Anjuman-e-Mishbahul Muslemin v. State of Bihar — 1987 DIGILAW 362 (PAT)

JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. This writ petition involves an interesting question of law relating to the vires of Section 24 of the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board Act, 1981 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as 'the Act'). The petitioners in this writ application have also questioned the validity and legality of the order of the Chairman, Bihar Madrasa Education Board (respondent no. 3) dated 11.10.1982 as contained in Annexure-8 to the writ application as also the order contained in the letter dated 12.10.1983 issued by the Secretary, Bihar State Madrasa Education Board (respondents no. 4) addressed to the Secretary, Madarsa Mutahul Oloom, Semrhaia (petitioner no. 2) as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. The petitioner no. 1, which is a Muslim Minority organisation of the people of village semrhaia situated in the district of East Champaran established a Makhtab in June, 1940, and the same was developed and in 1946 converted into a Madrasa known as 'Madrasa Misbahul Oloom'. According to the petitioners the Madrasa aforementioned is a minority institution and imparts religious and secular education from primary up to Aalim standard in Arbic, Persian Urdu languages and also provides for teaching Hindi and English languages in accordance with its syllabus. The Madrasa was recognised by the Bihar Madrasa Education Board in the year 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'). It is stated that the said Madrasa is controlled and managed by a Managing Committee constituted by the Anjuman with the Approval of the muslim public of the locality. 3. It has been further stated that the respondent no. 6 Md. Zafarullah was appointed as Head Maulvi the year 1978, of the said Madrasa. According to the petitioners, the respondent no. 6 had committed various acts of misconduct. The said fact has been stated in paragraph 11 of the writ petition, the relevant portion of which is quoted hereunder :- "From some time past the respondent no. 6 has/had been acting against the interest of the institution which was prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of the proper functioning of the Madrasa and its education. He has been provoking and misleading the muslim public by making false propaganda not to contribute to the fund of the Madrasa. 6 has/had been acting against the interest of the institution which was prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of the proper functioning of the Madrasa and its education. He has been provoking and misleading the muslim public by making false propaganda not to contribute to the fund of the Madrasa. He has been spreading false allegation against the Members of the Managing Committee so much so that he had been even instigating the students to leave the Madrasa by creating chaos and confusion. He took away stealthily several valuable registers, documents including its constitution and papers of the Madrasa to his own house without any information/action to the Managing Committee." 4. According to the petitioners, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent no. 6 and be was also suspended by the Managing Committee by a resolution adopted in this regard on 24.2.1983. The respondent no. 6 filed a writ petition in this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1573 of 1983, for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing the aforesaid Resolution dated 24.2.1983 and also for issuance of a writ of, or in the nature of mandamus forbearing the petitioners from interfering with the functioning of the respondent no. 6 as Head Maulvi of the said Madrasa. The writ petition after hearing the parties was dismissed by an order dated 10.8.1983 (vide Annexure-6). After the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent no. 6 was completed the enquiry committee submitted its report dated 7th April 1983 as contained in Annexure-3 before the Managing Committee, wherefrom it would appear that the charges levelled against the respondent no. 6 were found to be true. Accordingly, the said committee recommended for dismissal of the respondent no. 6. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the afore-mentioned proceeding culminating in the said report (Annexure-3), the Managing Committee in its meeting dated 10.4.1983 adopted a resolution to the effect that the respondent no. 6 be dismissed from service. The said Resolution is contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. 5. In the mean time the respondent no. 6 had flied an application before the Chairman of the Board on 1.3.1983, as contained in Allnexure-7 to the writ application, alleging therein that the Secretary of the Madrasa has taken the attendance on 17.2.1983, and is not permitting the respondent no. 6 to put his signature therein. 