Judgment :- 1. A copy of the original petition is served on the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. I have heard both sides. 2. The petitioner is a co-operative society registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, for short'the Act'. The present Managing Committee of the society was elected on 12-8-1984 and assumed office on 19-8-1984. The Managing Committee on 17-6-1987 passed a resolution fixing 16-8-1987 as the date of election of the succeeding Managing Committee and forwarded a copy of the resolution to the first respondent by registered post. On 27-6-1987 resolution was returned with a request to submit it through proper channel, viz., the second respondent. According to the petitioner, second respondent has already taken a decision to supersede the Managing Committee and appoint an Administrator in its piece on the ground that the term of office of the committee expired on 30-6-1987 and that the Managing Committee had cot taken steps sufficiently early for the conduct of election of the new Managing Committee. Petitioner would contend that the term of office of the present committee will expire only on 18-8-1987; alternatively petitioner has a contention that term of office would expire only on 30-6-1988. Hence the society has filed this original petition seeking writ of certiorari quashing all proceedings initiated by the first respondent for taking over the management of the society and seeking declaration that the present Managing Committee is entitled to continue in office till the expiry of the three year period. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that bye-law Nos. 33 and 35 provide three years from the date of taking charge as term of office of the elected Managing Committee and therefore the committee has life till 18-8-1988. Alternatively it is contended that if the later part of R.39 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, for short 'the Rules' is applied, term of office will end only on 30-6-1988 and not on 30-6-1987. It is further contended that in any view of the case since the Managing Committee has taken steps sufficiently early to constitute the new committee the term of office should be extended by the Registrar under R.39(2) of the Rules. 3. It is further contended that in any view of the case since the Managing Committee has taken steps sufficiently early to constitute the new committee the term of office should be extended by the Registrar under R.39(2) of the Rules. 3. Learned Government Pleader would contend that the bye-law does not specify the date on which elected Managing Committee should vacate office and in any event the date specified is not 'same date' and therefore second part of R.39 would be attracted in the instant case. It is further contended that the year contemplated in the bye-laws and the Rules is the year beginning from First July and ending with Thirtieth of June and the third year on such computation would end on 30-6-1987 and the appointment of the Administrator is justified. That being so, it is contended, the Managing Committee did not take steps sufficiently early to enable the new Managing Committee to take over and the Registrar should not be compelled to extend the term of office under R.39(2) of the Rules. Learned Government Pleader also submitted that the decision in Sadanandan v. Joint Registrar (1985 KLT 136) and the decision in OP. No. 5251 of 1987 (1987 (2) KLT 179) are not fully consistent with each other. Learned counsel appearing on both sides also refer to the decisions in OP. No. 1349/60, OP No. 2523/67 and in Hydrose v. Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (1971 KLT 753). 4. S.28 of the Act deals with the appointment of committee. Sub-s. (1) states that the general body of the society shall constitute a committee in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. R.35 lays down the procedure regarding conduct of election to the committee of the societies. Sub-rule (3) (a) requires that the result of the elections shall also be recorded in the minutes book of the society and attested by the Returning Officer and shall also be notified immediately on the notice board of the society. The members so elected shall be deemed to have been elected by the general body of the society for the purpose of S.29(b) of the Act. R.38 deals with constitution of the committee and other matters. When a committee is constituted under S.28, it shall elect its President and other office bearers within one week from the date of its constitution. R.38 deals with constitution of the committee and other matters. When a committee is constituted under S.28, it shall elect its President and other office bearers within one week from the date of its constitution. It shall also by a resolution authorise the officers to take charge from the outgoing office beams. A report showing the names and addresses of the members of the committee which has taken charge and the date on which they took charge shall be sent to the Registrar and other authorities referred to in sub-rule (2) within a week of their taking charge. R.39 deals with election and term of the members of the committees. 