JUDGMENT - KANTHARIA H.H., J.:-Simple but substantial law point that I am called upon to construe here is the proviso to Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 2. The petitioner was employed as a Punch Operator since February 1971 by the second respondent, Messers Tata Consultancy Services, a Division of Tata Sons Ltd., Nariman Point, Bombay 400 021. She was charge-sheeted by a memo dated 27th June, 1983 on the allegations that she remained absent without permission continuously from 31st March, 1983 to 12th June, 1983 which constituted a serious misconduct under Model Standing Orders 24(f) and 24(l). Subsequently, a department enquiry was held against her and by an order dated 18th August, 1983, her services were terminated on the basis of the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, holding her guilty of the misconduct alleged. On the same day, the Company filed an application before the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (the first respondent) under section 33(2)(b) of the Act for approval of the action taken by them against the petitioner as certain industrial disputes were pending before the said Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 111 of 1982. In that application, inter alia, it was averred by the company that the petitioner had been paid one month's salary in accordance with the proviso to section 33(2)(b). 3. The petitioner resisted the application, inter alia, contending that she was paid only Rs. 781/- which did not constitute her wages for one month as contemplated under the proviso to section 33(2)(b). 4. The parties adduced documentary as well as oral evidence before the Tribunal. The petitioner deposed that she did receive Rs. 781/- from the employer against salary but what was offered to her was not her one month's full wages as certain deductions were made by the employer therefrom. It was submitted on her behalf that in order to comply with the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the employer should pay one month's full wages and no deduction of any kind is permissible. It was contended on behalf of the company that certain amounts on account of provident fund, loan and interest due to them from the petitioner were adjusted from one month's wages payable to the petitioner and as such there was complete compliance with the proviso to section 33(2)(b). 5. It was contended on behalf of the company that certain amounts on account of provident fund, loan and interest due to them from the petitioner were adjusted from one month's wages payable to the petitioner and as such there was complete compliance with the proviso to section 33(2)(b). 5. The contentions raised on behalf of the company found favour with the Tribunal and accordingly he granted approval to the action of termination of the services of the petitioner by his order dated 11th March, 1985 which has been challenged in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. Mrs. Mhatre, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the impugned order is bad in law. The submission is that the employer here paid only Rs. 781/- to the petitioner after making certain deductions from her wages of one month which cannot be construed as payment of one month's wages to a workman in compliance with the proviso to section 33(2)(b). According to her, an employer is not permitted to deduct any amount whatsoever, even if it is due to him, from wages of one month of the workman while seeking an approval of the action of discharge or dismissal of the workman. Mr. Parakh, learned Advocate appearing for the company, urges that nothing prevents an employer from adjusting money due to him from one month's wages while making an application under section 33(2)(b). The submission is that admittedly what was deducted by the employer here from the petitioner's one month's wages was the money due to them and, therefore, there was nothing wrong if the employer adjusted the said amounts and offered only the remaining portion to the petitioner which would substantially comply with the proviso to section 33(2)(b). According to Mr. Parakh, it is no use giving one month's wages to a workman by one hand and taking it away by the other as dues of the employer and as such what was done here was strictly in compliance with the proviso to section 33(2)(b) and, therefore, the impugned order is perfectly in accordance with law and the same should not be interfered with. Alternatively, Mr. Parakh urges that even if there is some technical breach on the part of the employer, the action taken by the against the petitioner should not be disturbed. 7. Alternatively, Mr. Parakh urges that even if there is some technical breach on the part of the employer, the action taken by the against the petitioner should not be disturbed. 7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties, let us quote the relevant provisions of section 33 of the Act. “33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.-(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall, (a) ..... ..... ..... ..... (b) ..... ..... ..... ..... (2) During the pendency of any such proceedings in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the Standing Orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such Standing Orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman, (a) alter, in regard to any matter not concerned with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharges or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.” (emphasis supplied). 8. Broadly speaking, therefore, this provision of law prohibits an employer to alter the service conditions of a workman or to punish him by discharging or dismissing during the pendency of proceedings before the authorities under the Act. The underlying object is that when an industrial dispute is pending conciliation and/or adjudication, the employer should maintain status quo vis-a-vis terms and conditions of the employment of the workman and maintain harmonious relations so that consideration of the dispute in question by the concerned authorities in peaceful manner does not get hampered. Sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Act deals with matter unconnected with the dispute. Sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Act deals with matter unconnected with the dispute. Clause (a) of this sub-section gives liberty to the employer to effect alteration in the terms and conditions of service of a workman, if the matter is not connected with the dispute pending. This right could be exercised in accordance with the relevant Standing Orders. It is important to note here that Clause (a) does not require the employer to make an approval application for alteration in service conditions. When, however, an employer wants to punish the workman whether by discharge or dismissal or otherwise, on alleged misconduct not connected with the main dispute, he can do so in accordance with the Standing Orders but in such a case he has to make an application for approval of his action to the concerned authority as per the proviso to Clause (b). It is important to bear in mind that before the authority given approval, it shall have to see that the three conditions of the proviso to Clause (b) are satisfied viz. (i) the workman has been discharged or dismissed; (ii) the workman has been paid one month's wages; and (iii) the employer has made application for approval of his action to the proper authority. 