JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The common question which these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution give rise is whether the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Bareilly, is entitled to levy and collect market fee from the rice millers located within the market area Bareilly in respect of rice sold to the State Government under the provisions of the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulations of Trade) Order, 1985 hulled out of paddy purchased from outside the market area. 2. The petitioners are rice millers carrying on business within the market area Bareilly notified under Section 6 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam). They hold licence under Section 6 of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 and Section 17( 1) of the Adhiniyam. Licence is also held by them under the Food grain Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976. For hulling rice they make purchase of paddy from outside the market area. Paddy is purchased by them inside the market area too but with that we are not here concerned. In Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1124 at P. 1136 : (1980 All U 490 at Pp. 500,501) the Supreme Court has ruled in reference to the relevant provisions : - "If paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist producer under sub-clause (2) of Section 17(iii)(b). He cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice. Nor will it be open to the Market Committee to choose between either of the two in the example just given, Market fee has to be levied and collected in relation to the transaction of paddy alone. Otherwise, there will be a risk of violation of Article 14 if it is left to the sweet-will of the Market Committee in the case of some rice millers to charge market fee on the transaction of paddy and in case of others to charge it when the sale of rice takes place. Otherwise, there will be a risk of violation of Article 14 if it is left to the sweet-will of the Market Committee in the case of some rice millers to charge market fee on the transaction of paddy and in case of others to charge it when the sale of rice takes place. If, however, paddy is brought by the rice-miller front another market area, then the Market Committee of the area where paddy is converted into rice and sold will be entitled to charge market fee on the transaction of sale in accordance with sub-clause (3)." 3. The issue before us is confined to rice sold in levy to the State Government from out of paddy purchased outside the market area Bareilly. Under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, the State Government has, with the prior concurrence of the Central Government, issued the U.P. Rice and Paddy (Levy and Regulation of Trade) Order, 1985 (for short the Levy Order). Licensed miller is defined in Clause 2(g) as meaning the owner or other person in charge of a rice mill holding a valid licence under the Rice Milling Industry Regulation Act, 1958. Clause 3(1), insofar as relevant, provides "Every licensed miller shall sell and deliver to the State Government at notified price sixty per cent of variety of rice conforming to specifications - (a) hold in stock and owned by him on the date of commencement of this order : (b) milled by him every day out of stocks of paddy owner by him; and (c) purchased by him or coming into his custody or possession for sale or disposal through him on commission basis or any other manner every day beginning with the date of commencement of this Order and until such time as the State Government otherwise directs" 4. In view of clause 5 the licensed miller cannot sell or otherwise dispose of or remove to any place other than his usual place of business or storage in a particular locality his stocks of rice or paddy except in accordance with a release certificate in token of having sold the prescribed percentage of paddy or rice in levy to the State Government. The purchase or acceptance of rice is made through the medium of Controller (Regional Food Controller) or his nominee who also issues the receipt (Clause 6). The purchase or acceptance of rice is made through the medium of Controller (Regional Food Controller) or his nominee who also issues the receipt (Clause 6). Delivery of rice in such lots and in such manner, at such place and at such times as the Controller or his nominee' directs (Clause 8). In Clause 16 the provision made is that for rice delivered as levy payment shall be made at the notified price in accordance with the specifications to be notified by the State Government from time to time. 5. Under Section 17(iii) of the Adhiniyam the Mandi Samiti is empowered to (iii) levy and collect: (a) such fees as may be prescribed for the issue or renewal of licences, and (b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates, being not less than one per-centum and not more than one and half per-centum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Government may specify by notification, and such fee shall be realised in the following manner; (1) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee; (2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; (3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee. 6. The Mandi Samiti in these cases has raised demand for market fee for the period 1985-86 on the basis of section 17(iii)(b)(3) aggrieved against which the petitioners have approached this Court. The affidavits have been exchanged and upon the request of counsel on both sides we proceed to decide these petitions finally at the admission stage under Chapter XXII Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. 