Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. These writ applications involving common questions of law and facts with the consent of the learned counsels for the parties were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. Although the impugned orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner is common in all the cases and the orders passed by the Circle Officer are being different and the annexures are also being different. The orders impugned in each of the writ applications are being reproduced herein belows : - 2_1051_BLJ1_1988.htm 3. The facts of each case except in C, W. J. C. No.2071 of 1982 are common. However, the representing matrix of facts would be considered from the records of C. W. J. C. No.1579 of 1982. In each case a proceeding was initiated by the respondent No.2 (the Circle Officer) in purported exercise of its powers conferred upon him under Sec.3 of the Bihar Public Land Encroach ment Act, 1956. The petitioners in each case contended that the land in question being a portion of plot No.520 was recorded as Parti Kadim and the Ex-landlord of Handwa Estate settled different portions of lands by Pattas granted to the petitioners of each case except in C. W. J. C. No.2071 of 1982. The names of the petitioners in each case was entered in Register 11 and on payment of rent for the same, rent receipts were granted therefor. It is also the case of the petitioners that after vesting of the aforementioned Estate in the State of Bihar, the Ex-landlord submitted a return under the provisions of the Bihar Land reforms Act, 1950 in which specific mention was made about the settlement granted to the petitioners. However, in C. W. J. C. No.2071 of 1982, the name of the petitioner thereof was not entered in Register II maintained by the State of bihar nor any rent receipts was granted to him by the State of Bihar. 4. It may further be stated that in most of the cases during the table survey of Basukinath in the year 1964, the possession of the petitioners was found and in most of the cases, proceedings under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act were initiated against the petitioners and the said proceedings were dropped. 4. It may further be stated that in most of the cases during the table survey of Basukinath in the year 1964, the possession of the petitioners was found and in most of the cases, proceedings under Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act were initiated against the petitioners and the said proceedings were dropped. However, the respondent No.2 inspite of the fact that earlier proceedings under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act were dropped, initiated fresh proceedings as against the petitioners and in each case issued notice directing the respective petitioner to show cause as to why the alleged encroachment made shall not be removed. 5. In each writ applications, the details whereof have been mentioned hereinbefore, the respondent No, 2 directed the petitioner to remove the alleged encroachment from the lands in question in purported exercise of his power conferred upon him under Sec.6 of the Bihar Public Land Act, 1956. 6. The petitioner (s) in each case preferred an appeal from the afore mentioned orders passed by the Circle Officer to the court of the Deputy commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner acting as an appellate authority dismissedthe said appeal. 7. By reason of the impugned orders, the respondents no.2 and 3 purported to have held that the lands in question vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act and, therefore, the lands in question are Public Lands. 7-A. It will not be out of place to mention that one Parmeshwari Sahuain had filed a suit against the State of Bihar and others in the Court of Subordinate judge, Dumka, which was ultimately transferred to the court of 2nd Addl. Subordinate Judge, Dumka in the district of Santhal Pargana for disposal. The said title suit was marked as Title Suit no.48/69/8/72. The aforementioned suit also arose out of an order passed in a proceeding under Sec.6 of the Bihar public Land Encroachment Act being Encroachment Case no.88 of 1955-56. In the said suit also the aforementioned Plot no.520 of Mauja Basukinath was involved. The said title suit was marked as Title Suit no.48/69/8/72. The aforementioned suit also arose out of an order passed in a proceeding under Sec.6 of the Bihar public Land Encroachment Act being Encroachment Case no.88 of 1955-56. In the said suit also the aforementioned Plot no.520 of Mauja Basukinath was involved. In the said suit settlement granted in favour of the plaintiff thereof was questioned by the defendants on the ground that the proprietress of the estate, Rani Sonawati Kumari of Handwa Estate had no right to create homestead tenancy over Plot no.520 which was recorded in the settlement record not only as Parti Kadim, but as a Mela ground as well on the ground that the said deed was executed in violation of the Provisions of Transfer of Property Act and registration Act. 8. According to the State of Bihar, the said land was not acquired by the proprietors of the aforementioned Estate purported to be under Sec.25 (A) of the Regulation 11 of 1886. 