JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Both these revisions arise out of the one and the same case, and, therefore, were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The two Petitioners have been convicted u/s 7 (l) (a) of the Essential Commodities Act for having contravened Clause 15 of the Orissa Cement Control Order, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Control Order") and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months each and to pay a fine of rupees one thousand each, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month. 2. Petitioner T. Susila Patra who is Petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 183 of 1983 is the wife of T. Shyam Babu Patro who is Petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 190 of 1983, They stood their trial for having contravened the provisions of Clauses 11 (2), 15, 16 and 17 of the Control Order as well as Conditions 2 and 6 of the Licence issued under the said Order, but the prosecution having failed to establish regarding violation of Clauses 11 (2), 16 and 17 they have been acquitted of the said charges by the learned Magistrate. Their conviction in question is, however, for the contravention of Clause 15 of the Control Order and the said conviction has been upheld by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in appeal. 3. Clause 15 of the Control Order casts an obligation on every stockist obtaining cement to display at a conspicuous place in the premises where the cement is stocked, the stock of cement in his possession as well as the price at which the cement is sold by him. For convenience, Clause 15 of the Control Order is quoted hereinbelow in extenso: "15. Display of stock position and sale prices: Every stockist obtaining cement shall at the beginning of the business hours on each day display at a conspicuous place in the premises where the cement is stocked, the stock of cement in his possession and the price or prices at which the cement is sold by him." It is the prosecution case that on 2-12-1978, when the Inspector of Supplies, Aska and other officials of the Supply Department inspected the premises of M/s. Balaji Traders, Aska, there had been no display of the stock position and the prices, as required under the provisions of the Control Order. The prosecution case, as aforesaid, has been fully established through the evidence of P.Ws. 1,2 and 3 and both the Courts below have believed the said evidence, nothing has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners to discard their testimony in this revision. The defence version was that the Supply Officer directed the servant to clear the board as certain cement particles had been flued to the board and as he washed the same, the board in question did not contain the necessary entries. This defence story was sought to be proved through the evidence of d. w. 1, but the same has already been discussed and discarded by the learned trying magistrate as well as by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. In that view of the matter, the finding of the Courts below that there was no display of the stock position as well as the prices in the premises where the cement was being sold, must be sustained which would amount to an infraction of Clause 15 of the Control Order. 4. Mr. Padhi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, contends that Clause 15 makes liable only the stockist who contravenes the provision. "Stockist" is defined in Clause 2 (h) to mean, a person who holds a licence under the order to deal in cement for the purpose of selling to a consumer. Since the licence in the present case stands in the name of T. Susila Patra, it is she who will be the stockist and not her husband, T. Shyam Babu Patro, and consequently, no liability can be fastened on T. Shyam Babu Patro. This point unfortunately has not been raised in the Courts below, but this being a pure question of law, I permitted the learned Counsel for the Petitioners to urge the same. It is stated in the prosecution report itself that Smt. T. Susila Patra is the licencee as a cement stockist under the name and style of M/s. Balaji Traders, but the transactions of the firm are managed by her husband, T. Shyam Babu Patro and that is why the prosecution report was given against both. But Clause 15 makes liable only the stockist and, therefore, the husband who was managing the business cannot be penalised for violation of the provision of Clause 15. In that view of the matter, the contention of Mr. But Clause 15 makes liable only the stockist and, therefore, the husband who was managing the business cannot be penalised for violation of the provision of Clause 15. In that view of the matter, the contention of Mr. Padhi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, in this regard must be sustained and the conviction of T. Shyam Babu Patro is accordingly set aside. Criminal Revision No. 190 of 1983 is, therefore, allowed. 5. Coming to the case of T. Susila Patra, learned Counsel does not challenge the finding to there was no display of the prices and the stock Mr. Padhi, the the effect that position of the cement in question. He, however, urges that Clause 15 of the Control Order is ultra vires since it is not referable to any of the powers conferred for making an Order in Section 3 (2), Clauses (a) to (j) of the Essential Commodities Act. This contention in my view is wholly misconceived. The Control Order has been issued by the State Government for securing equitable distribution of cement at a fair price to the needy consumers in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, read with Notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Commerce, published under S. Order 1844 dated 18th June, 1966. The said provision contained in Section 3 (1) authorises the Government to make Order providing for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity and trade and commerce therein. There is no manner of doubt that cement is an essential commodity. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 begins with the phrase "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1)". Then again Sub-section (2) (d) authorises making of Order for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity. In that view of the matter, the impugned provision namely Clause 15 of the Control Order must be held to be one for regulating the distribution of the essential commodity in question. Consequently, the contention of Mr. Padhi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is devoid of force and cannot be accepted. 