5. In the mean time the respondent no. 6 had flied an application before the Chairman of the Board on 1.3.1983, as contained in Allnexure-7 to the writ application, alleging therein that the Secretary of the Madrasa has taken the attendance on 17.2.1983, and is not permitting the respondent no. 6 to put his signature therein. The Chairman of the Board thereupon called for an explanation from the Secretary of the Madrasa, in pursuance of which a show cause was filed by the Secretary on 20.3.1983. Thereafter the matter was entrusted for enquiry to Sri Abdul Baqui, the Assistant Secretary of the Board, who submitted his report dated 10.9.1983 to the effect that the suspension of the respondent no. 6 was in violation of Rule 23 of the Service Condition Rules, and further opined that the order of dismissal passed by the Managing Committee of the Madrasa as against the respondent no. 6 was also not in terms of Rule 26 thereof. On the basis of the said report, the Secretary of the Board put up a note before the Chair man to approve the findings of Shri Abdul Baqui. By reason of an order as contained in Annexure-8 to the writ application, which appears on the body of the said noting of the Secretary itself, the Chairman of the Board (respondent no. 3) approved the said proposal. Pursuant to the aforementioned order as contained in Annexure-8, the Secretary of the Board issued a letter dated 12.10.1983 to the petitioners directing them to allow the respondent no. 6 to continue as Head Maulvi of the Madrasa. The said letter dated 12.10.1983 is contained in Annexure-11 to the writ petition. 6. In this case a counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 6 in which the basic facts stated here-in-before have not been disputed. 7. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has made three-fold submissions. Firstly he submitted that Section 24 of the said Act is ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. Secondly he submitted that the Rules which have been framed by the State Government by its Notification dated 19.12.1977 and as published in the Bihar Gazette dated 12th April 1978 are also ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Secondly he submitted that the Rules which have been framed by the State Government by its Notification dated 19.12.1977 and as published in the Bihar Gazette dated 12th April 1978 are also ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Thakur Prasad further submitted that the Madrasa in question being an institution established, controlled and managed by the muslim minority community, it has an unfettered right to impose any punishment upon its employee and such right of the minority community cannot be taken away or abridged by reason of any legislative Act or executing instructions. It has further been submitted that the power of the minority community to take disciplinary measures as against its employees is an absolute right. He submitted that although a different situation may arise where an embargo is put upon the right of such minority community to suspend its employees by way of a regulatory measure. Learned Counsel in this connection has referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anjuman Ahle Hadees, Darbhanga and others v. State of Bihar & others (A.I.R. 1985 Patna 315). : 1985 PLJR 837 . This Court in the said case has held that Section 24 of the Act is ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. It has further been observed therein that no rule has been flamed in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Mr. Thakur Prasad further drew my attention to another Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Md. Sahrabuddin v. State of Bihar reported in 1985 P.L.J.R. 170, wherein it has been held that the earlier non-Governmental Rules ceased to have any effect after coming into force of 1981 Act, and any order passed in exercise of the power conferred by any authority relying on or on the basis of such inoperative Rules will be without jurisdiction. Mr. Thakur Prasad has, further submitted that assuming that the earlier Rules are still in force, but the said Rules being contradictory to and inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act the same cannot be given effect to being ultra vires the provisions of the Act. He, further submitted that in any event, the said Rules and in particular Rules 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 8. Mr. He, further submitted that in any event, the said Rules and in particular Rules 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 8. Mr. Indu Shekhar Sinha learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 6, on the other hand, drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association v. Union of India and ethers reported in A.I.R. 1987 Supreme Court 311, and Mr. Y. Theelamma v. Union of India and others reported in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1210, and submitted that in view of the aforementioned two decisions of the Supreme Court, the decision of this Court in Anjuman Ahle Hadees' case (supra) is no longer a good law. He further submitted that from a perusal of the preamble of the said Act, it would appear that the same was enacted for establishment of an independent Board for the purpose of development of education imparted in Madrasas and for better administration thereof. Learned Counsel also submitted that although minority institutions have the right to administer institutions established and managed by them, but they have no right to mal-administer the same. According to the learned Counsel, the said Act was enacted only for the purpose of keeping a supervisory the upon the Madrasas by the Board constituted under the Act, so that no mal-administration therein takes place. Mr. Sinha further submitted that the provisions contained in Section 24 of the Act is merely regulatory in nature, It was further submitted that the minority institutions should not be given the liberty to do whatever it likes to do at its sweet will and in that view of the matter such regulatory measure imposed on the said institution are permissible, which are designed towards the achievement of the goal of making the minority institutions effective instruments for imparting education. Such