JUDGMENT U.C. Srivastava, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order passed by the Labour Court allowing the application under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, filed by opposite party No. 2, the employee against the petitioner-employer computing the claim opposite party No. 2 to the tune of Rs. 2500. Admittedly the opposite party No. 2 was an employee of the petitioner and in the writ petition it has also been admitted that he along with other workmen was laid-off by the petitioner, but the averments in the writ petition are that this lay-off was caused because of short supply of electricity which was notified by the State Government and there was power tripping in the years 1977, 78 and 79. The opposite party No. 2 approached the Labour Court claiming consolidated wages for 60 days during which period he was illegally laid off by the petitioner to the tune of Rs. 2500. The employer earlier challenger' the claim of opposite party No. 2 on the technical ground that his fathers name was not mentioned ex, It appears that the claim of the employee was resisted by the employer and by means of an application it was contended that he was never laid-off in the years 1977 and 1978 and his claim for the said period was false and he was legally laid-off because of 33% power cut from August, 1979 to 1981. 2. On the application made by the workman, opposite party No. 2, the Labour Court summoned the lay-off attendance register for the relevant years and a joint inspection report was filed by both the parties before the Labour Court from which it was obvious from the own documents of the employer that in 1979-1981 the workman was laid off for 4 days and 65 days and from the said document it appears that the workman was laid off for 69 days. His claim was confined to 63 days only. On behalf of the employer before the Labour Court and in this Court also it was contended that as the'.employee came forward with the allegation that he was illegally laid off, there appears to be no dispute that no permission of the Labour Court was sought before the employee concerned was laid off. On behalf of the employer before the Labour Court and in this Court also it was contended that as the'.employee came forward with the allegation that he was illegally laid off, there appears to be no dispute that no permission of the Labour Court was sought before the employee concerned was laid off. The employer's witness R.P. Srivastava who appeared before the Labour Court admitted that the number of workman during the relevant period was not less than 500 and he further stated that the lay-off was on account of power break down work-load and shading of machines and there was no record to show that there was power break-down. He even went to the extent in saying that he was unable to state whether during the relevant period there was to fact power break-down at all. The question of fact decided by the Labour Court on the basis of the statement given by the said witness has not been challenged in this writ petition. The plea which has been raised is that according to the workman also he was illegally laid-off. It was beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to decide the illegality of the lay-off on an application under Section 33-G (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and further under Section 25-M (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the lay-off being because of shortage of power it was lay-off within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, defines the lay-off as follows : "Lay off" (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions') means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the break-down of machinery (or natural calamity or for any other connected reason) to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched. Explanation ......." Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act provides for prohibition of lay-off. Explanation ......." Section 25-M of the Industrial Disputes Act provides for prohibition of lay-off. It provides as under : "25-M. Prohibition of lay off - (1) No workman (other than a badli workman or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the muster rolls of an Industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall be laid off by his employer except (with the prior permission of the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereinafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) obtained on an application made in this behalf unless such lay-off is also due to shortage of power or to natural calamity, and in the case of a mine such lay-off is also due to fire, flood, excess of inflammable gas or explosion)." On behalf of the employer it was contended that lay-off was due to shortage of power, but this stand of the employer was contradicted by its own witness and the labour court was recorded a finding which is based on appreciation of evidence. As such the contention raised by the employer is without substance. 3. Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act deals with the recovery of money due from an employer. It reads as under : "(1)............. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government (within a period not . exceeding three months) : Provided that where the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit." The scope of Section 33-C (2) is wider than Section 33-C (1). Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Section 33-C (2) of the Act the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is limited and it could only compute that benefit which could be done in terms of money and beyond that it has no power. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Section 33-C (2) of the Act the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is limited and it could only compute that benefit which could be done in terms of money and beyond that it has no power. It cannot decide the legality or illegality of any action on which the computation had been made. In support of his case learned counsel made reference to the following cases : In the case of East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and others, AIR 1986 SC 205, it was held that Section 33-C (2) is a provision in the nature of executing provision. Section 33-C (2) will he applicable even to such cases in which claim is disputed the employer and it is open to interpret the award or settlement on which the workman's right, rests and this section is not limited to the award only, settlement or Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act under which claim can be entertained under Section 33-C (1). That case does not support the contention of the petitioner's as in the said case it was held that an award or settlement can be interpreted and die Tribunal can enter into the question whether the award is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel then made reference to the case of The Swatram Ram Prasad Mills Co, Ltd, v. Baliram Ukandaji and another, AIR 1966 SC 616 . It was a case under Section 33-C (1). In the said case it was held that "it is not essential that the claim which can be brought before the Government or its delegate under Section 33-C (1) must always be for a predetermined sum. The Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then take action under that section. Where in a case the dates of lay-off, are known each workman will show to the Labour Court that he is entitled to compensation for lay-off, that will be shown from the muster roll which the employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple arithmetical calculation which Section 33-C permits to be made. If there is any question whether there was lay-off or not the Labour Court will decide it." The observation does not support the contention of the petitioner. If there is any question whether there was lay-off or not the Labour Court will decide it." The observation does not support the contention of the petitioner. Learned counsel then made reference to the case of Punjab Brewerages v. Suresh Chand, AIR 1978 SC 995 . In the said case it was held that the contravention of Section 33 does not render the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative. The only remedy available to the workman for challenging the order of discharge or dismissal is that provided under Section 33-A. Apart of course from the remedy under Section 10, and he cannot maintain an application under Section 33-C (2) for determination and payment of wages on the basis that he continues to be in service. The workman can proceed under Section 33-C (2) only after the Tribunal had adjudicated, on a complaint under Section 33-A or on reference under Section 10, that the order of discharge or dismissed passed by the employer was not justified and has set aside that order and re-instead the workman. The said case has got no applicability to the instant case, but some of the observations made in this case would rather go against the petitioner as in the the said case it has been laid down that the benefit to be computed must be of existing one and arises out of relationship between the employer and employee. In New Taj Company v. Labour Court, 1972 (2) LLJ 51, it was held that if the money or benefit is claimed by a workman on the basis that the right already existed and the existence of that right is denied, it is competent for the Labour Court in proceedings under Section 33-C (2) to decide whether the right does or does not exist. It was held that the Labour Court was competent to arrive at the finding that the suspension of live workmen did not extinguish their right to receive their wages for the period of suspension because of the condition of service and thereafter compute the amount claimed by them. It was held that the Labour Court was competent to arrive at the finding that the suspension of live workmen did not extinguish their right to receive their wages for the period of suspension because of the condition of service and thereafter compute the amount claimed by them. In Bansilal Abirchand Mills Company Private Limited v. Labour Court, AIR 1972 SC 451 , it was held that the claim of compensation of every workman who is laid off is one which arises under the Statute itself and Section 25-E provides for benefit to a workman which is capable of being computed in terms of money under Section 33-C of the Act. The Scheme of the Act being to enable a workman to approach the Labour Court for computation of compensation claimed by him in terms of Section 25-C of the Act, he is not concerned whether other workmen will or will not adopt the same course. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. The Workmen and another, it was held that Section 33-C(2) does not involve a right of plaintiff s relief and the corresponding liability of the defendant including whether the defendant is at all, liable or not and the court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudication. The workman cannot put forward the claim in an application under Section 33-C (2) in respect of a matter not based on an existing right. In the said case it was held that the Labour Court has not to circumspect before it takes investigation of computation or benefit under an existing right. In the case of The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co., of India (P) Ltd. v. The Fire Stone Lyres and Rubber Company, AIR 1976 SC 1775 , it was held that under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act the money due has got to be quantified if the lay-off could be held to be in accordance with the terms of the contract of service and no compensation at all could be allowed under Section 33-C (2) of the Act, while in the reference some compensation could be allowed. Where the respondent company had no power to layoff any workman, there is no escape from the position that the entire sum payable of the laid-off workmen except the workmen who have settled or compromised, has got to be computed and quantified under Section 33-C (2) of the Act for the period of the lay-off 4. In the instant case so far as lay-off is concerned position is quite clear. From the admission made on behalf of the employer it is clear that the lay-off was caused not because of power shortage but on account of power break-down and the lay-off caused because of break-down will not deprive a workman of his wages. In such event it will not be a question of jurisdiction, as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner, The Labour Court was within its jurisdiction on the basis of the facts as were before it including admission as to make computation and such a computations are covered by Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. So far as amount is concerned no dispute has been raised that there is any mistake in calculation or computation. 5. In view of what has been said above, the writ petition has got no force and the same is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.