7. The affidavits have been exchanged and upon the request of counsel on both sides we proceed to decide these petitions finally at the admission stage under Chapter XXII Rule 2 of the Rules of Court. 7. Sri Sunil Ambwani learned counsel for the petitioners contends that where the supply of rice is made under the Levy Order, as in these cases, the petitioners (who admittedly are traders) cannot be said to be selling the produce to the State Government and hence section 17(iii)(b)(3) is not attracted. The rice which the State Government collects upon levy is supplied by it to the Food Corporation of India in the Central pool. Thereafter under the Central Governments directive the commodity is disbursed to the State Governments for distribution on sale to consumers in fair price shops. The expression sale is not defined in the Adhiniyam. In section 2(r) however, it is provided that sale includes barter or deposit of goods by way of pledge or as security for the amount received as advance, which serves only to expand the commonly understood connotation of sale. It is common ground that in order to constitute a sale as understood in the Sale of Goods Act, "there should be an agreement between the parties for the purpose of transferring title to the goods, which presupposes capacity to contract that the contract must be supported by valuable consideration and that as a result of the transaction property must actually pass in the goods" (State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. AIR 1958 SC 560 ). The Supreme Court adverted to what is said in Benjamin on Sale (8th Ed). "To constitute a valid sale there must be a concurrence of the following elements, namely : - (1) parties competent to contract, (2) mutual assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or general property in which is transferred from the seller to the buyer; and (4) a price in money paid or promised" 8. The argument is that in a transaction of supply on levy there is no consensus or mutual assent; the transfer is brought about under compulsion of the statute. The argument is that in a transaction of supply on levy there is no consensus or mutual assent; the transfer is brought about under compulsion of the statute. The Levy Order leaves no option to the petitioners except to supply 60% of the rice hulled from paddy to the orders of the State Government at the controlled price and the petitioners may not deal with any part of the produce so long as there is no discharge secured after having subscribed the levy. In support reliance is placed by Sri Ambwani upon Chhitter Mai Narain Das v. Commr. of Sales Tax, (1970) 3 SCC 809 : ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 ).. 9. Sri B. D. Mandhyan learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti counters this with the submission that the concept of freedom of contract has undergone a great deal of change. Gannon Dunkerley ( AIR 1958 SC 560 ) (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that there cannot at all be a contract of sale if the parties to a transaction are obliged to comply with the terms of a statute. In New India Sugar' Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Sales Tax AIR 1963 SC 1207 Hidayatullah J. in his dissenting opinion (which was later affirmed by the larger Bench in Vishnu Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (1978) 1 SCC 520 : ( AIR 1978 SC 449 )) observed that when Government of Madras after receiving the permit, telegraphed instructions to dispatch sugar and the mills dispatched it, a contract emerged and consent must be implied on both sides though not expressed antecedent to the permit. It was accepted that there was an element of compulsion in both selling and buying, perhaps more for the supplier than for the receiver, but, according to the learned Judge, "a compelled sale is never the less a sale" and "sales often take place without volition of a party". "So long as the parties trade under controls at fixed price and accept these as any other law of the realm because they must, the contract is at the fixed price both sides having or deemed to have agreed to such a price. Consent under the law of contract need not be express, it can be implied." 10. "So long as the parties trade under controls at fixed price and accept these as any other law of the realm because they must, the contract is at the fixed price both sides having or deemed to have agreed to such a price. Consent under the law of contract need not be express, it can be implied." 