Judgment :- 1. This original petition is filed under Art.226 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash Ext. P4 judgment of the first respondent, State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam. Learned Government Pleader appears for respondents 2 and 3 and Sri K. Radhakrishnan takes notice for fourth respondent. 2. The second respondent issued notification inviting applications for grant of temporary permit for four months on the newly introduced route Marayamangalam Athirkad. The notification stipulated, inter alia, that the applicant should conform to R.177A(3B)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Rules wherein it is stated that along with the application the applicant should produce clearance certificate relating, inter alia, to payment of motor vehicles tax in respect of vehicles owned by or in the possession of the applicant. Petitioner, 4th respondent and another submitted applications. The application of the fourth respondent was screened and rejected since he did not produce the motor vehicle tax clearance certificate as per Rules. Among the other two candidates, the RTA preferred the petitioner. Ext. P1 is a copy of the decision. Fourth respondent challenged the decision in appeal before the Tribunal. Ext. P2 is a copy of the Memorandum of Appeal. Ext. P3 is a copy of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the present petitioner. By Ext. P4 judgment the Tribunal set aside the decision in Ext. P1. The period of the temporary permit is 28-3-1987 to 27-7-1987. Since the Tribunal delivered the judgment on 21-7-1987 and a few days only remained for the expiry of the permit, the Tribunal refrained from remanding the matter for fresh consideration at the hands of the RTA and allowed the present petitioner to conduct service until the expiry of the period. This judgment is now challenged. 3. The short question for consideration is whether the RTA was justified in screening and rejecting the application of the 4th respondent or whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the decision of the RTA was wrong. The decision on this controversy depends on the question whether the fourth respondent did conform to R.177A(3B)(a). R.177A(3B)(a) requires each applicant to produce along with his application certain documents specified in the sub-clauses. Sub-clause (a) reads: "Clearance certificate relating to payment of income-tax or Agricultural Income-tax and motor vehicle tax including arrears of vehicle tax, if any in respect of vehicles owned by or in the possession of the applicant." 4. R.177A(3B)(a) requires each applicant to produce along with his application certain documents specified in the sub-clauses. Sub-clause (a) reads: "Clearance certificate relating to payment of income-tax or Agricultural Income-tax and motor vehicle tax including arrears of vehicle tax, if any in respect of vehicles owned by or in the possession of the applicant." 4. Fourth respondent herein in his application for permit had offered vehicle bearing registration No. KRP 3664 indicating that it was a hired vehicle. There is no dispute that he produced motor vehicle tax clearance certificate relating to that vehicle. But the certificate did not stand in his name; it stood in the name of one Ibrahimkutty, the registered owner of that vehicle. The RTA took the view that the certificate was of no avail since it was not in the applicant's name. This view was rightly overruled by the Tribunal, which was of the opinion that the certificate must relate to the vehicle offered by the applicant and need not necessarily be in his name. Fourth respondent herein contended before the Tribunal that by some agreement with the registered owner be obtained possession of the vehicle on 1-1-1987 and later he purchased the same and therefore clearance certificate stood in the name of the registered owner. There is no dispute before me that tax clearance certificate produced by the 4th respondent was valid and acceptable in relation to vehicle KRP 3664. The petitioner herein contended before the Tribunal that the 4th respondent has another vehicle in his name, viz., vehicle beating registration No. KRF 2241 and he had not produced motor vehicle tax clearance certificate relating to that vehicle and therefore the rejection of his application was justified. He also produced a photo copy of the R.C. particulars before the Tribunal, which was marked as Ext. R3. The document shows that P. M. Hassankutty, Managing Partner, Ameena Timber and Saw Mills, Pathiripala had purchased the vehicle from the registered owner, K. M. Ummer. P. M. Hassankutty mentioned is none other than the fourth respondent herein. The Tribunal was of the view that the vehicle belonged to the partnership firm of which 4th respondent is the Managing Partner and since 4th respondent applied for the permit in his individual capacity he was not obliged to produce tax clearance certificate of the vehicle belonged to the firm. The Tribunal was of the view that the vehicle belonged to the partnership firm of which 4th respondent is the Managing Partner and since 4th respondent applied for the permit in his individual capacity he was not obliged to produce tax clearance certificate of the vehicle belonged to the firm. It was thus the Tribunal found that the screening and rejection of the application was illegal. 