JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is defendants second appeal under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code and is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 5-10-1981, passed by III Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Raipur in Civil Appeal No. 9-A of 1979, arising out of the judgment and decree, dated 23-9-1979 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Dhamtari in Civil Suit No. 1- A of 1979. The effect of the impugned judgment and decree is to order eviction of the appellant from the suit premises under Section 12 (l) (a) and (e) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2. ) THAT there exists the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties is not in dispute. The respondent by a notice dated 28-8-1978 (Ex. P-1) terminated the tenancy of the appellant w. e. f. midnight of 30 September, 1978, as he was alleged to be in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 420/- and also because the house had become dilapidated and unsafe for human habitation. The appellant sent a reply to this notice, Ex. P-3 and denied that there was any valid reason for terminating his tenancy. According to him, he had spent Rs. 800/- in annual repairs of the tenanted house, as per agreement which he was entitled to adjust in the rent. He also claimed another adjustment of Rs. 1,500/- spent by him in constructing a separate room with his consent. Since the parties did not agree, the respondent filed the present suit based on non-payment of arrears of rent, requirement of the house for re-construction, construction without permission is detrimental to the interest of the respondent and requirement of the suit premises for his elder married son. The appellant filed his written-statement and denied that he was in arrears of rent. He claimed adjustment as the annual repairs and the new construction was done with the consent of the respondent. He also denied that the suit premises was required for the residence of married son. He also denied that the premises were required bona fide for re-construction. It appears that during the pendency of the suit an application under Section 13 (6) was filed by the respondent praying for striking out his defence and an application under Section 13 (1) of the Act was filed on behalf of the appellant. He also denied that the premises were required bona fide for re-construction. It appears that during the pendency of the suit an application under Section 13 (6) was filed by the respondent praying for striking out his defence and an application under Section 13 (1) of the Act was filed on behalf of the appellant. The learned trial Judge by his order, dated 23-7-1979 held that the appellant, in compliance with the first part of Section 13 (1) of the Act had deposited arrears of rent within one month from the receipt of the summons. The learned Judge, however, noticed that the future rent was not regularly deposited but was deposited late. He, therefore, found that the appellant was responsible for technical breach of second part of Section 13 (1) of the Act. Since all rent had been paid, the Judge found no justification for striking off the defence. Under the circumstances, the trial Court refused to strike out the defence and found justification for late payment of future rent and condoned the same. Deciding the suit on merits, the learned Judge, held that there was no agreement for adjustment of expenditure incurred by the appellant on maintenance or new construction. The learned Judge therefore, held that the appellant was not entitled to any adjustment Learned Judge further held that the house was not required by the respondent bona fide for residential requirements for himself or for the members of his family. Learned Judge, however, found that a case for eviction existed under Section 12 (1 ) (m) of the Act as the house is in a dilapidated condition. A decree for eviction was, therefore, passed. The appellant preferred his first appeal challenging this decree. The respondent also preferred his cross-objection. The learned lower appellate Court, on appreciation of evidence held that the need for re-construction was not established. He, therefore, set aside the decree of the trial Court based on the aforesaid ground. The learned lower appellate Court, however, came to the conclusion that the appellant has not complied with the second part of Section 13 (1) of the Act and therefore has rendered liable under Section 12 (l) (a) of the Act. The learned Judge also held that the respondent has proved his bona fide requirement of the house. The learned lower appellate Court, however, came to the conclusion that the appellant has not complied with the second part of Section 13 (1) of the Act and therefore has rendered liable under Section 12 (l) (a) of the Act. The learned Judge also held that the respondent has proved his bona fide requirement of the house. Under the circumstances, the learned lower appellate court passed the decree for eviction under Section 12 (1) (a) and (e) of the Act. ( 3. ) AS far as Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act is concerned, it entitles the landlord to file a civil suit for eviction of the tenant, if the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the legally recoverable rent from him within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the prescribed manner. It has been held in Chimanlal v. Misrilal, 1985 MPLJ 1, that giving of valid notice is a pre-condition for maintainability of eviction suit under this provision. Once a suit has been filed, Section 13 (1) comes into operation/this provision is in two parts. The first part deals with payment or deposit of arrears of rent, which necessarily means arrears upto the date of the suit, within one month of the service summons on the tenant. The second part of this provision deals with payment or deposit of future rent month by month by the 15th of each succeeding month. There is no dispute that both parts of this provision are required to be complied with. There is also no dispute that first part of this provision had been complied with and entire arrears upto the date of the suit have been deposited within the prescribed time limit. There is also no dispute that the deposit of future rent has been delayed. Section 13 (6) of the Act provides for the penalty for breach of sub-section (1) and entitles the Court to strike off the defence of the tenant if he fails to deposit or pay any amount as required by this section. The words "any amount" used in Section 13 (6) of the Act sufficiently indicate that the Court is entitled to strike out the defence in all cases if either or both parts of Section 13 (1) of the Act are not complied. The words "any amount" used in Section 13 (6) of the Act sufficiently indicate that the Court is entitled to strike out the defence in all cases if either or both parts of Section 13 (1) of the Act are not complied. Section 12 (3) of the Act limits the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the final decree by providing that in case a tenant has paid or deposited the amount as required under Section 13 of the Act, no order of his eviction under Section 12 (1 ) (a) shall be passed. The question for consideration is whether Section 12 (3) of the Act relates to default in making payment of arrears of rent referred to in Section 12 (l) (a) of the Act which is the basis of the suit or it refers to future rent as well covered by Section 13 (1) of the Act. The learned lower appellate Court seems to be thinking that even if the arrears upto the date of the suit have been paid as per Section 13 (1) of the Act, a decree for eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears under Section 12 (l) (a) can be passed if future rent has not been paid. The learned lower appellate Court also seems to be thinking that there is no power in the trial Court to condone delay in making deposit or payment covered by second part of Section 13 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently supports this conclusion. In case the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent and the view taken by the lower appellate Court is accepted, it would mean that even in those cases where arrears have been paid within the time permitted by law, decree will have to be passed on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. It is difficult to hold that a decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent could be passed even when he has paid arrears in accordance with law. This is neither justice nor the characteristic of judicial process. Under the circumstances, such a conclusion has to be avoided as far as possible. It is difficult to hold that a decree for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent could be passed even when he has paid arrears in accordance with law. This is neither justice nor the characteristic of judicial process. Under the circumstances, such a conclusion has to be avoided as far as possible. The acceptance of the above view would also mean that even those cases where the Court does not consider the default in payment of future rent serious enough to visit the penalty of striking out defence, it will be required to pass a decree of eviction. If that be the intention of the legislature, why give discretion to the Court to strike off or not to strike off the defence of prolong litigative length ? If that was the intention, the provision would have required the court to not only strike off defence but also pass eviction decree without any thing more. This, again, would have been unfair and unjust. The intention behind every enactment is to promote justice and therefore every enactment has to be interpreted in a manner that promote justice. Then, it is not as if the provision is incapable of any other interpretation. If operation of Section 12 (3) of the Act is limited to payment of arrears covered by Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, there would be no difficulty in interpreting these provisions in a just and fair manner. In such a case a combined reading of Sections 12 (l) (a), 12 (3), 13 (1) and 13 (6) of the Act would mean that if a tenant deposits arrears of rent within the time limit prescribed by the first part of Section 13 (1), he earns the benefit of Section 12 (3) of the Act and will not be evicted on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent. In case, however, the tenant having earned the aforesaid benefit, defaults in making payment of future rent required by the second part of Section 13 (1), the matter would be wide and open for decision of the trial Court In case the trial Court feels that the default was unintentional and therefore, decides not to strike out the defence, the protection earned under Section 12 (3) of the Act continues. In case, however, the Court decides to strike out defence on the ground of non-payment of future rent, the suit, in law, will remain undefended and the benefit under Section 12 of the Act would then not be allowed to be pleaded or proved. This interpretation will not only balance the convenience of both the parties but also promote justice between them and must, therefore, be preferred. This view finds its full support from the judgments of the Supreme Court in Shyamcharan v. Dharamdas, AIR 1980 SC 587 , and Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath, AIR 1984 SC 1392 . Ram Murtis case was a case where the defence of