5. R.39 reads thus: "39. Election and term of the members of committees (1) The bye-laws of every society shall provide that the term of its committee shall expire on the same date as may be specified. All the members of the committee (including those elected in casual vacancies) whether representing societies or individuals shall vacate their office on the date specified irrespective of the date on which they were elected as members of the committee. If no such date is specified in the bye-laws the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. (2) The election of all the members of the committee referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be held on or before the expiry of the term of office of the committee members, if for any reason, election is not held, the Registrar may extend the term until such time within which the election should in his opinion, be held" 6. Sub-rule (1) of R.39 is in three parts. According to the first part, the bye-law shall provide that the term of its committee shall expire on the same date as may be specified. Second part states that all the members of the committee shall vacate their office on the date specified irrespective of the date on which they were elected as members of the committee. Third part states that if no such date is specified in the bye-laws the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. Third part states that if no such date is specified in the bye-laws the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. Sub-rule (2) requires election to be held on or before the expiry of the term of office of the committee members and if for any reason election is not held the Registrar may extend the term until such time within which the election should in his opinion be held. 7. Thus the Rules have left it to the societies in their bye-laws to indicate the date on which the term of committee shall expire. If the bye-laws so indicate, the committee members shall vacate their office on the specified date. If no such date is specified in the bye-laws, the term shall expire on the 30th of June of the year in which the term expires. The controversy in this case centres round the exact connotation of the words 'the same date as may be specified and '30th of June of that year in which the term expires'. 8. The decision in Sadanandan's case (1985 KLT 136) and in O.P. No. 5251 of 1987 (1987 (2) KLT 179) refer to specification of date in the byelaws. The bye-laws dealt with in Sadanandan's case stated that the term of office of the committee shall be three years from the date of its election. In Para.10 of the reported judgment it is stated that the bye-laws do not specify the dale on which the term shall expire. It is pointed out that such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of art assumption without further consideration. In O P. No. 5251 of 1987 (1987 (2) KLT 179) I had occassion to consider the matter in the case of similar bye-laws. Indicating that 'to specify' means 'to mention, speak of or name definitely or explicitly; to set down or state categorically or particularly and the adjective 'specific' is explained as 'precise definite, explicit exactly named or indicated, or capable of being so'. I took the view that when the bye-laws stated that the term of office shall be three years from the date of assumption of office there is a specification of the date on which the term of office expires. 8A. Apparently the significance of the words 'same date' in the first part of R.39(1) was not noted in that decision. I took the view that when the bye-laws stated that the term of office shall be three years from the date of assumption of office there is a specification of the date on which the term of office expires. 8A. Apparently the significance of the words 'same date' in the first part of R.39(1) was not noted in that decision. The first part of sub-rule (1) of R.39 states that the term of the committee shall expire on the 'same date as may be specified', and not that term shall expire on such date as may be specified. According to Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, New Edition, the word 'same' means 'identical, not different, unchanged, unvaried'. This would mean that the date which is to be specified in the bye-laws should be unchanging or unvarying date. It the bye-laws state that the term of office shall be three years from the date of assumption of office, that may amount, as indicated in the judgment in OP No. 5251/87, (1987 (2) KLT 179) to specification of date; but that will not amount to specification of the same date. It is open to the society to mention in the bye-laws that the term of office of the committee shall be till a particular date. This is constant in regard to all committees, such as 31st December or 31st March or 30th June and so on. I find that in the bye-laws considered in OP No. 2523 of 1967 there is a specific provision that the period of office shall end with 30th of June and that the committee shall vacate office on 30th of June of the year in which the term expires. That would amount to specification of same date in the bye-laws. These aspects were not brought to the notice of the court in OP No 5251 of 1987 (1987 (2) KLT 179). As I have already pointed out, the judgment in OP No. 5251 of 1987 (1987 (2) KLT 179) did not take into consideration the significance of the words 'same date' found in the first part of R.39(1) of the Rules. On an anxious and careful consideration of all aspects I am inclined to hold that first and second parts of R.39(1) will be attracted where byelaws provide same date as may be specified, that is, a constant, unvarying date which may be specified. On an anxious and careful consideration of all aspects I am inclined to hold that first and second parts of R.39(1) will be attracted where byelaws provide same date as may be specified, that is, a constant, unvarying date which may be specified. When what is specified is not constant and unvarying date, part two of R.39(1) will not be attracted; on the other band it is part three which would be attracted. According to part three, date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. If the bye-laws do not prescribe a constant and unvarying date as the date on which the term of the committee expires, but merely indicate that the term shall be particular number of years from the date of election or from the date of assumption of charge or from any other variable date, second part of R.39(1) of the Rules will not be attracted; in such cases it is the third part of the R.39(1) of the Rules which applies. 