ORDER K.M. Natarajan, J. 1. These two revisions are directed against the common order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Madurai, in C.M.A. Nos. 3 and 4 of 1986 dismissing the appeals filed by the revision-petitioner. 2. The facts which give rise to these revisions are briefly as follows:-The respondent filed the suit in O.S. No. 122 of 1977 on the file of the District Munsif, Melur against this revision petitioner, who is the fifth defendant in the suit, and 15 others, for partition and separate possession of her 1/6th share in the suit properties. The revision petitioner was set ex parte. A preliminary decree was passed in the above suit on 18-8-1978 and a final decree was passed on 18-1-1984. According to the revision-petitioner, she came to know of the passing of the preliminary decree and the final decree only on 18-1-1985 when the Amin of the Court along with the village officials and the Surveyor came in a body in connection with the execution of these decrees. On her objection, they returned without executing the decree. Thereafter she consulted her lawyer and filed the applications. She filed I.A. No. 37 of 1985 and I.A. No. 38 of 1985 to set aside the preliminary decree and the final decree respectively. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is stated that her name is Muthupillai and not Mookkathal and no summons or notice was served on her. There was no such person as Mookathal in the village. There was no proper service of the summons and that the respondent-plaintiff in collusion with her brother (16th defendant) created records and obtained the decree. Since, the applications were filed immediately on coming to know of the passing of the decree, they were not barred by limitation. Further, she has got valid defence in the suit. Hence she field the two applications. 3. The said applications were resisted by the respondent-plaintiff and in the counter-affidavit it is stated that the real name of the petitioner is only Mookathal. The suit summons sent through court were duly acknowledged by her. Since she did not appear, she was set exparte and a preliminary decree was passed. Similarly, notice were taken in the final decree proceedings and after effecting proper service, exparte final decree was passed. The suit summons sent through court were duly acknowledged by her. Since she did not appear, she was set exparte and a preliminary decree was passed. Similarly, notice were taken in the final decree proceedings and after effecting proper service, exparte final decree was passed. Even in E.P. No. 244 of 1984 the petitioner refused to receive the same and an exparte order was passed on 20-11-1984. In the suit filed by Kasilingam, paternal uncle of the petitioner, in O.S. No. 331 of 1972 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai, the petitioner was also arrayed as a defendant and she was described as Mookathal and she entered appearance through lawyer Mr. K. Gopalakrishnan the said suit was dismissed on 28-2-1974, she did not raise any objection in the said proceedings that her name was Muthupillai and not 'Mookathal'. The petitioner has no valid defence in the suit. The petitions have been filed only to protract the proceedings. 4. The District Munsif, who enquired both the petitions, dismissed them holding that there was no sufficient ground to set aside the ex parte preliminary decree and the final decree. The petitioner was unsuccessful before the appellate Court also. Hence these two revisions. 5. The learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner mainly contended that the name of the petitioner is only Muthupillai and both the Courts below ought to have accepted the two documents, namely, Ex.A.1 Record-sheet, and Ex.A.2 Voters' List filed on behalf of the petitioner and held that her name is not Mookathal but only Muthupillai. Further, even in the previous suit O.S. No. 331 of 1972 the petitioner filed Vakalat only as Muthupillai. According to the learned Counsel, both the courts below overlooked the fact that at no time, any notice was served on the petitioner either by post or through Court and that the petitioner came to know of the proceedings only on 18-1-1985. 6. As far as the first contention that the petitioner's name is only Muthupillai and not Mookathal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on ExA.1 which is the record-sheet given to the petitioner from the school where she studied. Though the petitioner relied on the said document s one relating to her studies, it is disputed by the respondent-plaintiff. 