Chhotelal Bansilal Awasthi v. State of Maharashtra & others
1987-09-25
H.W.DHABE
body1987
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - DHABE H.W., J.:---This is a writ petition arising out of the proceeding under the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (for short, "the Restoration Act"). 2. The respondent No. 3 is the heir of the deceased Tukaram. Tukaram was a tribal and had executed a sale-deed on 18-6-1957 in favour of the father of the respondent No. 4 viz. Vithal Nagoji Thakare, who was a non-tribal. It is the case of the petitioner that he was inducted as a tenant by the said Vithal upon the suit field and, therefore, was in possession of the same as his tenant. After the Restoration Act came into force the original respondent No. 3 Tukaram filed an application before the Deputy Collector and Special Land Acquisition Officer, Yavatmal, under section 3 of the said Act claiming restoration of possession of the suit field form the petitioner as well as the respondent No. 4. The original respondent No. 3 Tukaram claimed that he was bond by caste and was thus a tribal within the meaning of the said expression given in section 2(1)(j) of the Restoration Act. He, therefore, claimed that he was entitled to restoration of possession of the suit field. After notice, the Respondent No. 4 submitted that the petitioner was in illegal possession of the suit field and he did not have any objection for restoration the suit field to the respondent No. 3. The petitioner, thus alone contested the proceedings. He denied that the original respondent No. 3 was Gond by caste. 3. The original respondent No. 3 led evidence before the trial Court in support of his case. He also filed certificates from the Sarpanch and the Talathi of the village showing that he was Gond by caste and was, therefore, a tribal. The petitioner, however, did not lead any evidence in that regard. Since the transaction of the sale of the suit field was during the period specified in the definition of the expression 'transfer' given in section 2(1)(i) of the Restoration Act, the learned trial Court held that the original respondent No. 3 was entitled to restoration of the suit field to him . He then determined the purchase price of the suit field in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Restoration Act. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, "the MRT").
He then determined the purchase price of the suit field in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Restoration Act. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, "the MRT"). The learned MRT, However, dismissed the appeal. He has, therefore, preferred the Instant writ petition in this Court. 4. The contention raised in this writ petition about the constitutional validity of the Restoration Act, stands concluded by the decision of this court as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Lingappa v. Kalu Gonya)1, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 389. The said question is thus no more res integra in this petition. On merits, it is urged that on the date of the transaction which had taken place on 18-6-1957, the original respondent No. 3 although was Gond by caste, was living in Yavatmal District and was , therefore, not a Scheduled Tribe as per the Schedule relating to the State of Maharashtra under the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950, which was applicable at that time His submission thus is that the original respondent No. 3 was not a tribal transferor within the meaning of the Restoration Act since he was not a Scheduled tribe on the date of the transfer. 5. In appreciating the above submission made on behalf of the petitioner, it may be seen that the protection and/or the benefit granted by the Restoration Act to the tribal transferor is regulated by said Act. In other words, for the purposes of the said Act the persons who are considered as tribals are defined in the said Act. Section 2(1)(j) of the said Act which defines a "tribal" shows that according to it, a "tribal" means a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of the Explanation to section 36 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (for short, "the Code") and includes his successor-in-interest also. It is thus clear that for the purposes of the Restoration Act, the definition of the expression "Scheduled Tribe" given in the Explanation to section 36 of the code has to be looked into. 6.
It is thus clear that for the purposes of the Restoration Act, the definition of the expression "Scheduled Tribe" given in the Explanation to section 36 of the code has to be looked into. 6. Turning now to the Explanation to section 36 of the Code, it may first be seen that the said Explanation stands amended by section 2(3) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act, 1974 (for short, "the Maharashtra Act No. XXXV of 1974) which came into force from 6-7-1974 as per its section 1(2), although the assent of the Governor to the said Act was received on 31-8-1974 and it was thereafter first published in the Government Gazette on 7-9-1984. It may be seen that the Restoration Act has received the assent of the President on 28-5-1975. It has actually come into force on 1-11-1975 as per the Notification of the State Government issued under section 1(3) of the said Act. The Restoration Act is thus subsequent to the Maharashtra Act No. XXXV of 1974. It is , therefore, the amended definition of the expression " Scheduled Tribe" given in the Explanation to section 36 of the Code which would stand incorporated in section 2(1)(j) of the Restoration Act and would be applicable in determining the question who the "tribal" is under the said Act. 7. The Explanation to section 36 of Code is reproduced below for ready reference: "Explanation.—For the purposes of this section "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of, or groups within such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State of Maharashtra under Article 342 of the Constitution of India and persons, who belong to the tribes or tribal communities or part of, or groups within tribes or tribal communities specified in Part VIIA of the Schedule to the Order made under the said Article 342, but who are not resident in the localities specified in that order who nevertheless need the protection of this section and section 36-A (and it is hereby declared that they do need such protection) shall, for the purposes of those sections be treated in the same manner as member of the Scheduled Tribes". 8.
