ORDER A.N. Varma, J. - This petition has been filed by the tenants and the heirs of one Brij Bhushan Lal to whom the accommodation in dispute is alleged to have been sublet. 2. The petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the Courts below decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent No. 3 for the ejectment of the petitioned on the ground of subletting and default. Both the Courts below have on a very careful and exhaustive consideration of the evidence on the record found that the tenants had sublet the disputed accommodation without the consent of the landlord. The Courts below have further found that the tenants have committed default in paying the arrears of rent. Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent has been decreed both for ejectment as well as for arrears of rent and damages. 3. Shortly, the plaint case was that the accommodation was let out to one Krishna Kant from 1-12-67 at a monthly rent of Rs. 130/-. Krishna Kant died on 15-12-1971 leaving behind him defendants Nos. 1 to 6 as his heirs and legal representative. Krishna Kant sublet a part of the residential accommodation to defendant No. 7 and the shop which was also in the tenancy of Krishna K ant to defendant No. 8 without the plaintiffs' consent. The tenants also fell in arrears rent whereupon a composite notice was served on the heirs of Krishna Kant on 29-1-1972 demanding the arrears of rent as well as terminating the tenancy. 4. The tenants (who are the heirs of Krishna Kant) failed to comply with the notice whereupon the present suit was filed for ejectment as well as arrears of rent and damages. 5. The suit was contested by the defendants on the allegations that Krishna Kant was a tenant of the disputed accommodation for 40 years from the time of his father Dwarika Prasad while defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were continuing in occupation of the accommodation as relations of Dwarika Prasad from his lifetime. Krishna Kant had not executed any rent note on 1-12-1967. Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were, in any case, in the occupation of the accommodation with the consent of the plaintiff. 6. The learned Judge, Small Cause Court found that Dwarika Prasad was a tenant in a different accommodation. Krishna Kant became tenant of the disputed accommodation under a rent note dated 1-12-1967. Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were, in any case, in the occupation of the accommodation with the consent of the plaintiff. 6. The learned Judge, Small Cause Court found that Dwarika Prasad was a tenant in a different accommodation. Krishna Kant became tenant of the disputed accommodation under a rent note dated 1-12-1967. Disbelieving the defendants pleas he held that Krishna Kant had sublet the accommodation to defendants Nos. 7 and 8 without the consent of the plaintiff-landlord. The suit was accordingly decreed. 6A. The tenants unsuccessfully challenged that decree by a revision before the learned Addl. District Judge who has dismissed the same by the impugned order. The learned Additional District Judge has concurred with the trial Court in the findings recorded by it. 7. Sri V. P. Misra learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the finding of the Court below that the accommodation or part thereof had been sublet by Krishna Kant is unsustainable in law inasmuch as defendants Nos. 7 and 8 had been continuing in possession as relations of Dwarika Prasad for more than 40 years within the knowledge of the landlord. A presumption should, therefore, have been raised that they were in possession with the consent of the landlord. Learned counsel further submitted that the landlord would be deemed in these circumstances to have acquiesced in the alleged sub-letting by Krishna Kant. 8. I am unable to agree. The Courts below have recorded a finding supported by cogent reasons to the effect that Dwarika Prasad with whom defendants Nos. 7 and 8 are stated to have been residing was occupying an altogether different accommodation and not the disputed accommodation. This finding of the Courts below is not vitiated by any error, whether of fact or of law to justify interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Learned counsel next submitted that even if it be assumed that the defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were admitted as sub-tenants by Krishna Kant after 1967, the fact that till the death of Krishna Kant in 1971 no action was taken by the landlord, was sufficient to warrant the inference that the defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were in occupation with the consent of the landlord. 10. The submission cannot be accepted. 7 and 8 were admitted as sub-tenants by Krishna Kant after 1967, the fact that till the death of Krishna Kant in 1971 no action was taken by the landlord, was sufficient to warrant the inference that the defendants Nos. 7 and 8 were in occupation with the consent of the landlord. 10. The submission cannot be accepted. The Courts below have analysed the evidence carefully and have concurrently held that in the facts of the present case it is not established that the landlord gave his consent, either express or implied, to the continuance of defendants Nos. 7 and 8 in the accommodation. In any view, from the mere fact that no notice was given by the landlord to Krishna Kant for nearly three years from the induction of the defendants Nos. 7 and 8, without anything more, it cannot be justifiably inferred that the landlord had agreed to the sub-letting. Learned counsel for the petitioners was wholly unable to point out any material on the record which might have indicated that the landlord had knowledge of the fact of sub-letting by Krishna Kant in favour of defendants Nos. 7 and 8. Mere passage of time without any further circumstance indicating some kind of tacit consent on the part of the landlord to the arrangement of sub-letting by the tenant-in-chief, would be an entirely unsafe guide in determining the question whether the sub-letting is with the consent of the landlord. I, therefore, reject the contention. 11. The next contention was that in view of the admitted position that the sub-tenants have been in occupation over the part of the accommodation in dispute until the filing of the suit, their occupation must be deemed to have been regularised under S. 14 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 12. The submission is entirely untenable. No such plea was raised on behalf of subtenant before the trial Court or even before the revisional Court. The plea is undoubtedly one which requires investigation of facts and cannot be permitted to be raised here for the first time. Further on the finding of the Courts below that the landlords consent was not there it is apparent that S. 14 can have no application. 13. The plea is undoubtedly one which requires investigation of facts and cannot be permitted to be raised here for the first time. Further on the finding of the Courts below that the landlords consent was not there it is apparent that S. 14 can have no application. 13. This brings me to the last submission of the learned counsel which was that the Courts below have not adjusted the amounts which the tenants had paid to the landlord in determining the arrears of rent. The submission was, however, promptly given up when his attention was drawn to the finding of the trial Court which has taken into account the entire payments which are alleged to have been made by the tenants to the landlord. 14. In the end, learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral prayer to the effect that the petitioners may not be evicted from the accommodation in dispute for a period of three months from today. Learned counsel is, however, unable to give any undertaking for safeguarding the interest of the plaintiff respondent In the interest of justice, however, this Court is inclined to give three months time to the petitioners subject to the condition that they shall deliver vacant possession of the disputed accommodation to the plaintiff peacefully and without any obstruction on or before the expiry of three months from today. 15. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but make no order as to costs. The execution of the decree for ejectment shall, however, remain stayed for three months from today subject to the direction that the petitioner shall handover vacant possession to the plaintiff respondent on or before the expiry of three months and to the further condition that the petitioners deposit the entire decretal amount as well as the amount which may have become due up to date as well as the next three months within one month failing which the stay of execution of the decree granted by this Court herein shall stand automatically discharged.