9. In this case, we are concerned with the above quoted condition (ii) that at the time of taking action against the petitioner to terminate her services she should have been paid wages of one month. In other words, before granting approval to the action of the second respondent, the first respondent had to satisfy himself that wages of one month had been paid to the petitioner. It is well settled law that like the other two conditions, this is a mandatory condition. 10. The moot question is whether an employer is permitted in law to pay anything short of the actual amount of one month's wages to a workman. In my judgment, the answer is an emphatic 'no'. It may be recalled that the requirement of payment of one month's wages is 'to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman against whom an order of discharge or dismissal has been passed' as was held by the Supreme Court in (Syndicate Bank Limited v. K.Ramnath V. Bhat)1, 1968(16) F.L.R. 39. 11. It may be recalled that the requirement of payment of one month's wages is 'to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face the workman against whom an order of discharge or dismissal has been passed' as was held by the Supreme Court in (Syndicate Bank Limited v. K.Ramnath V. Bhat)1, 1968(16) F.L.R. 39. 11. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in (Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Company Limited v. S.K. Dutta and another)2, 1970(21) F.L.R. 321 held: “One month's wages must be paid or offered to be paid in full to the workman concerned at the time of his dismissal and at that stage the management cannot be allowed to make any deduction or adjustment against the allegedly past dues.” This judgment of the Patna High Court was considered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in (M/s. Panchoo Gopal Karmakar and Sons v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others)3, 1979(38) F.L.R. 15 when a contrary and dissenting note was sounded. I, however, with utmost respect to the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court, am not been able to persuade myself to agree with them. The Patna High Court, in the case of Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Company Limited (supra) also observed that 'if it were to be held that the payment of one month's wages can be, made after deducting the previous dues due to the management from the workman, the very purpose of the mandatory requirement will be frustrated or is likely to be frustrated in many cases'. I am totally in respectful agreement with the observations made by the Patna High Court. 12. I am totally in respectful agreement with the observations made by the Patna High Court. 12. A Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in (Dinesh Khare v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and others)4, 1982 Lab.I.C. 517 while dealing with the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of the Act held: “The conditions laid down in the proviso are mandatory in nature and if any of the said conditions has not been satisfied by the employer, the application for approval is liable to be dismissed.” In the case before the Rajasthan High Court, the employer had deducted certain sum of money towards provident fund contribution from one month's wages and therefore, it was also observed by the Rajasthan High Court: “If, therefore, the management makes the deduction for provident fund contribution from the one month's wages to be paid to the workman at the time of the passing of the order of dismissal there is non-compliance with the provisions of section 33(2)(b) and the application filed by the management for approval under section 33(2)(b) is liable to be dismissed.” 13. While dealing with a similar point, a Single Judge of this Court (S.K. Desai, J.) in (Balmer Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. Waman B. More and another)5, 1981(42) F.L.R. 272 took a sympathetic view of the moot question as under: “In respect of the admitted amounts payment or tender would be made. In respect of the other amounts if there is any genuine or bona fide dispute it must be brought to the notice of the Tribunal at the stage of making the application for permission and an unconditional offer should be made to the Tribunal to deposit the said amount and even to pay the same subject to any direction for security or otherwise to be made by the Tribunal. Such an employer may perhaps be entitled to obtain permission despite a shortfall in initial payment.” In essence, therefore, it was also held by this Court that the payment or offer of one month's wages to a workman must be in full and a via media was suggested that if there was any genuine or bona fide dispute about the full wages of one month, the disputed amount may be deposited before the Tribunal and the Tribunal may order payment of the same to the workman on obtaining such security from him as the Tribunal may deem fit and proper. 14. 14. What is surprising in our case is the fact that the employer did not even choose this middle path suggested by our Court. All in all, it is clear that the employer here did not comply with one of the mandatory requirements of the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of the Act and, therefore, in granting approval to the action taken against the petitioner, the Tribunal erred and that is how the impugned order suffers from error apparent on the face of the record. 15. As regards the contention Mr. Parakh that even if the employer committed a technical error in not paying the full amount of one month's wages to the petitioner, the action taken against her should not be disturbed, all that I have to say is that a similar contention was raised on behalf of the employer by Mr. Jain in the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dinesh Khare (supra) which was dealt with by the Rajasthan High Court as under: “I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Jain that the failure to comply with the conditions laid down in the proviso to section 33(2)(b), is of no consequence whatsoever and that inspite of the contravention of the provisions contained in the said proviso, the Tribunal, while considering an application for approval under section 33(2)(b), can grant or refuse approval after considering whether the impugned action is justified or not. In my opinion, while dealing with an application for approval, the Tribunal is required to examine as to whether the conditions laid down in the proviso to section 33(2)(b) have been fulfilled and if the Tribunal finds that the same have not been fulfilled, it would be open to it to dismiss the application and refuse to grant approval...” I respectfully agree with the Rajasthan High Court and add that Mr. Parakh's submission may hold good while considering a complaint under section 33-A or a reference under section 10(1) of the Act. 16. In this view of the matter, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The impugned order dated 11th March, 1985 passed by the first respondent in Application (IT) No. 87 of 1983 in Reference (IT) No. 11 of 1982 is quashed and set aside. 17. Rule is made absolute in the terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances of the case, with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. The impugned order dated 11th March, 1985 passed by the first respondent in Application (IT) No. 87 of 1983 in Reference (IT) No. 11 of 1982 is quashed and set aside. 17. Rule is made absolute in the terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances of the case, with no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----