6. Mrs. Padhi then contends that Clause 15 contemplates display of the board at the beginning of the business hours of each day. Consequently, the contention of Mr. Padhi, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners is devoid of force and cannot be accepted. 6. Mrs. Padhi then contends that Clause 15 contemplates display of the board at the beginning of the business hours of each day. Since the seizure in question indicates that the premises was inspected by the Supply authorities at 12.10 p. m., which is obviously not the beginning of the business hours, it cannot be said that the requirement of Clause 15 has been contravened. This argument is merely stated to be rejected. Clause 15 is obviously a measure to make it known to the public the stock position as well as the prices thereof at which the cement is sold so as to prohibit clandestine dealing in the commodity. In that view of the matter, it cannot be construed that the requirement is for putting a board indicating the stock position and prices only at the beginning of the business hours. It must be construed to mean that the stock board in question must be indicated starting from the beginning of the business hours till the business closes all throughout the day the premises remains open and business transaction is carried on. Consequently, I would reject the submission of the learned Counsel unhesitatingly. 7. No other contention having been raised, the conviction of Petitioner T. Susila Patra must be sustained. Mr. Padhi, however, contends that taking into consideration the fact that Petitioner T. Susila Patra is a lady and the offence committed by her is not so serious in nature and no prior conviction has been proved against Petitioner Susila, the Court should apply the provisions of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contends that the conviction being one under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, which is a special statute, the provisions of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be attracted. 8. There is no doubt that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act in certain circumstances prescribe imposition of a minimum sentence and it is undoubtedly a special statute, but neither of those two conditions totally bars the discretion of the Court to grant probation to the convict either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or even under the relevant sections of the Probation of Offenders Act. Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself lays down the limitation within which it is to operate. It is attracted as regards persons above 21 years of age only when conviction is for an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less. As regards persons below 21 years of age, or any woman, the provision is more liberal and can be applied even for conviction for an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, if no previous conviction is proved against the offender. The said section nowhere Jays down that in case of prescription:t of a minimum sentence, it will not apply. That is the reason why in the case of Joginder Singh Vs. The State of Punjab a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court observed. .... It may, therefore, be inapt to impose such a bar by a process of interpretation, when the provisions of the section whilst prescribing its applicability, have laid down no such limitation. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Full Bench answered the reference in the following words: To conclude on the legal aspect, therefore, it must be held that the mere prescription of the minimum sentence u/s 61 (1) (c) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 is no bar to the applicability of Sections 360 and 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and the same is not a special reason for denying the benefit of probation to a person convicted, thereunder. In the alternative it is equally no bar to the applicability of Sections 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act..... In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, there is no bar in applying Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the facts and C Ircumstances of the present case. In the alternative it is equally no bar to the applicability of Sections 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act..... In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement, there is no bar in applying Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the facts and C Ircumstances of the present case. In this view of the matter and taking into consideration the fact that Petitioner Susila Patra is a lady and the offence in question for which she has been convicted is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction has been proved against the offender, and bearing in mind the age, character and antecedents of the offender as well as the circumstances in which the offence in question was committed, in my view it would be expedient that she should be released on probation of good conduct and accordingly though the conviction against her is sustained, I would direct that the sentence imposed against her be not given effect to immediately and instead she be released on her entering into a bond of Rs. 1,000/- (one thousand) with one surety for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence if called upon within one year from the execution of the sa id bond and in the meantime, she would be of good behaviour and conduct herself lawfully and properly in her business career and would not repeat commission of similar offence or any other offence during the said period of one year. The bond in question may be executed by her within a period of one month from today before the learned Magistrate and in case, the Petitioner fails to furnish the bond on the specified terms as ordered above, she will have to undergo the sentence that has been a warded against her and the learned Magistrate would be free to take such steps for execution of the sentence in accordance with law. 9. In the ultimate result, therefore, Criminal Revision No. 190 of 1983 is allowed and Criminal Revision No. 183 of 1983 is dismissed subject to the modification of the sentence as aforesaid. Final Result : Dismissed