6. As far as the first contention that the petitioner's name is only Muthupillai and not Mookathal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on ExA.1 which is the record-sheet given to the petitioner from the school where she studied. Though the petitioner relied on the said document s one relating to her studies, it is disputed by the respondent-plaintiff. The courts below have pointed out that in view of the fact that the authenticity of the copy of the record-sheet itself is disputed, the petitioner ought to have examined the concerned Headmaster or the person who prepared the document. Further, there is nothing to show from which document the copy was taken. The application form for admission from which the entries were made in the school register was not produced and no steps were taken in this regard. Hence, the courts below have not placed any reliance on Ex.A.1 true copy of the record-sheet filed in this case. As regards the Voter's List, which is marked as Ex.A.2, the same was not accepted by the Courts below. Though Sl. No. 297 shows the name of the voter s Muthupillai and her husband Arumugham, it is observed by the courts below that there is absolutely nothing to show as to who gave the information and it is not safe to act on the ipse dixit of the petitioner herself to hold that it relates to the petitioner. To rebut the same, the respondent produced Ex.B.1 decree copy in O.S. No. 331 of 1972 on the file of the Sub Judge, Madurai, dated 28-2-1974. The said suit was filed by the 16th defendant in this suit against the petitioner who was also arrayed as the 5th defendant in the said suit. Therein she was described as Mookathal. Not only the petitioner herein but also her brothers, sisters and mother were made as parties and the all entered appearance through lawyer Mr. P.V. Subramaniam. If really her name is not Mookathal, the plaintiff in the said suit who is no other than her paternal uncle, would not have given a different name. Further, she also would not have kept quiet. The plaintiff in the said suit was also examined in this petition as R.W.1 He also asserted that he being the paternal uncle of the petitioner herein, knew that her name is only Mookathal and not Muthupillai. Further, she also would not have kept quiet. The plaintiff in the said suit was also examined in this petition as R.W.1 He also asserted that he being the paternal uncle of the petitioner herein, knew that her name is only Mookathal and not Muthupillai. Both the courts below took note of the fact that the plaintiff in the present suit is the paternal aunt of the revision-petitioner and her evidence coupled with Ex.B.1 decree copy which came even in the year 1974 clearly established that her name was only Mookathal and not Muthupillai. Learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner now contended that though her name as described as Mookathal, she signed only as Muthupillai in the vakalat. But no steps were taken to produce the vakalat and there is absolutely nothing to substantiate the same that she has signed only as Muthupillai. The lower appellate court has even stated that she might be known even as Mookathal alias Muthupillai. As such in any event it cannot be said that she has no name as Muthupillai. It is only for the purpose of the petition, how such a contention was raised. It is not the case of the petitioner that there is any other person in the name of Mookathal wife of Arumugham available in the village. Hence, in view of the concurrent findings of both the courts, I find that the name of the revision petitioner is Mookathal. It cannot be said that the said finding is not supported by any evidence or suffers from any infirmity whatsoever. 7. The next question that remains to be considered is whether there was proper service of summons before ever the preliminary decree and the final decree were passed against the petitioner. It is the case of the revision-petitioner that she has not been served with any notice and that she had no knowledge till 18-1-1985 when the court amin came to execute the decree. But, it is the contention of the respondent that so far as the preliminary decree in concerned, summons were taken by registered post through court as well as through process server and both of them were served on this petitioner along with other defendants 4, 10 and 11 on 5-12-1977. The fourth defendant is no other than the sister of the petitioner. Defendants 10 and 11 are also admittedly close relations. The fourth defendant is no other than the sister of the petitioner. Defendants 10 and 11 are also admittedly close relations. The Process Server after effecting the service, filed an affidavit before the Court officer. The service was also attested by one Arumugham besides the Village menial. Both the Courts below accepted the said service holding that there is absolutely no reason for rejecting the version of the court process server and the postman. The above fact of service of summons was spoken to by R.Ws. 1 and 2, the respondent and the paternal uncle of the petitioner respectively and there is absolutely nothing to reject their testimony. The petitioner failed to establish that such summons were not served on her. The notice taken through post was acknowledged b her on 7-12-1977. As against this evidence, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the burden is on the respondent to examine the summons serving officer that there was proper compliance of Order 5, Rule 19, C.P.C. and the trial Court erred in throwing the blame on the petitioner. It is contended that the burden is only on the plaintiff to examine the postman and establish the service of notice and that the lower court erred in throwing the burden on the petitioner dew my attention to Order 5, Rule 19 Code