JUDGMENT 1. - This is a claimants' Misc. Appeal against the award dated 29th August, 1980, of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Tonk District Judge, Tonkj (for short 'the Tribunal'). Under the said award the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition preferred by the petitioners before him. 2. On March 22, 1975, an accident took place in which two trucks having Nos. RSL 1645 and DHG 188 were involved. One Narain Teli was the driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 and Vecrendra Kumar was a passenger in the said truck which was proceeding from Tonk to Devii. The said truck left Jaipur in the night of March 21, 1975, and reached near the village Saroli at about 7 a.m. When the said truck reached near village Saroli another truck No. DHG 188 was seen coming at a fast speed from the opposite direction from the side of Devii. There was a sudden collision between the two trucks as a result of which Narain Teli. driver of truck No. RSL 1645 as well as Vecrendra Kumar received injuries and they both died on the spot. A report of the accident was lodged in the Police Station concerned by one Tej Singh constable No. 433 who was also sitting in truck No. RSL 1645. A claim under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the MV Act') was filed by the father and mother of the deceased, Veerendra Kumar, as his legal representatives. In the said claim petition, besides impleading Harpal Singh, Gurmeet Singh and the New India Assurance Company Ltd., Jaipur as non-petitioner Nos. I to 3, i.e., the owner of the said vehicle, the driver and the insurance company respectively of the said truck No. DHG 188 and the owner and legal representatives of the deceased driver and the insurance company of the truck No. RSL 1645 were initially impleaded as the non-petitioners. But, later on the names of the owner and the legal representatives of the deceased driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 were deleted from the array of the non-petitioners by order of the Tribunal, dated October 26, 1976. Again, on 7th February, 1980, it was given out on behalf of the claimants before the Tribunal that they do not want to contest the claim against the non-petitioner, National Insurance Company Ltd.. Kota of Mick No. RSL 1645. 3. Again, on 7th February, 1980, it was given out on behalf of the claimants before the Tribunal that they do not want to contest the claim against the non-petitioner, National Insurance Company Ltd.. Kota of Mick No. RSL 1645. 3. The petition was contested on behalf of the owner and the driver of the truck No. DHG 188. The Tribunal framed the following five issues: 1. Whether the applicant Nos. 3,4 and 5 are the legal representatives of the deceased and they are also entitled to compensation? 2. Whether the accident was caused due to negligent and rash act of truck No. DHG 188? 3. Whether the driver of vehicle No. DHG 188 was not having a valid licence? 4. Whether the applicants are entitled to compensation amounting to Rs. 1,50,000/- or any other sum against which of the non- petitioners? 5. Relief? 4. After recording the evidence of the parties the Tribunal decided issue Nos. 2 and 3 against the claimant-applicants and in favour of respondent No. 2, who is the legal representative of the owner of the truck. Harpal Singh and the driver of the truck which met with the accident. Consequently, the claim petition was dismissed. 5. 1 have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. In spite of service none has put in appearance for the respondent No. 1, who, as already stated earlier, is a legal representative of Harpal Singh, the owner of the truck No. DHG 188 and who was present at the time of the accident. The appeal has been contested by New India Assurance Company Ltd., Jaipur of truck No. DHG 188. 6. It may be stated that only limited defences are available to the insurer. But, so far as the Tribunal is concerned, the claim could only he decreed in case the Tribunal could come to the conclusion that the accident was the result of the negligent driving by Gurmeet Singh, driver. Therefore, so far as the Tribunal is concerned, it was necessary for the Tribunal to have recorded the findings that the driver of the truck was rash and negligent. As already stated earlier, the Tribunal has recorded a finding and has decided issue No. 3 in favour of the respondents and against the claimants. The finding of the Tribunal has been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. As already stated earlier, the Tribunal has recorded a finding and has decided issue No. 3 in favour of the respondents and against the claimants. The finding of the Tribunal has been challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that from the material on record it can be said that the case is of composite negligence of the drivers of the two trucks. According to the learned counsel, not with- standing the fact that no such plea was raised in the claim petition, because there- is material on record, this court should hold that it is a case of composite negligence of the drivers of the two trucks. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. New India Assurance Company, Jaipur, insurer of truck No. DHG 188, contends that in the absence of pleading and proof the appellant cannot now come up with a new case that the case is of composite negligence. He contended that in the claim petition no claim was set up. rather it was stated that no relief is claimed against the owner as well as driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 and they are being made as parties to the petition as they are necessary parties. Later on, not only the owner of the truck, but also the driver of truck No. RSL 1645 were deleted from the array of the non-petitioners and it was given out by the appellant that no relief is claimed against them. He. therefore, contended that in the presence of these facts it is no longer avail- able for the appellant to say that it is a case of composite negligence and, as such, the liability is joint and several and the joint tortfeasors are not necessary parties. 7. It may be stated that in the claim petition the claimants came out with the specific case that the driver of the truck No. DHG 188 was rash and negligent. The driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 lost his life as a result of the accident. It may he stated that so far as the driver of truck No. RSL 1645 is concerned, no relief for compensation was claimed against either the owner of truck No. RSL 1645 but also against the insurer,of the said truck. The driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 lost his life as a result of the accident. It may he stated that so far as the driver of truck No. RSL 1645 is concerned, no relief for compensation was claimed against either the owner of truck No. RSL 1645 but also against the insurer,of the said truck. In the appeal, also, the appellants have come up with a case that it was the driver of the truck No. DHG 188 who was rash and negligent. No ground has been taken in the memorandum of appeal that it is a case of composite negligence. But when Mr. Mathur, learned counsel for the appellant, opened his arguments, he only advanced an argument that it was a case of composite negligence and he contended that there is material on record on which the finding has to be arrived at. Mr. Mathur was allowed to raise this ground notwithstanding the fact that no such ground was raised in the memo of appeal. In my opinion, a distinction should be made in a case where there is no material on record on which it finding can be arrived at and a case where it can he said that there is material on which a finding of composite negligence can be arrived at. It may he stated that the claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act are to be decided in a summary manner. There should be no strict adherence to the principles of pleadings as under section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act it is the duty of the Tribunal to hold an inquiry into a claim and to make such estimate of compensation it considers just and specify the persons whom compensation is to be paid and by whom to he paid. The Supreme Court in the case of Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta, 1977 ACJ 134 (SC) , in para 6, said as under: "Pleadings have to be interpreted not with formalistic vigour but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of poor people." 8. In my opinion, if in a case even if no case of composite negligence has been set up. In my opinion, if in a case even if no case of composite negligence has been set up. but the parties have led evidence and are alive to the issue and there is material on record for a finding of composite negligence, the Tribunal can and should record a finding more so when the legislature introduced section 92-A in the Act making the owner of the vehicle liable to pay an amount of Rs. 15.000/- even if there is no proof and material on record to record a finding of negligence or composite negligence. 9. In the instant case, only two witnesses are relevant, one produced for the claimant- appellant, namely, Abdul Ahmed PW-3 and Gurmeet Singh. the driver. The relevancy is also of the statement of the SHO Amar Singh DW-2 so far as he proved the site plan. It can be said on the basis of the site plan Exh. A-2 that metalled road is 9 ft. wide, the width of the truck can be taken as 61/2 ft. Thus, the metalled road was such that two trucks could not have passed on it together. Truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli. whereas the other truck No. RSL 1645 was coming from the opposite direction. It was a place where there was a slope and when truck No. DHG 188 was ascending and when truck No. RSL 1645 was coming down from the slope, the accident took place. At a place where there is a slope, both the drivers owe a duty to see as to whether there is a truck or other vehicle coming from the opposite side or not? Brakes should also be applied and a look at Exh. A-2 will show that no signs or marks of applying brakes by any driver were there. Truck No. DHG 188 was at its left side and some portion of its left tyres were in kacha. It has come in the statement of Abdul Ahmed AW-3 that he was a constable posted at police outpost Polyanda and was returning in truck No. RSL 1645 from Tonk to police outpost Polyanda. He says that at about 7 a.m. a truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli at a fast speed and near the police station Polyanda collided with truck No. RSL 1645. He says that at about 7 a.m. a truck No. DHG 188 was coming from the side of Devli at a fast speed and near the police station Polyanda collided with truck No. RSL 1645. Truck No. RSL 1645 was coming with a slow speed. As a result of the accident the driver of the truck No. RSL 1645 and one boy who was sitting in the same died on the spot. He also received some injuries. He told about the accident to Tej Singh and asked him to make a report. He says that initially the truck from the opposite direction, i.e., truck