JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---These are three writ petitions which can be conveniently disposed of by this common judgment. Various protractory proceeding have taken place between the parties in these writ petitions. However, the principal question which arises for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the respondent Mahadeo, who has died during the pendency of these writ petitions and is not represented by his legal representatives, was a tenant of the suit fields. 2. Briefly the facts are that the fields Survey No. 188/2 and fields Survey No. 239, total area 3.48 arces of mouza Amgaon (Buti) Tahsil Gadchiroli originally belonged to one Murari. It is the case of Smt. Gayabai that by registered gift deed executed in the year 1954, the said fields were gifted to her and other three sisters by their father Murari. It also appears from the evidence of Bihari examined by Smt. Gayabai in her case that there was also a family arrangement made by Murari in the year 1954 by which he made certain arrangement about the rest of his property. Smt. Gayabai and other co-owners of the suit fields sold the same to one Smt. Sakhubai (petitioner in W.P. No. 996/1983) by a registered sale deed dated 15-12-1958. as per the agreement dated 24-11-1958. It is clear that the said sale-deed is executed prior to coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (for short, the Tenancy Act), which came into force on 30-12-1958. 3. It is the case of the respondent Mahadeo (deceased) that the was the tenant of the suit fields in 1958-59. It appears from his deposition that one Narhari, who is admittedly the brother of Smt. Gayabai had talks with him about the tenancy of the suit fields which fact was confirmed by him to his son Waman, who had gone to his place for confirmation of the lease of the suit fields. However, according to him, in April/May, 1959, Smt. Sakhubai took forcible possession of the suit fields from him. It is his case that his name was recorded in the tenant's list as per the provisions of section 8 of the Tenancy Act and also in the Record of Rights. After his dispossession by Smt. Sakubai, he filed an application under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, for restoration of possession of the suit fields. It is his case that his name was recorded in the tenant's list as per the provisions of section 8 of the Tenancy Act and also in the Record of Rights. After his dispossession by Smt. Sakubai, he filed an application under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, for restoration of possession of the suit fields. Smt. Sakhubai had also filed an application under section 39 read with section 36(2) of the Tenancy Act for termination of tenancy of the respondent Mahadeo on the ground of resumption of land for personal cultivation. The said application for resumption of land was contested upto this Court in Special Civil Application No. 134/64 and stood rejected. 4. It appears that there were proceedings under section 121(1) of the Tenancy Act initiated before the Collector by Smt. Sakhbai for validation of aforesaid saledeed dated 15-12-1958 which went against her as the Collector did not validate her sale-deed. When the matter came to this Court an S.C.A. No. 291/1969 and the connected S.C.A. No. 877/1969 preferred by transferors Gayabai and her sisters and the transferee Sakhubai, this Court upheld the order of the Collector not validating the sale-deed and thus dismissed the above writ petitions by its judgment dated 8-12-72. This Court, however, by the aforesaid order dated 8-12-72 directed that the application filed by the tenant Mahadeo under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, and the application filed by the transferor Gayabai under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act which were pending at the time of the said order of this Court should be decided expeditiously within a period of four months. 5. At this stage I may state that when the sale-deed was not validated and there was possibility of the consideration being recovered from Gayabai, Gayabai filed an application under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act for declaration that the respondent Mahadeo was not her tenant. The said application is numbered as Revenue Case No. 2/59(32)/1968-69. In this case she stated that she was not aware of any of the above proceedings initiated either by Mahadeo or Sakhubai and also the fact the Mahadeo was claiming tenancy from her till the notice was received by her from Sakhubai that she should refund to her the amount of consideration under the sale-deed of the suit fields. In this case she stated that she was not aware of any of the above proceedings initiated either by Mahadeo or Sakhubai and also the fact the Mahadeo was claiming tenancy from her till the notice was received by her from Sakhubai that she should refund to her the amount of consideration under the sale-deed of the suit fields. I may also state that in view of the direction of the High Court in the aforesaid writ petitioners, the application filed by the tenant Mahedeo under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act which was registered as No. 519/59(6)/59 60 of village Amgaon Buti, and the aforesaid application filed by the transferor Gayabai under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act registered as Revenue Case No. 2/59(32)/1968-69 are disposed of by common orders by the Tenancy authorities. 