Judgment :- 1. Even though as many as 8 questions of law are formulated in the memorandum of grounds, counsel for the 1st defendant-appellant has urged only one point relating to the maintainability of the suit for the reason of the bar under S.92 CPC. The suit is for a declaration that the 1st defendant is only the Manager of the plaint school in his capacity as the Secretary of the School Committee and not in his individual capacity and also to restrain him from treating the school as his own and effecting transfers of staff from the plaint L. P. School to the High School Ottasekharamangalam and vice versa. Both the courts below have concurrently found that the plaint school, namely, the L.P. School, Ottasekharamangalam was established by the general public of the locality and the 1st defendant is only the Manager in his capacity as the Secretary of the School Committee, that bad been acting on behalf of the public of the locality. This finding is based on the documentary evidence Exts. Al to A6, A9 and A10 produced and proved on behalf of the plaintiffs. 2. The mere fact that the 1st defendant was later allowed to establish a separate high school and the U. P. section subsequently added to the L. P. school was allowed to be amalgamated with the High School does not in any way make the 1st defendant the educational agency of the plaint L. P. school. None of the documents produced by the 1st defendant would indicate that he was the educational agency in regard to the L. P. school. There is no dispute that the Ist defendant is the Manager and has been approved as such by the Education Department. The Manager is different from the educational agency. It is the educational agency that will be permitted to establish aided schools and it is the educational agency that is empowered to appoint the Manager of an aided school subject to the approval of the educational officer concerned. Sub-s. (2) of S.7. of the Kerala Education Act defines the "educational agency" to mean any person or body of persons permitted to establish and maintain any private school under the Act. Under sub-s. (4) of S.3 all existing schools shall be deemed to have been established in accordance with the Act. Sub-s. (2) of S.7. of the Kerala Education Act defines the "educational agency" to mean any person or body of persons permitted to establish and maintain any private school under the Act. Under sub-s. (4) of S.3 all existing schools shall be deemed to have been established in accordance with the Act. S.7 empowers the educational agency to appoint the manager of an aided school under the Art subject to the approval of the concerned educational officer. R.1 of Chap.3 of the KER classifies educational institutions as those under individual educational agency and those under Corporate Educational Agency. A school established by the general public of a locality will fall under the latter class of institutions viz. those under Corporate Educational Agency. Ext. A10 document, under which the land on which the school building is constructed is acquired, itself shows that the acquisition was in the name of the 1st defendant as the Secretary of the School Committee. Exts. A1 to A6 communications between the Department and the educational agency would also prove beyond any shadow of doubt that the educational agency in respect of the L.P. school involved in the suit is the public of the locality and a local committee had been acting on its behalf. 3. No relief of the nature falling under S.92 of the CPC. is sought for in this suit. Apparently the 1st defendant is acting as though he is the educational agency in respect of the plaint school. All that is sought for and granted by the courts below is a declaration that the Ist defendant is only the manager under the educational agency and that the educational agency is the general public of the locality. The second prayer granted is purely consequential and the same is also not one falling under S.92 C P.C. Counsel for the appellant relies on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Avvu v. Bapputty (1977 KLT 648). All that is held in the said decision is that by virtue of the provisions under S.7 and 9 of the Kerala Education Act and Chap.3 and 28 of the KER no suit to remove a person duly approved by the educational authorities as manager would lie without due cancellation or vacation of the approval by the department. All that is held in the said decision is that by virtue of the provisions under S.7 and 9 of the Kerala Education Act and Chap.3 and 28 of the KER no suit to remove a person duly approved by the educational authorities as manager would lie without due cancellation or vacation of the approval by the department. It was further held that no relief of injunction can lie against a duly approved manager from acting as manager of the school. No such relief as the removal of the manager nor an injunction to restrain him from continuing as manager of the school is prayed for in the present suit. The decision referred to has no application to the present case. 4. In the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai (AIR 1952 SC 143) it was held that a prayer for declaration that the properties in the suit are Trust properties does not fall under S.92 CPC. and the said section is not a bar against the maintainability of the suit. It is stated at page 144: "10. A suit under S.92, Civil PC is a suit of a special nature which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. Such suit can proceed only on the allegation that there is a breach of such trust or that directions from the Court are necessary for the administration thereof and it must pray for one or other of the reliefs that are specifically mentioned in the section. It is only when these conditions are fulfilled that the suit has got to be brought in conformity with the provision of S.92, Civil P.C. As was observed by the Privy Council in Abdul Rahim v. Md. Barkat Ali, 55 Ind. App. 96 PC, a suit for a declaration that certain property appertains to a religious trust may lie under the general law but is outside the scope of S 92, Civil P.C." I am therefore of the view that the present suit for the reliefs mentioned above is not barred by S.92 CPC. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.