Judgment :- 1. Defendants are the revision petitioners. They at first moved the court by an interlocutory application for leave to amend the written statement. That was disallowed on two grounds. (1) No law allows amendments of writ ten statement and their remedy is only to, apply under 0.8 R.9 for leave to file an additional written statement and (2) the amendments sought for are inconsistent with the original contentions. When they applied under 0.8 R.9 by another application with a written statement, that prayer too was rejected on the ground of delay. Hence they came up in revision. 2. The suit property is 79 cents. It belonged to plaintiff's brother Narayanan Ezhuthasan. Plaintiff got it under a will of his brother. The suit was filed on the allegation that defendants, who were permitted by Narayanan Ezhuthassan to reside in the building for a monthly rent of 12 annas, encroached upon the property. Prayer in the suit is for recovery of possession of the land building. Defendants claimed tenancy right over 50 cents out of the suit property and contended that they are residing in the building which was put up by them. They also claimed to have obtained a purchase certificate. 3. The question of tenancy was referred to the Land Tribunal. Tenancy right was found against. It was also found by the Land Tribunal that the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the transaction was relating to a building alone and therefore covered by S.3(1)(ii) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act which provides that nothing in Chap.2 shall apply to leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse and the site thereof with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. When the defendants claimed kudikidappu right before it the Land Tribunal said that though the Explanation to the above provision states that permission given to the kudikidappukaran to occupy a but shall not be deemed to be a lease of the building for the purpose of the clause, there is no claim or issue to be decided by the Land Tribunal as to whether the defendants are kudikidappukars. 4. It was then that defendants moved for amending the written statement by insetting the following contentions. (1) The but was put up by them (2) They are residing in the but (3) They have no other land or homestead and (4) They are kudikidappukars. 5. 4. It was then that defendants moved for amending the written statement by insetting the following contentions. (1) The but was put up by them (2) They are residing in the but (3) They have no other land or homestead and (4) They are kudikidappukars. 5. Though the first contention that the but was put up by them was found against by the Land Tribunal, that aspect need not stand in the way of allowing the amendment. Trial court alone is bound by that finding and has to incorporate the same in the judgment and dispose of the suit accordingly. That finding could be challenged in appeal as if it were a finding of the trial court and the appellate court can go into the correctness of that finding as if that is a finding of the trial court and even reverse the same. In such a contingency absence of pleading should not stand in the way of the defendants. The decision of the Land Tribunal need not therefore deter the court in allowing that amendment also if it is otherwise found allowable. 6. The trial court seems to have gene under the wrong impression that 0.6 R.17 is intended only to enable the plaintiff to amend the plaint and the corresponding prevision enabling the defendants to alter, amend or add to his contentions is by filing an additional written statement under 0.8 R.9 with the leave of the court. That may be the reason why the court said that no provision of law allows the defendants to amend his written statement and his remedy is only to apply for leave of the court and file an additional written statement. The wording in 0.6 R.17 is "allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings". The wording is not 'plaintiff, but 'either party'. That means plaintiff or defendant. They are the only parties to the suit though for some other purposes others may also be deemed to be parties. So also the word used is not plaint but pleadings. 0.6 R.1 makes it clear that pleading shall mean plaint or written statement. If so it is clear that O.6 R.17 allows the plaintiff to amend the plaint and defendant to amend the written statement. 0.8 R.9 deals with an entirely different contingency. So also the word used is not plaint but pleadings. 0.6 R.1 makes it clear that pleading shall mean plaint or written statement. If so it is clear that O.6 R.17 allows the plaintiff to amend the plaint and defendant to amend the written statement. 0.8 R.9 deals with an entirely different contingency. That rule requires the leave of the court before any party can present a further pleading after the written statement has been filed. Under that rule the court can suo mote also require a party to file a further and fuller statement if the pleadings of either party are too vague. There also in the first part the word used is 'pleading'. Such a pleading which could be filed subsequent to the written statement without the leave of the court is one by way of defence to a set off or counter claim. In other cases leave is required. That is entirely different from and independent of the provision for amendment of pleadings in 0.6 R.17. Under 0.6 R.17 what the court has to do after allowing the prayer is to permit the party to carry out the amendment in the original pleading. 7. There are various provisions in the Code for amendment of proceedings. S.152 deals with amendments of judgments, decrees and orders. S.153 confers a general power on the court to amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit. 0.1 R.10 provides for amendment of plaint by striking off or adding parties. 