10. In Vishnu Agencies (Pr) Ltd. (Supra) pursuant to the orders issued by the Department under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Paddy Procurement (Levy) Orders, the rice-millers had to supply a requisite quantity of rice to the wholesale or retail dealers at prices fixed by the Department. Every miller carrying on rice milling operations was required to sell to the agent or officer duly authorised by the Government the minimum quantities fixed by the Government at the fixed price. Except at the risk of prosecution for offence under the Essential Commodities Act no miller or other person who got rice milled in any rice mill could move or otherwise dispose of the rice received by milling at such rice mill otherwise than in accordance with the Controllers directions. After extensive review of the authorities, the Supreme Court affirmed the view that the contract is a contract of sale though the seller is obliged to give his assent under compulsion of a statute and held that the transaction between the rice millers arid the wholesalers or retailers were sales within the meaning of the A.P. Sales Tax Act, 1957 understood in the same sense as under the Sale of Goods Act. 11. Sri Ambwani urged that Chhitter Mai Narain Das ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 ) (supra) was distinguished, but not dissented in Vishnu Agencies ( AIR 1978 SC 449 ) and that the case before us falls within the purview of the former. We are relieved of necessity for detailed probe into this for the reason that the issue stands answered by the Supreme Court directly in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar & Co. v. State of U.P. AIR 1980 SC 1124 : (1980 All LJ 490) (supra). The case arose from the Adhiniyam. Point No. 19 therein raised for the appellants-traders was "Any goods sold under any controlled legislation such as rice etc. cannot attract the levy of fee as there is no freedom to make any sale in respect of such commodity." 12. The case arose from the Adhiniyam. Point No. 19 therein raised for the appellants-traders was "Any goods sold under any controlled legislation such as rice etc. cannot attract the levy of fee as there is no freedom to make any sale in respect of such commodity." 12. Untwalia, J, speaking for the Constitution Bench comprising of seven Hon'ble Judges spoke thus so far as this point is concerned, at page 1139 (of AIR) : (at p. 506 of All) - "This point has no substance and has got to be rejected. As held in Vishnu Agencies (Pvt) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1978) 2 SCR 433 : ( AIR 1978 SC 449 ) on a review of earlier decisions even if a commodity is sold pursuant to the controlled regulations still some small area is left to make it a transaction of sale. It may well be that no freedom is left to the parties in a large area of the transaction yet it is a transaction of sale."' 13. Vishnu Agencies (Pr.) Ltd. (supra) was thus held to conclude the controversy. The petitioners may not maintain, therefore, that there is no sale within the meaning of section 17(iii)(b) of the Adhiniyam when rice is supplied to the Controller in terms of the Levy Order, Chhitter Mai Narain Das ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 ) was distinguished in Vishnu Agencies (Pr.) Ltd. with the observation that the provisions of the Wheat Procurement Order were construed by the Court as being in the nature of compulsory acquisition of property, obliging the dealer to supply wheat from day to day, cases of compulsory acquisition of property by the State, it was pointed, stand on a different footing since there is no question in such cases of offer and acceptance nor of consent, either express or implied. This, however, was not without a qualification. This, however, was not without a qualification. In para 36 (45) of the report, supra it was observed - "We would, however, like to clarify that though compulsory acquisition of property would exclude the element of mutual assent which is vital to a sale, the learned Judges were, with respect, not right in holding in Chhitter Mai that even if in respect of the place of delivery and the place of payment of price, there could be a consensual arrangement, the transaction will not amount to a sale (1970-3 SCC 809 at p. 814) : ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 at p. 2004). The true position in law is as stated above, namely, that so long as mutual assent, express or implied, is not totally excluded the transaction will amount to a sale. The ultimate decision in Chhitter Mai can be justified only on the view that Clause 3 of the Wheat Procurement Order envisages compulsory acquisition of wheat by the State Government from the licensed dealer. Viewed from this angle, we cannot endorse the Courts criticism of the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commr., Sales Tax, U.P. v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopal ( AIR 1970 All 518 ) which held while construing Clause 3 that so long as there was freedom to bargain in some areas the transaction could amount to a sale though effected under compulsion of a statute. Looking at the scheme of the U.P. Wheat Procurement Order, particularly Clause 3 thereof, this Court in Chhitter Mai seems to have concluded that the transaction was, in truth and substance, in the nature of compulsory acquisition, with no real freedom to bargain in any area Shah, J. expressed the Courts .interpretation of Clause 3 in no uncertain terms by saying that "it did not envisage any consensual arrangement" 14. Hon'ble Beg J. in the separate but concurring judgment had this to say at page 550 (of 1978 (1) SCC): (at p. 453 of AIR 1978 SC) in reference to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Commr. of