5. According to R.177(3B)(a), the applicant should produce, inter alia, clearance certificate relating to motor vehicle tax in respect of the vehicle owned by or in the possession of the applicant. Can it be said that the Managing Partner of a partnership firm owns or is in possession of a vehicle belonging to the firm? Lindley on Partnership, Fourteenth Edition, at pages 29 and 30, states that partners are called collectively a firm and Merchants and lawyers have different notions respecting the nature of a firm. Commercial men and accountants are apt to look upon a firm in the light in which lawyers look upon a corporation, ie., as a body distinct from the members composing it and having rights and obligations distinct from those of its members. But this is not the legal notion of a firm. The firm is not recognised by English lawyers as distinct from the members composing it. In taking partnership accounts and in administering partnership assets, courts have to some extent adopt the mercantile view and actions may now, speaking generally, be brought by or against partners in the name of their firm; further, tax assessments are made, in the first instance against the partnership, but speaking generally, the firm as such has no legal recognition. The law, ignoring the firm looks to the partners composing it; any change amongst them destroys the identity of the firm; what is called the property of the firm is their property and what are called the debts and liabilities of the firm are their debts and their liabilities. At page 329 it is, stated that by the common law, every member of an ordinary partnership Ms liable to the last vestige of his property for the debts and engagements of the firm. The law, ignoring the firm as anything distinct from the persons composing it, treats the debts and engagements of the firm as the debts and engagements of the partners and holds each partner liable for them accordingly. 6. The law, ignoring the firm as anything distinct from the persons composing it, treats the debts and engagements of the firm as the debts and engagements of the partners and holds each partner liable for them accordingly. 6. In Law of Partnership in India by S. D. Singh and J. P. Gupta, Second Edition, at page 19 it is stated that a firm is not legal entity but is only a collective or compendious name for all the partners. This principle has been explained by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income tax v. A. W. Figgies and Co. (1953) 24 ITR 405. The concept of partnership law is that a firm is not an entity or a person in law but only a compendious mode of designating persons who have agreed to carry on the business of partnership. The law, English as well as Indian, has for some specific purposes relaxed its rigid notions and extended a limited personality to a firm. It is an independent and distinct juristic person for the purpose of income tax and sales tax laws. In other words, generally speaking, it has no juristic person. At page 254 it is stated that all partners are joint owners or co-owners of the entire partnership property. Again at page 259 it is stated that the concept of partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in capital money or even property, including immovable property. Once a partner brings his properties to the common hotchpotch of a partnership, whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of that partner. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all partners would have their shares. A partner subject to an agreement between the partners has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes, but has no right to possess such property for any other purpose. Each partner has dominion over the whole article and the entire partnership property. 7. S.25 of the Partnership Act states that every partner is liable, jointly with all other partners and also severally for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner. Each partner has dominion over the whole article and the entire partnership property. 7. S.25 of the Partnership Act states that every partner is liable, jointly with all other partners and also severally for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner. The Supreme Court in Sahu Rajeshwar v. IT Officer, Meerut (AIR 1969 SC 667) observed that: "Under the Partnership Act the liability of the partners of a firm is joint and several and it is open to a creditor of the firm to recover the debt of the firm from an; one or more of the partners." 8. The R.C. particulars of the vehicle show that P.M. Hassankutty, Managing Partner of Ameena Timber and Saw Mills, Pathiripala -purchased the vehicle in the name of the partnership firm in 1963. As a partner, he has no exclusive ownership over the partnership assets; but he is part owner of such assets. As Managing Partner of the firm he is in possession of the vehicle. The liability to pay motor vehicle tax is on the partners. As Managing Partner he cannot escape from the liability to pay motor vehicle tax. Public interest demands that permit should not be granted to a person who has not discharged his fax liability. Discharge of tax liability is to be established by production of clearance certificate. He is therefore bound to produce the tax clearance certificate relating to the vehicle, which forms part of the assets of the firm of which he is a partner. If he fails to do so he fails to conform to R.177A(3B)(a) of the Rules. The view taken by the Tribunal is absolutely unsustainable. I therefore set aside the judgment in M.V.A.A.183/87 and restore the decision of the RTA. The original petition is thus allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.