9. In such a case it must follow that the term of office of the Managing Committee expires on the 30th of June of 'that year in which the term expires." There is a serious controversy at the bar as to the meaning of the words 'that year in which the term expires.' Year may be calendar year or year as defined in S.2(u) of the Act, i.e., co-operative year or it may just indicate the second year or third year depending on the term fixed in the bye-laws. 10. In the common judgment in OP No. 1349/60 and 767/61 this court bad to deal with the case of a Managing Committee elected on 27-4-1959. Bye-laws prescribed the term as two years and further provided that the year shall begin from First of July and end with 30th of June and the Committee shall vacate office on the 30th of June of the year in which the term of office expires. This court held that year connotes the year from 1st of July to 30th of June and not according to the calendar and that the more reasonable interpretation is to relate the assumption of office to the year so defined in which assumption takes place and not to the year as defined which succeeds. This court held that year connotes the year from 1st of July to 30th of June and not according to the calendar and that the more reasonable interpretation is to relate the assumption of office to the year so defined in which assumption takes place and not to the year as defined which succeeds. Accordingly it was held that the term of office commenced as 1-7-1958 and ended on 30-6-1959. 11. Similar question arose for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in OP No. 2523/67. The bye-law in that case stated that the period of office shall commence from 1st of July and end with 30th of June irrespective of the date of election or assumption of office and the committee shall vacate office on the 30th of June of the year in which the term expires. The court held that since the election in that case was held in October, 1964 and the new committee assumed office in November, 1964, i. e., in the middle of the year 1964-65, that is, the period from 1-7-1964 to 30-6-1965, the term of office will have to be reckoned from Ist July of the year 1964-65, i. e.,1-7-1964, and the term must expire on 30-6-1967. 12. In Hydrose v. Dy. Registrar of Co-op. Societies (1971 KLT 753) this court had occasion to consider a similar question. The Managing Committee took office on 31-1-1969. The bye-laws provided two years as term of office. The question arose whether the term expired on 30-6-1970 or 30-6-1971? Following the decision of the Division Bench in OP No. 2523/67, Eradi, J., as he then was, held that the term expired on 30-6-1970 invoking the definition of the year in S.2(u) of the Act. 13. A similar question came up for consideration before me in Sadanandan's case. The election was on 30-12-1981. The bye-laws provided term of three years from the date of election. I held that by virtue of R.39 the date of expiry shall be 30th of June 1984. 14. The third part of R.39(1) states that the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. The election was on 30-12-1981. The bye-laws provided term of three years from the date of election. I held that by virtue of R.39 the date of expiry shall be 30th of June 1984. 14. The third part of R.39(1) states that the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. Year has been defined in S.2(u) of the Act as follows: "Year means the period commencing on the first day of July of any year and ending with 30th of Jane of the succeeding year or in the case of any registered society or class of registered societies, the accounts of which are made upto any other dale with the previous sanction of the Registrar, the year ending with such date." Later part of the definition has no relevance in this case. Year therefore would mean the period commencing on the first day of July of any year and ending with 30th of June of the succeeding year. This can be called 'cooperative year' as distinct from calendar year. Third part of R.39(1) refers to the date of expiry as 30th June. It is therefore clear that the year referred to is co-operative year which expires on the 30th of June. The term of office has to be reckoned on this basis. So also the commencement of the term and the end of the term. If the commencement of the term falls in a particular co-operative year, that year shall be regarded as first year of the term and on that basis the last year of the term has to be reckoned and the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of such last year. This view is consistent with the earlier decisions of this court referred to above. 14. The election in this case took place on 12-8-1984. The date of assumption of office is 19-8-1984. The bye-laws provide term of office as three years from the date of assumption of office. Thus the commencement of the term of office fell within the co-operative year 1984-85, i.e., 1-7-1984 to 30-6-1985, that is the first year of its office and the third year of its office shall be from 1-7-1986 to 30-6-1987. The term would naturally expire on the last of the date of the year, 30-6-1987. 15. Thus the commencement of the term of office fell within the co-operative year 1984-85, i.e., 1-7-1984 to 30-6-1985, that is the first year of its office and the third year of its office shall be from 1-7-1986 to 30-6-1987. The term would naturally expire on the last of the date of the year, 30-6-1987. 15. That being so, the committee should have taken steps sufficiently early for holding election so as to enable the new committee to take charge on 1-7-1987. The committee failed to do so. Since the life of the committee ceased on 30-6-1987, there is nothing objectionable in the appointment of an Administrator to look after the affairs of the society till election is held and the new committee takes charge. Of course it is open to the Registrar to extend the term of the committee. That is a matter of discretion. This court will net ordinarily compel the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think any ground is made out to issue any direction in regard to the exercise of the discretion. 16. In the result, the original petition is dismissed.