Sales Tax v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopai, AIR 1970 Ali 518 : - "It was held in the case of Ram Bilas (Supra) that the core of what is required for a "sale" was not destroyed by the so-called "levy" order which was legislative. of Sales Tax v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopai, AIR 1970 Ali 518 : - "It was held in the case of Ram Bilas (Supra) that the core of what is required for a "sale" was not destroyed by the so-called "levy" order which was legislative. It is true that passages from the judgment of Pathak, J., in the case of Ram Bilas Ram Gopal (supra) were cited and specifically disapproved by a bench of this Court in Chhitter Mai Narain v. Commr. of Sales Tax. ( AIR 1970 SC 2000 ). But, perhaps the view of this Court in Chhitter Mai Narain Das (supra) goes too far in this respect. It is not really the nomenclature of the order involved, but the substance of the transaction under consideration which matters in such cases." 15. This position is not altered in any manner in Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Amrit Roller Flour Mills, AIR 1985 SC 1199 relied upon by Sri Ambwani. Therein the respondent grinded the wheat and supplied the atta, maida and suji emerging from that process to the holders of permits issued under the Central Order. It was held that the case fell more appropriately within the rule laid down in Vishnu Agencies (Pr) Ltd. ( AIR 1978 SC 449 ) and the transaction amounted to sale. The noteworthy feature in our view is that the decision in Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab (1976) 38 STC 144 (Punj) upon which the High Court relied could not have the benefit of the Supreme Courts verdict in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar (1980 All LI 490) (supra) which we have reproduced above. A Full Bench of the Ratna High Court recently in Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1987 Pat 22 (at p. 27) in reference to the Levy Sugar Supply (Control) Order, 1979 observed : "it seems now beyond cavil that even a compulsory statutory sale is a sale in the eye of law and the necessary legal incidents of such a transaction are equally applicable thereto." 16. For implementation of the Levy Order, the State Government formulates procurement scheme from year to year. For implementation of the Levy Order, the State Government formulates procurement scheme from year to year. The Scheme formulated in 1984-85 is appended to the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10355 of 1986, This serves as a specimen there being no dispute that the scheme for 1985-86 with which we are concerned is on same pattern. In para 7 the Scheme refers to Government order dated 10th November, 1982 and says that the procedure observed regarding the delivery of rice in levy and the payment therefore shall be as specified in the Government Order. Learned Standing Counsel has placed a copy of that Government Order before us which proceeds on common pattern. 17. A perusal thereof shows that upon receipt of the information as to the rice being in deliverable state, the Regional Officer concerned shall inspect and take delivery. There shall then be payment made to the traders/millers as the case may be. The Regional Officer is enjoined to communicate this on day-to-day basis to the office of the Food Corporation. The corporation will treat this as offer made to it and communicate its acceptance within seventy two hours. If the Corporation rejects certain stock, the miller/dealer would be asked to rectify and bring the stuff in conformity with the specifications. If the Corporation rejects that still, there shall be adjustment made and the levy left over to another instalment. The order E thus leaves freedom to bargain in some limited areas including in regard to the place of payment Upon the stuff in its quality being not approved the miller may either bring that up to the mark or have the delivery deferred to another instalments. In regard to the time for delivery too, there is latitude to the miller. And these, in our opinion, may also constitute some of be distinguishing features which the Supreme Court (Pat. H.C.) took note of in Vishnu Agencies (Private) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others (supra). The transaction upon these facts and, circumstances does, in our view, constitute sale. 18. It was next argued by Sri Ambwani that assuming that the transaction is of sale, the State Government is not a trader as defined in section 2(y) of the Adhiniyam and for this reason the provision contained in section 17(iii)(b)(3) quoted above would not apply. The transaction upon these facts and, circumstances does, in our view, constitute sale. 18. It was next argued by Sri Ambwani that assuming that the transaction is of sale, the State Government is not a trader as defined in section 2(y) of the Adhiniyam and for this reason the provision contained in section 17(iii)(b)(3) quoted above would not apply. The definition in section 2(y) is as follows trader" means a person who in the ordinary course of business is engaged in buying or selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorised agent of one or more principals and includes a person, engaged in processing of agricultural produce;" 19. The submission made is that there is no element of profit in the State Government procuring rice on levy and therefore it may not be held that the State Government is engaged in buying the agricultural produce in the ordinary course of business. Business, the learned counsel adds, must comprise of profit motive. We have given careful thought but are of opinion that in the context this may not represent the correct position. 