0.6 R.16 deals with compulsory amendment of opponent's pleading. 0.14 R.5 deals with amendment of issues. The only provision which deals with amendment of one's own pleading with the leave of court is 0.6 R.17. The various provisions are intended to meet various situations. Though 0.6 R.17 is applicable only to amendments of plaints and written statements, the principles embodied in the rule could be extended to other areas also. The rule is not exhaustive of the powers of the court as regards amendment. It can be extended to other proceedings in the trial, appellate or revisional stages and even to proceedings in execution. The main considerations to weigh with the court are that the amendment is necessary for the determination of the real controversy between the parties and it should not work injustice to the opposite side. There may be other considerations also depending on facts of cases. 8. The main considerations to weigh with the court are that the amendment is necessary for the determination of the real controversy between the parties and it should not work injustice to the opposite side. There may be other considerations also depending on facts of cases. 8. The principles applicable to amendment of plaints are equally applicable to amendment of written statements also. Leave to amend written statement ought to be granted where the amendment sought is not inconsistent with the plea taken in the original written statement and where no right of the plaintiff is defeated by allowing the amendment. An amendment setting up a new case totally inconsistent with the original case set up will not be allowed if it is unjust to the opposite party. So also if the proposed amendment will have the effect of displacing the plaintiff's suit it will not be allowed. But on principle courts are more liberal in allowing amendments of written statements than in the case of amendment of plaints as questions of comparative prejudice are less likely to operate with the same rigour in the former than in the latter case. A new claim to amend the plaint after limitation has set in may not normally be allowed. But that is not the position with regard to the written statement because whatever be the contention the question of limitation as against the plaintiff will be considered only as on the date of suit. Anyhow 0.8 R.9 has no application when a party moves the court under 0.6 R.17 for amendment of the written statement already filed. By amendment what is meant is retaining the original pleadings and making alterations, corrections or additions to it. That is different from further pleadings. 0.8 R.9 cannot be confused with 0.6 R.17. 9. The stand taken by the trial court that the additional contentions are inconsistent with the original contentions and it is an attempt to have a second innings cannot be correct. As to who constructed the building is immaterial in considering the claim of kudikidappu right. It is admitted by the plaintiff that the original owner inducted the defendants into occupation of the building for a monthly rent of 12 annas. That they are continuing in occupation of the building is also admitted. As to who constructed the building is immaterial in considering the claim of kudikidappu right. It is admitted by the plaintiff that the original owner inducted the defendants into occupation of the building for a monthly rent of 12 annas. That they are continuing in occupation of the building is also admitted. There is no case so far that cost of construction at the time of construction will take the building out of the definition of hut. There is also no case till now that defendants are having land or homestead or income taking them out of the purview of kudikidappukars. It is true that defendants denied the entrustment of the building and pleaded a tenancy of 50 cents. They also claimed that the building was put up by them. But their case is also that they are in occupation of the building. In effect they were raising only a larger claim. The necessary averments for claiming kudikidappu were there in the original written statement itself. The only omission was that kudikidappu right was not specifically pleaded in so many words. That claim alone is the addition needed by amendment. In fact the claim put forward by the plaintiff before the Land Tribunal was that the transaction is exempted from the purview of Chap.2 of the KLR Act under S.3(1)(ii) which says that nothing in that chapter shall apply to leases only of buildings, including a house, shop or warehouse and the site thereof, with the land, if any, appurtenant thereto. It was accepting that contention that the defendants were found by the Land Tribunal to be not entitled to protection under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Though the defendants claimed kudikidappu right and though Explanation to S.3(1)(ii) says that permission given to a kudikidappukaran to occupy a but shall not be deemed to be a lease of building coming within the exemption under S.3(1)(ii), the Land Tribunal refused to consider that contention only on the technical ground that there was no claim or issue to be decided in that respect. When the Land Tribunal gave its verdict on the basis of an exemption claimed by the plaintiff, such a consideration ought to have included a probe into the Explanation which is capable of taking the transaction out of the exemption if the conditions in the Explanation, which acts as a proviso to the exemption, are satisfied. When the Land Tribunal gave its verdict on the basis of an exemption claimed by the plaintiff, such a consideration ought to have included a probe into the Explanation which is capable of taking the transaction out of the exemption if the conditions in the Explanation, which acts as a proviso to the exemption, are satisfied. Exclusion of the transaction under the exemption will be complete only if applicability of the Explanation, operating as a proviso, is also ruled out. When the tenancy right was found against, thereby considering the transaction one as a lease only of building, it was the duty of the Land Tribunal to have considered on the merits whether the Explanation is attracted or not. That is only what the defendants now want and that cannot be said to be inconsistent to the original written statement. 