JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---This is a proceeding peccadillos by the unfortunate stubbornness and callousness on the part of such a prestigious University as a University. 2. The appellant was 17 years of age on 31-12-1985 and hence was eligible for appearing for the 1st year B.H.M. S. (Bachelor of Homeopathic Medicine Surgery) Course Examination. Partly on account of negligence and partly on account of absence of astuteness on the part of her parents, her birth-date in the School Register was shown to be 1st June, 1969. The result was that she appeared to be less than 17 years on 13-12-1985 and, as such, ineligible for appearing for the particular examination. She tried to satisfy the University that the birth-date mentioned in the School Register was a mistake. The University Authorities refused to be satisfied. She filed a suit for vindication of her contention. The Courts are satisfied that her birth-date was wrongly mentioned in the School Register and that the true date of her birth was 8th August, 1968, which meant that she had completed 17 years on 31-12-1985 and was, as such, eligible for appearing for the particular examination so far as the rule relating to age was concerned. But in spite of this finding, both the University as well as the Courts refused to pardon her for the peccadillos of her parents, causing and insisting to cause her life long damage to her career. For doing so, some set of University Rules are sought to be relied upon. But nothing is brought to the notice of the Court which makes the Rule, if any, so rigid that such damage of the young student could not be obviated. The University Authorities have persisted with this attitude in the lower Court, have persuaded the lower Courts to ignore the justice of the case and, what is worse, have persisted with the stubbornness even in this Court, knowing full well that the fact that the student was eligible for appearing for the Examination, agewise, is a concurrent fact recorded by both the Courts below. While saying so, I do not wish to criticise their learned Counsel Shri Bhimrao Naik, who has argued the case with great fairness and aplomb befitting a Counsel of this Court. This is the bird's eye-view in respect of the factual position. While saying so, I do not wish to criticise their learned Counsel Shri Bhimrao Naik, who has argued the case with great fairness and aplomb befitting a Counsel of this Court. This is the bird's eye-view in respect of the factual position. However, since I am disagreeing with the final view taken by both the Courts below and I am allowing the appeal not without some pungent strictures both against the Courts below as well as against the University Authorities, it is necessary to set out the facts with more details. 3. The appellant (who will be referred to hereafter as the "plaintiff") was a student of Homeopathis Medical College, Kolhapur. A concurrent finding is recorded by both the Courts below that her date of birth was 8th August 1968. Mr. Bhimrao Naik, appearing for contesting respondents, who has as stated above argued the appeal with great fairness in a manner becoming of a Counsel appearing for such Public Bodies, did not dispute the binding character of those findings in the Second Appeal. I will, Therefore, henceforward, proceed upon the basis that the Appellant was born on the said date, 8th August, 1968. She had passed her 10th Standard Examination as well as the 12th Standard Examination. But the Certificate which the S.S.C. Board issued to her after passing both the Examinations showed her birthdate to be 1st June, 1969. I may state at this stage itself that this was a mistake which had crept into the School record on account of no fault on the part of the School Authorities. If at all any person was to be blamed in that behalf, it was the plaintiff's father, who made no attempt to correct the School Record by furnishing the correct date of the plaintiff's birth to the School Authorities. The trial Court has blamed eve the plaintiff's mother on that account. It may or may not be right on that point. But the point is that nothing is brought on record in any manner whatsoever that the innocent girl, the plaintiff, was in any way to be blamed on that account. After passing her 12th Standard Examination, the plaintiff applied for the admission for B.H.M. S. (Degree) Course. The application Form filed in by her is at Exhibit 71. In that application Form, she had mentioned her birth date of to be 1st June, 1969. After passing her 12th Standard Examination, the plaintiff applied for the admission for B.H.M. S. (Degree) Course. The application Form filed in by her is at Exhibit 71. In that application Form, she had mentioned her birth date of to be 1st June, 1969. There is no dispute before me that as per the rules of the University, a student is not allowed to appear for the 1st Year Examination of that Course unless he or she has completed 17 years of age. I must hasten to add that the rule as such was not produced before me; nor do I find that either of the Courts below have examined the Rule as such. The existence of the Rule is a matter more of assumption and