20. The term business is not defined in the Adhiniyam or the Rules framed thereunder. It is a word of large and wide import, capable of a variety of meanings. Reference to the meanings given to the term in the various Dictionaries is of little help for everyone of them notices a large number of meanings of the word. Obviously the meaning must be gleaned from the context in which it is used S. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondiah, AIR 1979 SC 1132 Dr. Bashir Uddin v. District Judge, Bulandshahr 1978 All WC 105 : 1978 All LJ 82). 21. The executive power of the Mate indisputedly extends to the carrying on of any trade or business vide: Article 298/Article 19(6).of the Constitution. In Union of India v. Ladulal Jain, AIR 1963 SC 1681 the issue considered in the context of section 20 Code of Civil Procedure was whether the running of railways is not business when they are run by Government. This was negatived holding that there appears to be no good reason to hold that it is so. It was laid down - "It is the nature of the activity which defines its character. Running of railways is such an activity which comes within the expression 'business. This was negatived holding that there appears to be no good reason to hold that it is so. It was laid down - "It is the nature of the activity which defines its character. Running of railways is such an activity which comes within the expression 'business. The fact as to who runs it and with what motive cannot affect it." And further - "We are of opinion that profit element Is not a necessary ingredient of carrying on business, though usually business is carried on for profit". 22. Their Lordships cited with approval State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610 in which the question arose whether the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 applies to the group of hospitals run by the State and whether they axe industry (business, trade, undertaking etc.) within the meaning of the Act. The criterion adopted was whether that activity i.e. the running of hospitals would be an undertaking if it is carried on by a private citizen or group of private citizens. The answer to this being indisputable it was held that it makes no difference that the hospital is run by Government. "It is the character of the activity which decides the question " If certain activities undertaken by an individual would equally be industry in the hands of a municipality. Monetary consideration for service is not an essential characteristic of industry in a modem State Corpn. of City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 . Commenting upon Satya Narain v. District Engineer, P.W.D. AIR 1962 SC 1161 which related to the plying of stage carriage buses undertaken by Government for ensuring the people a cheap, regular and realistic mode of transport, it was observed in Union Bank of India v. Ladulal Jain, ( AIR 1963 SC 1681 ) (supra) : - "The case simply held that commercial activity carried on with profit motive cannot be held to be public service. It does not hold that such activity carried on by Government will not be business if conducted without profit motive." 23. Depending, therefore, upon the nature of activity undertaken by the State, the presence of profit motive is not indispensable in all circumstances to constitute business. The central object behind procurement of agricultural produce upon levy would appear to be that there is equitable and fair distribution among the consumers at cheaper rates. Depending, therefore, upon the nature of activity undertaken by the State, the presence of profit motive is not indispensable in all circumstances to constitute business. The central object behind procurement of agricultural produce upon levy would appear to be that there is equitable and fair distribution among the consumers at cheaper rates. There significantly exist in the transaction the elements of the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity. Procurement of rice from the rice-millers on levy has gone on for a series of years in the past; it has assumed the character of annual feature with the advent of the new crops and it runs to several hundred tonnes. If such-activity were undertaking by some private agency, we are hesitant to say that it will not be construed as business of that agency. No difference is caused because the undertaking in the present is by the State. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the case reported in Government Medical Store Depot. Gauhati v. Superintendent of Taxes, (1985) 4 SCC 239 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1748 ). In that case the stand taken by the Government Medical Store Depot had been that it merely supplied the medical stores to the specified institutions on no profit no loss basis and there was no element or object of profit making. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of investigation made by Revenue to show that the transactions were carried on with profit motive, the appellant could not be assessed to sales tax as a dealer under the Sales Tax Act. Reference was made also to State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1066 which lays down - "Whether a person carries on business in a particular commodity must depend upon the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions of purchase and sale in a class of goods and the transactions must ordinarily be entered into with a profit-motive. By the use of the expression "profit motive" it is not intended that profit must in fact be earned. Nor does the expression cover a mere desire to make some monetary gain out of a transaction or even a series of transactions. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity.......... " 25. Nor does the expression cover a mere desire to make some monetary gain out of a transaction or even a series of transactions. It predicates a motive which pervades the whole series of transactions effected by the person in the course of his activity.......... " 25. Unlike the taxing statutes in the context whereof the pronouncements aforementioned are made, the Adhiniyam has for its central object, as appearing also from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the improvement of the marketing conditions for transactions in agricultural produce and the prevention of exploitation of the : producers. Functions and duties of the Mandi Samitiesare enumerated in section 16. There is regulation through licensing by the Samiti and for the purpose of the object being carried out the Samiti is empowered to levy and collect market fee (section 17). In a case where the purchaser is not a trader the incidence for payment of market fee is placed on such purchaser (section 17(iii)(b)(4)). But where the purchase is in the regular course of business in the sense of not being in some special venture, sporadic or casual, the liability to pay the market fee vis-a-vis the Mandi Samiti is laid on the seller with right to him no doubt to realise it from the purchaser. The petitioners it is not in dispute are traders; the State Government assumes the role of a trader too keeping in view the elements inherent in the transaction. In entering into the transactions of purchase of rice from the rice-milers in the market area, the State Government too, like any other trader partakes the facilities etc. which the Mandi Samiti is supposed to provide and, therefore, the Adhiniyam does not. exonerate Government too from the ultimate incidence for the payment of the market fee. In the context of section 17 the question is only of apportioning the liability between the sellers (the petitioners) and the purchaser (the State Government); it does not appear that in this context profit motive assumes any importance. We have presumed its absence for purposes of the discussion although there are no dates placed before us to establish this as a fact. 26. The other contention of the petitioners that there is no quid pro quo for charging the market fee is also not sustainable on me its. We have presumed its absence for purposes of the discussion although there are no dates placed before us to establish this as a fact. 26. The other contention of the petitioners that there is no quid pro quo for charging the market fee is also not sustainable on me its. In para 17 of the counter-affidavit of the Mandi Samiti there appears a fair account of the service rendered. Principal marker yard has been raised at Bareilly for more than rupees two crores and further construction is in process. Guest House and shops for whole lasers are being constructed too. Long roads have been provided. Method of sale and purchase through auction is on f anvil, Maintenance of roads, telephones, Sever, winnowers etc. is looked after and no part of the realisations is diverted to the general revenues. All this adequately meets the test laid down. The traditional concept of quid pro quo too does not mandate that there must be special service to the payers of the fees mathematical exactitude is not the requirement. Projections into future can be taken into account and present services only cannot be utilised to justify the imposition of fee. In Indian Tobacco Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 1985 Supple. SCC 477 the test propounded was - "Any incidental benefit to those other than the payers of the fee is not decisive of the fact whether it is a tax or a fee. It is necessary to find out the primary object and essential purpose of the imposition (emphasis supplied there into). If the primary object and essential purpose of the imposition be service of some special kind to the users of the market or payers of fee, other consequences or other benefits to others do not in the least affect the position. The concept of benefit to the users of market must be looked at from a broad commonsense point of view, taking an integrated view. In todays world you cannot build a good market if the accesses through which the produce comes to market are not maintained. However, at what point the roads will begin and at what point the roads will end to be able to justify the roads necessary to maintain solely the market, appears to be highly theoretical and unreal question in the modern