8. On perusal of the above explanation it is clear that the area restrictions contained in Part VIIA of the Schedule to the Order issued under Article 342 of the Constitution in relation to the State of Maharashtra are removed while defining a "Scheduled Tribe" in the said Explanation. It may be pertinent to see that thereafter by Act No. 108 of 1976, i.e. the Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976, the area restrictions in the Schedule Tribes Order, 1950 are removed by the Parliament by law. It has to be seen in this regard that the question of removal of area restrictions and recognition of a Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe in the non-specified areas under the Orders issued under Article 342 of the Constitution was long over-due as is clear from the legislative history of the Schedule Castes and the Schedule Tribes Order (Amendment) Act, 1976 (i.e. Act No. 108 of 1976, by which the Parliament itself thereafter removed the area restrictions in giving in the Schedules to the said Act the lists of the Schedule Castes and the Schedule Tribes. 9. Be that as it may, so far as the Restoration Act is concerned the area restrictions stand removed in view of the definition of the expression "Schedule Tribe" given in the Explanation to section 36 of the Code and, therefore, for the purposes of the said Act it would mean that tribal in non-specified area is also entitled to the benefits granted to a tribal under the said Act. It is also pertinent to see in this regard that sections 36 and 36-A of the Code and the provisions of the Restoration Act enact a common scheme and/or are supplemental to each other in granting benefits to the Tribals and hence they need to be understood in the same manner for the purposes of both these enactments. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the original respondent No. 3 is not a "tribal" within the meaning of the Restoration Act because he resided in a non-specified area cannot thus be accepted. 10. It is, however, urged that the provisions of the Restoration Act cannot be given retrospective effect so as to affect the transactions which had taken place prior to the commencement of the said Act.
10. It is, however, urged that the provisions of the Restoration Act cannot be given retrospective effect so as to affect the transactions which had taken place prior to the commencement of the said Act. What is urged is that if the tribal transferor was not a tribal, i.e. a Schedule Tribe as per the law existing on the date of the transaction i.e. under the Schedule Tribes Order, 1950 his transaction is not within the mischief of the Restoration Act. In my view, the above submission made on behalf of the petitioner is fallacious. There is no question of giving any retrospective effect to the provisions of the Restoration Act. What the said Act does not is to grant certain benefits to the persons whom the said Act treats as tribals. Therefore, the question which is to be determined under the said Act is whether a person defined as a tribal in the said Act has made a transfer in the past during the period specified in the definition of the expression 'transfer' given in section 2(1)(i) of the said Act. If he has, then he is entitled to restoration of his land under section 3 of the said Act. 11. It may be seen that the Restoration Act has provided its own dictionary for interpretation of the words used in the said Act and has chosen its own class of persons upon whom to confer the benefits thereunder. The question therefore whether a person who has made the transfer in the past during the specified period under the Restoration Act is a tribal or not has to be decided on the basis of the definition of the said expression given in the said Act and not on the basis whether he was a Schedule Tribe or not under the Schedule Tribes Order, 1950 as it was then applicable because the Restoration Act has conferred benefits upon him by providing for a special or an artificial definition of the word "Tribal". Moreover, although the transfer made during the specified period is reopened, the restoration of the land to the tribal under the Restoration Act is prospective as it is operative from the date the land is restored for a value to the tribal as per the order passed in that regard by the Competent Authority under the Restoration Act.
Moreover, although the transfer made during the specified period is reopened, the restoration of the land to the tribal under the Restoration Act is prospective as it is operative from the date the land is restored for a value to the tribal as per the order passed in that regard by the Competent Authority under the Restoration Act. The Restoration Act cannot, therefore, be said to be retrospective in operation. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner thus deserves to be rejected. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has then urged that by an application for amendment made which is obviously made a few days back after the instant writ petition was listed for hearing, he has raised the contention that the original tribal transferor has not given an undertaking for personal cultivation in the prescribed form, which is mandatory under the Restoration Act. It is true that giving of an undertaking for personal cultivation is mandatory under the Restoration Act. However, no such contention is raised by the petitioner in either of the courts below. The said amendment is clearly an afterthought and is clearly made without verifying the records of the trial Court, because, the record which is available in this Court is the record of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the amendment application is signed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner giving a note that the facts are taken from the record. In fact if such a grave lacuna was there in the proceedings of the learned trial Court, the ground would have been raised at least before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. This writ petition is filed in the year 1977 and the amendment is sought to be made after a period of 10 years. It is thus clear that the amendment is not only highly belated but is not bona fide also. I, therefore, reject the application for amendment made by the petitioner as late as on 24-9-1987. Needless to state that the learned trial Court must have followed the mandatory procedure under the Restoration Act. At any rate, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this contention for the first time at this stage in the writ petition. 13.
I, therefore, reject the application for amendment made by the petitioner as late as on 24-9-1987. Needless to state that the learned trial Court must have followed the mandatory procedure under the Restoration Act. At any rate, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise this contention for the first time at this stage in the writ petition. 13. The next contention urged on merits is that separate notice is required to be given for determining improvements after directing restoration of possession of the suit field to the tribal transferor as per the provisions of Rule 5 read with Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Restoration Act. The submission is that since the mandatory procedure is not followed the orders of the courts below are liable to be set aside. It may again be seen that no such objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner in the appeal preferred by him. On the contrary a perusal of the order of the learned trial Court would show that he has claimed development charges on account of the improvements alleged to be made by him and the said claim is considered by the learned trial Court in para 6 of his order. If the petitioner has already made a claim about improvements in the land the above objection is hypertechnical and cannot be given effect to. The above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner thus deserves to be rejected. It may also be seen that the petitioner himself has no legal interest in the land, because the courts below have rejected his case that he was a tenant of the suit field. If that is so the petitioner is not entitled to raise any objection against the transfer of the suit field to the tribal transferor which needs to be restored to him in view of the fact that the respondent No. 4 who is a non-tribal transferee has no objection to the restoration of the same to the tribal transferor. For all these reasons the instant writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 14. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----