Judgment : This suit was instituted by the United Bank of India in 1986, inter alia, claiming a decree for Rs. 67,11,944.09p. against the defendant Nos. 1 to 7, declaration of charge on the movable assets and decree for sale etc. In the said suit an interlocutory application has also been made, inter alia, praying for appointment of Receiver and other reliefs. 2. Mr. P. K. Mullick learned Counsel appearing with Mr. Nirmal Mitra Advocate for the defendants has submitted that the defendants are willing to submitts a decree without raising any controversy as to the quantum of interest charged by the Plaintiff bank upto the date of the suit. However, the learned Counsel has submitted that the Court should award interim interest and interest on judgment not at the contractual rate, but at such rate as the Court may deem fit and proper on the facts of this case. He has also submitted that the defendants should be allowed reasonable monthly instalments for payment of the decretal dues. 3. The two contentions which call for consideration are firstly, whether the Court has any discretion in the matter of awarding interim interest and interest on judgment and secondly whether this Court has any jurisdiction to grant instalment to the judgment debtor to payoff the amount decreed. 4. It has been submitted by Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the Bank that interim interest and interest on judgment should be granted on contractual rate of 18% per annum. Mr. Chatterjee has contended that this Court has no discretion in the matter of granting interim interest and interest on judgment. He has emphasised that the public undertaking is entitled to interim interest and interest on judgment at the contractual rate. 5. This question came up for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in the case of (1) State Bank of India v. B. Gupta P. Ltd. reported in AIR 1987 Cal 64 , where Mr. Chatterjee contended to the contrary. There the Division Bench held that the Court had no discretion so far as the interest antecedent to suit is concerned. It must be at the contractual rate. The interest pendentelite and future interest are however, in the discretion of the Court. In that view of the matter the contention of Mr. Chatterjee has to be rejected. 6. There the Division Bench held that the Court had no discretion so far as the interest antecedent to suit is concerned. It must be at the contractual rate. The interest pendentelite and future interest are however, in the discretion of the Court. In that view of the matter the contention of Mr. Chatterjee has to be rejected. 6. The question however, is at what rate the interim interest and interest on judgment should be allowed in this case. This question will necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Mr. Chatterjee has contended that the facts of the case do not warrant any reduction in the contractual rate of interest. Reliance has been placed in the case of (2) United Bank of India v. The New Glencoe Tea Co. Ltd. reported in 1986 (2) CHN 330. In that case a decree was passed by the trial Court for Rs. 33 lakhs with interim interest 6% per annum and interest on judgment at the rate of 7½ % per annum and the defendant was allowed to pay the decretal amount in 7 years by instalments. On appeal, the said decree was modified by the Appellate Court to the extent that the interim interest was calculated @10% per annum upto the date of the Appellate Court decree i.e., 1st October, 1986. The said suit was instituted in 1983 and decreed on 23rd May, 1986. From the operative part of the appellate court judgment it would appear that interim interest was allowed @ 10% per annum upto 1st October, 1986 being the date of the Appellate Court judgment and decree. Interest on judgment was allowed @ 6 % per annum although the trial Court awarded interest on judgment @ 7½ % per annum. 7. It may be mentioned that in that case the defendant was allowed by the appellate decree to pay the entire decretal dues within three years. Presumable the appellate Court was of the view that the entire decretal dues would be paid within three year and that might be the reason for reducing the rate of interest on judgment. In that case the decree was for Rs. 33 lakhs. In the instant case the decree is for Rs. 67 lakhs. The suit was instituted in June, 1986 and just after a year decree is being passed at the instance of the defendants. In that case the decree was for Rs. 33 lakhs. In the instant case the decree is for Rs. 67 lakhs. The suit was instituted in June, 1986 and just after a year decree is being passed at the instance of the defendants. By reason of the fact that the defendants have submitted to a decree the litigation expenses have been minimised. In the normal course the suit is not likely to he heard before 4/5 years. On the interlocutory application of the Bank, the defendant would have been allowed to ray off the dues by reasonably monthly instalments until the suit was heard. The decision in The New Glencoe Tea Co. Ltd. (Supra), does not establish any principle for fixing the rate of interim interest and interest on judgment. There cannot be any strait-jacket formula for determining the rate of interest. In a suit like this, the object of awarding interim interest and interest on judgment at a reasonable rate is to encourage the constituant of the bank to pay off the decretal dues. The Court has to strike a balance between the competiting needs. The bank has already charged interest at quarterly rest upto the date of the suit. The recalling of the loan by the bank puts the constituent into hardship. The ultimate remedy of the bank is to sell the hypothecated assets and to realise the dues, if the constituent fails to pay. But it is a common knowledge that the bank does not realise even 5 to 10% of the total claim by the sale of the assets. If the constituent pays off the decretal dues by instalments, the bank realises its money and at the same time constituent gets breathing time to survive so also the workmen employed by the constituent. The Court has to approach this problem from a practical and realistic point of view. A rigid or unflexible view based on misconception or ignorance of the nature of commercial transactions will neither solve the problem of the Bank nor the constituent. 8. Hiving regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the instalments, I propose to allow the defendants to payoff the decretal dues, the plaintiff will be entitled to interest on judgment at the rate of 8% on the reducing decretal principal. 8. Hiving regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the instalments, I propose to allow the defendants to payoff the decretal dues, the plaintiff will be entitled to interest on judgment at the rate of 8% on the reducing decretal principal. The instalment which would be paid in terms of the decree and order shall be first adjusted against decretal principal. The plaintiff however, will be entitled to interim interest at the rate of 10% from the date of the suit to the date of the decree. 9. The next question which calls for determination is whether this Court can grant any instalment to the defendants to payoff the decretal dues. 10. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee is that no instalment can be granted in view of the judgment in the case of United Bank of India v. The New Glencoe Tea Co. Ltd. (Supra). In other words, it is his contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to permit the defendants to m1ke payment by instalment of the decretal sum. 11. Mr. Mullick learned Counsel appearing for the defendants has firstly submitted that the reliefs granted by the Appellate Court in The New Glencoe Tea Co. (Supra), appears to be inconsistent with the apparent conclusions of the Appellate Court in law. The Appellate Court, has, infer alia, held that the suit to enforce mortgage of movable property is not a suit to enforce mortgage of immovable property and as such the suit to enforce mortgage of movable property is not governed by the provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure (para 6 at pages 333-334). Mr. Mullick has further submitted that it was also held in that case that in a suit to enforce mortgage of movable property the Court cannot exercise its power under the provision of Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the provision of Order 20, Rule 11 applies to simple money decrees and not to decrees for sale of a property for realisation of money due (para 8 at page 334). 12. According to Mr. Mullick there is an apparent contradiction in the above two conclusions. 12. According to Mr. Mullick there is an apparent contradiction in the above two conclusions. If it is held that the suit to enforce mortgage of movable property is not governed by the provisions of Order 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot at the same time be held that the provisions of Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to the suit to enforce mortgage of movable property. 13. Mr. Mullick has further submitted that the Divisional Bench in coming to the aforesaid conclusion that provisions of Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is limited to its application to money decrees only has relied on two decisions-one of the Patna High Court and the other of the Madras High Court-in (3) Basanta Kumar v. Chatonagpur Banking Association reported in AIR 1948 Pat 18 and (4) N. Shantilal v. A Sankar Subba reported in AIR 1979 Mad 13 . According to Mr. Mullick the Patna High Court has not given any reason at all. Madras High Court has proceeded on the footing in the case of mortgage decree, Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply, But it has not given any reason as to why the provisions of Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to mortgage decree in respect of movable property. 14. It is also the contention of Mr. Mullick that in the case of New Glencoe Tea Company (Supra), the Division Bench did not consider the subsequent judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of (5) State Bank of India v. M/s. Neeru Plastics Works reported in AIR 1984 Punjab 209. There the Punjab High Court considered the N. Shantilal (Supra) and Basanta Kumar Mitra (Supra) and held that Order 20, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot supersede the provision of Order 34, Rule 4. Although the said judgment has not given any explicit reason but impliedly referred to Order 34, Rule 4 which provides for specific period for payment of the decretal dues after the preliminary decree is passed. In other words, no discretion has been left to the Court in fixing the time for payment. Mr. Although the said judgment has not given any explicit reason but impliedly referred to Order 34, Rule 4 which provides for specific period for payment of the decretal dues after the preliminary decree is passed. In other words, no discretion has been left to the Court in fixing the time for payment. Mr. Mullick has further contended that the Division Bench has not also considered the judgment of earlier Division Bench in the case of (6) Bidhu Sekhar Bandapadhaya v. Sudhury Mahatabuadin reported in 15 CWN 1083 where it has been held that the Court may direct the payment of the decretal dues in the instalments under Order 20, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code even though the decree was passed under the provisions of Order 34. Mr. Mullick has also submitted that the Division Bench in this case has not considered the opening words of Order 20, Rule 11. 15. I have given anxious consideration to the submission of Mr. Mullick. Order 20, Rule 11 provides as follows :- "(1) Wher and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may for any sufficient reason (incorporate in the decree, after hearing such of the parties who had appeared personally or by pleader at he last hearing, before judgment, an order that) payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments, with or without interest, notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which the money is payable." 16. The Division Bench in the case of Bidhu Sekhar Bandopadhayo (Supra), considered the scope of Order 20, Rule 11 as it stood before the amendment. The words underlined were added by the Amendment Act of 1976. In that case the appellant mortgage applied under Order 34, Rule 6 for a personal decree against the respondents mortgagers for the balance of the mortgage debt which remained undischarged after the mortgage properties had been sold in pursuance of decree for sale obtained on the mortguge. The respondent prayed for an order under Order 20, Rule 11 allowing them to pay the amount by instalments. The learned Munsif having acceded to this prayer, the decree holder appealed to the Learned District Judge, in dismissing the appeal observed that it could not be held that Learned Munsiff in making the order did not exercise a sound discretion. The respondent prayed for an order under Order 20, Rule 11 allowing them to pay the amount by instalments. The learned Munsif having acceded to this prayer, the decree holder appealed to the Learned District Judge, in dismissing the appeal observed that it could not be held that Learned Munsiff in making the order did not exercise a sound discretion. It was contended before the Learned District Judge that the decree being a mortgage decree, Order 20, Rule 11 does not apply to it. But according to the learned District Judge it was a decree for the payment of money and accordingly the instalments could be granted. The decree holder preferred the second appeal. It was urged before the Division Bench that Order 20 Rule, 11 which provides for payment by instalments is not applicable to the case of decrees in mortgage suit and in that circumstances of this case order for payment by instalments postponing the satisfaction of the decree for a term of about seven years is bad. There the Division Bench held as follows: "In the present case, there can be no question that the decree passed against the judgment-debtor is a personal decree; it is also a decree for the payment of money. Order 20, Rule 11 says- 'Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, for any sufficient reason at the time of passing the decree, order that the payment of the amount decreed shall be postponed or shall be made by instalments, with or without, interest notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which the money is payable'. The rule does say 'where and in so far as the decree is passed in a suit for the recovery of money' or does the 'contract' under which the amount decreed was payable exclude an original mortgage contract. In the circumstances of Order 34, Rule 6, the decree is no longer directed against the mortgaged property; but in virtue of the contract, it binds the judgment-debtors personally. In the circumstances of Order 34, Rule 6, the decree