N. D. OJHA, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed by three petitioners. Petitioner No. 1. is Rickshaw Malik Sangh Jabalpur which is an Association of rickshaw owners. Petitioner No. 2 is the Secretary of petitioner No. 1, whereas petitioner No. 3, Rickshaw Yatayat Sangh, Raipur, is a branch of Rickshaw Malik Sangh, petitioner No. 1. These petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of Madhya Pradesh Cycle Rickshaw (Anugyaption Ka Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1984, (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam ). During the course of arguments, the validity of S. 4 alone of the Adhiniyam was challenged by learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of the rickshaw owners whom the petitioners represent to car on trade or business of owning rickshaw and hiring the same for income and is thus violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. ( 2 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties, we find it difficult to agree with this submission. Section 4 of the Adhiniyam reads as hereunder :"4. Grant of licence for cycle rickshaw - (1 ). Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (No. 23 of 1956) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (No. 37 of 1961) or any rule or order or bye-laws made thereunder or any other laws for the time being in force, no owner of a cycle-rickshaw shall be granted any licence nor his licence shall be renewed by any municipal authority after the commencement of this Act unless the rickshaw is to be plied or propelled by such owner by himself : provided that two licences may be granted to the owner of a cycle-rickshaw for the purposes of plying or propelling the cycle-rickshaw where he engages another person as an attendant subject to the conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed. (2) A licence granted or renewed prior to the commencement of this Act shall stand revoked after six months of the coming into force of the Act if it does not conform to the provisions of this Act. (2) A licence granted or renewed prior to the commencement of this Act shall stand revoked after six months of the coming into force of the Act if it does not conform to the provisions of this Act. "a similar provision was enacted in Section 3 of the Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act 1976, which read as hereunder :"licence for cycle-rickshaws - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, or any rule or order or bye-law made thereunder, or any other law for the time being in force, no owner of a cycle-rickshaw shall be granted any licence in respect of his cycle-rickshaw, nor his licence shall be renewed by any municipal authority after the commencement of this Act unless the cycle-rickshaw is to be plied by such owner himself. "the constitutional validity of the said Section 3 of the Punjab Act was challenged in Mansingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 1737 . Repelling the challenge, it was held in para 14 of the report as under :"in the instant case, S. 3 of the Punjab Act has the effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply the rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the full owner of the income earned by him. No longer will he be obliged to part with an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is beneficial legislation bringing directly home to the rickshaw puller the entire fruit of his daily toil. The enactment is intended as a social welfare measure against the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious cycle rickshaw owners who, by reason of their superior financial resources, fatten their wealth from the sweated toil of rickshaw pullers. The Punjab Act is beneficial legislation bringing directly home to the rickshaw puller the entire fruit of his daily toil. The enactment is intended as a social welfare measure against the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious cycle rickshaw owners who, by reason of their superior financial resources, fatten their wealth from the sweated toil of rickshaw pullers. Even if we look at the impugned legislation from the point of view of its impact on the fundamental right of rickshaw owners who give them on hire to rickshaw pullers for plying, it is plain that the legislation constitutes a reasonable restriction on the right of such rickshaw owners to carry on the business of hiring out cycle rickshaws inasmuch as the exercise of the right is excluded by legislation designed for the economic and social welfare of rickshaw pullers who constitute a significant sector of the people, a sector pressed by poverty and straitened by the economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of their full day's wages to them seems amply justified. "in our opinion, the plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioners stands answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Mansingh (supra) and for the reasons recorded therein, we are of opinion that Section 4 of the Adhiniyam cannot be held to be ultra vires on the ground urged by learned counsel for the petitioners. ( 3 ) IT was then urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Adhiniyam was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature of M. P. and as such, it was ultra vires. We find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, reads as hereunder :"5. Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal corporations, improvement trusts, district boards, mining settlement authorities and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration. "in exercise of the power conferred on it, the State Government has enacted the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act 1956, as also the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961. Section 427 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, confers power on a Municipal Corporation to frame bye-laws to regulate all or any of the matters specified therein. Item No. 43 (a) reads as hereunder :"43. Section 427 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, confers power on a Municipal Corporation to frame bye-laws to regulate all or any of the matters specified therein. Item No. 43 (a) reads as hereunder :"43. Vehicles or animals plying for hire - (a) Vehicles or animals plying for hire within the limits of the Corporation, the issue of licences to proprietors or drivers of such vehicles or animals; the prescription of types and specification of vehicles or animals to be licensed and the fixing of fees payable for such licences and the conditions on which they may be granted, suspended or revoked;"likewise, Section 358 of the M. P. Municipalities Act 1961, confers power on Municipal Councils to frame bye-laws for the items mentioned therein. Item No. (7) deals with public, health, safety, nuisance and sanitation. Cl. (i) (a) under item No. (7) reads as hereunder :"vehicles or animals plying for hire within the limits of the Municipality, the issue of licences to proprietors or drivers of such vehicles or animals, the prescription of types and specification of vehicles or animals to be licensed and the fixing of fees payable for such licences and the conditions on which they may be granted, suspended or revoked. "it is the aforesaid power of a Municipal Corporation and a Municipal Council which is indeed sought to be regulated by Section 4 of the impugned Adhiniyam. There can, therefore, be no manner of doubt that the State Legislature had legislative competence to enact the impugned Adhiniyam in virtue of the power conferred on it by entry 5 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. ( 4 ) REFERRING to Section 5 of the Adhiniyam which deals with exemptions; it was urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that even though exemption was contemplated in case of a widow, no similar provision has been made with regard to a divorcee who for all practical purposes, stood on the same footing as a widow. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that there is no averment in the writ petition that any of the rickshaw owners who are represented by the petitioner association is a divorcee. Consequently we do not consider it expedient to go into this question in the present writ petition. ( 5 ) IN the result, we find no merit in this writ petition. Consequently we do not consider it expedient to go into this question in the present writ petition. ( 5 ) IN the result, we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Outstanding security amount be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed. .