6. Parties led common evidence in both these cases. The learned Additional Tahsildar on the basis of the evidence on record oral as well as documentary, held that Mahadeo was the tenant of the suit fields. He, therefore, directed restoration of possession of the suit fields to him from Sakhubai. Gayabai preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Gadchiroli (for short, the S.D.O., Similarly Sakhubai and others preferred and appeal which is registered as 2/59(6) 1974-75 of Amgaon Buti against the aforesaid order of the Additional Tashildar. The learned S.D.O. held that Mahadeo failed to prove that he was the tenant of the suit fields. He, therefore, reversed the order of the Additional Tahsildar by allowing the above appeals by passing separate orders in them. Being aggrieved Mahadeo preferred two revisions before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (for short, the M.R.T.) against the aforesaid order in appeal. The revision in the case of Gayabai for declaration that Mahadeo was not a tenant of the suit fields is registered as Revision Application No. 10-A/98/1980 and the revision application in the proceedings under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act initiated by Mahadeo is registered as Revision Application No. 10-A/111/1980. 7. The learned M.R.T. held in Revision Application No. 10-A/98/1980 that although Gayabai was entitled to claim a declaration that Mahadeo was not her tenant, her application for claiming such declaration under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act was barred by time. He, therefore, dismissed the same allowing the revision preferred by Mahadeo. 7. The learned M.R.T. held in Revision Application No. 10-A/98/1980 that although Gayabai was entitled to claim a declaration that Mahadeo was not her tenant, her application for claiming such declaration under section 100(2) of the Tenancy Act was barred by time. He, therefore, dismissed the same allowing the revision preferred by Mahadeo. As regards Revision Application No. 10-A/111/1980 the M.R.T. held that Mahadeo had proved that he was in lawful possession of the suit field and therefore he is a deemed tenant under section 6 of the Tenancy Act. It therefore, allowed the said revision by setting aside the order of the learned S. D. O. and restoring that of the learned Additional Tahsildar. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned M.R.T. passed in Revision Application No. 10-A/98/1980 Gayabai has preferred Writ Petition No. 1586/1982 in this Court and being aggrieved by the order of the learned M.R.T. in Revision Application No. 10-/A/111/1980, Sakhubai has preferred Writ Petition No. 996/1983 and her son-in-law Pandhari and her daughter Manda have preferred Writ 2180/1983. As already pointed out above since common question of law and facts arise in these write petitions, they can disposed of this common judgment. 8. Since the question of tenancy is not decided by the learned M.R.T. in Gayabai's case on the ground that her application for declaration that Mahadeo is not her tenant is barred by time but is actually decided by it in Mahadeo's case under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, I will take up first Writ Petition No. 996/1983 for consideration filed by Sakhubai against the order of the learned M.R.T. in the revision in the aforesaid case of Mahadeo. The same question is also involved in Writ Petition No. 2180/1983 filed by the son-in-law and daughter of Sakhubai who have no interest in the suit fields because, Sakhubai is alive and the sale is exclusively in her favour. The said writ petition is thus not maintainable or at any rate shall stand disposed of in terms of the decision in Writ Petition No. 996/1983 filed by Sakhubai. 9. The said writ petition is thus not maintainable or at any rate shall stand disposed of in terms of the decision in Writ Petition No. 996/1983 filed by Sakhubai. 9. Turning, therefore, to the W.P. No. 996/1983 filed by Sakhubai it may be seen that it arises out of the application made by Mahadeo for restoration of the possession of the suit fields from her under section 36(1) of the Tenancy Act, Sakhubai had denied his tenancy in these proceedings, although in the application registered as Revenue Case No. 258/59(6) of 1959-60 of Amgaon Buti filed by her under section 39 read with section 36(2) of the Tenancy Act for resumption of land for personal cultivation. She had admitted that Mahadeo was her tenant in the suit fields. The said application for resumption of land for personal fields. The said application for resumption of land for cultivation was, however, dismissed by the Additional Tahsildar by the order dated 30th July, 1960 on the ground that Sakhubai cannot be recognised as a landlord since her sale is invalid. The learned Counsel for Mahadeo was, however, relied strongly upon the admission of Sakhubai made in her aforesaid application for resumption of land for personal cultivation to prove the tenancy of Mahadeo. 