is no longer directed against the mortgaged property; but in virtue of the contract, it binds the judgment-debtors personally. The decree has been passed under Order 34, Rule 6 in accordance with the judgment, and the general provisions relating to judgments and decrees embodied in Order 20 undoubtedly cover the decree based on an antecedent judgment, which is allowable under Order 34, Rule 6." "Furthermore, the decree now passed must be executed under the general provisions of the Code and we cannot regard Order 34 as self-contained. We cannot say that because there are no provisions for payment by instalments in the Order 34, the general provisions of Order 20, Rule 11 do not apply. Viewing the decree, as it appears, to be a decree for the payment of a definite sum of money, we think that it was open to the lower Appellate Court to pass the order it has passed in favour of the judgment-debtors. The first contention, therefore, is overruled." 17. This decision was not referred to in New Glencoe Tea Company (Supra). The Division Bench in Bidhu Sekha, Bandapadhaya (Supra), considered the scope of Order 20, Rule 11 in a mortgage suit. In my view the earlier Bench decision in the case of Bidhu Sekhar Bandapadhaya (Supra), is directly on the point and having regard to the conflicting opinions, I am inclined to follow the earlier Bench decision. It has to be emphasised that Order 34 deals with suits relating to the mortgages of immovable property. Under Order 34, Rule 4, in a suit for sale, the Court shall pass a preliminary decree to the effect mentioned, inter alia, in Rule 2(1)(c) of Order 34. No discretion has been left to Court in fixing the time for payment under the preliminary decree it is consented to by the decree holder. The final decree only directs sale in view of the default committed by the judgment-debtor. In a mortgage decree it is usual practice not to grant a personal decree until sale has been carried out and the deficiency ascertained. The suit as framed by the Bank is for a personal money decree against the defendant and also for a declaration of charge and sale of the hypothecated movable assets. In a mortgage decree it is usual practice not to grant a personal decree until sale has been carried out and the deficiency ascertained. The suit as framed by the Bank is for a personal money decree against the defendant and also for a declaration of charge and sale of the hypothecated movable assets. The defendant against whom a money decree is passed, can always ask for instalment for payment of the decretal dues. If such instalments are granted by the Court, then so long such instalments are being paid, the question of sale of the hypothecated movable assets would not arise. Otherwise the grant of instalments would be rendered completely nugatory. On the one hand the decree-holder obtains a personai decree and on the other a decree for sale. These two decrees cannot be executed simultaneously. If it is like a mortgage suit, then a preliminary decree has to be passed and thereafter a decree for sale and if after the sale the dues of the bank are not realised, then the Bank has to ask for a personal decree. At that time the Court will have the jurisdiction to grant instalments under Order 20, Rule 11 to the judgment-debtor. Assuming in a case where hypothecated assets are non-existent or not available or the judgment-debtor has no title at all in the assets to be sold, in that even the bank has to obtain a personal decree only and there the Court could grant the instalmeuts under Order 20, Rule 11. It is, therefore, evident that the decree passed in bank suit where the movable assets are involved, is a decree for payment of definite sum of money irrespective of the fact whether a declaration of charge or prayer for sale has been made. The ratio of the decision in the case of Bidhu Sekhar Bandhopadhya (Supra), shall apply to the facts of this case. A decree passed may include a decree for money as also a decree for other reliefs. Order 20, Rule 11 empowers the Court to grant relief to the judgment-debtor either by postponment of payment of decretal dues to a certain period by granting instalments. This provision should be liberally construed and should Dot be confined to the decree for money simpliciter. Order 20, Rule 11 opens with the phrase "in so far as", It means "to the extent". This provision should be liberally construed and should Dot be confined to the decree for money simpliciter. Order 20, Rule 11 opens with the phrase "in so far as", It means "to the extent". If it narrow view is taken and Order 20, Rule 11 only is held to be applicable to money decree simpliciter and not to any composite decree as in the case of bank suit, in that event the words "In so far as" and "notwithstanding anything contained in the contract under which money is payble" would be nugatory. Legislative intent is quite clear. Where several reliefs have been granted to the decree holder, in so far as the relief is