concession. I do not even know, whether after full examination of the Rule, it cannot be said that the Rule is elastic enough to facilitate the student such as the plaintiff to appear for the particular Examination. But since that was the matter of concession in both the Courts below, I will proceed upon the assumption that the Rule in question is an elastic Rule operating as an unsurmountable stone-wall against the plaintiff if she was below 17 years of age on 31-12-1985. The College Authorities were aware of this. But even then they have provisional admission to the plaintiff for the 1st year Course. However, when the question of allowing her to appear for the 1st year Examination Course arose, the plaintiff was required by the College Authorities to apply to the University and to obtain an Eligible Certificate from the University with a view to appear for the Examination. This fact suggests that atleast the College Authorities did not regard in question to be an inflexible rule. However, in view of the implied concession on the part of the Advocate for the plaintiff appearing in the lower Court, I need not say anything further on this point. Point is that the plaintiff accordingly applied to the University for the Eligibility Certificate mentioning in the application her date of birth to be 1st June, 1969. The University Authorities refused to find their way to give to her the Eligibility Certificate and for that purpose they put their finger upon some Rule which, according to them, dis-entitled her from getting any such certificate. The University Authorities refused to find their way to give to her the Eligibility Certificate and for that purpose they put their finger upon some Rule which, according to them, dis-entitled her from getting any such certificate. This meant that even though the plaintiff had filled in the Terms and had attended the Course for the entire 1st year, she would not be allowed to appear for the examination. This might perhaps also mean that the entire year spent by her studying for the 1st year course would be deemed to have been wasted requiring her to attend the College and filling in the Terms all over again for the 1st year. When the plaintiff's father learnt about this position, he rushed to the Village Panchayat who had maintained the Birth Register and which Birth Register showed that the plaintiff was not born on 1st June, 1969 but almost 10 months earlier, on 8th August, 1968. He secured the Village Panchayat Certificate and the plaintiff thereafter produced the Certificate to the University requesting them to reconsider their refusal to grant the Eligibility Certificate. In the Certificate, the plaintiff's name was shown to be Vandana, whereas her name shown in the School and College Record was Aparna. She explained that the two persons, Aparna and Vandana, were the same individual and that Vandana's name was shown in the School College Record was Aparna. She explained that the two persons, Aparna Vandana, were the same individual and that Vandana's name was shown in the School register to be Aparna. It is a finding recorded by both the Courts below that Vandana is none other than the plaintiff Aparna. The plaintiff's parents have got only one daughter and the Birth Certificate itself shows that Vandana was the daughter of the plaintiff's parents. All this was a matter of some little application of mind on the part of the authorities. But nobody had time or inclination to commission into service any such application of mind. It meant saving or ruining the young student's career. But the University Authorities evidently had no time for such "unimportant" things. Finding that the University had chosen to be stubborn, the plaintiff was advised to file a suit for declaration of her birth date to be 8th August, 1968 and for mandatory injunction directing the University Authorities to allow the plaintiff to appear for the particular examination. 4. But the University Authorities evidently had no time for such "unimportant" things. Finding that the University had chosen to be stubborn, the plaintiff was advised to file a suit for declaration of her birth date to be 8th August, 1968 and for mandatory injunction directing the University Authorities to allow the plaintiff to appear for the particular examination. 4. In the plaint, the plaintiff stated the above facts and contended that she was, factually speaking, eligible for appearing for the examination agewise. In the suit, the Vice-Chancellor of the University was defendant No.1, its Registrar was defendant No. 2 and the Principal of the College was defendant No. 3. The Principal of the College did not contest the plaintiff's claim. But it appears that the ego of the University Authorities is very much hurt. As will be presently pointed out, the gist of the material which was there before the Court for seeing that the plaintiff's date of birth was really speaking 8-8-1968 was there before the University Authorities even before the date of the suit. Moreover, the authorities learnt about the entire factual position atleast after the evidence was led by the plaintiff. But when matters are decide on the basis of ego truth and justice generally are the first casualties. This is precisely what happened in the present case. Evidently the interest of the young student and her entire future and career are matters of no relevance for the University Authorities. They had chosen not to give her the Eligibility Certificate and they wanted to stick to their stand so that their ego might triumph. They resisted the suit tooth and nail. In the Written Statement, they contended:--- (a) that the University decision not to grant to the plaintiff the Eligibility Certificate was in accordance with the Rules and conditions of the University for the eligibility; (b) that the plaintiff not completed 17 years on 31-12-1985, because the true date of the plaintiff's birth was 1-6-1969 and not 8-8-1968, which date was in consonance with the School Register and her own application Exhibit 71; (c) that the plaintiff had no right to ask for declaration of the date of birth from the Civil Court; and (d) that the suit had become infructuous in view of the fact that the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction had been finally rejected by the Competent Courts. I will presently mention the nature of the interlocutory proceedings in which the plaintiff's application for temporary injunction had came to be rejected. 5. Immediately after the filing of the suit, the plaintiff applied for an interlocutory injunction mandating the University to permit the plaintiff to appear for the particular 1st Year Examination. The actual order of the Court was not placed before me. But it appears that the application was the subject matter of the Appeal in the District Court and of a writ petition in this Court. However, there is no dispute that by virtue of the Court's Order, the plaintiff was allowed to appear for the Examination of the particular year with the further direction that her result should not be declared by the Authorities concerned until the decision of the suit. 6. On the above pleadings, Issues were framed by the trial Court. The 1st issue was whether the plaintiff prove that her correct date of birth was 8-8-1968 and not 1-6-1969? The 2nd issue was : Does the plaintiff prove that Vandana and Aparna are one and the same person? The 3rd issue was : Does the plaintiff prove that she was entitled to get the eligibility certificate from the defendant? The 4th issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled for any relief from the Court. On these issues, the parties went to trial. The plaintiff examined as many as 16 witnesses to prove her date of birth as well as to prove that Vandana mentioned in the village Register was the same person as Archana, mentioned in the school and college record. No evidence was led by the contesting defendants to disprove this position and I may state at this stage itself that having regard to the voluminous and impeccable evidence led by the plaintiff, the trial Court had no other alternative but to come to the conclusion that the two names Vandana and Arpana were of one and the same individual, viz. the plaintiff, and that her date of birth was 8-8-1968 as mentioned in the Birth Certificate and not 1-6-1969 as mentioned in the School records. 7. But inspite of these findings the learned trial Judge took the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the Eligibility Certificate. the plaintiff, and that her date of birth was 8-8-1968 as mentioned in the Birth Certificate and not 1-6-1969 as mentioned in the School records. 7. But inspite of these findings the learned trial Judge took the view that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the Eligibility Certificate. For coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge seems to have taken the view that the University was bound by its own rules and the University Rules mandated that whatever might be stated in the School Register relating to the Date of Birth was final and conclusive. The trial Court appears to have taken the further view that this was a case where the plaintiff's parents, though not the plaintiff herself, were the person really in fault. The plaintiff's father is a Teacher in a High School and the plaintiff's mother has passed the 10th Standard Examination and has completed Physical Training Course. The learned Judge, therefore came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's parents were educated persons. He further found or, rather, suspected that the plaintiff's parents must have been all the time aware of the true date of birth of the plaintiff as also of the fact that the true date of birth was mentioned in the Village Panchayat Record. This inference was drawn by the trial Court, probably rightly, from the conduct of the plaintiff's father betrayed by the fact that immediately upon learning about the refusal of the University to grant to her the Eligibility Certificate on the ground of her Age deficiency, he rushed to the Village Panchayat and obtained the Certificate and caused it to be produced before the University. The learned Judge, therefore, felt perhaps rightly, that the plaintiff's parents were all the time aware of the fact that the plaintiff was born on 1-1-1968, but wanted to take advantage