JUDGMENT : R.A. Jahagirdar, J. - This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the order dated 20th of May, 1979 passed by the Labour Court at Kolhapur in I.D.A. Application No. 155 of 1975 filed by the petitioner. That application was made u/s 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The case of the petitioner ought to be briefly mentioned. By an order dated 14th of November, 1956, the Executive Engineer, Ratnagiri Division, the petitioner was appointed as a Mechanic on Work-charged establishment to work on the Boring Plant in Kankavli Sub-Division. The scale of pay which was offered to the petitioner was Rs. 60-4-100. According to the petitioner, his name had been suggested by the Employment Officer of Kolhapur for the post of a Boring Mechanic to be filled in by the office of the Executive Engineer of Ratnagiri. The scale of pay attaching to the post of the Boring Mechanic was Rs. 100-5-150. This was so on 1st of January 1957. After joining the duty, the petitioner noticed that there was no such post known as Mechanic on Boring Plant, but there was a post known as Boring mechanic. Naturally he made inquiries and found that the scale of pay attaching to the post of Boring Mechanic was much higher than the one which was offered to him, though he was appointed as a Mechanic in connection with the work done on boring Plant. 3. The petitioner made several representations to the higher authorities. Material on record shows that at different times the authorities have recognised the fact that the petitioner was doing the work of Boring mechanic. Some increments by way of palliatives were given to the petitioner. Unfortunately, at no time did the department unequivocally, accept the fact that the petitioner though doing all the work which a Boring Mechanic was expected to do should be given the pay attached to the post of Boring Mechanic. The petitioner ultimately filed the abovementioned application u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. The Labour Court did notice, as has been mentioned in paragraph 4 of its judgment, that the record of the department, which was got produced by the petitioner, showed that the petitioner was doing the work of a Boring Mechanic and was also designated as such. 4. The Labour Court did notice, as has been mentioned in paragraph 4 of its judgment, that the record of the department, which was got produced by the petitioner, showed that the petitioner was doing the work of a Boring Mechanic and was also designated as such. It has also come on record that with effect from 17th November 1962 the petitioner was appointed as a Boring Mechanic, but he was appointed in the pay scale of Rs. 125-5-160-8-176. Despite this, the Labour Court thought that what the petitioner was asking it to do was to re-write the contract between him and the department which, naturally, could not be done by the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2). The function of the Labour Court under the said provision was to determine what the terms of the contract are and not to decide what the contract should have been. The Labour Court cannot be said to be in error in so understanding the nature of its jurisdiction. The Labour Court also held that the claim made by the petitioner for a period prior to 1st December 1969 was over-delayed and stale. On these two grounds the application of the petitioner was dismissed. 5. Dr. Kulkarni, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has taken me through the judgment of the Court below as well as the relevant documents in this case. Dr Kulkarni has canvassed the view, and in my opinion correctly, that though legally the Labour Court might have correctly interpreted the scope of its jurisdiction u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it erred in applying the same to the facts of this case. While summarising the case of the petitioner I have already mentioned above, and it has been sufficiently clearly established on the basis of the evidence on record, that the original intention of the authorities was to appoint the petitioner as a Boring Mechanic. By itself this may not necessarily mean that the petitioner was entitled to be treated from the date of his appointment as a Boring Mechanic, especially because in the appointment letter he was not described as a Boring Mechanic nor was he given the pay scale which is attached to the said post. By itself this may not necessarily mean that the petitioner was entitled to be treated from the date of his appointment as a Boring Mechanic, especially because in the appointment letter he was not described as a Boring Mechanic nor was he given the pay scale which is attached to the said post. Nevertheless, subsequently, on the representations made by him the authorities concerned recognised that the petitioner was doing the work which was done by a person occupying the post of a Boring mechanic and decided to compensate him for the same. That is. how, as mentioned earlier in this judgment, certain palliatives were given to the petitioner. The petitioner, naturally, was not satisfied with the same and fought to get justice done by approaching the higher authorities Unfortunately his efforts in that direction failed. 