decree for money the Court will be entitled to give relief to the judgment-debtor by either postponing the payment or granting instalments. In other words, to the extent the decree is for money, the Court passing the decree will be at liberty to grant instalment for payment of the amount decreed. I am therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant instalments in this suit. 18. Assuming that the Court has no power to grant instalments to the judgment-debtor to payoff the decretal dues, but in view of the decision of New Glencoe Tea Company (Supra), the court can postpone the payment of the amount decreed for a specified period. In that case the Appeal Court, inter alia, decreed as follows : "The joint Receivers will not interfere with the administration of the tea estate but they would effect sale of all the products and collect all the book debts and other dues and out of the sale proceeds and collection keeping apart such sum as would be necessary to meet the wages and salaries of employees and other day to day expenditures, the rest would be paid to the bank in pro tanto satisfaction of the decretal amount. If the entire decrelal amount be not liquidated and/or otherwise paid by defendant No. 1 within three years all the hypothecated movables would be sold and the sale proceeds be paid to the plaintiff in proportionate satisfaction of the decretal dues." (Emphasis Supplied) 19. If the entire decrelal amount be not liquidated and/or otherwise paid by defendant No. 1 within three years all the hypothecated movables would be sold and the sale proceeds be paid to the plaintiff in proportionate satisfaction of the decretal dues." (Emphasis Supplied) 19. It, therefore, appears that although the Appeal Court did not grant monthly instalments to the judgment-debtor, it in fact allowed time for three years to the defendant to payoff the decretal dues and the Joint Receivers were directed to pay surplus to the bank in pro tanto satisfaction of the decretal amount. Thus even in such a suit a time limit may be fixed to enable the defendant to liquidate the decretal dues either at a time or by such instalments as the defendant may choose to avail of. It is a matter of procedure, the substance remaining the same. The Court passing a decree has the power to stay the execution of a decree or part thereof for a specified period. In a suit like this where a composite decree for payment of money and decree for sale of the hypothecated assets are made the Court passing the decree can stay the execution of the decree for sale for a specified period allowing the judgment debtors to payoff the amount decreed in the meantime. It is immaterial, whether the defendants are directed or are given liberty to liquidate the dues within the specified period by monthly instalments or otherwise. I am, therefore, of the view that the defendants in this case may be allowed time to liquidate the amount decreed by fixed monthly amount irrespective of profit or loss of the business and so long such payments will be made the decree for sale would remain stayed. In default of payment, however, the decree for sale would become executable forthwith. The judgment-debtor, therefore, cannot get the benefit of stay of execution of the decree for sale unless the judgment debtors go on paying the fixed monthly instalments. On the ether hand so Ion g as the judgment debtors go on paying the instalments, the decree-holder can realise a part of the decretal amount. 20. It has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Bank that in this case the defendants are not entitled to have discretionary relief from the Court as they have suppressed material facts. 20. It has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Bank that in this case the defendants are not entitled to have discretionary relief from the Court as they have suppressed material facts. Firstly, they have not disclosed the maintenance of accounts with other banks and secondly they have taken a stand that the stock of hosiery goods have not been- hypothecated and they are only a bailee of the hosiery goods. If the decree is not satisfied the value of the plant and machinary alone would not be sufficient to cover the decretal dues. He has, therefore, submitted that this Court should consider ail these facts in granting the instalments to the defendants. 