S. C. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFF is the petitioner in this civil revision against an appellate order refusing the prayer for temporary injunction. ( 2 ) BAI Bewa filed the suit for avoiding three sale-deeds of the years 1957 and 1960 claiming that the documents are invalid as she is a paradanashin and illiterate lady. The suit was decreed by the trial Court as well as in appeal. In the second appeal, however, the decree has been vacated and the suit has been remitted back for fresh hearing which has been posted to 23-11-1987 for hearing. Bai Bewa having died the petitioner has been substituted in her place. ( 3 ) THE disputed lands originally belonged to Bai Bewa which have been transferred to the defendant. The disputed lands are claimed to be in actual possession of some persons claiming to be tenants who have filed applications under S. 36a of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, against Bai Bewa for declaration of their occupancy right which are pending in view of the pendency of the suit involving title to the disputed lands. In the said proceeding opposite party No. 1 has entered appearance. In the proceedings under the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972, the name of the opposite party No. 1 has been recorded. In an earlier proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. between the applicants under S. 36a of the O. L. R. Act and the defendant possession of those persons has been declared restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of those persons until they are evicted in due process of law. The said order was challenged unsuccessfully up to the stage of writ application where it has been held that the consolidation proceeding is the appropriate proceeding where the question of possession can be properly decided. During pendency of the second appeal an application was filed by the petitioner for prohibitory injunction against the defendant-opposite party No. 1. The Hon'ble Vacation Judge by order dt. 17-6-1987 granted interim injunction against the defendant and adjourned the matter for giving opportunity to the defendant to file objection. At that stage while the interim injunction matter had not been disposed of, the second appeal itself was disposed of. At the instance of the defendant, a proceeding under S. 144, Cr. The Hon'ble Vacation Judge by order dt. 17-6-1987 granted interim injunction against the defendant and adjourned the matter for giving opportunity to the defendant to file objection. At that stage while the interim injunction matter had not been disposed of, the second appeal itself was disposed of. At the instance of the defendant, a proceeding under S. 144, Cr. P. C. was filed against the applicants under S. 36a of the O. L. R. Act. However, the proceeding has now come to an end. ( 4 ) IN the suit after remand, an application was filed by the petitioner for temporary injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession alleging that the defendant was persisting to interfere with his possession. Opposite party No. 1 filed objection. Trial court having rejected the prayer an appeal was filed by the petitioner to be unsuccessful. Present civil revision has been filed against the said appellate order. ( 5 ) THE main question for consideration in this civil revision is whether the petitioner who is not in actual possession of the disputed lands can move for restraining the opposite party No. 1 from interfering with the possession of the alleged tenants of the petitioner. For considering this question it is to be kept in mind that as between the alleged tenants and the opposite party No. 1, the latter has already been restrained by an order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. Even if the orders of the consolidation authorities nullify the order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. of which I do not express any opinion, the tenants have not alleged interference with possession. ( 6 ) IT is now settled so far as this Court since the decision in ILR (1973) Cuttack 1309 (Orissa State Commercial Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Satyanarayan Singh) that for grant of temporary injunction the party applying is to prove his prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. In case one of the three requirements is not satisfied injunction shall not be granted. Since the petitioner had become successful in the two lower forums earlier before the decree was set aside and the question whether the suit would be barred by any law would depend upon the facts proved, there may not be any difficulty in finding that the petitioner has a prima facie case. Since the petitioner had become successful in the two lower forums earlier before the decree was set aside and the question whether the suit would be barred by any law would depend upon the facts proved, there may not be any difficulty in finding that the petitioner has a prima facie case. It is to be examined if the balance of convenience would be in favour of the petitioner. ( 7 ) BALANCE of convenience is to be considered on the fact of each case for which no hard and fast rule can be laid down. There can be no dispute that in some circumstances the landlord can file an application for injunction against the third parties even though his tenant is in actual possession of the land where his interest is likely to be affected. The interest may be either in respect of collection of rent from the tenant or for sale of land for non-payment of the dues by the tenant. The question of sale of land would be academic in view of the allegation that the tenants in possession is a bhag chasi and such interest of the tenant is not saleable. There is no scope for occupancy tenancy under a private person. Thus, the only inconvenience would be realisation of rent. There is no whisper in the application which has given full details that the tenants are not likely to pay rent to the plaintiff in case the defendant persists in interfering with the possession. Whether in such circumstance the tenant would pay the rent would be a matter for consideration of the authorities under the Orissa Land Reforms Act for which I need not express any opinion. However, merely on such apprehension which has not been specifically stated in the application I cannot draw an inference that balance of convenience would be in favour of the petitioner for restraining the defendant. ( 8 ) ALTHOUGH this finding would have been sufficient for me to dispose of this civil revision let me examine the question of irreparable injury also. The plaintiff in this case in the maximum would be entitled to rent under the Orissa Land Reforms Act. No whisper has been made in the petition that in case the tenants do not pay the rent the suffering of the petitioner would be beyond repair. The plaintiff in this case in the maximum would be entitled to rent under the Orissa Land Reforms Act. No whisper has been made in the petition that in case the tenants do not pay the rent the suffering of the petitioner would be beyond repair. Thus, the loss on account of the wrongful act of the opposite party No. 1 can be compensated. If there would have been allegation that the defendant is taking such steps which would damage the land to such extent that it cannot be repaired the question would have been completely different. In the present facts and circumstances, I am not satisfied that this is a fit case to come to the conclusion that the petitioner would suffer irreparable injury. ( 9 ) IN the result, there is no merit in this civil revision which is accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 10 ) I may, however, observe that the suit which has been directed to be disposed of by Dec. , 1987, has been posted for hearing to today and on the application of the defendant the same has been adjourned to 23-11-1987. I am sure the trial Court shall take all steps for disposal of the suit within the time-limit fixed by this Court. Revision dismissed. .