of the fact that her date of birth was wrongly shown in the School Register to be 1-6-1969. According to the learned Judge, the parents were taking advantage of the opportunity of showing the plaintiff to be of an age less than her real age obviously for some future prospects. But when they found that this was inconvenient for the plaintiff at the present juncture, they came out with the truth before the Authority. According to the learned Judge, the parents were taking advantage of the opportunity of showing the plaintiff to be of an age less than her real age obviously for some future prospects. But when they found that this was inconvenient for the plaintiff at the present juncture, they came out with the truth before the Authority. In Para 19 of his Judgement, the learned Judge has observed that if this was done by some uneducated parents belonging, say, to communities such as the tribal communities, the position would have been different. As it appears from his discussion in para 19 of his judgment, the learned Judge has taken the view that the University rules will have to be interpreted differently for tribal communities and for educated communities. It appears that as per the view of the learned Judge if the same mistake was committed by the tribal parents, he would have been inclined to bend the University rule, assuming that it was a mandatory rule, and would have directed the University to permit the student to appear for the examination when the true age of the student was disclosed. The learned Judge has also observed that the plaintiff as such was an innocent student. But he took the further view that if the rule was not observed stringently in such a case, havoc could be played by the mischief. This is the substance of what he has stated in Para 22 of his judgement. I may mention here that no where has the learned Judge examined the rule or rules in question. In fact, it is even doubtful as to whether any such rules have been infact produced before him. If the relevant rule was produced before him, it would have been incumbent upon him to apply his mind to the question as to whether the rule is so very inflexible that even an innocent student had to suffer a disproportionate penalty by virtue of its inelastic character. Taking the view that "greater evil should be awarded in context to lesser evil" (I am using his own words), the learned Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit with no order as to costs. 8. Taking the view that "greater evil should be awarded in context to lesser evil" (I am using his own words), the learned Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit with no order as to costs. 8. In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, it was once again urged by the contesting respondents before the learned Appellate Judge that the Birth Certificate produced by the plaintiff was of no avail for her because it referred to Vandana Hingane, whereas the plaintiff's name was Archana Hingane. It was further urged that the plaintiff had not proved her date of birth to be 8-8-1968. In other words, even though the officers of the respondent/ University had seen the voluminous evidence led by the plaintiff proving beyond doubt that the name Vandana was her alias and further that the date of her birth was 8-8-1968 and that, hence, she had very much completed the age of 17 on 31-12-1985, these offices of the University refused to have a look at the truth even when it was presented before them on a platter as it were. They had closed their mind once for all to all the realities and the fact that a young student was being ruined by their attitude was a matter of no concern for them. Fortunately, the learned Addl. District Judge was least impressed by arguments of the respondent on this point. He saw the voluminous evidence that was brought on record proving both the claims of the plaintiff, viz. her date of birth and her identity. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge in this behalf were, therefore, confirmed by the Appeal Court. Question then arose whether, according to the learned Judge, the contesting respondents were justified in sticking fast to earlier order refusing to grant the eligibility certificates to the plaintiff. If they were unaware of the true position before the evidence was led, they became aware of it atleast after they saw the voluminous evidence led in their own presence. Nothing was brought to notice of the Court by virtue of which it could be said that the officers had become functus officio the moment they passed the order refusing to grant the Eligibility Certificate to the plaintiff, so much so that even the streak realities brought on record by the plaintiff were insufficient to enable them to have a second look at the matter. I will have more to say about this aspect of the duties of the public Bodies and Public Officers. Here I may state that the officers of the University failed in their duties of seeing reality and of saving a young student from ruin vis-a-vis her career. But here I am considered with the anomalous view taken by the learned Judge. He lost sight of the fact that the contesting respondents had