. 7 the lessee was asked to quit the lease hold premises on the expiry of 15th June, 1973 and the notice, therefore, was not in accordance with section 106 of the Act, as the tenancy was not terminated on the last date of the expiry of the month of tenancy. 12, Admittedly, Ext. 4 was executed on 16-1-1958 and on and from that day the lease came into existence. 12, Admittedly, Ext. 4 was executed on 16-1-1958 and on and from that day the lease came into existence. For computing the period of ten years, 16-1-1958 shall have to be excluded. The tenancy, therefore, was required to be terminated on the expiry of a month. 13. Ext.7 was dated 30-11-1972. It was given on behalf respondent No. 1 to Latifur Rahman, the appellant and respondent No.3, who was running petrol pump on the lease hold property. In paragraph 4- of Ext.7 it was stated that the lessee was to deliver the possession of the lease hold land by 16.1.1973. In paragraph 5 of Ext. 7 the appellant and respondent No. 3 were required to remove the buildings, plants esc. by 16-1-1973. In the last but one and the last paragraph of Ext. 7 it was stated that the lessee was to surrender the properties of the lease hold land on the expiry of 15-1 -1973. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant Submitted that from reading of the notice, it was clear that respondent no. I required the lessee and sublessee to quit and vacate the premises on the expiry of 15-1-1973 and that was before the expiry of month of the tenancy. According to him, notice, therefore, was bad. Learned counsel for respondent No. I submitted that reading the notice as a whole; the intention of respondent No.1 was to determine the tenancy of the lessee by 16-1-1973 and, therefore, the notice was valid. The observation of the Privy Council made in the case of Harihar Banerji Vs. Ramshashi Roy1 with reference to section 106 of the Act, was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mangilal Vs. Sugan Chand2. It was observed by the Privy Council that "notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them ma y still be good and effective •in law; that the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and Circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances; and, further, that they are to be construed, not with a desire to find-faults in them which would render them defective, but to be construed ut resmagis valeat quam pereat." 15. I have noticed that at most of the places in Ext. 7, the date by which the lessee was required to quit and vacate the lease hold premises was 16-1-1973 but at the last two paragraphs the date stated was 15-1-1973. The lessee knew about the terms of the lease and he was, therefore, conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case. As observed by the Privy Council, the notice is to be construed not with a desire to find faults in it which will render it defective, but to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the tenancy of the lessee was validly terminated. This answers the second question. 16. In view of the finding above, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.