JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This revision is directed against the order dated 13.6.86 passed by IInd Munsif Magistrate, Etawah in a case u/s 323/324 IPC summoning the applicants u/s 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code). 2. It appears that the case was proceeding and some statement in Examina-tion-in-Chief was made by PW 1 Janak Singh who stated that the present applicant were also accused in the said case. An application thereafter was made u/s 319(1) of the Code for summoning the applicants and that application was allowed. Against that order present revision has been filed. 3. Learned Counsel for the applicant urged that it appears that cross-examination was not conducted and only statement was recorded in Examination jn-Chief, hence the same cannot be said to be a complete statement or com-1037 plete evidence and the applicants could not be summoned just on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief. Reliance was placed on Amarjeet Singh v. State of Punjab 1983 CriLJ 98. 4. Before considering the point whether applicants were correctly summoned in view of the Section 319, it is better to ascertain the intention of Legislature in enacting Section 319. It is said to be the duty of a Judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. (See Heydon's case 3 Co. Rep. 7 a.) In Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 43 E.R. 429, it was observed that, The Judges of the law in all times past have so far pursued the intent of the makers of the Statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were general in words to be, but particular, where the intent was particular. In order to have the correct interpretation of Section 319 and to know the intent of the makers of the statute it is better to have object and reasons for enacting Section 319, particularly when in a somewhat different and restricted form a corresponding provision existed u/s 351 of the Old Code. In order to have the correct interpretation of Section 319 and to know the intent of the makers of the statute it is better to have object and reasons for enacting Section 319, particularly when in a somewhat different and restricted form a corresponding provision existed u/s 351 of the Old Code. The Object and Reasons in enacting Section 319 are to be found in 41st Report of the Law Commission which is as follows: It happens sometimes, though not very often that a Magistrate hearing a case against certain accused finds from the evidence that some person, other than the accused before him, is also concerned in that very offence, or in a connected offence It is only proper that a Magistrate should have the power to call and join him in the proceedings. Section 351 (of the Old Code) provides for such a situation, but only if that person happens to be attending the Court. He can then be detained and proceeded against. There is no express provision u/s 351 for summoning such a person if he is not present in Court. Such a provision would make Section 351 fairly comprehensive and we think it proper to expressly provide for that situation. 5. It is therefore abundantly clear that the object of the makers of the statute in enacting Section 319 of the Code was to provide for a more comprehensive provision, with considerable improvement in the old Section 351, for proceeding against other persons appearing to be guilty, although he is not an accused. Section 319 of the Code provides that where in the Court in an enquiry or trial of an offence, if it appears from the evidence that any person not being accused has committed any offence, Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. The intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 319 appears to be that if somebody other than the person who is party and facing trial or enquiry is also an accused, he may be summoned on the basis of some evidence available on the record. 6. It was submitted that only the examination-in-chief of a witness would not be said to be evidence but I do not agree with that submission. 6. It was submitted that only the examination-in-chief of a witness would not be said to be evidence but I do not agree with that submission. The inclusive definition of word "evidence", has been given u/s 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which means and includes all statements which the Court permits or requires it to be made by the witnesses before it in relation to matters of fact under an enquiry. It is, therefore evident that the statements which are permitted by the Court to be made or the Court requires to be made before it is called oral evidence. If something positive has been stated in the Examination-in-Chief by a witness that also is evidence and is sufficient for the purpose of Section 319 to proceed against the person against whom statement has been made. It cannot be said that unless cross-examination and re-examination has been made, statement made in Examination-in-Chief cannot be said to be evidence. Even though cross-examination of a witness was done nevertheless any court can scruitinise the statement in chief portion and ascertain its veracity. Truthfulness of a statement can be assessed even from statement-in-chief portion. (See Ambika Singh Vs. State, AIR 1961 All 38 . 7. In the case of Amarjeet Singh v. State of Punjab, relied upon by the applicant the definition of evidence was not noticed. Further the Division Bench case of Ambika Singh v. State (Supra) applies on all fours. The case of Amarjeet Singh v. State of Punjab, (Supra) is of no assistance. I am of the view that even the statement made in Examination-in-Chief alone is sufficient evidence on the basis of which the person against whom allegations have been made, can be proceeded against by the Court concerned even though no cross-examination was done. I accordingly do not find any merit in the revision, consequently the same is dismissed. Interim stay order dated 30th July, 1986 is vacated.