JUDGMENT : H.H. Kantharia, J.—The petitioner joined the services of the first respondent as the Stores Delivery Clerk on 1st December, 1973. His services came to be terminated by a letter dated 31st December, 1981. The relevant portion of the letter of termination reads as under: "We regret to inform you that we are not interested in your services with us and have decided to terminate the services with effect from 31.12.1981. Your terminal dues may please be collected during office hours on any working day." On 1st January, 1982, the Union raised a demand on behalf of the petitioner for his reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. Conciliation proceedings were taken up but as the matter could not be settled, a failure report was submitted by the Conciliation Officer u/s 12(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). Thereafter a reference was made to the industrial Tribunal, Bombay (second respondent) for adjudication of the said dispute. 2. In the Statement of Claim, the case of the petitioner was that he was victimised for his trade union, activates as a result of which his services were terminated in a colourable exercise of management powers on false and concocted grounds. He also contended that, in any event, as per the letter of termination, it was a simple discharge which amounted to retrenchment and since the provisions of Section 25F of the Act were not satisfied the retrenchment was invalid. 3. The case of the first respondent as per the Written Statement was that the services of the petitioner were terminated by way of discharge simpliciter. It was also contended on his behalf that the petitioner was doing an executive job and, therefore, was not a "workman" as defined u/s 2(s) of the Act. A contention was also raised that in view of the closure of the establishment of the first respondent the Reference was not maintainable in law. 4. On considering the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced before him, the second respondent-Tribunal by his award dated 9th February, 1984 rejected the demand of the petitioner which has been impugned in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing on both sides, I went through the evidence on record and the impugned award passed by the second respondent. 5. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing on both sides, I went through the evidence on record and the impugned award passed by the second respondent. It is painful to note that the reasoning of the second respondent for making the impugned award is far from satisfactory and is difficult to comprehend. The only consistent finding given by him is that the petitioner was a "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. After coming to such a conclusion the second respondent proceeded to deal with the matter on merits and came to the conclusion that this was not the case of victimisation but a clear case of loss of confidence, because the petitioner delivered certain goods to wrong parties. Now, if the petitioner was sought to be punished on account of his misconduct in as much as he delivered certain goods to wrong parties, it was incumbent upon the first respondent to have held a domestic enquiry against him. But that was not done and surprisingly the second respondent held that although this was clearly a case of punitive discharge and not a discharge simpliciter it could not be set aside merely because the punitive discharge was not preceded by a charge sheet and a domestic enquiry. It is difficult to appreciate an observation of the second respondent that even though the order of discharge is punitive, the fact remains that the employer was justified in taking recourse to discharge simpliciter instead of charge-sheeting the workman and discharging him by way of punishment and that therefore the workman cannot be allowed to contend that his discharge should be set aside merely because it was punitive and the procedure of holding enquiry was not followed'. 6. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner before the second respondent that since there was no compliance with the provision of Section 25F of the Act, the order of discharge may be set aside as illegal. The second respondent dealt with the evidence adduced on behalf of the first respondent and came to the conclusion that he was unable to believe the first respondent's witness Bhaskaran that he had offered cash amount to the petitioner at the time he was giving the letter of termination. The second respondent dealt with the evidence adduced on behalf of the first respondent and came to the conclusion that he was unable to believe the first respondent's witness Bhaskaran that he had offered cash amount to the petitioner at the time he was giving the letter of termination. And in the same breath the second respondent further observed that 'it was, however, a fact that the workman had accepted termination letter but refused to sign on office copy and therefore it would appear that even if the workman was offered the amount he would have refused to accept the same'. The second respondent thereafter held that the letter of discharge, no doubt, indicated that this is a case of retrenchment but he would hold that this is a case of loss of confidence for violating the instructions of the employer which was an act of misconduct for which the employer could discharge the workman by way of punishment after holding a domestic enquiry but in his view the action of the first respondent was bona-fide and was not actuated by unfair labour practice, the demand of the petitioner should be rejected. 7. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend the reasoning and the finding of the second respondent in passing the impugned award. If this was the case of punitive action, the petitioner's services could not have been terminated without holding a domestic enquiry against him and if charges were proved, it was incumbent upon the second respondent to find out whether the punishment was proportionate to the charges proved. And if this was a case of discharge simpliciter, since the provision of Section 25F of the Act were not complied with, the retrenchment was illegal and the petitioner in that event was entitled to the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. In either case, the petitioner was entitled to the relief of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. However, his just and rightful claim was unfortunately rejected. 8. The matter does not rest here. It was contended on behalf of the first respondent that the establishment was closed. In view of the finding that the petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement, as above, the second respondent was of the view that it was not necessary to go into the disputed question of closure of the establishment. 8. The matter does not rest here. It was contended on behalf of the first respondent that the establishment was closed. In view of the finding that the petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement, as above, the second respondent was of the view that it was not necessary to go into the disputed question of closure of the establishment. But surprisingly he proceeded to enquire into that aspect of the matter and dealt with the evidence of the petitioner who deposed that the factory of the first respondent was still working whereas on behalf of the first respondent his witness Bhaskaran deposed that the manufacturing activities had come to an end from 19th April, 1982. The second respondent preferred the evidence of Bhaskaran to that of the petitioner for the reasons best known to him. He observed against the petitioner, that if the manufacturing activates were still going on the petitioner would not have failed to adduce evidence by calling the watchman or any other ex-workman of the first respondent to prove that fact. Some documentary evidence that was adduced by the petitioner to show that the establishment of the first respondent was still working was brushed aside on the ground that there was no reason to disbelieve the evidence of Bhaskaran. 9. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the impugned award passed by the second respondent suffers from many errors apparent on the face of the record. In the result, the said award dated 9th February, 1984 in Reference (IT) No. 121 of 1982, is quashed and set aside. The same is substituted by a direction to the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner in his original post with continuity of service and full back wages from 31st December, 1981. The petitioner shall be reinstated in his services from 2nd November, 1987, and all his backwages shall be paid to him alongwith his salary for the month of November 1987 on 1st December 1987, failing which the first respondent shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the amount of back wages effective from 1st December, 1987. 10. Rule is made absolute in the terms aforesaid but, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.