9. In the aforementioned suit also, the alleged patta granted by the proprie tors of the Handwa Estate was challenged as a forged and fabricated document. In the said it was held that the proprietress of the aforementioned estate had the right to grant settlement inrespect of lands, which was recorded as Parti Kadim. In the aforementioned suit it was further held that the plaintiff did not acquire any title on the basis of the patta which was an unregistered and unstamped one, but it was held that the plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession. 10. In the aforementioned suit, it was further held that as alleged, the suit land which is a part of the mela ground had become the property of the plaintiff thereof and the Bihar State Religious Trust Board was not a necessary party. 11. In the instant case the concerned respondents while passing the im-pugned orders purported to have held that alleged patta granted in favour of the petitioner by the aforementioned propritress of Hadwa estate were forged and fabricated and further purported to hold that the onus to prove the genuineity of the said patta although lay upon the petitioner, but they have been not adduced any evidence in that regard, the said patta can be held to be forged and fabri cated. In order to appreciate the points involved the finding of the Deputy Com missioner as recorded in his order dated 22-3-82 as contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition may be summarised as follows :- (a) That onus to show that the pattas were genuine lies upon the appellants. (b) The intention of the legislature in framing the Bihar Public Encro achment Act is that the opposite party has to prove his case by adducing evidence. (c) The very fact that the pattas bears dates from the period 1940 to 1944-shows that they were deliberately specified to avoid this the consequences under Sec.4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. (d) As the genuineness of the pattas are doubtful, the entries in the return submitted by the Ex. proprietor without the proof of its correctness is of no avail. (e) The entries of the name of the petitioners in the tenants ledger are of no avail as no order was passed in that regard by the Collector. (f) The land in question being a Mela ground automatically vested in the State of Bihar and by accepting rent, no lease was created by the state of Bihar in servant the petitioners. (g) The petitioners can not be said to have acquired title by adverse possession as they were put in permissive possession by the landlord. (h) The petitioners being not one of such agriculturist, whose case is covered by Sec.6 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act were liable to be evicted therefrom. (i) As the deeds in question created eucumberances, the same vested in the State of Bihar and Sec.4 (h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act has no application in such a case. 12. From a perusal of the aforementioned purported order, it appears that the Deputy Commissioner held a local inspection in presence of the Land Reforms deputy Collector and directed the said Land Reforms Deputy Collector to submit a report. The Deputy Commissioner relied upon his purported finding arrived at by him during his local inspection as also the said purported report of the land Reforms Deputy Collector. It may be mentioned here that it does not appear from the record that the Land Reforms Deputy Collector was examined to put the said record. The procedure adopted by the Dsputy Commissioner, in my opinion, is not contemplated under the provisions of the Bihar Land encroachment Act. It may be mentioned here that it does not appear from the record that the Land Reforms Deputy Collector was examined to put the said record. The procedure adopted by the Dsputy Commissioner, in my opinion, is not contemplated under the provisions of the Bihar Land encroachment Act. 13. Mr. Tarakant Jha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the petitioners submitted that in view of the fact that the question as to whether a settlement can be granted by the propritress of the estate or not, being a com plicated question, the same could not have been decided in a summary proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. The learned counsel further, submitted that in any event in respect of some of the cases, the earlier proceedings which were initiated under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act having been dropped, the Collector under the said Act cannot be said to have any jurisdiction whatsoever to initiate a fresh proceeding in respect of the self save lands. 14. Mr. Madhup, the learned Standing counsel No.1 appearing on behalf of the State in some of the writ applications, on the other hand, submitted that the findings of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 that the land is a public land being a finding of fact, this Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has no jurisdiction to interfere with the said orders. 15. From the facts stated hereinbefore, it is absolutely clear that the lands belonged to the ex-proprietress of Handwa estate. Although the land was recorded as Parti Kadim or the Mela ground, in view of the fact that the same belonged to the ex-proprietress, it was open to her to make settlements thereof by either creating a tanure or a tenancy right inrespect thereof. 16. The Collector under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act while deciding a case thereunder must record his satisfaction by determining the jurisdictional fact that on the date of initiation of a proceeding under the said act, the land was a public land in terms of the provision of the said Act. 16. The Collector under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act while deciding a case thereunder must record his satisfaction by determining the jurisdictional fact that on the date of initiation of a proceeding under the said act, the land was a public land in terms of the provision of the said Act. Under section 4 of the said Act, a person upon whom a notice is served under Sec.3 is entitled to raise any defence which he could have raised if he was a defendant in a properly framed suit for the removal of the encroachment. Sec.5 of the said Act provides for the manner as to how the hearing of a proceeding shall take place. Sec.6 provides for passing of a final order. Sec.8 provides that all proceeding under the said Act shall be heard and disposed of in a summary manner. Under Sec.9 of the said Act in respect of certain class of lands as mentioned therein, the burden of proof that the land is not a public land rests upon the opposite party. Sec.10 provides for a power of the Collector to summon witnesses etc. in enquiries under the said Act. Sec.11 provides for an appeal. Sec.16 of the said Act bars the jurisdiction of a civil court or any other legal proceeding in respect of the different provisions of the said Act as enumberated hereinbefore, it would be evident that the lagislature by reason of the provisions of the said Act intended to provide for therein the power upon the authorities to remove the encroachment in a summary manner. By necessary implication, therefore, a complicated question of title cannot be decided in a summary proceeding initiated under the provisions of the said Act. From the finding recorded by the Deputy Commissioner himself in his order impugned herein and as quoted hereinbefore, it would be evident that he, without there being any evidence on the record, purported to be only on the basis of his own experience, held that the pattas executed by Rani Sonawati Kumari were not genuine. 17. From the stand taken on behalf of the State there cannot be any doubt that it admitted the existence of the pattas executed by the Ex-proprietress of Handwa estate in favour of the petitioners. The State had further admitted that the name of the petitioners finds place in the return submitted by the ex-landlord. 17. From the stand taken on behalf of the State there cannot be any doubt that it admitted the existence of the pattas executed by the Ex-proprietress of Handwa estate in favour of the petitioners. The State had further admitted that the name of the petitioners finds place in the return submitted by the ex-landlord. Presumably on the basis of the return which must have been filed ia the prescribed form and upon proper verification thereof in terms of the provi sions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and the rules framed thereunder, the names of petitioners of each writ application except that of C. W. J. C. No.2071 of 1982 were entered in the tenants ledger. It is also admitted that the petitioners except the petitioner of C. W. J. C. No.2071 of 1983 were paying rent to the state of Bihar, which had all along been accepted by it and rent receipts therefor were granted in their favour. 18. Further as mentioned hereinbefore, even the petitioners were found to be in possession during table survey of Basukinath in the year 1964. Even the proceedings were initiated against some of the petitioners undar the Provisions of bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, but the same were dropped. 19. In my view, the question, therefore, which arose for consideration of the Collector involved determination of a complicated questions of title which could not have been the subject-matter of a summary proceedings under the provisions of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act. 20. It is true that the statutory tribunal while determining the disputed facts has also right to determine the jurisdictionsal fact, but it is also well known that such tribunal cannot confer a jurisdiction upon himself by wrongly deciding such jurisdictional facts. Although the Collector in the Bihar Public Land encroachment Act,- thus was entitled to decide as to whether the land in question were public land or not, but it could not decide a complicated question of title or a matter where a serious and bonafide dispute arises with regard to the title of the land. Whether the dispute involved in a proceeding under Bihar Public Land encroachment Act, 1956, which provides for a summary proceeding is a bonafide serious one. Whether the dispute involved in a proceeding under Bihar Public Land encroachment Act, 1956, which provides for a summary proceeding is a bonafide serious one. In my opinion in the intstant case invoking of the jurisdiction by the Collector under the said Act directing ejectments of a person from the alleged public land was not warranted. In Government of Andhra Pradesh V/s. Thummala krishna Rao and another, AIR 1982 SC 1081 the Supreme Court in similar circumstances, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if there is a bonafide dispute regarding the title of the government in any property, the Government cannot take an unilateral decision in its own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision take recourse to the summary remedy provided by Sec.6 for evicting the person who is in possession of the property under a bona fide claim or title. It has further been held therein that although the duration of the encroachment is not decisive, but the same is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima fade, to have a bonafide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 21. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, a summary proceeding in peculiar facts of this can under the provisions of the said Act was wholly unwarranted. 22. Further in the cases in which there had been earlier proceeding under the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, which were dropped, the same became final and no fresh proceeding could have been initiated in respect of the self-same lands. In Kali Prasad Seal V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1969 PLJR 23 a division Bench of this Court held that where the order passed in the earlier proceed ing became final, the case of the alleged encroachment must also be taken to have finally concluded, there was no jurisdiction in the officers concerned, to re-agitate the matter in another fresh proceeding. 23. Further, in my view, the reasons assigned by the respondent Nos.2 and 3 in their impugned orders and as referred to hereinbefore are wholly bad in law. In Clatworthy Ex. P. R. V/s. Mental Health Review Tribunal, 1985 All E. R. Vol. 23. Further, in my view, the reasons assigned by the respondent Nos.2 and 3 in their impugned orders and as referred to hereinbefore are wholly bad in law. In Clatworthy Ex. P. R. V/s. Mental Health Review Tribunal, 1985 All E. R. Vol. III 330 at 333, it was observed as follows :- Accordingly, I agree with both counsel as to its effect and it follows that the tribunal, by failing to give reasons, have fallen into error. That is enough, strictly speaking, to dispose of the question put to me. It is right, however, that I should go further and amplify what I under stand by the requirement that reasons should be given. I do so by quoting passages from two very well-known authorities in which this matter has been considered. The first is a passage from the Judg ment of Megaw J in Re Poyssr and Mills Arbitration (1963) All er 612 at 616 : (1964) 2 Q. B.467 at 478, where he said; ". . . Parlir ment having provided that reasons shall be given, in my view that must clearly be read as meaning that proper, adequate, reasons must be given ; the reasons that are set out must be reasons which not only will be inteligible, but also can reasonably be said to deal with the substantial points that have been raised. . " In Alexander Machi nery (Dudley) Ltd V/s. Crabtree (1974) ICR 120 at 122 to lay down any precise guidelines. The overriding test must always be : is the tribunal providing both parties with the materials which will enable them to know that the tribunal has made no error of law in reaching its finding of fact?. " The aforementioned observations was followed by the Queens Bench in a later decision reported in 1985 Vol 3 All ER page 699 at page 703. In my view the reasons assigned by the Deputy Commissioner in passing the impugned orders for the purpose of basing his decision are not in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner, in my opinion, clearly misdirected itself in proceeding on the basis that the burden of proof lay upon the petitioners. 24. In my view the reasons assigned by the Deputy Commissioner in passing the impugned orders for the purpose of basing his decision are not in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner, in my opinion, clearly misdirected itself in proceeding on the basis that the burden of proof lay upon the petitioners. 24. As discussed hereinbefore and particularly in view of the provisions of Sec.4 of the Bihar Public Land Encroachment Act, it is evident that the burden of proof lies upon the State unless the land falls in one of the categories mentioned in Sec.9 thereof. In the instant case the lands in question do not fall within one or the other categories of landsjmentioned in Sec.9 of the said act and in that view of the matter, the onus to prove that the lands in question were public lands clearly lay upon the State of Bihar. 25. Further as the State of Bihar itself was disputing the title of the petitioners by raising a contention that the pattas granted to them were forged, the burden of proof to prove the said fact also squarely lay upon the State. The state has not adduced any evidence whatsoever to discharge its onus to prpve the said fact. The respondent Nos.2 and 3 it appears without any materials, pro ceeded to hold that the purported settlements were made in order to defeat the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act. There is no material on the records to come to the aforementioned finding. 26. In terms of the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 if a settlement is to be annuled, a proceeding under Sec.4 (h) thereof has got to be taken recourse to. Obviously such a proceeding could not have been initialed against the petitioners in view of the fact that the settlement were made by the ex-proprietress of Handwa Estate during the period 1940 to 1944. The Deputy commissioner further committed a serious error of law in jumping of the conclu sion, again without any materials on the record, that the return filed by the ex-proprietress was mala fide. 27. The Deputy Commissioner further, in my opinion, misdirected himself in law in holding that the rent receipts granted could not have conferred any advantage to the petitioners as no order therefore was passed by the Collector. 27. The Deputy Commissioner further, in my opinion, misdirected himself in law in holding that the rent receipts granted could not have conferred any advantage to the petitioners as no order therefore was passed by the Collector. It stands admitted that the name of the petitioners find place in the return submitted by the ex-proprietress which must have, been accepted by a competant authority and in that view of the matter, the issuance of the rent receipts being a matter of routine affair, the Karamchari, in my opinion, cannot be said to have acted illegally in granting such receipt after accepting the rent therefor. It was not a case where an application was filed by the petitioners for entering their names in the Zamabandi as only in such cases, the procedure prescribed therefor are to be followed. In any event, there is nothing on the records to show that the return filed by the ex-proprietress of the Estate was not accepted by the com petent authority. It also did not lie in the mouth of the State to say that the rent receipt having been granted without prejudice the same is not binding upon the state of Bihar. In Sardamoni V/s. State of Bihar and others, AIR 1979 Patna 106, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the word without pre judice denotes without prejudice to the right of the 3rd party but the State of bihar is bound thereby. 28. The question as to whether the land vested in the State of Bihar pursuant to the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act the same being an iencum-berance to the estate or not is again a complicated question of fact and leasee created by the ex-proprietress cannot be an incumberance if person has acquires a raiyati or under raiyati interest, such interest is saved from vesting under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Even if by reason of grant, of tenure interest is created, the tenure holder is also entitled to show that on the date of coming into force of Bihar Land Reforms Act, he being in possession of the land in question became the statutory tenant under the State of Bihar by reason of the provisions of Sec.5, 6 and 7 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. 29. 29. Further even in a case where a tenure holders interest has vested in the State of Bihar in terms of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, a proceeding under Sec.4 (g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act is to be initiated if such tenure holder failed to deliver possession into the estate pursuant to the provisions thereof. 30. In my view the Deputy Commissioner also misdirected himself in holding that the petitioners cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Such a finding is clearly contrary to all principles of law as also contrary to the judgment of the title suit being Title Suit No.48 of 1969 as mentioned herein before. 31. In Judicial Review of Administrative Action by Prof. S. A. De Smith it has been stated by the learned author as to what constitutes an error of law apparent on the face of the record : "the concept of error of law includes the giving of reasons that are bad in law or (if there is a duty to give reasons) inconsistent, unintelligible or, it would seem, substantially inadequate. It includes also the application of a wrong legal test to the facts found, taking irrelevant considerations into account, exercising a discretion on the basis of any other incorrect legal principles, misdirection as to the burden of proof, and wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence, as well as arriving at conclusion without any supporting evidence. " 32. From the discussions aforementioned it would be evident that the deputy Commissioner posed unto himself a wrong question of law and therefore misdirected himself in law. In the case of Secretary of State V/s. Tameside (1976-3 all England Report 665) Lord Diplock held that if an authority passing the an order did not ask itself the right question and take reasonable step to acquaint itself with the relevant information to enable it to answer it correctly, this same amounts to a misdirection in law. The aforementioned decision has been quoted with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Shyama Nand Singh V/s. State of Bihar. , 1978 PLJR 588. 33. I am, of therefore, the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustain ed. However, it goes without saying that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the State of Bihar may institute a civil suit in a court for ventilating its grievance if any. Shyama Nand Singh V/s. State of Bihar. , 1978 PLJR 588. 33. I am, of therefore, the view that the impugned orders cannot be sustain ed. However, it goes without saying that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the State of Bihar may institute a civil suit in a court for ventilating its grievance if any. 34. In the result these writ applications arc allowed and the impugned orders as mentioned in paragraph 1 of each petitions arc hereby set aside. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Writ applications allowed.