No. DHG 188, was coming at its left side but all of a sudden came to the wrong side and when both the trucks were on a turn, the accident took place. He also stated that truck No. DHG 188 was on the wrong side. There can he no dispute that AW-3 was sitting in truck No. RSL 1645. It is not unusual for a police constable to stop the truck and travel in it. Gurmeet Singh DW-3 was the driver of the truck No. DHG 188. He has stated that truck No. RSL 1645 was coming at a fast speed and he stopped his truck and took it on one side. A look at the reply filed on behalf of Gurmeet Singh will show that the case was not set up that truck No. DHG 188 was stopped or was stationary at the time of the accident. It has been stated in para 9 that truck No. DHG 188 was proceeding in a normal speed on its side. Therefore, it can he said that the drivers of both the trucks did not apply any brakes and the accident took place as a result of which the deceased, Veerendra Kumar and Narain in truck No. RSL 1645 lost their lives. It is not the case that Veerendra Kumar in any way contributed to any negligence. In the case of Andhra Marine Exports (P) Ltd.. Quilon v. P. Radhakrishan, 1984 ACJ 355 (Madras) , it was held in para 3 that: "When a person is injured without any negligence on his part, but as a result of negligence on the part of the other person or as a result of the combined negligence of two other persons, it is not a case of contributory negligence. Quilon v. P. Radhakrishan, 1984 ACJ 355 (Madras) , it was held in para 3 that: "When a person is injured without any negligence on his part, but as a result of negligence on the part of the other person or as a result of the combined negligence of two other persons, it is not a case of contributory negligence. The term 'contributory negligence' squarely and solely applies to the conduct of the claimant alone. If the claimant is guilty of an act or omission which has materially contributed to the accident and the resultant injury and damages, the matter comes within the concept of contributory negligence and courts are enjoined to apportion the loss between the parties as the facts and circumstances may justify." The court again said in para 4: "The principle of 'composite negligence' is, where more than one person are responsible in the commission of the wrong, the person wronged has a choice of proceed- ing against all or anyone or more than one of wrongdoers. Every wrongdoer is liable for the whole damage if it is otherwise made out, and it does not lie in the mouth of one wrongdoer to say though I am also responsible, yet, the other man was also equally responsible for the wrong and on this basis he cannot avoid the liability to the person wronged." It can, therefore, be said that in case a person is injured without any negligence on his part and he in no way contributed to the negligence, no case of contributory negligence, no question of apportionment of compensation is made out. In case an accident occurs in which a person dies and the accident is the result of the composite negligence of both the parties it is open for the legal representatives of the deceased to claim compensation from the joint tortfeasors who are liable jointly or severally. This court (G.M. Lodha, J.) in the case of Mohan Lal v. Balwant Kaur, 1 (1985) ACC 322 , held that the joint tortfeasors are jointly liable in the accident cases for the negligence, can he made liable jointly and severally. A logical and legal deduction from the above is that the claimant can choose to file claim petition against any one of them and recover the damages from anyone of them. A logical and legal deduction from the above is that the claimant can choose to file claim petition against any one of them and recover the damages from anyone of them. It was further held that the contention that unless the joint tortfeasors are made parties, a claim petition cannot survive, is not supported by any decision. In view of the learned Judge joint tortfeasors maybe proper parties but cannot be necessary parties. 10. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the insurance company, has relied on Suraj Narain v. Sneh Lata Jain, 1985 ACJ 581 (Rajasthan) , a case where Lodha, J. held that in a case of composite negligence the liability is to be apportioned. It appears that no attempt was made to make a distinction in the case of contributory negligence and composite negligence. In my opinion, the view taken by Lodha, J. in the earlier cases that in case an accident occurs in which a person dies and the accident is the result of the composite negligence by both the parties it is open for the legal representatives of the deceased to claim compensation against both the tortfeasors or against one and liability is joint or several is the correct. In my opinion, unless the deceased whose legal representatives filed a claim contributed in some manner to the accident it cannot be said to be a case of contributory negligence. How can he be said to have contributed to the negligence in driving a motor vehicle when he happens to he simply a pedestrian or passenger. Such a case is of composite negligence and not of contributory negligence and the cases of contributory negligence where the question of apportionment arises, do not apply. In the instant case, as already stated earlier, both the drivers, i.e., driver of truck No. RSL 1645 as well as the driver of truck No. DHG 188, were responsible for the negligence. It was, as already stated earlier, the duty of the drivers of the trucks driving