J.R. CHOPRA, J.—This petition is directed against the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Sri Ganganagar dated 31.3.1986 where by the learned Magistrate registered the case against the petitioner under s. 500 IPC. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this petition briefly stated are that one Smt. Manju Pande, Advocate of Sri Ganganagar filed a complaint against the petitioner as also one Shri Hardeosingh Sandhu, Advocate of Jodhpur under secs. 200, 209, 211 and 500 IPC pleading inter-alia, that the petitioner Makhansingh and Shri Hardeosingh Sandhu filed a transfer application for transfer of a sessions case from the court of the then Sessions Judge, Shri R.S. Verma. It has been alleged by Smt. Pande that her husband is a Senior Lecturer in English and her father is the Superintendent Engineer (Irrigation) at Sri Ganganagar. She has been standing counsel of Government Prees and Municipal Board, Sri Ganganagar. She is a member of the Central Jail Vigilance Commit-es as also of the Legal Aid Committees. She is also a member of the District Children Court and has been appointed as a Honorary Magistrate for that Court. She has stated that in transfer application No. 846 of 1985 (Makhansingh vs. State) filed in this court, it has been alleged that Smt. Manju Pande is a much Junior Advocate than others and she has conducted very few cases so far. She has also conducted very few sessions cases. As regards the trial of that case, it has been alleged in the transfer application that she was unable to cross-examine the witnesses properly and so, actually, the Sessions Judge has acted as a defence counsel. It was further alleged in that application that Smt. Manju Pande acts as mediator of Shri R.S. Verma for settlement of illegal deals about the decisions of cases. This allegation has been made on account of certain complaints made against Shri R.S. Verma about certain sessions cases. She has complained that by these averments in the transfer petition, her prestige has been lowered down in her legal profession and, therefore, she has filed the above said complaint. 3. The learned Magistrate ordered for the registration of the complaint and after that it was fixed for recording the statements of the complainant and as also of her witnesses under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. The statements of her four witnesses were eventually recorded. 3. The learned Magistrate ordered for the registration of the complaint and after that it was fixed for recording the statements of the complainant and as also of her witnesses under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. The statements of her four witnesses were eventually recorded. They are P.W. 1 Smt. Manju Pande, PW 2 Jitendra Kinra, PW 3 Ramniwas and PW 4 Tejsingh. After hearing the arguments on 31,3.86, the learned Magistrate ordered that a case under s. 500 I.P.C. be registered against the petitioner Makhansingh. No order was made by the learned Magistrate about second accused i.e. Shri Hardeo Singh Sandhu. 4. Aggrieved against this order, the petitioner has preferred this petition. 5. I have heard Mr. Nandlal and Mridul. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.K. Singhal, learned counsel for the non-petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two questions in his petition one is whether for the purpose of taking cognizance in a complaint case, the statements recorded under s. 200 Cr.P.C. can be looked into or the court is competent to consider only the complaint. Closely connected with this question, certain ancillary points have been raised during arguments as to when it can be held that a competent court has taken cognizance of an offence whether the order taking cognizance should be a speaking order which must specifically mention whether all the limitations put on the powers of the court to take cognizance under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure have some application in the matter or not? The second question that has been raised by the petitioner is whether the litigants rights to complain before the High Court or Tribunal against the conduct of a trial Judge can form the subject matter of defamation case against the petitioner. It was contended that if he persues his legal rights or remedies available to him under law and in doing so, if he makes certain adverse comments against the conduct of a Presiding Officer then those comments should be covered by the expression "fair comments against the person concerned which are permissible under Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and according to Mr. Nandlal, such comments are protected by the exceptions of s. 499 I.P.C. Detailed arguments were advanced on both these major questions. 7. Nandlal, such comments are protected by the exceptions of s. 499 I.P.C. Detailed arguments were advanced on both these major questions. 7. The most important question that arises for decision in this petition is as to when it can be said that the Court has taken cognizance of the complaint. Cognizance has no where been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. 190 Cr.P.C. relates to the taking of cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate and it provides that subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-s. (2), may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; and (c) upon information received from any person other then a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. In this petition, we are only concerned with Clause(a) of s. 190 Cr.P.C. According to clause(a) of s. 190 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence and that power of taking cognizance is subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV. Restraints on taking cognizance by the Magistrate are contained in ss. 195, 196, 197, 198 and 199 Cr. P.C. Provisions of ss. 191 to 194 Cr.P.C. have no application to the controversy raised before this Court. S. 191 Cr.P.C. relates to transfer of a case on application of the accused and it provides that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 190, the accused shall before any evidence is taken, be informed that he is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by another Magistrate, and if the accused or any of the accused, if there be more than one objects to further proceedings before the Magistrate taking cognizance, the case shall be transferred to such other Magistrate, as may be specified by the C.J.M. in this behalf. S. 192 Cr.P.C. relates to making over of cases to Magistrates. Ss. 193 and 194 Cr.P.C. relates to cognizance of an offence by the court of sessions and to the trial of sessions cases by the Additional and Assistant Sessions Judge to try cases made over to them. S. 192 Cr.P.C. relates to making over of cases to Magistrates. Ss. 193 and 194 Cr.P.C. relates to cognizance of an offence by the court of sessions and to the trial of sessions cases by the Additional and Assistant Sessions Judge to try cases made over to them. Provisions of s. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C , of course, put certain limitations on the powers of the Court regarding taking cognizance of an offence but those factors have to be taken into consideration when the Court applies its mind for taking cognizance on the basis of allegations made in the complaint. That stage is prior to the recording of statements under ss. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. It is true that the limitations put on the powers of the Court can be agitated even after the cognizance is taken i.e. to say that cognizance has wrongly been taken but legally speaking, the court has only to apply its mind to the contents of the complaint when it decides to take cognizance on a complaint under s. 190(l)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is thus clear from the perusal of s. 190(1) clause(a) read with s. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. that a Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of the facts which constitutes such an offence, ft is not necessary for taking of the cognizance that the Magistrate should record the statements of the complainant and his witnesses under s. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. S. 200 Cr.P.C. itself provides that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses as also by the Magistrate. Thus, it is clear that the Magistrate can examine the complainant and the witnesses present on his behalf only after he takes cognizance of the case and, therefore, examination of the complainant and his witnesses under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is not at all essential for taking of the cognizance. The Magistrate has only to look into the complaint to find out whether they disclose any such offence which are complained and if he is prima facie satisfied that they disclose such an offence, he can take cognizance of the case. 8. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is not at all essential for taking of the cognizance. The Magistrate has only to look into the complaint to find out whether they disclose any such offence which are complained and if he is prima facie satisfied that they disclose such an offence, he can take cognizance of the case. 8. The next question that arises for decision is whether the order taking cognizance should be a speaking order and whether it should be specifically mentioned in the order taking cognizance of the case that none of the provisions contained in ss. 195 to 199 are attracted in a given case and if they are attracted then to what extent. 9. Mr. Nandlal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M.L. Sothi Vs. R.P. Kapur (1) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been pleased to lay down that when a Magistrate is taking cognizance under s. 190 Cr.P.C. he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under section has or has not been taken away under sec. 195(1) Cr.P.C. In the case of an offence under sec. 211 I.P.C. Sec. 195(1) (b) Cr.P.C. provides that, no Court shall take cognizance of it when such offence is alleged to have been committed, in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court or of some other court to which such court is sub-ordinate. Their Lordships have further observed that it is not correct to say that s. 195 Cr.P.C. lays down that the offences therein referred to shall not be deemed to be any offences at all except on the complaint of the person or the courts therein specified. An offence is constituted as soon as it is found that the facts which constitute the offence have been committed by the person accused of the offence and it remains an offence whether it is triable by a court or not. 10. Reliance was also placed by Mr. An offence is constituted as soon as it is found that the facts which constitute the offence have been committed by the person accused of the offence and it remains an offence whether it is triable by a court or not. 10. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Nandlal learned counsel for the petitioner on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Govind Mehta V. State of Bihar (2) where in it has been observed : "The point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken by a Magistrate. The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under s. 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. S. 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to taks cognizance under s. 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under s. 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power to take cognizance under s. 190 has not been taken away by any of the Clauses (a) to (c) of s. 195(1). Therefore, if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of s. 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offence enumerated therein." The ratio of both these decisions is that although the Magistrate has power and jurisdiction to take cognizance under sec. 190(1 )(a) Cr.P.C. upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence but while taking cognizance, he must apply his mind whether his powers are in any way taken away by the provisions of ss. 190(1 )(a) Cr.P.C. upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence but while taking cognizance, he must apply his mind whether his powers are in any way taken away by the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. It has also been observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court that at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under s. 