6. The question is whether in proceedings u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act the petitioner can be given the relief of the type he has asked for. The Labour Court thought that since the petitioner was initially given a pay scale which went with a post much junior to the post of a Boring Mechanic and since the petitioner was not, in the appointment letter, designated as a Boring Mechanic, he could not legitimately claim the salary attached to the post of a Boring Mechanic. This is eminently a correct view. But the Labour Court overlooked the fact that subsequently the petitioner was not only designated as a Boring Mechanic but in fact was appointed as such with effect from 17th of November 1962. This has been mentioned by the Labour Court in paragraph 4 of its judgment. That the petitioner was so appointed, therefore, must be accepted. If this is so, naturally, the petitioner is entitled to ask the Labour Court to give him that salary which was attached to the post of a Boring Mechanic. It has not been demonstrated before me by Mr. Saldanha appearing for the respondents that the pay scale of Rs. 125-176 could have been legitimately given to a person who was holding the post of a Boring Mechanic. It has also not been shown, as indeed it could not be, that the said pay scale was attached to any particular post which was below the post of Boring Mechanic. Saldanha appearing for the respondents that the pay scale of Rs. 125-176 could have been legitimately given to a person who was holding the post of a Boring Mechanic. It has also not been shown, as indeed it could not be, that the said pay scale was attached to any particular post which was below the post of Boring Mechanic. In other words, this was a pay scale which was improvised by the officers of the department to suit what they regarded as the peculiar middle position occupied by the petitioner for no fault of his. In law the petitioner is either entitled to the pay scale which was attached to the post of a Boring mechanic, to which he was appointed with effect from 17th November 1962, or the authorities could have treated him as a person occupying a much lower position and given him the pay scale attached to that lower position. Since the latter is not the case and since the authorities themselves have appointed the petitioner with effect from 17th November 1962 to the post of a Boring Mechanic, in law and in fact he must be given the pay scale attached to that post. Unfortunately the Labour Court missed this point and proceeded on the basis that the pay scale mentioned was more important than the post to which the petitioner was appointed. The Labour Court thought that if the authorities have fixed the petitioner's pay scale, then he will be entitled only to that pay scale and none other, though his designation might have been different. One should not forget that here we are dealing with a Governmental agency which is bound by its rules and regulations. If according to the law governing the employees of this department a Boring Mechanic was entitled to a particular pay scale, it is the duty of the authorities to give him that pay scale. No official of the Government can fix a pay scale other than the one warranted by the rules. This they cannot do even by way of compensatory measure. 7. If the Labour Court had focussed its attention on the fact that the petitioner had been appointed as a Boring Mechanic with effect from 17th November 1962 then I am sure it would have passed the proper order by computing the benefit available to the petitioner in terms of money. 7. If the Labour Court had focussed its attention on the fact that the petitioner had been appointed as a Boring Mechanic with effect from 17th November 1962 then I am sure it would have passed the proper order by computing the benefit available to the petitioner in terms of money. I do not see how the petitioner can be denied the benefit of a particular pay scale attaching to a particular post for which he was appointed. Calculation of this benefit, in my opinion, was within the competence of the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. What the Labour Court Industrial Disputes Act. What the Labour Court was called upon to do was to merely calculate the benefit that was available to the petitioner and not to re-fix his salary or to give him a position to which he has not been appointed by the authorities. 8. On the question of stateness of the demand, one must not fail to notice that within a year after he joined in service the petitioner became aware of the discrepancy between the terms of his appointment and the terms on which he was to be appointed. Almost incessantly he has fought for justice through various representations and it was only when he gave up all hopes of getting justice from the officers concerned that he was forced to approach the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2). I do not think that on the facts of this case the petitioner's application could have been dismissed on the ground that the claim made in it was stale. This apart from the question as to whether a claim at all can be dismissed u/s 33-C(2) on the ground that it is stale. 9. The amount which the petitioner is entitled to get will have to be, naturally, calculated by the Labour Court by calling for the appropriate material from the parties, especially from the department concerned. The matter, therefore, will have to be remitted to the Labour Court for discharging this function. 10. In the result, this petition is allowed. The order passed by the Labour Court, Kolhapur, on 10th of May 1979 in I.D.A. Application No. 155 of 1975 is set aside. The matter, therefore, will have to be remitted to the Labour Court for discharging this function. 10. In the result, this petition is allowed. The order passed by the Labour Court, Kolhapur, on 10th of May 1979 in I.D.A. Application No. 155 of 1975 is set aside. The Labour Court is directed to compute the benefit available to the petitioner in terms of money on the basis that he was holding the post of a Boring Mechanic with effect from 17th November 1962. Since the application itself was of the year 1975 and, unfortunately, this petition has been disposed of belatedly by this Court, I am sure the Labour Court will give top priority to this matter and dispose of the same in accordance with the directions given above. 11. There will be no order as to costs in this petition.