in opposite directions to drive the vehicles with due care and attention. In the instant case, as the road was only 9' wide, there was a slope, both the drivers were negligent, they did not apply brakes as a result of which the accident took place. Thus, it is a case of composite negligence. In the instant case, as the road was only 9' wide, there was a slope, both the drivers were negligent, they did not apply brakes as a result of which the accident took place. Thus, it is a case of composite negligence. As already stated earlier, the owner and the driver of truck No. RSL 1645 were not made parties and no plea was raised. but the liability in such a case is joint and several and neither can escape from liability. There being sufficient evidence on record, it is held that it is a case of composite negligence where both the truck Nos. DHG 188 and RSL 1645 were rash and negligent. 11. Now, the question arises as to what amount of compensation is to he awarded to the appellants. It may be stated that so far as the appellant No. 2, Raj Kumar Singh Bapna. is concerned, there is no doubt that he died in the year 1986 during the pendency of the appeal. One of his legal representatives Sampat Kunwar Bai is his widow. Therefore. she sufficiently represents his interest. It has come into evidence that Raj Kumar was running his own business under the name and style of Bapna Fertilisers, Bhanpura. He was having an annual income of Rs. 15,000/- approximately. There is no rebuttal of this evidence which stands corroborated from the documentary evidence in so far as the fact that he was doing business under the name and style of M/s. Bapna Fertilisers. It is proved from Exhs. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 on record that the deceased, Veerendra Kumar. was working in the name and style of M/s. Bapna Fertilisers. It is proved on evidence that Veerendra Kumar was 23 years of age at the time of his death. He was a graduate and he had been engaged and his marriage was to take place shortly. It can, therefore, he said that Veerendra Kumar deceased earned about Rs. 1,000/- per month. He was to be married shortly and after marriage it can easily be said that he could not have contributed Rs. 600/- per month over the maintenance of his parents. In other words, the appellants have only expected ⅓rd of monthly income from him after his marriage. But dependency of the father and mother on Veerendra Kumar can he arrived at Rs. 300/ per month. 600/- per month over the maintenance of his parents. In other words, the appellants have only expected ⅓rd of monthly income from him after his marriage. But dependency of the father and mother on Veerendra Kumar can he arrived at Rs. 300/ per month. I am not taking into consideration the fact as to whether the income would have increased with the advance in age as after his marriage his liability too would have increased towards his wife and his other members of the family which he might have had. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer the dependency on Veerendra Kumar as Rs. 300/- per month. It will be reasonable to hold that both the appellants would have depended to the extent of Rs. 150/- per month each. As already stated earlier, the father died in the year 1986, that is, after II years of the accident: Life expectancy of the father as a result of the accident in the year 1986 can be arrived at for II years and it will be reasonable to apply that multiplier. Thus, taking into consideration that the father depended on the deceased for Rs. 150/- per month, the amount of compensation to which the father can be said to be entitled comes to Rs. 19.800/-. At the time of the accident the mother of the deceased was aged 52 years. She is still alive. Though there is no evidence as td when her father and mother died and what is the longevity in her family, but it is reasonable to say that she can expect to live upto 70 years having survived till now. In her case, applying the multiplier of 18, she can be held entitled to Rs. 150X 12= Rs. 1800 X 18 Rs. 32,400/-). But, I would like to award a total sum of Rs. 50,000/- and so I will award Rs. 31,000/- to the mother who being the legal representative of her husband is also entitled to the amount awarded to her husband. 12. It may be stated that the recent trend is not to allow any deduction for lump sum payment. Even otherwise, so far as this case is concerned, I am not taking into consideration the prospect of increased income of Veerendra Kumar as also increase in his liability to his wife and others as he was to marry shortly. 12. It may be stated that the recent trend is not to allow any deduction for lump sum payment. Even otherwise, so far as this case is concerned, I am not taking into consideration the prospect of increased income of Veerendra Kumar as also increase in his liability to his wife and others as he was to marry shortly. I am, therefore, not inclined to make any deduction for lump sum payment. 13. Consequently, I allow this miscellaneous appeal, and set aside the judgment and the award of the Tribunal. The claim of the petitioners Sampat Kunwar Bai and Raj Kumar Singh is allowed to the extent of Rs. 31,000/- and Rs. 19,000/- respectively. In all, Sampat Kunwar Bai, legal representative of her husband Raj Kumar Singh and appellant No. 2, is entitled to Rs. 50,000/- from the respondents. The respondent is directed to make payment of Rs. 50,000/- to Sampat.Kunwar Bai along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Cost is made easy.Appeal allowed. *******