10. Rejection of the application for amendment itself was wrong. The amendment did not involve introduction of a new and different case as held in M/s. Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and another v. M/s. Ladha Ram and Co. (AIR 1977 SC 680) or a relief absolutely inconsistent with the original claim as observed in J. Anantha v. J. Bapanna Rao (AIR 1959 AP 448). Lack of bona fides propounded in Krishnaswamy Iyer v. Ouseph Mathai (AIR 1961 Kerala 110) cannot also be attributed as a reason in this case in view of the admitted facts and the attitude taken by the Land Tribunal which necessitated the amendment. The facts of this case cannot have comparison to Ranga Pai v. Spl. Tahsildar (LR.) Vypeen (1983 KLT 77) or Markose Peter v. Chacko Ittycheria (1971 KLT 481) also. Here, on admitted facts, the defendants are entitled to kudikidappu rights, when the tenancy right pleaded by them is found against, provided certain further facts not so far raised or denied by the parties in the pleadings or evidence are established. Those facts are that the building is a but and defendants are persons not excluded from the purview of kudikidappukars. No contention was raised by the plaintiff so far negativing such claims. When tenancy right is found against and when admitted permissive residence is there, the only question that arose further before the Land Tribunal was exemption under S.3(i)(ii) which was dependent on the further decision on the applicability of the Explanation. No contention was raised by the plaintiff so far negativing such claims. When tenancy right is found against and when admitted permissive residence is there, the only question that arose further before the Land Tribunal was exemption under S.3(i)(ii) which was dependent on the further decision on the applicability of the Explanation. The omission of the Land Tribunal to consider that explanation, in spite of request, on a technical ground, has vitiated that finding. The finding is therefore incomplete for non-consideration of all the ingredients of the exemption claimed by the plaintiff and accepted by the Land Tribunal. 11. It is true that on the principle of constructive res judicata embodied in Explanation.4 to S.11 CPC the specific claim of kudikidappu might and ought to have been raised. As held in Narayanan v. Kunchi Amma Parukutty Amma (1986 KLT 1340) S.125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act does not contemplate successive references to Land Tribunals. It may be an abuse of the process of court if alternative pleas of tenancy under different sections of the statute are raised in successive proceedings or different stages of the same proceedings requiring every time that there shall be a reference to the Land Tribunal whenever such contentions are raised by the occupant of the land. But that decision also contemplated contingencies in which such subsequent reference may be justified. The instance of such a contingency pointed out in that decision could only be illustrative and not the sole instance. For the reasons already stated by me the case in hand presents a better illustrative instance where such a second reference must be had. When the Land Tribunal found against the tenancy and when the plaintiff claimed exemption from the benefits of the Kerala Land Reforms Act before the Land Tribunal only under S.3(1)(ii) and when the Land Tribunal allowed that claim without considering the benefits of the Explanation pleaded by the defendants before it, the finding of the Land Tribunal is not complete and conclusive. It is not a new case but only a smaller relief arising out of the original case even on admitted facts. The amendment had therefore to be allowed and the matter again referred to the Land Tribunal for a proper finding on kudikidappu right after considering the explanation also. It is not a new case but only a smaller relief arising out of the original case even on admitted facts. The amendment had therefore to be allowed and the matter again referred to the Land Tribunal for a proper finding on kudikidappu right after considering the explanation also. Even though the rejection of the subsequent prayer for leave to accept the additional written statement is also wrong, that question will not arise for consideration when amendment of written statement itself is allowed. Additional written statement became necessary only because of rejection of the prayer for amendment. 12. CRP is therefore allowed in part. The order rejecting IA 861 of 1986 is set aside and the IA is allowed. The amendments will be permitted to be carried out. After allowing the plaintiff to file subsequent pleading, if any, and after framing additional issues the trial court will refer the claim of kudikidappu right to the Land Tribunal and proceed to dispose of the suit on the merits after getting a finding from the Land Tribunal on the claim of kudikidappu right if it is disputed. In the above circumstances the order rejecting IA 400 of 1987 is not interfered with since it is unnecessary. There will be no order as to costs.