JUDGMENT B. N. Katju, J. 1. The prayer of the applicant that his arrest may be stayed in crime no. 137 of 1985 under sections 395, 397 and 412 IPC P. S Gajner, District Kanpur Dehat during the pendency of this application is rejected. 2. This is an application under section 482 CrPC praying that the arrest of the applicant Puttan Singh be stayed in connection with case Crime No. 137 of 1985 under sections 395,397 and 412 IPC Police Station Gajner, district Kanpur Dehat. It was further prayed that the arrest of the applicant in the aforementioned case be stayed during the pendency of this application in this Court. It appears that a first information report was lodged by Sheo Nath Singh opposite party no. 2 on 9-7-1985 at 6.10 P. M. at Police Station Gajner, district Kanpur Dehat against the applicant and five others, namely, Chandra Bhan Singh, Smt. Suraj Kali wife of Chandra Bhan Singh, Udai Bhan Singh, Rustam Singh and Bhuwan Singh son of Rustam Singh, A charge-sheet has been filed in Court against Udai Bhan Singh, Rustam Singh and Bhuwan Singh but no charge sheet has been filed against the applicant, Chandra Bhan Singh and Smt. Suraj Kali in court so far. Udai Bhan Singh was granted bail on 12-12-1986 by this court. Chandra Bhan Singh and Smt. Suraj Kali filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 7444 of 1986 in this court under section 482 CrPC praying that their arrest be stayed pending investigation in the aforesaid case and this court by its order dated 22-1-1986 stayed their arrest. 3. Leela Singh and Ram Singh who were subsequently named as being amongst the accused during investigation filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 3009 of 1986 and this court by its order dated 14-5-1986 stayed their arrest during the pendency of the investigation. 4. This application was heard by a learned Single Judge who found it difficult to accept the prayer of the applicant that his arrest be stayed during the pendency of the investigation of the above mentioned case in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the ease of State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna, AIR 1980 SC 326 . As the arrest of the co-accused had been stayed by this Court as mentioned earlier he: referred the question as to whether or not the arrest of the applicant can be stayed during the investigation of the case against him by this court under section 482 CrPC for decision to a larger Bench. That is how this question has come up for decision before us. The applicant is nominated in the first information report lodged by Sheo Nath Singh under sections 395 and 397 IPC which are cognizable offences. The power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence without any interference by this Court in the exercise of its inherent powers has been considered in a number of decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. In the case of Emperor v. Khwaja, Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 it was held : "Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under section 491, Criminal P. C, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the: present, however, the Court's functions being when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. In such a case as the: present, however, the Court's functions being when a charge is preferred before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation." In the case of State of West Bengal v. S. N. Bahak, AIR 1963 SC 447 it was held : "At the time the respondent filled the petition in the High Court only a written report was made to the police (by the Sub-Inspector of Police Enforcement Branch and on the basis of that report a First Information Report was recorded by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station and investigation had started. There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and section 156 with investigation into such offences and under sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under section 439 or under the inherent power of the court under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. " and the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra) was approved in the case of Si. " and the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra) was approved in the case of Si. N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, AIR 1970 SC 786 the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra) was again approved and it was held : "This interpretation, to some extent, supports the view that the scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code is that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is not to be interfered with by the judiciary. Their Lordships of the Privy Conncil were, of course, concerned only with the powers of the High Court under section 561-A, CrPC while we have to interpret section 159 of the Code......... Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant urged that such an interpretation is likely to be very prejudicial particularly to officers of judiciary who have to deal with cases brought up by the police and frequently give decisions which the police dislike. In such cases, the police may engineer a false report of a cognizable offence against the Judicial Officer and may then harass him by carrying on a prolonged investigation of the offence made out by the report. It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers." In the case of Hazari Lal Gupta v. Rameshwar Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 484 it was held : "The inherent power of the High Court under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code has been considered by this Court in R. P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, 1960) 3 SCR 388 = AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak, (1963) 2 SCR 52 = AIR 1968 SC 447. In exercising jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is "reliable or not". Where again, investigation into the circumstance of an alleged cognizable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. "' In the case of Jehan Singh v Delhi Administration, AIR 1974 SC 1146 after referring to the case of State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak (supra) it was held : "Here also, no police challan or charge-sheet against the accused had been laid in court, when the petitions under section 561-A were filed. The impugned proceedings were those which were being conducted in the course of police investigation. Prima facie, therefore, the rule in Basak's case would be attracted. " In the case of Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 it was held : "It surprises us in the extreme that (he High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it could quash a first information report The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the FIR. It ought to be realized that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice, That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." In the case of State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna, AIR 1980 SC 326 it was held : "There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in section 173 (8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate." and the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra) was approved. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, AIR 1985 SC 195 it was held : "The next aspect to be considered is whether it is open to the Court to interfere with the investigation which is still proceeding. It has been conceded before us and rightly in our view, that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code. It has been conceded before us and rightly in our view, that investigation is a matter for the police under the scheme of the Code. Judicial opinion seems to be settled and we have several authorities of this Court where interference by the court into police investigation has not been approved." And the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), and the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of S. N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tewari (supra), and State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna (supra) were approved. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949 after referring to the case of Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra) it was held : "The Privy Council qualified its statement by saying : " No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation. " If anything, therefore, the judgment shows that an investigation can be quashed if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR. It shall also have been noticed, which is sometimes overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to qualify its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases," 5. It is thus settled law that the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence is unfettered and cannot be interfered with by this court in the exercise of its inherent powers under section 482 CrPC. As mentioned earlier the First Information Report lodged by Sheo Nath Singh discloes the commission of a cognizable offence and also the complicity of the applicant in it. As mentioned earlier the First Information Report lodged by Sheo Nath Singh discloes the commission of a cognizable offence and also the complicity of the applicant in it. The police thus has statutory power under section 156 CrPC to investigate the case registered on the basis of the aforesaid first information report without any interference by this Court in the exercise of its inherent Sec. 41 (1) (a) CrPC is as follows : - "41(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person- (a) Who has been concerned in any cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned ; " Section 41 (1) (a) CrPC thus confers power on a police officer regarding the arrest of a person with respect to a cognizable offence. This statutory power is exercised by a police officer during the investigation of a cognizable offence and is a step in investigation as the accused is interrogated after his arrest and at times the interrogation of the accused leads to important discoveries which connect the accused with the crime and are admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The power of the police to arrest a person under Section 41 CrPC cannot thus be interfered with by this Court in the exercise of its inherent powers. This Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to direct a police officer not to arrest the applicant during the pendency of the investigation of the case registered on the basis of the First Information Report lodged by Sheo Nath Singh against the applicant and others which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC. 6. I accordingly reject the prayer of the applicant that his arrest may be stayed in crime No. 137 of 1985 under Sections 395, 397 and 412 IPC Police Station Gajner, district Kanpur Dehat during the pendency of this application. B. L. Yadav, J.-I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by learned brother Hon'ble B. N. Katju, I., for whom I have profound regards, who has considered in detail the point urged. B. L. Yadav, J.