JUDGMENT : K.P. Mohapatra, J. - This revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Koraput in I.C.C. Case No. 21 of 1986 rejecting two petitions filed by the Petitioner who was the complainant in the Case. 2. The Petitioner filed a complaint case against the opposite party for having committed offences under Sections 186, 451 and 506 I.P.C. When the evidence of the prosecution was being adduced the Petitioner filed two petitions. In the first petition, the Petitioner prayed for issuance of summons to Shri S. Panda former Principal of the D.A.V. College, Koraput and to call for the records of I.C.C. Case No. 17 of 1986. In the second petition, he prayed for calling for the records of enquiry relating to the incident from the Office of the Principal, D.A.V. College. Both the petitions were opposed by the opposite party and after hearing both parties, the learned Judicial Magistrate, by the impugned order, rejected them as it was not necessary either to summon the witness or to call for the documents. 3. Mr. B.K. Nayak, learned Counsel appearing for the apposite party, raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the impugned order was interlocutory in character and so the revision is barred u/s 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another. ILR 1976 Cutt. 1229, V.K.P. Sankavally v. Republic of India, represented by the Inspector of Police. C.B.I. New Delhi and Ors. and 60 (1985) C.L.T. 404, Liluram Agarwal v. Sailendra Mohanty and Ors. In the case of Amar Nath and Ors. (supra), Fazal Ali, J. examined the provisions of Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and laid down as to what are treated as interlocutory orders against which a revision is barred. He said: ...It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted Sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights of the liabilities of the parties. He said: ...It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted Sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights of the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie u/s 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. It will appear from the principle laid down above that an order either summoning a witness or refusing to summon a witness in a criminal case, is of an interlocutory nature. In the case of Sankavally v. Republic of India (supra), a learned Judge of this Court held that, an order refusing to call for documents is interlocutory in character. In the case of Liluram Agarwal (supra), a learned single Judge of this Court took the same view and held that an order rejecting an application to call for documents is an interlocutory one. From the aforesaid principle, it is apparent that an order either calling for documents or refusing to call for documents is interlocutory in character. 4. By the impugned order, the learned Judicial Magistrate refused to summon a witness and to call for documents. In either case the order, according to the legal principle referred to above, is interlocutory in character and so the revision is barred u/s 397(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. By the impugned order, the learned Judicial Magistrate refused to summon a witness and to call for documents. In either case the order, according to the legal principle referred to above, is interlocutory in character and so the revision is barred u/s 397(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, if at a subsequent stage it will appear to the learned Judicial Magistrate that the documents shall be necessary for just decision of the case or, if the presence of the witness will be necessary for the same purpose, he may exercise his discretion in accordance with law and pass necessary orders either for calling for documents or for summoning the witness. 5. In the result and subject to the aforesaid observations, the criminal revision is dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed