Judgment :- 1. The first respondent in this revision petition is a Harijan woman. She had been admittedly residing in a hut in the property from 1968 which initially was owned by the second respondent Ipe Varkey. A domestic misfortune befell her when her husband deserted her and the two children. The revision petitioner entered the scene on 22-t-1981 by purchasing the property from the 2nd respondent. Within a short time thereafter, on 29-5-1981, the first respondent, the Harijan woman, filed before the Land Tribunal an application for the purchase of the kudikidappu. The application for purchase, apparently infuriated the new purchaser of the property. He thought of solving the problem very quickly. The hut itself was demolished by force. Who is there to protect a poor and helpless Harijan woman? And what could she do when she was thus virtually thrown into the street along with her little children? She could only complain to the police. This she did immediately. The police registered a case, Crime 160 of 1981. A mahazar, prepared by the police on 27-6-1981, would indicate prima facie the highhanded action on the part of the revision petitioner. The case happened to be "referred" ultimately. The revision is not directly concerned with that aspect. It has, however, a bearing in relation to the administration of law and justice in the country, particularly as regards the most harassed and oppressed section of society. I will refer to it later. 2. The case of the applicant was that she has been staying in the hut with her two children, her husband having deserted her. She is the person in occupation of the hut, and consequently entitled to purchase the kudikidappu. 3. The landowner contended that only the husband could make the application. He had a further case that the husband had other lands and consequently was disentitled to claim kudikidappu right. 4. The case had a chequered career. The Land Tribunal, in the first instance, allowed the application by its order dated 31-7-1982. The Land Tribunal, which had perhaps a deep conviction of the raw deal which a poor Harijan woman had, expressed himself strongly and in a language noted for its beauty and emotive fervour. 4. The case had a chequered career. The Land Tribunal, in the first instance, allowed the application by its order dated 31-7-1982. The Land Tribunal, which had perhaps a deep conviction of the raw deal which a poor Harijan woman had, expressed himself strongly and in a language noted for its beauty and emotive fervour. The necessity to overlook minor and unsubstantial contradictions in pleadings and/or evidence, having regard to the pathetically low faculties of understanding of that unfortunate section of society, was rightly emphasised in that order. There was an appeal, LRAS 129/82. That was decided only three years later, on 25-7-1985. The Appellate Authority took the view that the Land Reforms Act did not make any distinction between the haves and havenots and that the case should be decided purely on the basis of the pleadings and evidence. The result was a remand. 5. The Land Tribunal considered the question afresh, after remand. Five documents were produced and six witnesses were examined on the side of the applicant. The applicant herself gave evidence about the material facts as P.W. 1. Her evidence was clear and categoric that she was residing in the hut for about twelve years, and that the husband had deserted her and the children about two and half years prior to the filing of the petition. Subsequent demolition of the hut by the land owner was also spoken to by her. Her mother was examined as PW2. Independent witnesses PWs. 4 and 5 had given evidence about the long and old residence of the applicant in the hut in question. 6. Two witnesses and two documents constituted the evidence of the land owner. On the day on which arguments were heard, two more documents were produced from his side. The fact that the 1st respondent, from whom the 2nd respondent purchased the property in 1981, had not been examined to contradict the evidence on the side of the applicant regarding the occupation of the hut is significant. 7. The order of the Land Tribunal was affirmed by the Appellate Authority. According to the Appellate Authority, the husband had deserted the applicant-wife, and the applicant had been staying in the hut. The Appellate Authority particularly referred to the habits of, and practices obtaining in, the Harijan community and the absence of a registry of marriage or a proper record regarding divorce. According to the Appellate Authority, the husband had deserted the applicant-wife, and the applicant had been staying in the hut. The Appellate Authority particularly referred to the habits of, and practices obtaining in, the Harijan community and the absence of a registry of marriage or a proper record regarding divorce. The story of the land owner, of the husband leaving the kudikidappu voluntarily on receipt of a compensation was disbelieved by it. It was highly improbable that the land owner did not care to obtain a receipt from the kudikidappukaran, if he had in fact left the place voluntarily and after receiving money. The entitlement to purchase the kudikidappu was accordingly found to be based on evidence in the case. 8. The Revision Petition challenges the concurrent orders of the authorities below. 9. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the case of a family where a husband, wife and children had been living, no application for the purchase of kudikidappu is maintainable at all at the instance of a wife. The proposition, in its broad form, according to me, does not arise in this case in view of the factual situation. The finding of the authorities below are that the husband had deserted the wife and children. This finding is fully justified by the evidence on record. Ext A2 would corroborate the version of the wife. The separation between the husband and wife is seen to have been made in the presence of two Panchayat members, P.M. Moideen and P.V. Poulose. The separation is spoken to by the applicant, her mother and two independent witnesses. Whether the deserted wife in occupation of the but and satisfying all the ingredients of the definition of 'kudikidappukaran' is disentitled to the kudikidappu rights, for the only reason that the deserting husband has chosen to be disinterested in claiming the rights, is the question for decision. 10. The definition of 'kudikidappukaran' occurring in the Land Reforms Act reads: "a kudikidappukaran" means a person who has neither a homestead nor any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead and..." The deeming provision of the Act, as contained in Explanation.2A is of particular relevance. It is as follows: "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who, on the 16th day of August, 1968. was in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessors-in-interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran: Provided that no such person shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran (a) in cases where the dwelling house has not been constructed by such person or by any of his predecessors-in-interest, if (i) such dwelling house was constructed at a cost, at the time of construction, exceeding seven hundred and fifty rupees; or (ii) such dwelling house could have, at the time of construction yielded a monthly rent exceeding five rupees; or (b) if he has a building or is in possession of any land exceeding in extent three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a building;..." The applicant satisfied all the requirements of the deeming provision. 11. The occupation of the hut is one of the essential ingredients of the kudikidappu claim. When a husband deserts the wife, it does not mean that the wife's occupation of the hut is extinguished. The disadvantages and disabilities attendant on the husband's desertion, should not lead to further disasters in the form of the deprivation of the statutory right to have a kudikidappu. If the wife, deserted by her husband, continues in the same hut, doubtless she will be entitled to the kudikidappu rights if other conditions, such as the nature of the hut, are satisfied. A different interpretation would cause untold hardship to a helpless wife. The law will certainly lean against such an interpretation. I have no hesitation to reject the contention urged on behalf of the land owner that the wife cannot apply for kudikidappu rights for the only reason that the husband is physically alive, even when he had ceased, to all intents and purposes, to be a husband. The wife along with the children had been living all through in the hut from 1968. She did so, initially in the company of the husband, and latterly without it. The wife along with the children had been living all through in the hut from 1968. She did so, initially in the company of the husband, and latterly without it. The structure occupied by her comes fully within the definition of 'hut' as defined in the Act. Her occupation of the but is thus established. There is no case that she has any other immovable property anywhere in this world. The voters' list of 1980 and other materials, as also the oral evidence (which is net contradicted by any other acceptable contrary evidence) will clearly establish her occupation of the hut and the satisfaction of the various elements in the definition of kudikidappu. That is the view which has been taken by the Land Tribunal which devoted considerable attention to the various factual details and to the statutory definition. That has been the view of the Appellate Authority which has also assessed the evidence in great detail and in a larger perspective of the facts, the evidence and the circumstances. Absolutely no ground exists to take a view different from the conclusions so taken by the authorities below on an evaluation of facts and circumstances. There is no scope for interference in revision with the concurrent orders of the statutory authorities. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed. 12. I shall now allude to the harassment practised against the applicant-Harijan women. As is clear from the materials furnished before the Authorities, it is a case, prima facie, where a person with money and might, had taken law into his bands. He had no hesitation to exploit the helpless situation of a Harijan woman who had been staying in a hut with her very young children and aged mother. The criminal complaint which she gave before the police soon after the demolition of the hut, the records relating to the crime 160 of 1981 of the Kothamangalm Police Station, and MP 692/1981 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Moovattupuzha would speak volumes about the sorrow and suffering she had undergone. 13. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the criminal case had been referred. This is not perhaps much surprising, having regard to the hard realities of our social life. 14. The Constitution of India has in it a glorious content the special provisions for the uplift of the oppressed sections of Society. 13. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the criminal case had been referred. This is not perhaps much surprising, having regard to the hard realities of our social life. 14. The Constitution of India has in it a glorious content the special provisions for the uplift of the oppressed sections of Society. It gave them sword and shield so as to find their way through difficult terrains to the mainstreams of national life. The Courts too have always taken care to give them a helping hand wherever situations so demanded. When the executive agencies have failed in their solemn duty towards them, the courts have taken pains to point out such deficiencies and defaults. The highest Court of the country, the Supreme Court of India did so very recently in Viswanathan v. STAT, Pondicherry and Another, AIR 1987 SC 731 (That related to the failure of the State for nearly a decade to effectively implement provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act regarding reservation of permits in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes In the Kerala State too this disregard of the safeguards given by the Parliament would appear to continue. Neither the Transport Department nor the Law Department of Kerala appears to have noted the thrust of the direction given by the Supreme Court as regards reservation of permits in favour of the Harijans under the Parliamentary enactment. This is in tune with the neglect of the interests of the Harijans observable in every walk of life.) 15. A recent decision rendered by the American Supreme Court indicated the thrust and emphasis necessary in the form of an affirmative action so that the races (like the black) and the sections (like the women) who bad been subjected to segregations and deprivations in the past, are enabled to get effective equality by reckoning past neglect as a plus factor in the present employment opportunities. The decision, well known by its name, Johnson's case, (See 55 Law Week 4379) has now attracted internal and international attention among the intelligentsia. (There appears to be a mistake in the date of the report, as given in the Law week. The opinions were announced on 25th March, 1987. It could not, therefore, have been published in the Law Week of 2tth March, 1987. (There appears to be a mistake in the date of the report, as given in the Law week. The opinions were announced on 25th March, 1987. It could not, therefore, have been published in the Law Week of 2tth March, 1987. Probably this is printing error.) The decision has referred to "the Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustices, and the law intended "to improve the lot of those who had been excluded from the American dream for so long." A necessity "to give favourable considerations to disadvantaged group status" has been indicated therein. Protection of "historically disadvantaged groups" was stated as a felt necessity. 16. Coming to the Indian situation, it is useful to recall the words of a distinguished Prime Minister of India, who bad always a great concern for this suffering section of humanity. He observed: "Another point is that we in India live in a very mixed society mixed in terms of human beings, in terms of the variety in the country and the people. You will find that many people still live as their forefathers lived thousand years ago or more. You will also find here people who may be said to live in the middle of the twentieth century. So you see in India a mixture of tenth, fifteenth and the twentieth centuries. We have vast areas in India which differ from one another. We have a large number of people whom we call 'tribal' people". (See Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1963-64, Vol. 5, P. 102). The Harijan woman involved in this case perhaps belongs to an anterior century. It is useful to remember that that Prime Minister had also emphasised the necessity to affect the status quo when major changes are brought about in the economic and other spheres of life as regards such classes of people. (See Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1949-53, Vol. 2, P. 515). 17. It was felt necessary to refer to some of these aspects to indicate the approach which the Courts and Tribunals should have, in view of a conflict disclosed in the approach made by the Land Tribunal which dealt with the application initially and the Appellate Authority which ordered a remand on appeal. 18. 2, P. 515). 17. It was felt necessary to refer to some of these aspects to indicate the approach which the Courts and Tribunals should have, in view of a conflict disclosed in the approach made by the Land Tribunal which dealt with the application initially and the Appellate Authority which ordered a remand on appeal. 18. The Land Tribunal prefaced its discussion of the issue, by emphasising the necessity to evaluate the substantial evidence as distinguished from the minor incongruities in pleading, the trivial discrepancies in documents, and the insignificant contradictions in the evidence. The language of the Land Tribunal, has a high degree of literacy flavour and forceful logic. The pre-factory portion of the order reads: ("The petitioner in this case is a member of the Harijan community. Harijans are the ancient people of India suppressed socially, economically and educationally. They are symbols of accursed life condemned to the dark underworlds of ignorance and squalor, driven away for generations from the royal roads of light. It Is true that from among this group, who were compelled to be total strangers to the world of learning of knowledge, a small minority has entered on to the steps of light and development in recent times; yet the majority still wallow in the vallies of ignorance. They cannot present their own hopes and desires, expectations and opinions before an institution of administration of justice, with arguments well laced with logic. Ignorant as they are about the observance of propriety, they do not know much, the effect their words will have on those who hear them. It is this intellectual inferiority that is fundamentally responsible for the flaws in the pleadings and the contradictions in the depositions. I consider that the rights conferred by the Constitution on these weaker sections could be made effectively realised in actuality if only their problems are viewed in a broader angle and with sympathy, recognising this condition of their backwardness. I do not therefore find any reason to think that the applicant has engaged herself in putting forward a false and artificial case of creating a kudikidappu in her favour, as was alleged by the respondent with his imaginatively eloquent arguments, relying on the contradictions and mistakes in the application and depositions.") (This is only a rough translation of the passage extracted above in Malayalam.) 