the tenant had not been struck off for non-payment of future rent and the question was whether in spite of an order of not striking off defence on the aforesaid ground, a tenant will lose the benefit of Section 14 (2)of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 14 (1) (a) of the said Act is the same as Section 12 (1) (a) of our Act. Similarly, Section 14 (2) of Delhi Act is the same as Section 12 (3) of our Act. The Supreme Court held that it would be incongruous to hold that even if the defence of the tenant is not struck out, the tenant must still be visited with the punishment of being deprived of the protection. In this view of the matter the Supreme Court even held that their earlier decision in Hemchand v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. , AIR 1977 SC 1986 , was impliedly overruled. Under the circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the view taken by the lower appellate court that even when the trial court did not consider it fit and proper to strike out the defence of the appellant, the appellant could be deprived of the protection of Section 12 (3) of the Act. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the impugned decree under Section 12 (l) (a) of the Act. ( 4. ) THE impugned decree is, however, based on the bona fide requirement of the respondent covered under Section 12 (l) (e) of the Act also. The trial court has held that the said need was not proved. The learned lower appellate Court had, however, set aside the said finding. ( 4. ) THE impugned decree is, however, based on the bona fide requirement of the respondent covered under Section 12 (l) (e) of the Act also. The trial court has held that the said need was not proved. The learned lower appellate Court had, however, set aside the said finding. The main reason why the learned trial Judge has reached this conclusion is the absence of this ground in notice, Ex. P-1. The learned Judge had relied on the Supreme Court decision in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499 , and held that absence of this ground in the notice may justifiably lead one to conclude that either the need did not exist on the date of the notice or the notice did not contain this ground inadvertently. Since the learned trial Judge found nothing on record to hold it to be inadvertent omission, he held that the need did not exist on the date of the notice. Since the respondent did not show how the need arose thereafter, the learned trial Judge concluded that the need was neither real not bona fide. It is unfortunate that the learned lower appellate Court has said nothing about the aforesaid reasoning of the trial Judge and remained satisfied by observing that even the trial Judge felt that absence of this ground from the notice was not fatal. This part of the impugned judgment is nothing but a piece of perversity. A bare reading of the judgment of the trial Court does not lead to the conclusion that it is based on mere absence of this ground in Ex. P-l. Its fair reading would show that the learned trial Judge had properly appreciated the effect of this omission and had drawn the correct conclusion after appreciating the evidence in the background of this omission. Absence of this ground from the notice, Ex. P-1 is very material in the context of facts and circumstances of the case and therefore, it cannot be entirely overlooked. ( 5. ) IN spite of it, it may be examined if the finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court is legally sustainable. In para 6 of the plaint it is stated that his elder son is married and his family has grown in size and hence the present accommodation is insufficient. ( 5. ) IN spite of it, it may be examined if the finding recorded by the learned lower appellate Court is legally sustainable. In para 6 of the plaint it is stated that his elder son is married and his family has grown in size and hence the present accommodation is insufficient. This plea is really a half-hearted ple as it does not contain the other important averment viz. that the plaintiff has no other alternative accommodation of his own available for the purpose. Then, this para indicates that his son has separated from the family. In reply to this para it is alleged by the appellant in his written-statement that the son was married 7 or 8 years before and, therefore, the need could not be real and bona fide. In support of this plea, there is evidence of respondent Laxmandas (P. W. 1) who deposed that there are 11 members in his family and his elder son Nandlal is married and, wants to live alone. He does not say that Nandlal is living alone as alleged in the plaint. In cross-examination he admits that Nandlal was married 10 years before and was separate. He also admitted that Nandlal was only a partner in his business. Since Nandlal had separated and was only a partner, he cannot be treated to be a part of the family of the respondent and respondent would not be able to get the suit premises vacated for the need of Nandlal. Then Nandlal is married since last 10 years and is doing his independent business. Under the circumstances, he has to find out accommodation of his own to meet his residential requirement. The definition of the members of the family as given in Section 2 (e) of the Act includes a son living jointly and not separately. It is unfortunate that this part of the controversy has not been looked into. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the finding of bona fide requirements recorded by the lower appellate Court. ( 6. ) THE appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree arre hereby set aside and the suit filed by the respondent is dismissed. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.