concept of integrated development. However, at what point the roads will begin and at what point the roads will end to be able to justify the roads necessary to maintain solely the market, appears to be highly theoretical and unreal question in the modern concept of integrated development. In the case of Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 353 : ( AIR 1983 SC 1246 ); a bench of three Judges of this Court had to deal with this question. The said decision reiterated the distinction between a fee and a tax and observed that a tax was levied as part of a common burden, while a fee was for payment of a specific benefit or privilege although the special advantage was secondary to the primary motive of regulation in public interest. According to this decision in determining whether a levy was of fee, the true test must be whether its primary and essential purpose was to render specific services to a specified area or class; it might be of no consequence that the State might ultimately and directly be benefited by it. There must, however, be a reasonable relationship between a levy of fee and the services rendered to the payers of fees. According to this decision. Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 1008 did not lay down any legal principle of general applicability. Sreenivasa General Traders case was approved by another decision of the bench of three learned Judges in the case of Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 345 : ( AIR 1985 SC 218 ) (Judgment delivered by Chinnappa Reddy, 27. In Shivam Talkies v. State of U.P. 1986 All LJ 88 a Division Bench of this Court also after considering the Supreme Court decision in Sreenivasa General Traders AIR 1983 SC 1246 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohd. In Shivam Talkies v. State of U.P. 1986 All LJ 88 a Division Bench of this Court also after considering the Supreme Court decision in Sreenivasa General Traders AIR 1983 SC 1246 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Mohd. Yasin AIR 1983 SC 617 ; Amar Nath Om Prakash AIR 1985 SC 218 ; City Corporation of Calicut v. T. Sadasivan AIR 1985 SC 756 and also the decisions of this Court in Shyam Behari Mathur v. Zila Parishad 1984 All LJ 660 and Anil Rice Mill v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1984 All LJ 869 concluded - "The law laid down is that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo has undergone a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered or the advantage conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered. Even general benefit to a person who pays the fee would justify the levy". 28. The last contention raised then by Sri Ambwani that the liability to pay the market fee to the Mandi Samiti would be of the State Government as purchaser and not the sellers i.e. the petitioners need not detain us long, to take this view is unwarranted on the plain and unambiguous language of section 17(iii)(b)(3) already reproduced above. The words are the trader selling the produce shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee." In clause (1) also, it will be observed, the commission agent who sells is liable to pay the fee to the Committee, True, the seller may both under (3) and (1) realise from the purchaser, but then vis-a-vis the Committee, the liability is of the seller squarely. Clause (4) is residuary and of no avail in the case unless clause (3) is ruled out. The Committee can recover market fee only . from such person on whom the liability to pay the same has been fixed by section 17(iii)(b). This was also the view taken in Agra Roller Flour Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti 1981 All LJ 76 (Division Bench). The Committee can recover market fee only . from such person on whom the liability to pay the same has been fixed by section 17(iii)(b). This was also the view taken in Agra Roller Flour Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti 1981 All LJ 76 (Division Bench). There the petitioners-traders purchased the produce from the Food Corporation of India and it was held that the liability under clause (3) for payment of market fees in respect of such transaction could only that me Food Corporation of India and not of the petitioners. 29, Our attention was invited on petitioners behalf to the directive which the State Government issued to the Regional Food Controllers in general on 5th February 86 (Annexure-I) wherein the latter were directed to clear off the Mandi fee in accordance with the rules. This suggests that the State Government did not refute its liability to reimburse the sellers in respect of the market fee. Strangely enough in the counter affidavit filed for the State, though there could be nothing stated to explain this directive, the stand taken is that the price of rice paid to the sellers is inclusive of market fee. This is belied dearly from the Note appended to the Notification No. 8168/XXIX-Food-4 dated 6th November, 1935 (published in the Gazette of the same date) under clause 16 of the Levy Order, 1985 specifying the price for the different varieties. The note reads as under "Note-Prices of rice are inclusive of Mandi Tax on Paddy and depreciation on Gunny used for packing paddy but exclusive of gunny charges for rice and purchase or sales tax levied after the ex-mill stage on rice. Above mentioned prices are subject to revision if there is any change in the rate of mandi or any change in other statutory charges." 