21. On the other hand the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that pursuant to the direction of this Court the defendants have already paid a bout Rs. 3 lakhs towards the claim in the suit. Unless easy reasonable instalments are allowed the defendants would not be able to payoff the entire decretal dues nor would it be possible for them to carryon the business. It is also submitted if the business is not carried on, more than 300 workmen would become jobless and ultimately the business has to be closed down. It also submitted that there has been no suppression and the bank accounts with other banks have been opened with the knowledge of the plaintiff. It is also submitted that the stocks were never hypothecated to the bank. 22. It appears that on 7th April, 1983 a Deed of hypothecated was executed by the Defendant No. 1 which shows that whole of the borrower's stock consisting of stocks of chemicals, dyes, miscellaneous stores and spare parts, hosiery cloth etc. were hypothecated to the bank. 23. The Deed of Hypothecation dated 7th September, 1983 shows that the whole of the borrower's stocks consisting of stocks of chemicals, dyes, miscellaneous stores, coal, cloths etc. were hypothecated to the Bank. 24. By the Deed of Hypothecation dated 27th April, 1984 the whole of the borrower's stocks consisting of storks of chemical, dyes, miscellaneous stores, coal, cloth (All current assets) had been hypothecated. 25. On 28th February, 1985 and 30th April, 1985 the Defendant No. 1 submitted the statements of stocks/stores in Godown/Factory hypothecated to the plaintiff bank. 24. By the Deed of Hypothecation dated 27th April, 1984 the whole of the borrower's stocks consisting of storks of chemical, dyes, miscellaneous stores, coal, cloth (All current assets) had been hypothecated. 25. On 28th February, 1985 and 30th April, 1985 the Defendant No. 1 submitted the statements of stocks/stores in Godown/Factory hypothecated to the plaintiff bank. The first statement dated 28th February, 1985 would show stocks of finished goods, dyes and chemicals, miscellaneous stores and coal but in the statement tiled on 30th April, 1985 no particulars of the stock of finished goods had been given. 26. It appears that there is some confusion regarding the goods which have been hypothecated to the bank. 27. By a letter dated 15th May, 1978 the United Bank of India informed the first defendant that the first defendant was required to prepare the stock statement "depicting the details of chemicals and stores" but that was not done. Accordingly the first defendant was requested to send a list of item of the stocks with details of quantity and value. 28. By a letter dated 15th February, 1979 the credit limit was increased from Rs. 11 lakhs to Rs. 15 lakhs. The primary securities mentioned therein are chemicals, dyes and book debts, plant and machinery (present and future) equitable mortgage of lease-hold property, Lancashire boiler obtained by the company on lease. The additional securities mentioned are (a) personal guarantee of all the Director and (b) hypothecation of all tangible assets to cover the entire credit line. Therefore, the bank enhanced the credit limit from Rs.38.98 lakhs to Rs. 57 86 lakhs by a letter dated 5th April, 1983. The said letter, inter alia, provides as follows : "We are pleased to advise you having agreed at your request to enhance your overall limit from Rs. 38.98 lakhs to Rs. 57.86 lakhs under the following sub-limits and terms and conditions : 1. Overall Limit Rs. 57.86 lakhs a) Cash Credit (Hypo) against stock and books debts. Rs. 2100 lakhs b) Working Capital Term Loan A/c. Rs. 3.00 " c) Term Loan A/c. I Rs. 9.00 " d) Term Loan A/c. II Rs. 9.00 " e) IDBI Deferred Payment Guarantee. Rs. 15.86 " 2. Primary Securities a) 1st Hypothecation charge on all Current Assets of the Company. Rs. 2100 lakhs b) Working Capital Term Loan A/c. Rs. 3.00 " c) Term Loan A/c. I Rs. 9.00 " d) Term Loan A/c. II Rs. 9.00 " e) IDBI Deferred Payment Guarantee. Rs. 15.86 " 2. Primary Securities a) 1st Hypothecation charge on all Current Assets of the Company. b) 1st hypothecation charge on all plant and machineries procured under IDBI Deferred Payment Guarantee (for IDBI Deferred Payment Guarantee outstandings). c) 1st pari-passu hypothecation charge with WBFC on all movable fixed assets present and future except plant and machineries procured under IDBI Deferred Payment Guarnttee (for Bank's Term Loans and Working Capital Term Loan). d) Negative Lien on Building situated on leasehold land. 3. Additional Securities a) 2nd hypothecation charge on the movable fixed assets including plant and machineries subject to aforesaid 1st charges. b) Personal guarantee of the Directors" It, therefore, appears that the bank was satisfied before the credit limit was increased about the securities furnished by the first defendant. Whatever stocks and current assets are shown in the Profit & Loss Account and Balance Sheet must necessarily be the assets of the first defendant. The question of taking any contrary stand by the first defendant at this stage does not and cannot arise at all. In 1985, the credit limit was increased by the Bank from Rs. 38.98 lakhs to Rs. 57.86 lakhs which would show that the Bank duly considered the nature and extent, adequance and sufficiency of the securities before such enhancement was allowed. It is not the case of the bank that the securities are in jeopardy. The securities may be sold at a later stage if and when the defendants fail to make the payment in terms of the decree. In that view of the matter the appointment of the