-I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by learned brother Hon'ble B. N. Katju, I., for whom I have profound regards, who has considered in detail the point urged. I respectfully agree with the conclusions arrived at but I desire to add a few words in view of the importance this matter has assumed. 7. These are the two applications Hinder Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code (for short the Code), with a prayer that the arrest of the applicants, Puttan Singh in Crime No. 137 of 1985, under Sections 395, 397 and 412, IPC and of Mohammad Mustafa in Crime No. 294 of 1986, under Sections 406, 407, 409, 415 IPC etc. read with section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, may be stayed during the pendency of these applications and the First Information Report and the investigation proceedings may be quashed. 8. The facts of the case, so far as they are material, lie in a very narrow compass and they are these. In Puttan Singh's case the First Information Report was lodged on 9-7-85 at 18.10 hrs. against six persons including the applicant under Sections 395 IPC etc. at P. S. Gajner, District Kanpur Dehat In the other case the First Information Report was lodged under Sections 406, 407 IPC etc. and under Section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act on 5-10-86 in Crime No. 294 of 1986 at P. S Maduadeeh, District Varanasi. The investigation in these cases was still in progress. The applicant Mustafa was, however, not named in the First Information Roport, These applications came up for- admission before learned brother Hon'ble R. K. Shukla, J., who with a view to have a considered opinion about the scope of enquiry by this Court in an application under Section 482 of the Code. When the investigation proceedings were still in progress, keeping in view the observations in State of Bihar v. J. 0. A. C. Saldamma, AIR 1980 SC 326 has referred the matter to a larger Bench. This is how these applications have come up for disposal before us. When the investigation proceedings were still in progress, keeping in view the observations in State of Bihar v. J. 0. A. C. Saldamma, AIR 1980 SC 326 has referred the matter to a larger Bench. This is how these applications have come up for disposal before us. Sri A. Rathore, appeared for Puttan Singh and Sri N. N. Singh for Mohammad Mustafa, The Deputy Government Advocate appeared for the State of U. P. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code was much comprehensive and there was no limitation in exercising it for staying the arrest and quashing the First Information Report or prosecution during investigation proceedings by the Police. As there was a case of abuse of process and a prima facie case has been made out, the interference can be made and the arrest of the applicant can be stayed. Reliance was placed on State of West Bengal v. Sopan Kumar Guha. AIR 1982 SC 949 , State of Karnataka v. L. Munniswami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 and Mohammad Hafiz v. State of U. P., 1977 AWC 398 (DB). Few more cases were also cited but it is not necessary to refer to them. 9. Learned Deputy Government Advocate, on the other hand, urged that under the provisions of Section 482 of tie Code, this Court has no inherent power to interfere with the investigation proceedings or to pass order staying the arrest. The language of Section 482 of the Code was couched in a clear form as to indicate that inherent power of the High Court can be exercised only if it becomes necessary to prevent abuse of process of any court. Unless charge sheet has been submitted before the court, proceedings for investigation need not be interfered with by an order of this Court. Reliance was placed on State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal, AIR 1985 SC 195 , State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldamma, AIR 1980 326, King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1945 PC 18, Anurag Kumar Barnwal v. State of U. P., 1986 AWC 612 (DB), State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447 , Eastern Spinning Mills v. Raja Potdar, AIR 1985 SC 1668 and Smt. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 628 . 10. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the principal question for determination is about the scope of enquiry by this Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 of the: Code, 'Ex' Abundanti Cautela, the statutory provisions of Section 482 are set out below :- "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." The aforesaid provision is, in fact almost verbatim reproduction of Section 561-A of the Code. Before considering the scope of interference by this Court during pendency of investigation, it is better to have in brief, some principles of statutory interpretations. I think the general principle for interpretation of penal statutes is that it has to be strictly construed and in case of certain doubt, it must be interpreted in favour of the accused, but I am of the view that where the words employed by the legislature: to manifest its intention are clear, the language must not be twisted, rather the expressed intention of the legislature has to be accepted. It is better to quote an observation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M. V. Joshi v. M. U. Shimpi, AIR 1961 SC 1494 , at page 1498, para 11 as follows : "When it is stated that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly it only means that the Court must see that the (thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. It has also been held that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. It has also been held that in construing a penal statute it is a cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principles of interpretation, namely that the primary test is the language employed in the Act, and when the words are clear and plain, the Court is bound to accept the expressed intention of the legislature." 11. In M. Satyanarayana v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1986 SC 1162 it was observed that a statute must be construed reasonable and rationally to give effect to the intention of the legislature or the legistator. Sir Rupert Cross on ' Statutory Interpretation ' has quoted with approval on page 18 an observation of Black Stone in his commentary on English Law as follows : Blackstone tells us that : "The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. " 12. Lord Devlin in "Samples of Law Making", page 2, has made the following observations : "The law is what the judges say it is. If the House of Lords (in its jurisdiction of deciding cases and interpreting statutes) were to give an Act of Parliament a meaning which no one thought it could reasonable bear, it is their construction of the words used in preference to the words themselves that would become the law." See LORD Reid in London Transport Executive v. Betts, (1959) AC 213 at page 232 ; R. v. Board of Control Ex-perte Rutty, (1956) 2 QB 109 ; Richardson v. London County Council, (1957) 2 All. ER 330." In American Jurisprudence (Second Edn.) Vol. 13 page 838-839 (Paras 36 and 37) it has been stated, " that the prime object of construction of laws is to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature. The Courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction or interpret that which has no need of interpretation. It is for the courts to ascertain, neither to add nor substract, delete or distort. The Courts themselves have no power to legislate and may not amend an Act directly or indirectly by construction or interpret that which has no need of interpretation. It is for the courts to ascertain, neither to add nor substract, delete or distort. It is n the judicial function to apply statutes on the basis what the legislature has write not what the legislature might have written. " See Barsky v. Board Regen s, 347 US 442. 13. I am, however, equally conscious that the laws are not the just things of the moment but they are certainly enduring phenomena. The judge may come and go but really they function in a continum of time. 14. In fact, Section 482 of the Code is based on a maxim " Quando Lex Aliquid Alicui Concedit Concedere Viditure Id Sine Quo Res Ipsa Esse Non Potest, " which obviously means that when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist and when something required by law to be done appears apparently to be impossible unless something more was also given which has not been expressly mentioned in that event that something else would be supplied by inevitable intendment. This provision is a reminder to the High Court that it has got inherent powers and that it is not just a court of law but in fact a court of justice. No new power, however, have been conferred other than what it actually had either under the Code or under the present Code. It is just with extra precaution that the legislature has enacted Section 482 which is in three clauses. The first clause is that the High Court may make such order as appears necessary to give effect to an order passed under the Code. When an order had been passed under the Code and no procedure has been provided to give its effect between the parties, 'the consequential order can be made by the High Court. The second clause is relevant for the present case. It is to the effect that the High Court can pass an order to prevent the abuse of process of 'any court'. It has to be highlighted that the Parliament has used deliberately the words 'any court' and not 'any authority' or 'law'. The second clause is relevant for the present case. It is to the effect that the High Court can pass an order to prevent the abuse of process of 'any court'. It has to be highlighted that the Parliament has used deliberately the words 'any court' and not 'any authority' or 'law'. It obviously means that the abuse of the process of any Court as created under the Code, only has to be rectified and the High Court has no power to prevent any abuse of the process of the executive or any other authority of the executive including the police and the investigating agency. I am of the view that the intention of the legislature has to be explored as exhibited by the words employed including the words "any Court". To quote an observation in Maxwell on the Interpetation of Statutes on page 28 to the following effect appears to be useful : " The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament ' but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used ' ...... ' it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumption of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law ; See Capper v, Baldwin, (1965) 2 QB 53." 