19. The Appellate Authority, took a typical conservative approach, the obsession of a wooden equality casting its shadows in the observations made by it. It said: "I think, the Tribunal has forgotten the fact that he has to take a decision based on the documentary evidence, oral evidences of the witnesses etc. and considering other aspects before him, and not based on the status and community of the parties involved in the case. There is no difference between haves and havenots in the eye of law. In the KLR Act and Rules, no special consideration has been given in the application for purchase of kudikidappu under S.80B to a particular community. Therefore, the above observation of the Land Tribunal in disposing of an application for purchase of kudikidappu filed under S.80B of the KLR Act is unwarranted and out of place." 20. I have no hesitation to hold that the Appellate Authority was thoroughly unjustified in making the above observations. It has missed the message of the Constitution. It omitted to note judicial decisions indicating the attitude and approach to be adopted by Courts and Tribunals in safeguarding and promoting the interests of the suffering sections of humanity by a liberal approach and an understanding heart. 21. Even academics who had studied the problems of 'Kudikidappukars' had observed how the hutment dwellers needed the support and sympathy of the statutory functionaries, for the effective realisation of what the Statute had conferred on them in theory. The observations of Ronald J. Herring as quoted in Pappu Plus v. St. George Church, 1984 KLT 1032 are relevant in this context: "for the little man to win, the officer must give special, sympathetic treatment, but often this is not done." "In sum, the obtaining of a kudikidappu through official channels was often tedious, costly, and uncertain." (See "Land to the Tiller".- The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Sjuth Asia." 1983 Edn. by Ronald J. Herring). 22. The infirmities and disabilities of the Adivasies in the conduct of cases and in giving evidence had been pointed out by this Court earlier. In Vembira v. Rayarappan Nambiar, (1985 KLT SN 30, Case No. 45) this Court adverted to the guidelines in the evaluation of the evidence of such backward sections of the society like the Adivasies. 22. The infirmities and disabilities of the Adivasies in the conduct of cases and in giving evidence had been pointed out by this Court earlier. In Vembira v. Rayarappan Nambiar, (1985 KLT SN 30, Case No. 45) this Court adverted to the guidelines in the evaluation of the evidence of such backward sections of the society like the Adivasies. It observed: "Persons who are familiar with the habits and limitations of the community to which the plaintiff belongs, could very well appreciate the lack of precision in matters of details." Those views were approvingly adopted in Thazhathevayal Kedukka v. Karumattathil Ellas, (SA No. 1087 of 1980 F). This approach, in substantial degree, applies to the members of the scheduled castes also. 23. In the light of the above discussion, I am clearly of the view that the Land Tribunal had the correct approach and proper perspective. The applicant in the present case had a double handicap. She was a Harijan; she was a woman. She has just managed to survive the litigation and legal proceedings before the Tribunal and other authorities. Her agonies are not yet ever. It is still a long way to go, to have a roof over their heads, in place of the demolished hut. Many are not likely to rush with help to a woman in such distress. Even those with revolutionary fervour seem to develop cold feet when influential pressure groups persist in depriving the Harijans of even limited legal benefits. Governmental apparatus with its rust and obsolescence cannot always be expected to be efficient enough in the protection of these weaker sections. It is here that voluntary organisations with real involvement and dedication can play a relevant and useful role. Organisations like People's Council for Social Justice, or the Indian Federation of Women Lawyers may, and can, give help to such helpless persons. A copy of the order will be sent to the Secretaries of these organisations for their consideration. 24. This is probably a case where the Government could meaningfully inquire into the deficiencies in the working of the State Agencies in giving effective and timely aid and assistance to a poor Harijan woman. At least the Vigilance Department, can think of a meaningful probe, so that the basic reasons for the past omission, if any, could be understood and future remedial measures, evolved effectively. At least the Vigilance Department, can think of a meaningful probe, so that the basic reasons for the past omission, if any, could be understood and future remedial measures, evolved effectively. To facilitate such thinking, a copy of the order will be sent to the Chief Secretary to Government. 25. It is also desirable that the Special Officer, the Constitutional functionary under Art.338 of the Constitution, entrusted with the duty to investigate ail matters relating to the welfare of and safeguards provided for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is also appraised of the happenings in the present case. That authority can chalk out plans and programmes for meaningful and effective action for Harijan protection. It is for consideration of that authority whether institutionalised machinery should not be provided for, to note and monitor atrocities against Harijans, soon after they come to the notice of the public authorities. If arrangements are made for immediate transmission of information to Special Officer whenever a crime against a Harijan is reported in any police station in the Indian Union, that will enable that Officer to have a close and vigilant watch over the fate of the investigation undertaken by the State agencies in such cases. Periodic scrutiny of the results of the Governmental action, could then be easily undertaken. These and other matters are essentially for the administrative authorities to consider. The facts of this case, would, perhaps indicate the necessity for such, meaningful programmes conceived in the welfare of the Harijans. A copy of the order will be sent to the Special Officer for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, Government of India, New Delhi also. Allowed.