10. As regards the evidence on the question of tenancy there is no dispute that the name of Mahadeo was recorded as tenant in the tenant's first prepared under section 8 of the Tenancy Act and that his name was also shown as tenant in the Record-of-Rights. As regards the question of creation of tenancy, Mahadeo has stated in his evidence that he had talks about the terms of tenancy with Narhari, the brother of Smt. Gayabai. According to him, the lease money was fixed in crop share of six and half khandis and accordingly he had sent his son Waman to Newargaon for confirmation of the terms of the lease. It is his case that pursuant to the aforesaid oral agreement of tenancy, he was put in possession of the suit fields. In support of the above case he has examined neighbouring cultivators Tukaram Ganpati and Nathuji Chinku besides his son Waman, who corroborated him of has cultivating possession of the suit fields and the terms of tenancy. It is his case that pursuant to the aforesaid oral agreement of tenancy, he was put in possession of the suit fields. In support of the above case he has examined neighbouring cultivators Tukaram Ganpati and Nathuji Chinku besides his son Waman, who corroborated him of has cultivating possession of the suit fields and the terms of tenancy. There is a document on record alleged to be the lease deed executed by Waman son of Mahadeo in favour of Murari the father of Gayabai which is dated 9-6-1958. The said document appears to have been executed in favour of Murari, who had already died in the years 1957. Although, Waman does not refer to this document in his examination-in-chief or cross-examination on his own the said document is put to him in cross-examination in reply to which although initially he states that it is the same paper (by which he perhaps means the same document), he thereafter denies the same and states that it is a forged document because there is a difference in the ink. There is also a notice referred to by Mahadeo which is alleged to have been issued to his son Waman by Narhari on behalf of Gayabai and others to show that there is admission of tenancy therein by Gayabai. The said notice is also not proved by Mahadeo. Since the above two document are not proved, they cannot be taken into consideration while appreciating the evidence in the instant case. 11. On behalf the landlord Sakhubai has not entered the witness box not anybody is examined on examined on her behalf. Gayabai has, however, led evidence by examining herself and her brother Bihari in the instant case. She deposed that the suit fields were gifted to her by a registered gift deed, but the said gift deed is not on record. She has further stated that at the time the suit fields were alleged to be leased out to Mahadeo, she was already married and was not staying at Amgaon, but was staying with her husband at Gadegaon in Bhandara District. She denied that her brother Narhari had any authority to leased out the suit fields to Mahadeo. There is, however, no evidence on the question whether her co-owners were staying at Amgaon or not. Bihari had supported her case by saying that the suit fields were gifted to her and other sisters. She denied that her brother Narhari had any authority to leased out the suit fields to Mahadeo. There is, however, no evidence on the question whether her co-owners were staying at Amgaon or not. Bihari had supported her case by saying that the suit fields were gifted to her and other sisters. He also supported her case that the relations between the brothers and the sisters were strained, because the suit fields did not come to the share of the brother is as they were gifted tot he sisters. It may also be seen that Mahadeo in his evidence admitted that Sakhubai was married to his elder brother and that their relations were strained. 12. It is on the basis of the above evidence on record that the question has to be consideration whether Mahadeo had proved that he was the tenant of the suit fields. As regards the question of talks about the terms of tenancy alleged to be held by Narhari with Mahadeo, in my view there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence in that regard led on behalf of Mahadeo particularly where no evidence is led on behalf of the landlords to controvert the same. The best evidence in that regard was of Narhari who was alive and could have been examined to controvert the same, but for reasons better known to them he has not been examined either by Gayabai or Sakhubai. It has therefore, to be held on the basis of the evidence led on behalf of the tenant Mahadeo that there were talks of about the terms of tenancy of the suit fields with Narhari and as per the said terms he had granted lease of the suit fields to Mahadeo in 1958-59. 13. The only question which then needs consideration is whether Narhari had authority to lease out the suit fields. In this regard it is clear from the evidence of Mahadeo and Waman that according to them Narhari was managing the suit fields as wahiwatdar of Gayabai and other co-owners. In appreciating the evidence of Gayabai on this question, it is first necessary to see that Gayabi herself is living away from the suit fields at Gadegaon in District Bhandara. It would, therefore, be legitimate to infer that somebody must be managing the suit fields on her behalf at Amgaon (Buti) in district Gadchiroli. In appreciating the evidence of Gayabai on this question, it is first necessary to see that Gayabi herself is living away from the suit fields at Gadegaon in District Bhandara. It would, therefore, be legitimate to infer that somebody must be managing the suit fields on her behalf at Amgaon (Buti) in district Gadchiroli. It is not her case that she was cultivating the suit fields from Gadegaon personally. Moreover, she is not the exclusive owner of the suit fields. There is no evidence to show where her sister who were co-owners of the suit fields were residing at that time. In the circumstances, the evidence of Mahadeo and his son Waman that Narhari was the wahiwatdar cannot be disbelieved. It may also be seen that the best evidence in this regard also was of Narhari himself and for reasons better known to the landlords he is not examined. Instead, Bihari another brother of Gayabai is examined by her which would shown that if Narhari is examined his evidence would go against her on the question of authority to him by her to manage the suit fields. It is also surprising how Bihari came forward to depose in favour of Gayabai, when according to him, the relations between the brother and the sisters were strained on account of the gift or the suit fields in favour of the sisters. 