regulatory measures which are designed to achieve such goal are not and cannot be held to be ultra vires, Article 30 of the Constitution. Mr. Sinha further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anjuman Able Hadees (supra) did not consider the question of vires from this angle and as such the same is not a binding precedent and more so in view of the recent Supreme Court decisions referred to herein before. Mr. Mr. Sinha further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anjuman Able Hadees (supra) did not consider the question of vires from this angle and as such the same is not a binding precedent and more so in view of the recent Supreme Court decisions referred to herein before. Mr. Sinha further submitted that the Rules framed by the State Government in the year 1977 survive the enactment of the said Act. It has also been submitted that in the counter, affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 6 as it is alleged, that petitioner no. 1 is not a minority institution and as such the provisions of the said Act have no application in respect of the said Madrasa, which is not a minority institution and in that view of the matter, the orders as contained in Annexures-8 and 11 impugned in this writ application are absolutely valid and legal. 9. So far as the question raised on behalf of the respondent no. 6, that the Madrasa in question is not a minority institution, is Concerned, it may be stated that the only relevant paragraph in the said counter-affidavit filed by the respondent no. 6 on 3.11.1987, is paragraph 9 thereof which reads as under :- "That the Madrasa in question is not a minority institution. It is clear from the syllabus of the school." In the said counter-affidavit, however, the statements made in the writ petition to the effect that the Madrasa in question was established by a minority community have not been controverted. Paragraph 9 of the said counter-affidavit filed by the respondent no. 6 besides being vague, has also not been verified by the deponent thereof. In such a situation the contention raised on behalf of the respondent no. 6 that the Madrasa in question is not a minority institution cannot be accepted. 10. It may further be mentioned that in the writ petition it has clearly been asserted by the petitioners that the Madrasa in question was established with a view to impart religious and secular education from Primary up to Aalim standard in Arabic, Persian and Urdu languages. It is now well settled that an institution established by a minority does not lose its minority character, only because it imparts teaching in other subjects or other languages. It is now well settled that an institution established by a minority does not lose its minority character, only because it imparts teaching in other subjects or other languages. It is now also well settled that the education in a minority institution need not be confined to religious teaching only, but the same extends to general secular education also. Reference in this connection may be made to in Re : the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 Special Reference no. 1 of 1958 reported in A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 956 (paragraph 23). The said paragraph is quoted hereunder :- "23. Having disposed of the minor point referred to above, we now take up the main argument advanced before us as to the content of Art. 30 (1). The first point to note is that the article give certain rights not only in religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities. In the next place, the right conferred on such minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic 'minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions for teaching their language only. What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible fur higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attainments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institutions imparting general secular education also. In other words, the article leaves it to their choice to establish such educational institutions as will serve both purposes, namely, the purpose of conserving religion, language or culture, and also the purpose of giving a thorough good general education to their children. The next thing to note is that the article. In terms, gives all minorities, whether based on religion or language two rights, namely, the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The next thing to note is that the article. In terms, gives all minorities, whether based on religion or language two rights, namely, the right to establish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and the implication of the article under consideration are the words "of their own choice". It is said that the dominant word is “choice” and the content of that article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community may make it. The ambit of the rights conferred by Art. 30 (1) has, therefore to be determined on consideration of the matter from the points of view of the educational institutions themselves. The educational institutions established or administered by the minorities or to be so established or administered by them in exercise of the rights conferred by that Article may be classified into three categories, namely, (1) those which do not seek either aid or recognition from the State, (2) those which want aid, and (3) those which want only recognition but not aid." Reference may also be made to paragraphs 74 and 96 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society vs. State