BEHERA. J. ( 1 ) THIS is an unfortunate case of a husband killing his wife. For his conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the Codet J, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. He also stands convicted under section 201 of the Code and sentenced there under to undergo imprisonment for a period of three years with a direction that the sentence would run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE appellant is alleged to have killed his wife (hereinafter described as the deceased) on his way back from a weekly market where he had gone with her and in order to screen himself from legal punishment by causing evidence of commission of the offence of murder to disappear, buried the dead body of the deceased. Of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to substantiate the charges under sections 302 and 201 of the Code, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 who have spoken about an extra judicial confession made by the appellant and that of his son (P W. 3) who has spoken about the appellant leaving for the market with the deceased is important. On a consideration of the evidence, the learned trial Judge has accepted the case of the prosecution and has held both the charges to have been established. ( 3 ) UPON hearing the learned counsels for both the sides, we see no reason to take a view different from the one taken by the trial court for the reasons to follow. ( 4 ) NO motive has been established by the prosecution for the commission of the offence. Mysterious is the working of the human mind. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Nanak v. State of Uttar Pradpsh1l when a husband is alleged to have killed his wife, it may be difficult to know the exact motive in the circumstances of a given case. If the evidence against an accused is clear and cogent, true and trustworthy, the absence of motive becomes immaterial. Reference may be made in this connection to the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another2. If the evidence against an accused is clear and cogent, true and trustworthy, the absence of motive becomes immaterial. Reference may be made in this connection to the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah and another2. ( 5 ) THE evidence of the son of the appellant (P. W. 3) is that the appellant had left home for the weekly market with the deceased and he did not return home on that day and even on the day following where after P. W. 3 informed P. W. 1, the brother of the appellant. This finds support in the evidence of P. W. 1. P. Ws. 1 and 2 went in search of the appellant and his wife and not finding them, came back when they saw the appellant alone in the house without the deceased. All this would be clear from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3. ( 6 ) BOTH P. Ws. 1 and 2 have testified that when asked as to the whereabouts of the deceased, the appellant gave out that she was in the paddy field. P. Ws. 1 and 2 went to the paddy field and unsuccessfully searched for her. On return, they asked the appellant to speak the truth and the appellant gave out that he had killed his wife and had buried the dead body. He took them to a place where the dead body was buried, as stated by him. The place was guarded by some villagers and the appellant was brought and kept confined in a house and thereafter information was lodged at the police station. The police officer came to the scene and in the presence of an Executive Magistrate (P. W. 5) the dead body was disinterred and identified to be that of the deceased. The medical evidence conclusively establishes that her death was homicidal in nature. A saree recovered from the person of the deceased and a napkin seized on the spot when the dead body was brought out contained human blood, as found on chemical and serological test. These are telling circumstances appearing in the evidence against the appellant. The evidence of P. W. 1, who is no other person than the brother of the appellant and P. W. 2. his co-villager, is clear and trustworthy. These are telling circumstances appearing in the evidence against the appellant. The evidence of P. W. 1, who is no other person than the brother of the appellant and P. W. 2. his co-villager, is clear and trustworthy. There is no material discrepancy in their evidence with regard to the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant which bad been done voluntarily before persons in whom he could repose confidence. The appellant has, no doubt, retracted from the extra-judicial confession and therefore, as a rule of practice and prudence although not as a requirement of law, some general corroboration is necessary. ( 7 ) THE appellant had left home with the deceased. He came a day thereafter and made a false statement before P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the deceased was in the paddy field. The medical evidence would lend support to the case of the prosecution that the deceased had been done to death by assault on her person. The internal injuries, according to the doctor, were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. At the trial, the appellant held not stuck to his statement made before P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the deceased was in the paddy field. He had, on the other hand, stated at the trial that while he and the deceased were returning home and the deceased had money with her and was going ahead, some one killed her. There is nothing on I record to show that when the appellant was first asked as to the whereabouts of the deceased, he had made any such statement. No doubt, the prosecution has to establish its case by its evidence which cannot be built up merely on some weaknesses of the defence and it would be open to an accused to take alternative pleas. A false plea or false defence would not lead one to a conclusion of the guilt of an accused. But if there is other evidence as in the instant case, pointing to the guilt of the accused, a false plea or a false defence would be an additional link and would lend further assurance to the evidence on which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be rested. But if there is other evidence as in the instant case, pointing to the guilt of the accused, a false plea or a false defence would be an additional link and would lend further assurance to the evidence on which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be rested. The presence of some injuries on the person of the appellant, as testified by D. W. 1, would not affect the bona fides of the prosecution or the story put forward by it. ( 8 ) THERE is thus the extra judicial confession of the appellant, which is direct evidence of his guilt. See K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra3. Besides, there are some items of circumstantial evidence referred to above which amply corroborate the retracted extra judicial confession. ( 9 ) THERE can thus be no doubt that the appellant had assaulted the deceased to death and had buried the dead body to cause the evidence of commission of the offence of murder to disappear and in order to screen himself from legal punishment. ( 10 ) MRS. Padhi has contended that the offence committed by the appellant, in case of acceptance of the case of the prosecution, would be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We see no force in this contention. Internal injuries on vital parts had been noticed on the bead, pleura and liver. According to the doctor, two of the injuries noticed by him were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. The injuries could be caused by hard and blunt object, as opined by him. ( 11 ) REGARD being had to the nature of the injuries and the seats of assault, it would be legal, reasonable and proper to conclude that the appellant had the intention of causing the death of the deceased and had, with that intention, caused injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. ( 12 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, we find that the order of conviction recorded against the appellant in respect of both the charges is well-founded. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .