JUDGMENT M.P. MENON, J. The petitioner-firm is engaged in the business of buying and selling coconut oil, coir, copra, etc. Its principal place of business is in Kerala State, but it has also a branch office at Patna in Bihar. Assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act for the year 1973-74 was completed in July, 1975; but it was subsequently noticed that certain "branch transfers" in respect of which exemption had been granted, were not really branch transfers. It was therefore proposed to rope in this escaped turnover also, and exhibit P1 detailed notice dated 16th March, 1978 under rule 6(7) of the C.S.T. (Kerala) Rules, was served on the petitioner. The proposal was to bring to tax a turnover of over Rs. 1,00,00,000 which had allegedly escaped assessment, and to levy tax at the rate of 10 per cent., as the transactions were not covered by C forms. 2. The petitioner filed exhibit P2 objections on 18th May, 1978 and on 6th December; 1978 another notice (exhibit P3) was served on the firm requiring it to produce the books of accounts for the year 1973-74, in order to verify the facts and circumstances relied on in exhibit P2. According to the petitioner, the books were so produced on 23rd December, 1978 and was later returned to it. The firm was thereafter under the impression that the matter was closed. 3. However, exhibit P4 notice was again issued by the department on 24th December, 1983 for production of records and books relating to the years 1973-74 and 1974-75, for finalising/determining the firm's tax liability for the said years. The firm furnished the following reply (exhibit P5) on 10th January, 1984 : "We are in receipt of the above notice. As you are aware our branch is located at Patna and we have to gather the required particulars, documents, etc., from them. This will take sometime. The firm furnished the following reply (exhibit P5) on 10th January, 1984 : "We are in receipt of the above notice. As you are aware our branch is located at Patna and we have to gather the required particulars, documents, etc., from them. This will take sometime. Hence we are constrained to request you to grant us at least two months' time to take further action in the matter." The request was granted, and time was given up to 12th March, 1984 but in the meanwhile, the firm appears to have become wiser : it gave a twist to the stand taken in exhibit P5 and wrote the following letter (exhibit P7) on 15th February, 1984 : "We have for acknowledgment your letter under reference wherein you have required us to produce all accounts relating to the assessment year 1973-74 on or before 12th March, 1984. You have stated in the said letter that we had applied for two months' time for production of accounts. You will note from our letter dated 10th January, 1984 that we had only requested you for time to take further action in this matter. We are informed that an assessment can be reopened within a period of five years and in our case it is about ten years since the expiry of that assessment year. We shall hence thank you to kindly let us know the provision of law under which you have proposed to reopen the assessment. Please note that you have no jurisdiction to revise the assessment for 1973-74 at this stage. In this connection, we may mention that we had produced our accounts for the year 1973-74 before you as early as December, 1978 and the accounts had been examined for about 15 days continuously and you had closed the proceedings on the ground that there is no basis for reopening the assessment. In these circumstances, the present notice is wholly without jurisdiction. We shall proceed further in this matter after receipt of your reply." The department was not impressed by this new approach, and it furnished exhibit P8 reply on 3rd May, 1984, reiterating the need for producing the books, etc., and pointing out that failure to do so would have the result of the assessment getting completed on the lines indicated in exhibit P1. 4. 4. This writ petition by the firm seeks to quash the proceedings connected with exhibits P1, P4 and P8 on the ground that if the department was desirous of proceeding against turnover alleged to have escaped, it should not have acted in the fitful manner of taking the first step in 1978, and then waiting till 1983 or 1984 for moving over to the next. The procedure is vitiated by "inordinate delay", it is complained, relying on some of the decisions of this Court which, according to me, do no more than recognise the well-known principle that every power conferred on an authority has to be exercised in a reasonable manner, and that where the delay in exercising it is so unreasonable as to cause serious detriment or harm to a citizen, the courts could, on appropriate occasions, reach the conclusion that the power has been illegally or improperly exercised. 5. Before examining the decisions cited, it is necessary to notice the language of the relevant part of rule 6(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules, reading as follows : "(7)(i) If, for any reason, the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax in any year, the assessing authority may at any time, within four years from the expiry of the year to which the tax relates, proceed to determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable on such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer and after making such enquiries as he considers necessary." The provision is somewhat similar to the one contained in section 35 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950 but with a difference. Subsection (1) of section 35 empowers the assessing authority to assess agricultural income that has escaped assessment, within five years of the year in question, after issuing an appropriate notice to the party; and subsection (2) provides that no assessment or reassessment under sub-section (1) shall be made after the expiry of five years from that year. The first proviso however seeks to extend the above period in certain cases by providing that such assessment or reassessment can be made within one year of the notice given under sub-section (1). The first proviso however seeks to extend the above period in certain cases by providing that such assessment or reassessment can be made within one year of the notice given under sub-section (1). In other words, subsection (2) of section 35 fixes an outer limit of time within which proceedings initiated under sub-section (1) should be completed. The difference therefore is that while rule 6(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules fixes a time-limit within which steps for bringing to tax escaped turnover have to be initiated, as in the case of sub-section (1) of section 35 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, there is no further prescriptions in the Rules, about the period within which such steps should be finalised. 6. Turning now to the decisions cited, it is significant to note that none of them had arisen either under rule 6(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Kerala) Rules, or under section 35 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. In Bhavani Tea & Produce Co. v. Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax 1972 Tax LR 2413 the writ petitioner before this Court was a tea planter. Income from the plantation was partly agricultural and partly non-agricultural, and the law was clear that in fixing the agricultural part of the income, the Agricultural Income-tax Officer should have taken into account the computation made by the income-tax authorities, regarding the non-agricultural part of the income. The officer had not done so, and the planter had moved the Commissioner, under section 34 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, for revising/correcting this mistake. The Commissioner declined to interfere, and it was this decision of the Commissioner which was being challenged before this Court. Isaac, J., noticed that the Commissioner was not right in rejecting the revision merely on the ground of "difficulties"; but the learned Judge found, on a thorough examination of the matter, that the assessee had not raised the question at the appropriate stage, that be had not furnished relevant data, and that it would have been impossible for the Commissioner, even if he were so minded, to accept the assessee's contention. The writ petition was therefore dismissed, but it was also observed that the Commissioner Could have dismissed the assessee's revision (under section 34) on the ground of delay also, because the revisional jurisdiction had been invoked nine years after the assessment order. The writ petition was therefore dismissed, but it was also observed that the Commissioner Could have dismissed the assessee's revision (under section 34) on the ground of delay also, because the revisional jurisdiction had been invoked nine years after the assessment order. In answer to the Contention that section 34 did not provide for any period for limitation, his Lordship said : "Though section 34 does not prescribe any period of limitation, the section indicates that, in a case where exercise of that jurisdiction would affect an assessee adversely, any variance of the assessment can be done only subject to the provisions of the Act. In other words, the proceedings would be also subject to the periods of limitation provided for the different proceedings under the Act. It may be permissible to exercise that jurisdiction to the benefit of an assessee at any time; but there should be some reasonableness regarding the time-limit; and nine years after the assessments have become final is not certainly a reasonable period within which that jurisdiction can be invoked." The above observations of Isaac, J., were noted with approval in Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Paul Pandian 1981 KLT 66 where part of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, under section 34 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, was set aside on the ground of inordinate delay. 7. Krishna Bhatta v. Agricultural Income-tax Officer ILR (1981) 2 Ker 16 was concerned with the scope of section 41 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. Sub-section (1) of section 41 provides for imposition of penalty on an assessee, when he is in default of payment of the tax assessed; and no time-limit is fixed for such imposition. Sub-section (4) provides that proceedings for recovery of tax will stand barred after 3 years from the date specified for payment in the demand notice. And the question before the court was whether the assessing authority could impose penalty in a case where the tax imposed had itself become irrecoverable for long. After examining the facts and circumstances of the case, where the assessment was in 1960 and the penalty was imposed in 1976, the court held that in the absence of any explanation as to the long lapse of time, the penalty imposed had to be set aside. After examining the facts and circumstances of the case, where the assessment was in 1960 and the penalty was imposed in 1976, the court held that in the absence of any explanation as to the long lapse of time, the penalty imposed had to be set aside. Poti, J. (as he then was), adverted to the Supreme Court's observation in the Swastik Oil Mills case [1968] 21 STC 383 that where a statute has not prescribed a period of limitation, the courts cannot read into it any such period, and observed : "The question is not one of limitation as has been said by many courts but is one of propriety of exercising of power beyond a reasonable time ....... Proceedings enforceable against a party should not continue to be so enforceable all the time ......... it cannot be said that irrespective of the conduct of the authority seeking to enforce or exercise its powers, if the statute does not lay down a time-limit within which such exercise should be made, it can be exercised at any time ...." In other words, even where no limitation is prescribed by the statute, courts will be entitled to look into the conduct of the authority invested with power and decide whether it has acted properly and reasonably in exercising it, where such exercise comes after a long lapse of time, unusual or abnormal on its face, and without any explanation. 8. In my opinion, however, the above decisions are not very helpful to the petitioner herein : as already noticed, a time-limit of four years is fixed by rule 6(7), for initiation of proceedings in connection with assessment of escaped turnover. The position is thus different from cases arising under section 34 or 41(1) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act. It is also different from situations arising under section 35 of the said Act, where a time-limit is fixed not only for commencement of proceedings, but also for their completion. Where the legislature or the rule-making authority has addresssd itself to the question of limitation, and where it has chosen to fix a time-limit for commencement of proceedings, but not for completing it, can a court insist that the proceedings should be completed within such time as it considers reasonable ? Where the legislature or the rule-making authority has addresssd itself to the question of limitation, and where it has chosen to fix a time-limit for commencement of proceedings, but not for completing it, can a court insist that the proceedings should be completed within such time as it considers reasonable ? Assuming that it can, is there scope for holding that the time-lag of five years between exhibits P3 and P4 was "inordinate" or unreasonable ? Admittedly, exhibit P1 was issued in time, and it cannot be treated as illegal because there was delay in what followed. (It has to be remembered that in the cases cited, this Court had not interfered with the assessment proceedings while such proceedings were pending : interference was only with action taken or orders passed after completion of such proceedings). And if the conduct of the authorities is relevant, as observed in Krishna Bhatta's case ILR (1981) 2 Ker 16, the conduct of the petitioner must be more relevant, at least in proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution. When exhibit P4 notice was issued in December, 1983, the petitioner had no complaint that it was belated; in fact, the stand taken in exhibit P5 was that some more time was required, as records from the Patna office were involved. It was only after the department had given the firm the required time (as per exhibit P6) that it suddenly started quibbling about what it had said in exhibit P5. I think this conduct itself disentitles the petitioner from seeking relief under article 226. Again, by exhibits P4 and P8, the petitioner has only been asked to produce the books of accounts; and if the firm fails to do so, all that will follow is the completion of the assessment, without reference to the firm's objection in exhibit P2. If the action of the authorities in finalising the assessment proceedings as above will be illegal or improper because of delay, or other considerations the petitioner can conjure up, it will then be time enough for the firm to approach this Court. Questions of law or legality apart, I am of the view that in exercise of its discretion under article 226, this Court should decline to interfere with exhibits P1, P4, P8, etc., at least at the present stage. The O.P. is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.