of Gujrat reported in A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 1389, which read as under:- "74" Clause (1) of Article 30 gives right to all minorities, whether based on religion or language to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Analysing that clause it would follow that the right which has been conferred by the clause is on two types of minorities. These minorities may be based either on religion or on language. The right conferred upon the said minorities is to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The word "establish" indicates the right to bring into existence, while the right to administer an institution means the right to efficiently manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with their ideas of how the interest of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. The management must be free of control so that the founders or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit and in accordance with their ideas of how the interest of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. The words "of their choice" qualify the educational institutions and show that the educational institutions established and administered by the minorities need not be of some particular clause the minorities have the right and freedom to establish and administer such educational institution as they choose. Clause (2) of Article 30 prevents the State from making discrimination in the matter of grant of aid to any educational institution on the ground that the institution is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language." "96. Question has been posed during the course of arguments whether the educational institution referred to in Clause (1) of Article 30 must only be those institutions which have been established with a view to conserve language, script or culture of a minority. To put it in other words, the question is whether clause (1) of Article 30 is subject to the provisions of clause (1) of Article 29: In this regard I am of the view that clause (1) of Article 29 and clause (1) of Article 30 deal with distinct matters, and it is not permissible to circumscribe or restrict the right conferred by clause (1) of Article 30 by reading in it any limitation imported from clause (1) of Article 29. Article 29 (1) confers a right on any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture of its own to conserve the same. It is not necessary as mentioned earlier, for invoking this clause that the section of citizens should constitute a minority. As against that the right conferred by Article 30 (1) is only upon minorities which and based either on religion or language. The right conferred by Article 29 (1) is for conservation of language, script or culture, while that guaranteed by Article 30 (1) is for establishment and administration of educational institutions of the choice of minorities. As against that the right conferred by Article 30 (1) is only upon minorities which and based either on religion or language. The right conferred by Article 29 (1) is for conservation of language, script or culture, while that guaranteed by Article 30 (1) is for establishment and administration of educational institutions of the choice of minorities. Had it been the intention of the Constitution makers that the educational institutions which can be established and administered by minorities should be only those for conservation of their language script or culture, they would not have failed to use words that effect in Article 30 (1). In the absence of those words, it is difficult to subscribe to the view that educational institutions mentioned in Article 30 (1) are only those which are intended to conserve language, script or culture of the minority. Clause (1) of Article 30 also contains the words of their choice". These words which qualify "educational institutions" show that the vast discretion and option which the minorities have in selecting the type of institutions which they want to establish. In case an educational institution is established by a minority to conserve its distinct language, script or culture, the right to establish and administer such institution would tall both under Article 29 (1) as well as under Article 30 (1). The minorities can however, choose to establish an educational institution which is purely of a general secular character and is not designed to conserve their distinct language, script or culture. The right to establish and administer such an institution is guaranteed by Article 30 (1) and the fact that such an institution does not conserve the distinct language script or culture of a minority would not take it out of the ambit of Article 30 (1).' 11. The points involved in this writ application, in my opinion, is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in a long line of decisions starting from In Rs the Kerala Education Bill 1957 (A.I.R 1958 S.C. 956) down to All Saints High School, Hyederabad and others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1042) has held that neither the disciplinary power of the Managing Committee of a minority institution can be taken away nor appellate power can be conferred by the State Government or on any other agency. I may hasten to add that it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that the provisions contained in any legislative Act regulating the suspension of a teacher is not ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 12. In the case of the Ahmadabad St. Xaviers College Society and another v. State of Gujrat and another (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1389) the Supreme Court declared Sections 41-A and 52-A of Gujrat University Act (similar to the 1981 Act) enacted by the State to be not applicable in relation to the minority institution. In paragraph 305 at page 1471, the Supreme Court has held as follows :- "Sections 33-A, 40, 41, 51-A (1) (b), 51-A (2) (b) and 52-A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 as amended do not apply to institutions established and administered by linguistic and religious minorities...... Similarly, in Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina and others (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 52); Section 33 (4) of the Kerala University Ordinance (14 of 1957) was declared ultra vires. In this decision the Supreme Court has held as follows :- "52. The power of appeal conferred on the Vice Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) is not only a grave encroachment on the institution's right to enforce and ensure discipline in its administrative affairs, but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice Chancellor is not denied; and, indeed, his powers are unlimited. The grounds on which the Vice Chancellor can interfere in such appeals are also now defined. He may not only set aside an order of dismissal of a teacher and order his reinstatement, but may also interfere with any of the punishments enumerated in items (ii) and (v) of Ordinance 33 (2), that is to say, he can even interfere against the confliction of minor punishments. In the absence of any guide lines, it cannot be held that the power of the Vice Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) was merely a check on mal-administration:” In the case of All Saints High School, Hyderabad (supra) the Supreme Court has held Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the A.P. Recognised Private Educational Institutions (Control) Act to be ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. In the said decision Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act have also been held to be ultra vires. The Supreme Court in the said judgment categorically held that there cannot be any controlling voice over the managing committee. Fazal Ali, J. who delivered the leading judgment has held as follows :- "Coming to the provisions of the Act one significant feature may be noticed here. Unlike other Acts, while it takes within its sweep even the minority institutions, does not at all lay down any rules, regulations governing the conditions of service of the teachers of the institution, nor does it provide any guidelines on the basis of which rules could be made, oar does it contain a mandate directing the minority institution to frame proper rules and conditions of service of its teachers. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha appearing for the appellants submitted that this is a most serious lacuna in the Act which makes it completely violative of Article 30 of the Constitution and the other provisions read in the light of this lacuna also lose their legal sanctity." The Chief Justice of India in paragraph 11 of the aforesaid judgment has concurred with the judgment of Fazel Ali, J., so far as the same related to Sections 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act. 13. This Court, as stated hereinbefore, in Anjuman Ahle Hadee's case (supra) held that Section 24 of the Act is ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. Uday Sinha, J., in the said decision noticed that the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent in that case in view of the decisions referred to therein had to concede that Section 24 of the Act confer absolute power upon the Board, but merely urged that the said provision has to be read down. However, S.B. Sanyal, J., concurring with the judgment of Uday Sinha, J., held the afore-mentioned Sections of the Act to be ultra vires without referring to the said concession. The afore-mentioned judgment of the Division Beach is a direct authority on the question raised in this writ application and is binding on me. 14. In my view the decisions cited by Mr. Sinha instead of supporting the respondent no. 6, support the case of the petitioners. The afore-mentioned judgment of the Division Beach is a direct authority on the question raised in this writ application and is binding on me. 14. In my view the decisions cited by Mr. Sinha instead of supporting the respondent no. 6, support the case of the petitioners. In Frank Anthoney Public School Employees Association's case (supra), the Supreme Court had held Section 8 (2) of the Delhi School Education Act (18 of 1973) to be ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution but held that Section 8(4) of the said Act, which requires prior approval of the Director before passing of an order of suspension of school staff does not suffer from such vice and it has been further held therein that the said provision is eminently reasonable and sound. Section 8 (2) of the Delhi School Education Act (18 of 1973) provides, "no employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the Director." Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education Act is in pari materia with Section 24 of the said Act. It has also been held in Frank Anthony P.S.E. Association's case that the provisions contained in Section 8 (2) of the Delhi School Education Act interferes with the right of minority institutions and, therefore the same is inapplicable so far as the minority institutions are concerned. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case has further observed in paragraph 18 as fol1ow:- “...........Keeping in mind the views of the several learned Judges, it becomes clear that Section 8 (2) must be held to be objectionable.........." In Mrs. Y. Theelamma's case (supra) the Supreme Court had taken the same view. 15. From a perusal of the aforementioned decisions there cannot be any doubt that the decision of the Supreme Court in Frank Anthony P.S.E. Association's case as also the decision in the case of Mrs. Theelamma (supra) do not advance the case of the respondent no. 6, but really support the petitioner's case, I am, therefore, of the view that Section 24 of the said Act is ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 16. From a perusal of the impugned orders (Annexures 8 and 11) it would appear that the action of the petitioners suspending and ultimately dismissing the respondent no. 6, but really support the petitioner's case, I am, therefore, of the view that Section 24 of the said Act is ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. 16. From a perusal of the impugned orders (Annexures 8 and 11) it would appear that the action of the petitioners suspending and ultimately dismissing the respondent no. 6 was held to be invalid as the Managing Committee failed to comply with the provisions of Rules 22 and 26 of the Non-Government Madrasa (Service Condition) Rules, 1972. Under Rule 22 of the said Rules, the Managing Committee of an educational institution can only impose minor punishment upon its employees, but so far as major punishments are concerned, the same can only be imposed by the Board and the power of the Managing Committee is merely recommendatory in nature. Rules 23 and 25 of the said Rules provide for procedure as to how the disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted. For the purpose of disposal of this writ application it is not necessary to deal with the said Rules. Rule 26 provides that no Head Maulvi or teacher can be put under suspension without prior approval of the Madrasa Education Council, nor such suspension shall remain in force for more than three months. With regard to the Head Maulvi it has further been provided therein that the order of suspension shall not come into force except with the previous approval of the Chairman of the Madrasa Education Council. 17. The aforementioned Rules of 1977 are not statutory rules and as such it must be held that such Rules cease to have any effect after coming into force of 1981 Act. Section 26 confers power upon the State Government to frame rules. It is, however, admitted that no rule has yet been framed by the State Government. The aforementioned fact as found hereinbefore has also been noticed by this Court in the cases of Anjuman Ahle Hadees, Darbhanga and Md. Sohrabuddin (supra). 18. Even assuming that the said Rules survives the Act, Rule 22 thereof clearly being not in consonance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, it must be held to be nonest in the eyes of law. Sohrabuddin (supra). 18. Even assuming that the said Rules survives the Act, Rule 22 thereof clearly being not in consonance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, it must be held to be nonest in the eyes of law. From a bare perusal of Section 24 of the Act, it would appear that the same merely provides that the teaching and non-teaching staff shall neither be demoted nor their service can be terminated without prior approval of the Board; Rule 22 however, provides that major punishments, namely, (1) stoppage of increment, (2) reduction in rank, (3) termination of service and (4) removal from service upon the teaching and non-teaching staff can only be imposed by the Board, the power of the Managing Committee being only recommendatory in nature. Rule 22 of the said Rules, therefore, clearly being inconsistent with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act, it must be held to be ultra tires the said provision. 19. In any event Rule 22 as such must be held to be ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India, as thereby the entire disciplinary power of the Managing Committee of the minority has been taken away. The said provision so far as the same is applicable to the minority institutions, must be held to be ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. 20. So far as Rule 26 of the said Rules is concerned although the same cannot be said to be ultra vires Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, but order of suspension of the respondent no. 6 having merged with the order of dismissal the Board even had no power to set aside the order of suspension as the order of dismissal had already been passed against the respondent no. 6 by the Managing Committee in terms of the Resolution dated 10.4.1984 as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition. The Board could have interfered with the order of suspension only before the implementation of the order of dismissal passed against the respondent no. 6 and not thereafter. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 600 : 1955 (2) S.C.R. 391 . 21. 6 and not thereafter. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 600 : 1955 (2) S.C.R. 391 . 21. From the discussions made hereinbefore it is clear that the impugned orders as contained in Annexure 8 and 11, cannot be sustained and as such the same are liable to be quashed. 22. In the result the application is allowed and the orders as contained in Annexures 8 and 11 to the writ application are hereby quashed. In the facts and circumstances of the case however, there shall be no order as to costs.