of Civil Procedure and submitted that it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove the service and that he ought to have examined the serving officer. He drew my attention to the decision of Sambhunath Das v. Sirish Ox. Mohpatra. In that case, while considering Order 5, Rules 17 and 19, C.P.C. in similar circumstance where service through process served by affixture was effected and the defendant denied the service, it was held that if the plaintiff failed to examine the process server, it cannot be said that there was sufficient service of summons. In that case reliance was placed on the earlier decision in Reghunath Pani v. Radhakant Deb wherein it was held that the onus of proof lay on the party who asserted that there was sufficient service of summons. Therefore, such party should prove by examination of the Process Server that service of summons, was duly effected according to the provisions of Order 5 of the Code. Therefore, such party should prove by examination of the Process Server that service of summons, was duly effected according to the provisions of Order 5 of the Code. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to the decision of this Court in Nataraja Iyer v. Nacharammal where it was held: It would appear from Order 5, Rule 9(20), Code of Civil Procedure, that even though summons was sent by post, if the defendant did not appear on the day fixed on the summons, the court has to direct that the summons should be delivered or sent to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates of the defendant. In the context in which the word 'may' is used, it has to be interpreted as 'shall'. The word 'may includes 'may not' but is also capable of meaning 'must' or 'shall', depending upon the context in which it is used. Where a discretion is conferred upon the court coupled with obligation, the word 'may' denotes 'shall'. It is the duty of the courts in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the legislature. The learned Judge ultimately held that if the defendant disputes the service of summons by post, it cannot be held to be sufficient to sustain the exparte decree or exparte order, observing that the court has no control over the postman and there is every possibility of the summons or notice being served on a wrong person with the same name, and the service of summons through court again if the defendant does not appear after the purported service of summons by post was deemed necessary and laid down in the abovesaid rule. Relying on the above decision, the learned Counsel submitted that the court below ought not lo have accepted the acknowledgment of the service of summons sent through post without resorting to service of summons under Order 5, Rule 19, C.P.C. and in the instant case, there is no proper service even in respect of the passing of the exparte preliminary decree. The learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner in support of his contention cited the decision reported in Dr. Cherian v. Ramaswami Naidu, where P. Venugopal. The learned Counsel for the revision-petitioner in support of his contention cited the decision reported in Dr. Cherian v. Ramaswami Naidu, where P. Venugopal. J., observed: When summons is returned under Order 5, Rule 19, and if the return under the rule has not been verified by the affidavit of the serving officer on oath, the Court may examine him or cause him to be so examined by another court touching his proceedings, and may make such further enquiry into the matter as it thinks fit. It is further observed in the said decision: The requirement under law is that besides the report of the serving officer under Order 5, Rule 17, there must have been an affidavit of the serving officer under Order 6, Rule 19. Since no affidavit was taken by the Nazir, it was incumbent on the Court under the first part of the Order 5, Rule 19 to examine the serving officer on oath. Since, that was not done, there is no valid service of notice under Order 21, Rule 66. The requirement under Order 5, Rule 19, is mandatory and a sale held in contravention of that mandatory requirement is not a mere irregularity, but would have the effect of making the sale a nullity. The learned Counsel submitted that in the instant case since the said requirement as contemplated has not been complied with, the Court ought to have held that there is no valid and proper service of summons. In Nawabjan v. Krishnan Chettiar Ramanujam, J., held: The affixture of notice of execution petition on the appellant's residence on his refusal to accept the notice appears to be due service as contemplated by Order 5, Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code. So long as the statutory provision contemplates service by affixture when the party refuses to receive the summons, it cannot be said that there has been no proper service. In Munassar Bin v. Fatima Begum, while dealing with an appeal against the order rejecting the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, it was held that if the return by a process server under Order 5, Rule 19, is supported by the affidavit of the serving officer, it is left to the discretion of the