14. After considering the above evidence led on behalf of the landlords there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence led on behalf of the tenant Mahadeo that Narhari as Wahiwatdar had granted the lease of the suit fields one behalf of Gayabai and other co-owners. If Narhari had such authority it cannot be said that the lease of the suit fields by Gayabai and other co-owners is illegal or unauthorised. At any rate it cannot be said that the tenant Mahadeo was not in lawful possession of the suit fields within the meaning of section 6 of the Tenancy Act. If he was in lawful possession of the suit fields as rightly held by the learned M.R.T. he would become a deemed tenant of the suit fields under section 6 of the Tenancy Act. It is in the context of these, facts that the admission made by Sakhubai in her aforesaid application for resumption of land needs to be seen. If he was in lawful possession of the suit fields as rightly held by the learned M.R.T. he would become a deemed tenant of the suit fields under section 6 of the Tenancy Act. It is in the context of these, facts that the admission made by Sakhubai in her aforesaid application for resumption of land needs to be seen. A perusal of the allegation in the said application would show that according to her the suit land was already subject to Mahadeo for the year 1958-59 and accordingly Mahadeo cultivated the same in the year 1958-59 and took produce of the same. It is thus clear that from her admission also that Mahadeo was tenant of the suit fields. In view of the facts narrated above regarding the creation of tenancy by Narhari in favour of Mahadeo, there is no merit in the contention of Sakhubai that the above admission was given under wrong information. Moreover, she has not substantiated the same by examining herself or anybody on her behalf. 15. It is also necessary to see that the name of Mahadeo was included in the tenant's list under section 8 of the Tenancy Act as a tenant of the suit field. It may be seen that section 8(2) of the Tenancy Act requires that the tenant's list should be published in the prescribed manner and if there is no objection to the said list by the landlord or any other person, then the said list shall becomes final. It was, therefore, open to the original landlord Gayabai or other co-owners or Sakhubai to raise objections to the said list if according to them Mahadeo was not the tenant of the suit fields. Their conduct in not raising any objection to the tenant's list, therefore shows that they had admitted the tenancy of Mahadeo. It appears that it is only when the question of refund of consideration under the sale-deed of the suit fields cropped up because the said sale deed was not validated by the Collector that Gayabai decided to challange the tenancy of Mahadeo and she therefore, field the application for declaration that Mahadeo was not the tenant of the suit fields. 16. 16. Be that as it may the presumption of tenancy of the suit fields raised on account of the name of Mahadeo being shown in the tenant's list as a tenant of the suit fields stands corroborated by the evidence on record in the instant case. The finding of the learned M.R.T. that Mahadeo was the tenant of the suit fields cannot be interfered with as it is clearly supported by the evidence on record and cannot, therefore, be said to be perverse. The learned S. D. O. in appeal has not properly applied his mind to the evidence on record in the in instant case as result of which his finding is vitiated. It was, therefore, rightly interfered with by the learned M.R.T. 17. As regards the Writ Petition No. 1586/1982 preferred by Gayabai it is urged on her behalf that the learned M.R.T. was in dismissing her application for declaration that Mahadeo was not her tenant on the ground of limitation which was raised for the first time before the learned M.R.T. In my view it is not necessary to go in to the said question because on merits it has been held by the learned M.R.T. in the companion revision application No. 10-A/111/1980 that Mahadeo was the tenant of suit fields. Infact, the learned M.R.T. should have decided both the revision applications by a common order, particularly when common evidence is led in both these cases and when originally the Additional Tahsildar had decided both these cases by his common order. The findings on merits on the question of the tenancy would therefore, hold good in the instant case also. It is therefore, not necessary to consider the question whether the application under section 100(2) filed by (..) is barred by time or not since on merits it is liable to be dismissed. 18. In the result, all these three writ petitions fail and are dismissed. However, under the circumstances there would be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. -----