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his powers to take cognizance under Sec. 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of s. 195(1) and if there is a noncompliance with the provisions of s. 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein; that means application of the mind is essential on the part of the Magistrate, when it appears to the Magistrate from the complaint that the offence complained against is such, about which restrictions imposed by ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. may come into play. I am, however, of the view that even if the allegations contained in the complaint disclose that the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. are likely to be attracted imposing restrictions in the exercise of the unfathered powers by the Magistrate under sec. 190(l)(a) of Cr.P.C. than loo, it is not the requirement of the law that he has to pass any speaking order to show that he has applied his mind about the applicability of the restrictions contained in Sec. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. What is expected of him in such a situation is to prima-faciely apply his mind and if any, detailed arguments are advanced, he need not pass any detailed order mentioning there in that the complaint does not attract any of the limitations provided in ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. No such negative order need be recorded by him. What is provided by s. 190(l)(a) Cr.P.C. is that the Magistrate must prima facie apply his mind to the facts contained in the complaint and if it appears to him that certain offences are made out, he can take cognizance of the complaint. Some times if so happens that the legal position about the application of the provisions of ss. What is provided by s. 190(l)(a) Cr.P.C. is that the Magistrate must prima facie apply his mind to the facts contained in the complaint and if it appears to him that certain offences are made out, he can take cognizance of the complaint. Some times if so happens that the legal position about the application of the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. may not be very clear, as it is, in this case, Say for example, in this case, the accused Makhansingh wanted to get his sessions case transferred on account of certain allegations made by him against the learned Sessions Judge and in doing so, he has also made certain libellous allegations against the complainant Mrs. Manju Pande then whether for those allegations concerning an Advocate of the opposite party made in a transfer application with which that Advocate has no concern, can any protection be claimed under sec. 195 (1) (a) is a question not free from doubt and so, while taking cognizance if the Court orders under secs. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and later before issuing process, it applies its mind to the facts of the complaint and the evidence produced in the case then too, it is a sufficient compliance of the provisions of law incorporated in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate is not required to go in minute legalities when he exercises his powers under s. 190(l)(a) Cr.P.C. If certain questions are very much apparent on the face of the record then, of course, if the Magistrate registers the case under certain offences which are covered by the provisions of s. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. then he has to apply his mind and record his reasons for doing so but if he only takes cognizance of the complaint and the offences mentioned therein without specifically expressing his opinion about the maintainability or non-maintainability of a charge or charges covered by the provisions of s. 195 to 199 either because their application is doubtful or because their application can only be thrashed out after recording evidence under ss. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. he need not record his reasons for doing so and, therefore, if the Magistrate finds that prima facie, an offence has been committed looking to the allegations of facts disclosed in the complaint, he can register the case without recording his reasons and then after holding an enquiry under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C, if the court issues the process only with regard to offences which are not covered by the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. then in that case, the earlier order of the court taking cognizance of the case before proceeding under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. cannot be held to be illegal or improper. In this respect, I place reliance on a decision of this Court in Narayan Vs. State of Raj. (3) wherein K.D. Sharma, C. J. (as he then was) has held as under : "On 13. 7. 81, the Judicial Magistrate passed an order that challan be registered and he committed the accused to the court of Sessions judge. Therefore, it is only on 13. 7. 81 that the Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences". I may also gainfully refer to another decision of this Court in Mahadeo Singh Vs. Gajesiugh (4) wherein Mrs. Mohini Kapoor, J. has held as under : "In view of the legal pronouncement of the Supreme Court. 1 have s.o hesitation in coming to the conclusion that when the learned Magistrate upon receiving the complaint and applying his mind, directed to proceed under s. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and recorded the statement of the complainant then it amounts to taking cognizance of offence This order was passed on May 5, 1984 and was within the period of limitation, prescribed under s. 468 of the Code. The Magistrate in this case, did not order further investigation by the police or the issue of a search warrant or any similar act but ordered to examine the complainant. A reading of s. 200 Cr.P.C. would go to show that a Magistrate after taking cognizance of an offence can proceed further to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any. It shows that the complaint is examined only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence. A reading of s. 200 Cr.P.C. would go to show that a Magistrate after taking cognizance of an offence can proceed further to examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any. It shows that the complaint is examined only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence. This being the position, cognizance of the offence in this case was taken on 5th May, 1984 and does not in any way vitiate the proceedings against the petitioner." In Mahadeo Singha case (supra), the learned Judge noticed the decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court in R.R. Chari Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh(5), Ajit Kumar Dalit Vs. State of West Bengal(6), Narayandas Bhagwan Das Madhav Das Vs. The State of West Bengal (7) and Devarpali Lakshmi Narayan Reddy Vs. Narayana Reddy (8). 11. In D. Lakshminarayana Vs. Narayana Redely (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in para 14 of the Judgment as under : "The expression taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate has not been defined in the Code. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 190 (1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the made in which the case is sought to be instituted, the nature of the preliminary action, if any taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under s. 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offences within the meaning of sec. 190 (1) (a). If instead of proceeding under Chapter IX, he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under s. 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence." (Emphasis supplied). Thus, when the Magistrate elects to proceed under secs. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C., it clearly means that he has taken cognizance of the complaint and the offences mentioned therein. It is not essential that he should pass a speaking order about the cognizance. Thus, when the Magistrate elects to proceed under secs. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C., it clearly means that he has taken cognizance of the complaint and the offences mentioned therein. It is not essential that he should pass a speaking order about the cognizance. There may be cases of disputed facts and disputed questions of law wherein provision of s. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. may be applicable or may not be applicable. If any dispute is raised about the applicability of these aforesaid provisions and the Magistrate clearly rules out the application of those section then he must record a speaking order but if he does not do so, he has only to apply his mind to the facts of the case and to prima-facie see whether the provisions of the ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. are attracted or not in a particular case and if facts that they are really attracted then he must pass an order accordingly but if he is not definite as regards their applicability, he need not pass a speaking order. It is quite possible that in doing so, some harassment may be caused to the accused but when things are not very clear or the controversy that may be raised is not free from doubt then of course, that harassment is very much inherent in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is true that taking cognizance of an offence either on the F. I. R. or on a complaint made on facts to a Magistrate is not an administrative act but it is a judicial act as held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Mowu Vs. Superintendent, Special Jail, Nowgong, Assam (9) but inspite of the fact that it is a judicial order, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to pass a detailed order at the time of taking cognizance. The statements under ss. 200 or 202 Cr.P.C. cannot be considered before taking cognizance. They should actually be recorded after the cognizance is taken and not before that and as such, so far as the question No. 1 raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, 1 hold that while taking cognizance, statements recorded under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. should not be taken into consideration and they should actually be recorded after taking cognizance and not prior to it. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. should not be taken into consideration and they should actually be recorded after taking cognizance and not prior to it. The order taking cognizance of an offence need not be a speaking order. The mere registration of a complaint after applying the mind to the facts in complaint is enough compliance of the provisions of the law. However, if the facts contained so disclosed in the complaint are unambiguous and from the facts contained in the complaint, the Magistrate comes to the conclusion that the limitations put on his powers to take cognizance as provided by ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. are attracted then he is obliged to pass a speaking order while taking cognizance. He, however need not do so in cases where the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 Cr.P.C. are not applicable or where their application is based on disputed questions of facts and law. 12. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the complaint has been filed against two persons i.e. accused-petitioner Makhansingh and Hardeosingh Sandhu, Advocate and the Court while issuing the process against the accused-petitioner Makhansingh has not given any reasons as to why it has not issued process against accused Hardeosingh Sandhu, Advocate- According to him, it was very much necessary for the Magistrate to have recorded reasons for not issuing process against Hardeo Singh Sandhu and the absence of reasons may vitiate the orders. In this respect, he drew my attention to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Udeybir Singh Vs. Smt. Shakuntala Devi (10) wherein it has been held that where a complaint is lodged against several persons but the Magistrate orders process against some of them, his order amounts to dismissal of the complaint against others, and though the Magistrate can pass a composite order which may be covered by both sections 203 and 204 of the Code, he is bound to record his reasons for not issuing the process against others. Law does not warrant any arbitrary order under either of the said provisions. An order passed in disregard of obligations imposed by ss. 203, 204 is bad in law. It is true that the learned Magistrate has not recorded any reasons as to why he has elected not to issue process against accused Hardeosingh. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter in my concluding para. 13. An order passed in disregard of obligations imposed by ss. 203, 204 is bad in law. It is true that the learned Magistrate has not recorded any reasons as to why he has elected not to issue process against accused Hardeosingh. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter in my concluding para. 13. So far as the second question is concerned, Mr. Nandlal, learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioner has drawn my attention to the provisions of Art. 19(1) of the Constitution which relates to the right of freedom of speech and expression. There is no doubt that freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental right of the citizens of the country but ordinarily this right cannot be exercised in a manner which can be termed libellous or contemptuous. However, in cases of filing transfer applications on the basis of misconduct of Judge even if defamatory allegations are made, the applicant use such a language which can be termed as contemptuous. In this respect, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to me Note 10.59 of the Constitutional Law of India, Third Edition, By H.M. Seervai, wherein it has been stated: 14. "As Mukherjee, J. rightly held, the interest of justice requires that the Judges misbehaviour should be brought to light." In Note 10.64, it has been stated by the learned author that an application for transfer of a case because of the Judges misconduct, or an application for a new trial on the ground that judges conduct of the case made a fair trial impossible involves a serious reflection on the judge, but the aggrieved party can protect his interest only by bringing the judges misconduct to the attention of a higher court entitled to grant him relief and advocates who after careful verification of the facts sign the relevant application or memorandum of appeal are obviously discharging their duty. The learned author has referred in para 10:65 the decision in Barads-kants Vs. Registrar, Orissa H. C. (11) wherein Art. 235 of the Constitution was considered in the context of a Criminal contempt of court as defined in s. 2(c), Contempt of Courts Act, Palekar, J (speaking for himself, Ray, C.J. and Chandrachud, J.) observed that no comprehensive definition of the administration of justice had been brought to the attention of the Court. Registrar, Orissa H. C. (11) wherein Art. 235 of the Constitution was considered in the context of a Criminal contempt of court as defined in s. 2(c), Contempt of Courts Act, Palekar, J (speaking for himself, Ray, C.J. and Chandrachud, J.) observed that no comprehensive definition of the administration of justice had been brought to the attention of the Court. The administration of justice did not consist merely in the adjudication of disputes between parties. Art. 235 entrusted to the High Court and not to individual judges disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary and the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction by the High Court was essential for the administration of justice. Consequently, vilificatory criticism of a judge functioning as a Judge even in an administrative or non-adjudicatory matter amounted to criminal contempt. It is, therefore, clear that even in moving the transfer application, one should not use any contemptuous language and the right to move the superior court complaining about the misconduct of a Judge does not entitle a man to use contemptuous language. 15. Mr. Nandlal, learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to a decision of the High Court of Australia in the Kind V. Nicholi wherein Griffith C. J. and Barton and O Connor JJ. have observed that : "A judge is much open to be libelled as anybody else. The libel may or may not be justified. But although a publication concerning a Judge may be libellous it is not a contempt of Court unless it is calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice of the due administration of the law." It was further observed as under: "In one sense no doubt every defamatory publication concerning a Judge may be said to bring him into contempt as that term is used in the law of libel but it does not follow that everything said of a Judge is calculated to bring him into contempt in that sense which amounts to contempt of court. ......... An imputation of want of impartiality to a Judge is necessarily a contempt of court. ......... An imputation of want of impartiality to a Judge is necessarily a contempt of court. On the contrary I think that, if any Judge of this Court or of any other court were to make a public utterance of such character as to be likely to impair the confidence of the public or of suitors or any class of suitors in the impartiality of the court in any matter likely to be brought before it, any public comment would so far from being a contempt of court, be for the public benefit, and would be entitled to similar protection to that which comment upon matters of public interest is entitled under the law of libel." I need not give any detail of the facts on the basis of which this decision has been given but this much is clear from this judgment that a derogatory remark against a Judge may be libellous that but it should not amount to the contempt of court. A client maybe saved of a charge of libel if makes any derogatory remarks against the conduct of a Judge to the superior court in a transfer application, if such remarks are made in good faith whereby he bonafidely believes that he will not get justice from that court but even in making such derogatory remarks, he cannot use language which may amount to contempt of court. However, all these cases have no relevance to the facts of the present case. Here, it is not the Judge against whom an imputation of dishonesty has been made, has filed any complaint against the petitioner under ss. 200, 201 and 202 Cr.P.C. In the transfer application, supported by the affidavit of the petitioner Makhansingh, not only the misconduct of the Judge was brought to the notice of the higher court but allegation was made about a practising Advocate that she cannot cross-examine the witnesses which is perse defamatory. The allegation made against the Advocate that it is allege J that she works as a mediator or agent between the clients and the Judge to secure a judgment or an order in favour of particular party on account of illegal gratification is also libellous. The fact that she is comparatively a junior Advocate is not by itself libellous. Further the fact that she has at her credit a practice of only 5 years is not libellous. The fact that she is comparatively a junior Advocate is not by itself libellous. Further the fact that she has at her credit a practice of only 5 years is not libellous. The fact that she is a junior Advocate and she has not conducted number of cases or number of sessions trials is not libellous by itself but to say that she cannot cross examine or she acts as an agent or mediator between the Judge and the clients for illegal gratification, these allegations are definitely libellous. If such statements are made against an Advocate by any person even if in a transfer application, these statements are perse defamatory and libellous and as such, he cannot protect himself from a charge of defamation because such allegations about advocates by private citizens cannot be protected on the ground that such derogatory remarks concern the misconduct of a Judge and are made before a superior court in a transfer application. I am, therefore, of the view that if the learned Magistrate has held that these statements are perse libellous and defamatory and that has lowered down the prestige of the Advocate as has been stated by the witnesses who have been examined in support of the complaint then the learned Magistrate was. perfectly justified in registering the case against the accused under s. 500 IPC. It is true that the petitioner may take defence that he made statement in good faith and for public good believing it to be true but in such cases, it is the petitioner who has to plead such an exception and to prove it. In this respect, 1 place reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in H. Singh Vs. State of Punjab(12) wherein it has been held that where to the charge of defamation under sec. 500 IPC, the accused invokes the aid of exception 9 to sec. 499, good faith and public good have both to be established. The failure to prove good faith would exclude the application of the ninth exception in favour of the accused even if the requirement public good is satisfied. It has further been observed as under: "Where the accused is called upon to prove that his case falls under an exception, law treats the onus as discharged if he succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability. It has further been observed as under: "Where the accused is called upon to prove that his case falls under an exception, law treats the onus as discharged if he succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability. As soon as the preponderance of probability is established, the burden shifts to the prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus." It is true that in the order dated 31-3.1986, the learned Magistrate has not specifically mentioned that he has considered the complaint also. The allegations in the comprint were considered for taking cognizance which was taken on 19.10.1985. The consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint was essential in addition to the consideration of the evidence recorded under ss. 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. but if the Magistrate has failed to specifically mention in the order sheet that he has also considered the complaint, it does not mean that he has not done so. 16. I have perused the allegations in the complaint and have also perused the statement of (he witnesses produced in support of this complaint and I find that the allegation contained in the complaint and the assertions made by the witnesses in their sworn testimony clearly show that these allegations are perse libellous and defamatory and, therefore, in this view of the matter, the order of the Magistrate cannot be quashed. 17. Their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivlingappa Kanjalgi (14) that in the following cases, an order of the Magistrate can be quashed or set aside: (a) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused ; (b) Where the allegations in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (c) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant inadmissible; and (d) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 18. I am definitely of the view that none of the situations as mentioned in clauses (a) (b) quoted supra exist in this case. Rather the allegations contained in the complaint and the facts asserted in the evidence recorded so far clearly show that the offence under s. 500 IPC is prima facially made out against the petitioner and so, the order dated 31.3.1986 does not deserve to be quashed, so far as it relates to the taking of cognizance under s. 500 IPC against the petitioner is concerned. 19. The result is that I find no force in this petition and it is hereby dismissed with this direction that the learned Magistrate must pass a speaking order in respect of the co-accused Hardevsingh as to why it has not thought fit to register the case against him under s. 500 IPC or in any other section mentioned in the complaint. The learned Magistrate should afford an opportunity of hearing to the parties afresh about the case of Shri Harideosingh.