Court to examine him on oath or not. In the above quoted case, me Court, did not think it necessary to examine the serving officer on oath. In the above quoted case, me Court, did not think it necessary to examine the serving officer on oath. It was held that the service was sufficient and it cannot be said that the court was not justified in doing so. In Y. Anasuyamma v. C. Raghavam it was held: Notwithstanding the Explanation to Article 123, Limitation Act, 1963, that substituted service under Order 5. Rule 20, C.P.C, shall not be deemed to be due service, in view of the Second Proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9, C.P.C. to the effect that an ex parte decree should not be set aside merely for irregularity in the service of summons where the defendant knew about the hearing and had enough time, to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim, in a case whether the mother and son, defendants in the suit, lived in the same house and were served with summons by substituted service, the son filed written statement, the mother's version that she did not know about the suit was rejected and the exparte decree against him was refused to be set aside. The further fact that all the other defendants too lived in the same village also disproved her version. Although the contents of the written statement filed by her son were irrelevant, the fact that the written statement was filed was relevant. Ultimately, it was held in that decision that in view of the fact that the defendant had knowledge of the proceedings, the decree need not be set aside, In Ellappa Naicker v. Arumuga Servai it was held that the non-examination of the serving officer on oath amounts to procedural irregularity. In Saradamani v. Rajendran 94 L.W. 407, Balasubrahmanyan, J. while dealing with the setting aside an exparte decree observed that in the absence of material to show in what manner the passing of the exparte order had prejudiced the interests of the applicant, the question of setting aside ex parte decree does not arise. Applying the ratio in the above decision to the facts of the instant case, it is seen that so far as the preliminary decree is concerned, the summons was served through registered post and the same was acknowledged by the petitioner herein on 7-12-1977 and that the summons sent through the process server was served on 5-12-1977. On 5-12-1977 the summons were served on the petitioner herein and three other defendants. On 5-12-1977 the summons were served on the petitioner herein and three other defendants. The process server returned the served summons with an affidavit and the endorsement of service is also attested by witnesses. Further, it is also corroborated by the evidence of the respondent-plaintiff and also the paternal uncle of the petitioner herein. He was also a defendant in the suit. He was examined as R.W.2 in the petition. Their evidence is to the effect that they were present at the time of service effected by the process server. Since the petitioner did not appear, she was set ex parte. One of her sisters, who is also a defendant in the suit, by name Gandhimathi, contested the suit and he was declared entitled to 1/54th share in the properties. It is seen that the petitioner's lawful share was also declared on merits also on the objection raised by the other defendants who are equally entitled to a share. The preliminary decree was passed on 18-8-1978 and the present application was filed only in 1985, about 7 years later. In this connection, it is worthwhile to quote the decision reported in Sambhunath D. v. Sirish Ch. Mohapatra A.I.R. 1085 Orissa 215 where, in para 9 it is stated that in M.P. Swami v. Mangaram Agarwalla A.I.R. 1979 Orissa 11 relying on the two decision of the Supreme Court reported in Radha Krishna v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chindamana Venkata Ramana, it was held that where a notice sent by post in a registered cover is returned by the postman with the endorsement that the addressee refused to receive it and the posting of the notice has been proved, there arises presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the addressee did refuse to receive it even though the postman has not been produced to prove tender and refusal. Ultimately it was held in the above quoted decisions: ...On the proof of the facts that a prepaid properly addressed postal cover containing the notice and summons was sent by registered post and when acknowledgment purporting to be signed by the defendant or his agent is received by the Court or the postal article containing the notice and summons is received back by the Court with an endorsement purported to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the defendant or his agent has refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the notice and summons when tendered to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the notice and summons has been duly served on the defendant and upon such declaration service by registered post on the defendant shall be deemed to be sufficient. If the defendant shall challenge that he did not either receive the notice and summons which was not