30. Included within the prices of rice, therefore, is mandi tax on paddy and significantly not rice. Before us is the question of market fee payable on rice supplied to the State Government under the Levy Order, 1985 milled of paddy purchased from outside the market area The price thereof is not inclusive of market fee. It indeed does not behove the State Government not to carry out the statutory liability imposed upon it under section 17(iii)(b)(3). Before us is the question of market fee payable on rice supplied to the State Government under the Levy Order, 1985 milled of paddy purchased from outside the market area The price thereof is not inclusive of market fee. It indeed does not behove the State Government not to carry out the statutory liability imposed upon it under section 17(iii)(b)(3). This litigation may have been averted if only the State Government had duly paid off the market fee to the Mandi Samiti, We hope and trust that there would be no dilly-dallying further on part of the State Government in paying off its dues to the trader-sellers who are placed under the liability vis-a-vis the Mandi Samiti, 31. Before concluding we must refer to Banda v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, 1976 UP-TC 79 (Division Bench) cited by Sri S. P. Agarwal learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 8083 of 1986 who adopted the other arguments of Sri Ambwani. The relevant extract from that decision is as follows : - "It was next urged that the Mandi Samities are empowered to levy and collect fees on the specified agricultural produce which are brought and sold in the market yards. Mere sale in the market yards is not enough to attract the levy of fees. The goods must first be brought into the market yard before the transaction of sale takes place there. If the goods are already present within the market yard, no fee is leviable on the sale of such goods. The contention appears to be sound. After the purchase of the paddy the petitioner brought in and sold by the producers in the market, yard, the goods do not go out of the market yard. The paddy is husked in the mills situate within the market yard and the rice so obtained is sold by the petitioners within the market yard. The element of bringing in of the agricultural produce is totally absent in such a transaction. Under the rule the right to levy fee is not on all transactions of sale of agricultural produce within the market yard but on the sale of those specified items of agricultural produce which are introduced into the market yard from outside. The element of bringing in of the agricultural produce is totally absent in such a transaction. Under the rule the right to levy fee is not on all transactions of sale of agricultural produce within the market yard but on the sale of those specified items of agricultural produce which are introduced into the market yard from outside. The rule as it stands does not envisage levy of fee on the sale of produce which are present in the market yard when the transaction takes place. It is true that section 17(iii)(b) empowers the Mandi Samities to levy and collect market fee on all transactions of sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce in the principal and sub-market yards and places no limitations on the source and origin of the goods. Rule 66(1), however, places a limitation on the authority of the Mandi Samitis to levy' and collect fee only on that class of specified agricultural produce which are brought in the market yards and then sold there. The use of the expression brought in clearly indicates that the goods must be introduced in the market yards from outside. It is not open to the respondents to justify the levy in question on the strength of the scope ambit of section 17 when rule 66( 1) confines the power of levy and collection to a restricted class of specified agricultural produce. The Mandi Samities have no legal sanction to law and collect fee in respect of rice which has not been brought inside the market yards from outside". 32. This evidently rests upon Rule 66(1) of the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Rules, 1964. Section 17(iii) of the Adhiniyam was however amended by section 5 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Laws (Amendment) Act, 1978 (U.P, Act 7 of 1978) with retrospective effect from June 12, 1973. This amendment could evidently not be before the Court when Tulsiram Raghuram (1976 UPTC 79) (supra) was decided on 12th November, 1975. The remarkable feature is that section 17(iii)(b) (as amended) provides that "such fee shall be realised in the following manner" meaning [hereby that in contradiction to section 17(iii)(b), as it earlier was, the manner for levy and collection of the market fee is laid down in the Adhiniyam itself thereby rendering anything appearing in Rule 66(1) otiose. Due to the legislative enactment, therefore, this decision renders no assistance to the petitioners. 33. Due to the legislative enactment, therefore, this decision renders no assistance to the petitioners. 33. The petitions, therefore, fail and are dismissed with no order as to the costs. The interim stay is vacated.