15. In case the -Parliament wanted that the abuse of the process of the executive or its wing, the police or the investigating agency, may also be rectified by passing a suitable order, it could have used the words 'any authority', or the 'law', in express words. The design of the Parliament in using the words 'any Court' signifies that the intention was only to confer powers on the High Courts to rectify the mistakes committed by' any Court ' as created and provided under the Code. The third clause under Section 482 is that the High Court can make such order to secure the; ends of justice. These words are, 'or otherwise to secure the ends of justice'. This clause is not to be read independently or separately from the proceeding clause. This third clause has to be assigned the meaning for similar purpose, when the case is proceeding, or pending before any Court, and not before 'any other authority'. In other words, this last clause has to be interpreted applying the maxim "EJUSDEM GENERIS" (i.e. of the same kind). This third clause has to be assigned the meaning for similar purpose, when the case is proceeding, or pending before any Court, and not before 'any other authority'. In other words, this last clause has to be interpreted applying the maxim "EJUSDEM GENERIS" (i.e. of the same kind). This principle of interpretation is in fact, a rule of language. There is another maxim "NOSCITURA SOCIIS " (i.e. a thing or clause is known by its companions). There is similarly another maxim "EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXCUJSSIO ALTERIUS" which obviously means that the mention of one thing in any clause, or provision of a statute is the exclusion of another. See Allen v. Emmerson, (1944) 1 KB 362. 16. The learned counsel for the applicants' however, suggested that the third clause gives ample power to the High Court to make an order in respect of investigation proceedings also even though the charge sheet might not have been submitted in Court nor any complaint might have been tiled before the Court. But applying the aforesaid principles of interpretation, I am of the view that this clause has to be read with particular reference with the meaning of the preceding second clause. The language of the third clause cannot be stretched so far, as suggested by the learned counsel for the applicants. I am afraid the Court has only power of / interpretation and not of legislation. It is better to have the scheme of the Code to ascertain the power of the police while making tie investigation and the powers of the Court and the demarcation between the two. 17. Chapter XII (Twelve) of the Code deals with the information of police and its power to investigate is relevant. Under this Chapter Section 154 enacts provisions for information in cognizable cases and provides as to how the First Information Report in a cognizable case has to be taken down by officer incharge of a police station. Section 155 provides information as to non cognizable cases and investigation of such cases. Section 156 provides about the police Officers' power to investigate the cognizable cases. Section 177 lays down procedure for investigation. It is for the Officer incharge of a police station to decide on sufficient grounds either to proceed with the; investigation or not. This depends, of course, on the availability of relevant evidence. 18. Section 156 provides about the police Officers' power to investigate the cognizable cases. Section 177 lays down procedure for investigation. It is for the Officer incharge of a police station to decide on sufficient grounds either to proceed with the; investigation or not. This depends, of course, on the availability of relevant evidence. 18. Section 161 and 162 provides for recording of statement of witnesses during investigation. Section 167 deals with the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours. Section 169 is material for the present purpose, which provides that in case the evidence is not sufficient against a particular accused or there are reasonable grounds of: suspension to justify forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the officer incharge of the police station shall release him on his executing a bond with or without sureties. Section 170 read with Section 173 provides about the cases to be sent to the Magistrate by the Officer Incharge of the Police Station when the evidence is sufficient so as to try the accused or commit him for trial. Section 176 of the Code, on the other hand, provides enquiries by Magistrate into the cause of death of a person who died in the custody of police. In this view of the matter the enquiry by a Magistrate into the cause of such death or similar other enquiry conducted by a Magistrate falls within the domain of investigation and that is not treated to be a proceeding before the Court. The Magistrate has however, also power to try and decide the case in respect of which he has got jurisdiction under the Code. Chapter XIII (Thirteen) of the Code provides jurisdiction of criminal courts in enquiry and trial. In this view of the matter it is clear that the investigation proceedings are within the -powers of the police and the jurisdiction of Court does not commence unless the case has been submitted by the police after investigation is completed. 19. As stated above, the Criminal Courts -have been specified in different Sections and unless after completion off the investigation the police is satisfied, that there is evidence against the accused and that the case has been referred to Criminal Court for enquiry and trial, the Criminal Courts gets no jurisdiction in the matter. 