offered to him nor did he refuse the same, the onus will lie on him to prove the contrary by doing which he may examine the postman or any other employee of the Postal Department entrusted with the duty of delivering the registered postal cover. In the instant case, as against the evidence of service of notice through registered post which has been sent by Court, the burden is on the petitioner to show that it was not received by her and she has not discharged the same. On the other hand, the courts below accepted the said acknowledgment as well as the summons served on her personally by the process server, which is supported by the affidavit of the serving officer, and held the service sufficient and set her ex parte. As regards the service of summons by the process server also, which is proved by his affidavit, the same has been accepted by the courts below and it cannot be said that the same is in any illegal or improper on account of the non-examination of the process server, in view of the ratio laid down in Nawabjan v. Krishnan Chettiar; Y. Anasuyamma v. C. Raghavamma and Ellappa Naicker v. Arumuga Servai A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 5. 8. 5. 8. As regards the final decree proceedings, it is seen from the concurrent findings of both the courts below that summons were taken thrice to the revision-petitioner on 18-4-1980, 14-7-1980 and 5-9-1980 and on all the three occasions, the main affixed the notice on the house of the petitioner. On one occasion on 5-9-1980 when the process server went to effect service, the petitioner is said to have received the copy of the notice and refused to sign the same and thereafter it was affixed. In respect of the same, the process server has given affidavit along with the return and it is attested by the village menial. It is further stated that R.W.2, paternal uncle of the petitioner, identified the petitioner to the process server at the time of the said service of notice. Since the petitioner did not appear in spite of the notice, a Commissioner was appointed and in pursuance of the report of the Commissioner, the final decree was passed, about a year before filing of the petition. My attention was drawn to the decision in Mali Ram Bharma v. Gayatri Devi wherein it was held: Where an application was filed for setting aside the ex parte decree which was dismissed by the trial and appellate court and the trial court as well as the court of appeal had jurisdiction to decide the list arising out of the application, it was held that if the said courts had power to adjudicate on the question before them, High Court will not assist the defendants-applicants even if in its view, the court of appeal has acted erroneously and has rendered a decision with which this Court does not agree. In other words, if the court has jurisdiction to decide the matter, it may act rightly or wrongly in the exercise of its illegally with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction that a revision at the instance of aggrieved party can lie. In the said decision it was also held that the effect of the addition of the Proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9 is that the irregularity in the service of summons is no longer a ground sufficient for setting aside an ex parte decree if the defendant had knowledge that such a decree had been passed against him. In the said decision it was also held that the effect of the addition of the Proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9 is that the irregularity in the service of summons is no longer a ground sufficient for setting aside an ex parte decree if the defendant had knowledge that such a decree had been passed against him. It was also held that after amendment, the provisions contained in Rule 19 of Order 5 are only directory and not mandatory. Applying the ratio laid down in the said decision to the facts of the present case, in view of Rule 19 of Order 5, it cannot be said that the concurrent findings of both the courts below suffer from any irregularity so as to warrant interference with the concurrent findings of both the courts below in respect of the petitioner regarding setting aside the ex parte final, decree. As already stated, there is absolutely no material in this case to show that in what manner the passing of the final decree has prejudiced the litigant. In view of the close relationship between the parties also, it cannot be said that the petitioner had no knowledge of the proceedings. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are not at all helpful to the case of the petitioner. Both the courts below rightly observed that there is proper service of summons in respect of both the preliminary decree and the final decree. Further, the petitioner to set aside the ex parte decree proceedings, so also in respect of the final decree proceedings after the service was affected by the amin in view of the fact that there is evidence that the petitioner was apprised of the proceedings and she had an occasion to go through the summons when the amin tendered the summons. For all these reasons, both the revisions fail and stand dismissed. There is no order as to costs.