JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - This revision is directed against the order dated 10-2-86 passed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar allowing the revision and setting aside the order dated 3-12-85 passed by the Magistrate in a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code). 2. In the proceedings u/s 145 of the Code, 13th December, 1985 was a date fixed when Ashok Kumar Jain, the opposite party No. 2 was absent, the case was dismissed in default. A revision was filed against that order which has been allowed by the impugned order and the case has been remanded to the Additional S.D.M. with direction to decide the case from the stage at which it was dismissed in default. 3. It was urged by the learned Counsel for the applicant that once the case was dismissed in default, it could not be restored as there was no provision of restoration in-the Code and the impugned order was erroneous. The learned Counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand urged that in fact 13 the December, 1985 was not the date fixed when the case had been dismissed in default, as no notice was sent to the opposite party No. 2. From the Court of S.D.M. Kairana the case had been transferred to the Court of Additional S.D.M. Kairana about which no notice was served on the opposite party No. 2. It was clear from order sheet that firstly 9th December, 1985 was the date fixed which was adjourned to 16th December, 1985, but later on it was changed to 13th December, 1985, without any notice to the opposite party No. 2. Consequently it appears that without any notice to the opposite party No. 2 who was the first party, the case had been dismissed in. default. Under these circumstances the order in revision was correct and the case had correctly been remanded to the learned Magistrate and there was no mistake in the impugned order. 4. The first point for determination is as to whether the case u/s 145 of the Code can be dismissed in default. Secondly whether the dismissal can be made without any notice to the affected or aggrieved party. 4. The first point for determination is as to whether the case u/s 145 of the Code can be dismissed in default. Secondly whether the dismissal can be made without any notice to the affected or aggrieved party. In a case without any notice to the other side some date has been fixed and the opposite, party No. 2 remains absent, whether the case would be dismissed in default, is convenient to decide these points together. Section 145(3) of the enacts that in view of schedule two (Form No. 25) notice of preliminary order served on the second party. In Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (Twelf Edition) page 28, there is a statement as follows: If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which Statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of words and sentences. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to case. (See Att. Gen. v. Mutual Jontine Westminister Chambers Association Ltd. (1876)/Ex.D. 469, Braddeugh v. Clerke (1883) 8 A Cases 354; Barrd v. Fordree (1932) A.C. 676). 5. u/s 145(4) the legislature has deliberately employed the language in brief to the effect that the Magistrate shall then peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them....decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under Sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute. The important clauses are "peruse the statements" "hear the parties" and "decide". The emphasis is that Court should peruse the statements and hear the parties. The clause 'hear the parties' is quite comprehensive and it includes by implication that unless other side has been informed about next date fixed in the case or next date changed in the case, how can other side be deemed to have any notice to appear on a particular date and be heard. From the perusal of para 3 of the impugned order it is manifest that the case was earlier pending in the Court of S.D.M, Kairana. From there, it appears to have been transferred to the Court of Additional S.D.M. Kairana who has dismissed in default on 13th December, 1985. From the perusal of para 3 of the impugned order it is manifest that the case was earlier pending in the Court of S.D.M, Kairana. From there, it appears to have been transferred to the Court of Additional S.D.M. Kairana who has dismissed in default on 13th December, 1985. It appears that earlier 16th December, 1985 was the date fixed but later on it was changed to 13th December, 1985. Even assuming that the opposite party No. 2 could have any information about the date fi1985, if subsequently it was changed to 13th December, 1985, the opposite party No. 2 was entitled to have a notice for the said date, in its absence it could not be assumed that the opposite party No. 2 was aware of the date fixed. It was ordinarily expected of him to appear on date fixed. Consequently the learned Magistrate without ascertaining as to whether any information has been given to the opposite party No. 2 about the change in date, than the earlier date fixed, dismissed the proceedings u/s 145 of the Code in default on 13th December, 1985. This procedure adopted was not consistent either with the statutory requirement or with the general principles of fair play and natural justice. 6. The matter can be viewed from another angle. When the case was transferred from one Court to another, notice must be given to the parties or their Counsel in case they are not present in Court when order of transfer was being passed. I am of the view that in the event of a case being transferred without information to a party or in case some date already fixed was being altered, notice must be given about change of date. In such matters the principles of natural justice applies. If some act of a Court was going to affect the right of a party, that party must be informed before any such order is passed. 7. There are two maxims Actus Curiae Nemi Nem Chavarit, which connotes that an act of the Court shall prejudice no man; and Actus Legis Ne Min Est Damnosus which means an act in law shall prejudice no man. These maxims apply to the present case. The opposite party No. 2 was entitled to notice about the transfer of the case and alteration in date fixed. These maxims apply to the present case. The opposite party No. 2 was entitled to notice about the transfer of the case and alteration in date fixed. Impugned order is perfectly correct and the order of the learned Magistrate has been correctly set aside and the case has been correctly remanded to the Court of Additional S.D.M. Kairana. 8. In view of the discussions made hereinbefore, I do not find any merit in the revision and the same is dismissed. The interim stay order dated 13-8-1986 passed by this Court is vacated. The records of the case would be sent back immediately.