Receiver for sale of the assets will not solve any problem. The sale of the assets by the Bank will not enure to the benefit of the Bank or of the constituents. It is for the interest of all that the factory should be run and the Bank be paid its dues by instalments. Reserve Bank of India has also issued words of caution in this regard. Reference may be made to report of the Study Group to Frame Guidelines for Follow up of Bank Credit "published by the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, 1975. Reserve Bank of India has also issued words of caution in this regard. Reference may be made to report of the Study Group to Frame Guidelines for Follow up of Bank Credit "published by the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, 1975. At page 59 of the said Report the following guideline has been given: "12.15. It is true that even the best of systems cannot altogether prevent poor performance and sticky advances cannot entirely be avoided. However, once danger signals are thrown up and signs of difficulty emerge, speedy action is called for on the part of the banker and timely and firm holding are of essence. In dealing with large industrial advances in particular the banker's interests are best served not by sale and recovery of the security charged to the bank but by seeking implementation of appropriate measures to overcome the incipient difficulties." (Emphasis Supplied) For the reasons aforesaid this suit and the application are disposed of by the following decree and order: There will be a decree for Rs. 67,11,944.09 p. against the defendant Nos. 1 to 7. There will be also a decree for interest from 1st April, 1986 till 30th June, 1986 i.e., the date of institution of the suit at the contractual rate of 18% per annum on the sum Rs. 65,06,944.09 p. These will be decree in terms of prayers (c) and prayer (d), but this decree shall not be executed until the time hereinafter mentioned. 29. The plaintiff will be entitled to costs of the suit as well as the costs of the application. 30. Having regard to the fact that the defendant Nos. 1 to 7 have already paid a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- as directed by the earlier order, which has been appropriated by the bank towards its claim in the suit, the decree will stand reduced to Rs.64.11,944/-. The interim interest will be calculated at the rate of 10% on the reducing principal of Rs. 67,11,944/- from the date of the suit. Interest on judgment on the principal decretal sum of Rs. 64,11,944/- will be calculated at the rate of 8%. 31. For the months of October, 1987, November, 1987 and December, 1987 the defendants shall pay instalments as directed below : Rs. 80,000/- by 15th October, 1987 Rs. 1,00,000/- by 15th November, 1987 and Rs. 1,00,000/- by 15th December, 1987. Interest on judgment on the principal decretal sum of Rs. 64,11,944/- will be calculated at the rate of 8%. 31. For the months of October, 1987, November, 1987 and December, 1987 the defendants shall pay instalments as directed below : Rs. 80,000/- by 15th October, 1987 Rs. 1,00,000/- by 15th November, 1987 and Rs. 1,00,000/- by 15th December, 1987. Thereafter from the month of January, 1988 the defendant shall pay monthly instalments as follows: 1988 at the rate of Rs. 75,000/- 1989 at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- 1990 at the rate of Rs. 1,25,000/- 1991 at the rate of Rs. 1,50,000/- 1992 at the rate of Rs. 1,75,000/- 32. From January, 1993, the defendants shall pay instalments at the rate of Rs. 2,00,000/- per month until the entire decretal dues with interests and costs are fully paid off. 33. All such monthly instalments shall be paid within the last date of each month. The payments shall be made by the defendants without obtaining the signed copy of the operative part. All payments shall first be adjusted against the decretal principal and the interest on judgment shall be calculated on the reducing decretal principal. 34. In default of payment of any three instalments, the plaintiff will be at liberty to execute the decree for the sum remaining due and payable and shall also beat liberty to ask for sale of the hypothecated assets. 35. Mr. Ananda Ghose will continue as Receiver, but he will not interfere with the carrying on of the business of the defendants until any default is committed in terms of this decree and order whereupon the Receiver shall taken possession of the hypothecated assets. The Receiver shall be paid a monthly remuneration of 20 Gms. by the defendants. The order of injunction will continue, but this will not prevent the defendants from carrying on the business in the usual course subject to the default clause made hereinbefore. 36. The suit and the application are disposed of accordingly. Receiver and all parties shall act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of this judgment, decree and order on the undertaking of the Advocate-on-Record for petitioner to apply for and obtain certified copy.