Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the Post Master, Punalur and the Superintendent of Post Offices. Pathanamthitta, challenging the judgment of the learned single judge in OP No. 4950 of 1981. The respondent was appointed as an Extra Departmental Stamp Vendor as per Memo dated 6-7-1981 issued by the first appellant in the promotion vacancy of Thyagarajan Pillai. She joined the service and was continuing to discharge the functions of the said post. Thereafter by Ext. P3 Issued by the 2nd appellant, the first appellant was directed to terminate the services of the respondent with immediate effect under R.6 of the Extra Departmental Agents Conduct And Service Rules, and to call for fresh applications to make fresh selection in the light of the instructions issued on the subject. The reason given for such a direction in Ext. P3 is that the 2nd appellant noticed that the test prescribed for making the selection as laid down in P.M.G. Trivandrum letter No. STA/1/28/Reg. dated 29-10-1986 has not been followed and further that the respondent is a near relation of the departmental official working in the same office and that such an action is also contrary to the instructions laid down in Dg. P & T. Letter No. 43/36/64 Pen. dated 17-10-1966. It is also stated that the order of appointment given by the first appellant is not in the prescribed form. The responded challenged this direction contained in Ext. P3 in the writ petition. But during the pendency of the writ petition, the first appellant acting in pursuance of Ext. P3 terminated the services of the respondent by issuing the order Ext. P6 dated 29-9-1981. It is stated therein that the services of the respondent are terminated with immediate effect. By amending the Original Petition, Ext. P6 order was also challenged. 2. The learned single judge has allowed the Original Petition and quashed Ext. P6 and directed the appellants to re-employ the respondent and pay her full salary and other benefits which she would have received had her services not been terminated. It is the said judgment that is challenged in this appeal. 3. The power that was exercised for terminating the services of the respondent by the first appellate is under R.6 of the P. & T. Extra Departmental Agents Conduct and Service Rules. It is the said judgment that is challenged in this appeal. 3. The power that was exercised for terminating the services of the respondent by the first appellate is under R.6 of the P. & T. Extra Departmental Agents Conduct and Service Rules. The 2nd appellant called upon the first appellant to terminate the services of the respondent in exercise of the power conferred by the said provision. The contention of Sri Madhavan Nambiar, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that all the conditions stipulated under R.6 having been satisfactorily fulfilled, the exercise of the power could not have been interfered with. For the sake of convenience R.6 is extracted below: "The services of an employee who has not already rendered more than three years' continuous service from the date of his appointment shall be liable to termination by the appointing authority at any time without notice for generally unsatisfactory work, or on any administrative ground unconnected with his conduct." It is not the case of the appellants that the termination was on the ground of unsatisfactory work of the respondent. The precise case of the appellants as put forward before the learned single judge and also before us is that the termination was on account of administrative grounds unconnected with the conduct of the respondent. Administrative grounds, according to Sri Madhavan Nambiar, are that the first appellant failed to follow the procedure prescribed in the matter of making the selection and in the matter of issuing the order of appointment in the prescribed form. Though there is reference to another reason, namely, that the respondent was related to an official of the department, it was submitted that it was only an incidental statement and that is not one of the reasons for termination. We shall therefore examine as to whether the reason put forward, namely, non-compliance with the procedure prescribed and issuance of the order in a Form other than the prescribed Form can be regarded as an administrative ground contemplated by R.6 justifying termination of service without notice. Termination on any administrative ground unconnected with the conduct of the respondent is that administrative ground or reason which has come into existence or which has arises after appointment. It does not contemplate irregularities if any conducted in the process of selection itself or in the matter of appointment. Termination on any administrative ground unconnected with the conduct of the respondent is that administrative ground or reason which has come into existence or which has arises after appointment. It does not contemplate irregularities if any conducted in the process of selection itself or in the matter of appointment. R.6 contemplates termination of service of an employee who has not already rendered more than three years' continuous service which pre-supposes that the appointment has been made properly and that a situation has arisen which is purely of an administrative character which requires termination of an employee who is otherwise properly appointed. Hence we have no hesitation in taking the view that the termination of service on any administrative ground contemplated by R.6 is a ground or reason that arises after the appointment and that on grounds that have arisen before or in regard to the appointment, termination cannot be done under R.6. As it is not the case of the appellants that there was any administrative ground or reason which has arisen after the appointment of the respondent, we have no hesitation in taking the view that R.6 could not have been pressed into service by the appellants. Hence on this short ground the termination of the respondent is liable to be vacated as the same has been brought about in violation of R.6. We therefore see no good grounds to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge. We would however make it clear that the allowing of the Original Petition does not and shall not come in the way of the authorities taking appropriate action if so advised in accordance with law. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.