19. As stated above, the Criminal Courts -have been specified in different Sections and unless after completion off the investigation the police is satisfied, that there is evidence against the accused and that the case has been referred to Criminal Court for enquiry and trial, the Criminal Courts gets no jurisdiction in the matter. In American Jurisprudence, Second Edition (Para 376, Pages 398-99), there is an observation as follows : "The 'criminal jurisdiction' of (a Court) is that which exists for punishment of crimes. It is power of Court to enquire into facts, apply the law and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceedings. It embraces every kind of judicial action on the subject matter, from finding the indictment, to pronouncing a sentence. " 20. Now adverting to the cases.' relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants, State of West Bengal v. Sapan Kumar Guha (supra), was, in fact, a case in which offence was to be made out in accordance with the ingredients provided under Section 2 (c), 3 and 4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, (Act No. 43 of 1978). In that reference the Supreme Court has held that as the ingredients as specified under Section 3 and 2 (c) of the Act were not made out, hence even the investigating agency shall have no authority to proceed in the matter That case State of West Bengal v. Sapan Kumar Guha (supra), was also relied upon before a Division Bench of this Court in a Writ Petition in Anurag Kumar Barnwal v. State of U. P. (supra), in connection with quashing the investigating proceedings in a writ petition. That Division Bench, of which one of us was a member, distinguished that case and held that it has no application. In the present case the offence was to be made out on the basis of evidence collected at the investigation. Assuming a First Information Report has been lodged by any person for an offence under Sections 395/397 IPC and the names of the accused have not been mentioned and the names are to be ascertained after the evidence is collected during investigation, can it be said that no offence was made out on the basis of the First Information Report ? The case of the State of West; Bengal (supra), has no bearing to the facts of the present case. In Mohd. Hafiz v. State of U. P. (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that the warrant of arrest can be quashed on an application under Section 482 of the Code. That warrant was based on the basis of the alleged judgment and order purported to have teen passed in State v. Hari Mohan and Mohammad Hafiz under Sections 395, 396 and 397 IPC and issued by the High Court stating that the applicant has been convicted and sentencnd to 16 years R. I. but that order of this Court itself was forged and there was no such order. The facts of that case stand entirely on different footings and it is not of any assistance in the instant case. 21. State of Karnataka v. L. Munniswami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 was a case where the committal proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and the reasons recorded by the Sessions Judge in Committal proceedings to that effect were found to be insufficient. The committal proceedings are held before the Court and if there was some abuse of the process of the Court that proceeding was correctly quashed by the High Court and that order was correctly maintained by the Supreme Court. That case has no bearing to the present case. 22. Adverting to the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the State of U. P. in Eastern Spinning Mills v. Raja Potdar (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offence. In all routine cases where information of an offence or offences has been lodged, investigation commenced, search and seizure followed and suspects arrested as a result of unusual application for early bail and interim orders thereon, would have the effect of staying the investigation of offences by the investigating Officer performing a statutory duty under the Code. It was accordingly held that in an application under Section 482 of the Code, no interference during the investigation should be made. It was accordingly held that in an application under Section 482 of the Code, no interference during the investigation should be made. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (supra), in paragraph 11 it was held by the Supreme Court as follows : "All the ingredients of an offence under Section 405 IPC were pleaded and a prima facie case for summoning the accused was made out. In such circumstances the complainant should have been given an opportunity by the High Court to prove her case rather than quashing the complaint. Such an exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is totally unwarranted by law;" 23. State of West Bengal v. Sampat Lal (supra), relied upon on behalf of the STATE of U. P. was a case about (the mysterious death of two boys. The Police investigation was pending and an oral Petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court which directed, in addition to local police, the Dy. Inspector General, Central Bureau of Investigation, 13 Lindsay Street, Calcutta 16, a different investigation agency, to cause an enquiry to be made, and the local police was directed to extend all possible help as required by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The orders of the learned Single Judge were challenged by filing an appeal before a Division Bench which modified the order of the learned Single Judge to some extent and ultimately the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court by an appeal under Art. 134 (a) of the Constitution. Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution was also filed. Both the matters were connected. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court relying upon the observations made in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, (Privy Council) (supra), State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak (supra), and some other cases of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court for appointment of the Special Investigation Officer as there should be no interference during investigation proceedings. It is better to quote the following observations made under para 25, page 204 :- "The investigation in the present case is still pending as we were told at the Bar. It is better to quote the following observations made under para 25, page 204 :- "The investigation in the present case is still pending as we were told at the Bar. It is quite likely that some day, and we hope and trust that there would be no further delay, the Court of competent jurisdiction would be in seisin of the matter and would be called upon to decide whether it was a case of murder or suicide. We have, therefore, thought it proper exercise of discretion not to enter into the facts and express any opinion one way or the other so as to prejudice the trial that might take place. It; is sufficient to indicate that there is residuary jurisdiction left in the Court to give directions to the investigating agency when it is satisfied that the requirements of the law are not being complied with and investigation is not being conducted properly or with due haste and promptitude. The Court has to be alive to the fact that the scheme of the law is that the investigation has been entrusted to the police and it is ordinarily not subject to the normal supervisory of the case as placed before us, to take the view that the materials placed before the Court did not justify an exception to be made to the rule indicated by this Court ami the appointment of a Special Officer was not called for at this stage. " 24. It is also better to quote the material observations of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nasir Ahmad (supra), which have been referred to and relied upon in a number of the Supreme Court cases including the State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak (supra) and State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna (supra), which has been mentioned in the referring order itself. The Privy Council observed as follows : "The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementry, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in as appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus, In such a case as the present however, the Court's functions being when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has some times been thought that section 561-A (now section 482) CrPC has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Count are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of the Act." In West Bengal v. S. N. Basak (supra) after quoting the aforesaid observations of the Privy Council, the Supneme Court held as follows :- " With this interpretation which has (been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. On a finding that the High Court had exceeded jurisdiction in interfering with the investigation, the appeal of the State of West Bengal was allowed. " 25. In Sultan Singh Jain v. State of U. P., AIR 1951 All. 864 a Full Bench of this Court held that if some other remedy was available under the Code the application under Section 561-A (old) would not be maintainable, Similarly in Five Judges Full Bench of the Court in Mahesh v. State of U. P., 1971 Crl LJ 1674 it was held that if some remedy was available under the Code of application under Section 561-A of the Code (old) would not lie. Similarly in other cases of this Court including Bhagwan Das v. State through Badri Prasad, AIR 1953 Alld. 630 (DB) and Rama Shankar v. State of U. P., AIR 1956 Alld. Similarly in other cases of this Court including Bhagwan Das v. State through Badri Prasad, AIR 1953 Alld. 630 (DB) and Rama Shankar v. State of U. P., AIR 1956 Alld. 525 = 1956 CrLJ 1037 it was held that when some other remedy was available under the Code no resort must foe had to section 561-A of the Code (old). 26. It is better in connection with the interpretation of Section 482 of the Code, to refer to a statement contained in " Law In a Changing Society " by W. Friedmann, at page 35 as follows : "In order to form a right judgment when the letter of a statute has restrained and when enlarged by enquity, it is a good way when you persue a statute, to suppose that the law maker is present and when you have asked him a question you want to know, touching the equity ; then you must come there is such an answer as you imagine he would have done, if he had been present...... if the law maker would have followed equity, notwithstanding the words of law .........you may safely do the like. "-See Huidon's Case (1584) 3 Rep. 7b Eysten v. Studd, (1574) 2 PLOW 459. Considering the aforesaid different observations I am of the view that the power under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised with care and circumspection. It has not to be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. But it has to be exercised " Ex debita justice to do real and substantial justice for administration of which courts exist. This inherent power is not to be exercised when there is some other remedy available under the Code. In the instant case the applicants, namely, Puttan Singh, in Criminal Misc. Application No. 13691 of 1986 is named in Crime No. 137 of 1985 under Sections 395, 397 and 412 IPC and the investigation is still in 'progress. The police is collecting evidence against the applicants. At this stage it cannot be said as to what would be the positive nature of evidence available against the applicants. In Crime No. 254 of 1986 under Sections 406, 407, 409, 415, 419 and 420 IPC read with Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, the applicant Mohd. The police is collecting evidence against the applicants. At this stage it cannot be said as to what would be the positive nature of evidence available against the applicants. In Crime No. 254 of 1986 under Sections 406, 407, 409, 415, 419 and 420 IPC read with Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, the applicant Mohd. Mustafa is not named in the FIR and his case is that he is a watchman employed in the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Mughal Sarai District Varanasi. The local police is collecting evidence available against the accused either named or not named. The investigation in the cognizable offence is still in progress. Under Section 41 (1) (a) of the Code, the police has unfettered power to arrest any person against whom either a complaint has been made or some credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned with the offence. It may be just a preliminary stage of investigation and after the arrest the police may interrogate the accused which may lead to discovery of some other reliable evidence or some other clue in the matter. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that unless the charge sheet has been submitted after completion of investigation proceedings, the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised, nor it is the intendment of the legislature itself by using the word ' to prevent the abuse of process of any court' under Section 482 and not ' any authority ' or ' any law '. It has further to be emphasised that the legislature has purposely and very correctly used the word ' any court'. 28. The applicants in both the cases can very well surrender and make an application for bail and avail all the opportunities available to them under the Code either for bail or for acquittal. Thereafter they shall have right to file an appeal or revision as the case may be. Under the Code there is well defined demarcation in the functions of the Executive through the police and the criminal court in the field of detection of crimes. Thereafter they shall have right to file an appeal or revision as the case may be. Under the Code there is well defined demarcation in the functions of the Executive through the police and the criminal court in the field of detection of crimes. Once the FIR has been lodged or the matter has been brought to the notice of the local police or in some other way., the police commences investigation as provided under the code or under some other similar law just to collect evidence with a view to ascertain if the crime has been committed and who are the offenders. In case the police reaches the conclusion that the offence has been committed by the persons either named in the FIR or not, it submits the case in the court of a Magistrate or some other similar authority constituted under a particular statute. The police submits the result of the enquiry to the Magistrate in case there is sufficient evidence. In case he is empowered to decide the case, he proceeds to decide it, otherwise he submits it to the Sessions Judge for taking cognizance of the same, who proceeds to hold the trial. But. before the police submits the case or the charge sheet to the Magistrate, it is in the realm of investigation, or in other words the process of collection of evidence. 29. The matter may be viewed from another angle. The language employed by the legislature to convey its intendment deserves to be highlighted. In the second clause of Section 482 of the Code, the phraseology employed is to prevent the abuse of process of 'any court'. The section does not say to prevent abuse of process of 'any authority' or 'law '. But it is emphatic in using the words 'any court'. To accept the argument of the learned counsel for the applicants would be to substitute the words 'the court' with the words 'authority' or law'. But that would amount to legislation and I am conscious that the Court has only power to interpret the statute and not to legislate. Further, to substitute the words 'any authority' or any law ' would be impermissible on the settled canons of construction rather it; would be putting plain violence to the specific language of Section 482 itself. But that would amount to legislation and I am conscious that the Court has only power to interpret the statute and not to legislate. Further, to substitute the words 'any authority' or any law ' would be impermissible on the settled canons of construction rather it; would be putting plain violence to the specific language of Section 482 itself. The executive or the police authorities are certainly not 'the court 'or' any court' as created under the Code and, therefore, the intention of the legislature was never to mean, that the investigation proceedings conducted by the police authorities, would be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers. 30. In view of the discussions made herein-before, my answer to the questions referred is that during the pendency of investigation proceedings and until the charge sheet has been submitted, this Court has no power under Section 482 of the Code to pass any order having the effect to interfere with the investigation proceedings by making an order to stay the arrest. As this was the only question involved and also referred, the file of the case need not be referred back to the learned Single Judge. As an inescapable corollary, the prayer of the applicants to stay the arrest in both the cases is consequently rejected. As a result thereof, both the applications are dismissed. Applications dismissed.