shirked from viewing the real question in its proper prospective. He should have seen that the University's first decision, the order dated 24-15-1985, refusing the Eligibility Certificate to the plaintiff might well be correct. But what the learned Judge lost sight of was that the adamance of the contesting respondent in the matter of refusal to examine the fresh material produced by the plaintiff was unpardonable. The plaintiff's parents might be indiscreet in not getting the School Record corrected in due season. But that did not mean that the poor student herself should be condemned by the University for all her life for the peccadillos of her parents. The learned Addl. District Judge observed that the University was bound by certain set of rules and that it was not open for the Court to find fault with the rule. Unfortunately, however, the learned Judge has not even referred to any particular rule which made it incumbent upon the University Officers to keep the plaintiff bound hand and foot to the mistaken averment made by her in her application for admission. The learned Judge has further observed that he could not adjudicate upon the question whether the Rules were ultra vires. He is very much wrong in taking this view. A Civil Court can certainly enquire into the vires of such rules. But what he lost sight of was that the plaintiff had nowhere questioned the vires of the rule at all. The plaintiff has been clamouring that there exist no valid rule which disables the contesting respondents from moulding and shaping their orders so as to subserve to the justice of the case. Point is that the learned Judge has not applied his mind to the question as to what the rule is and without seeing the rule he has observed that it was beyond his power to examine the vires of the rule. Point is that the learned Judge has not applied his mind to the question as to what the rule is and without seeing the rule he has observed that it was beyond his power to examine the vires of the rule. The learned Judge also confirmed the trial Court's view that there were laches on the part of the plaintiff in the matter of taking appropriate steps for getting the Eligibility Certificate. According to him, the delay committed by the plaintiff's parents in getting the birth date in the school register corrected was fatal for the plaintiff's case. The learned Judge further held that the University had no power to correct the birth date, the production of the correct birth certificate by the plaintiff notwithstanding. The learned Judge took the strange view that if the University accepted the plaintiff's contention that her birth date was 8-8-1968, that act on their part would be ultra vires the powers of the University. Making quite a few other anomalous observations of the above character, the learned Judge confirmed the Judgement of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. 9. Immediately after the appeal reached hearing before me, I called upon Mr. Naik, the learned council for the University to place before me the rules which incapacitated the officers of the University, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from saving the plaintiff from the grave loss that was bound to befall upon the plaintiff. I called upon him to show to the Court the rule which was so inelastic that even in deserving cases the officers of the University were helpless in the matter of saving an innocent student from damage to her career. All that Mr. Naik could say was that the lower Courts had seen these rules and were satisfied about the existence of the rules. He himself was, however, unable to show any such rule. No doubt there must be some rules, which govern the University and which direct it to be guided by the entries made in the school Register and the averments made in the application for admission, while deciding the question of the age of the student-candidate; but normally speaking such a provision would be an enabling provision. Atleast Mr. No doubt there must be some rules, which govern the University and which direct it to be guided by the entries made in the school Register and the averments made in the application for admission, while deciding the question of the age of the student-candidate; but normally speaking such a provision would be an enabling provision. Atleast Mr. Naik was unable to invite my attention to any rule which put the position in a straight-jacket, prohibiting the officers from looking at other evidence which reflected upon the truth. 10. Moreover, I asked Mr. Naik one question. In the present case, it is the minimum age which is prescribed for the eligibility. Supposing the correct Birth Certificate extracted from the correct Birth Register showed that she was above the minimum age, thus, disqualifying herself for the eligibility. For instance let us assume that the maximum age that was prescribed was 21 years, the school register showed the age to be 20 years, whereas the Birth Register disclosed that she was 22 years .Would the University Authorities take a blind eye to the entry in the birth register, if it was brought to their notice before the eligibility certificate was given, merely because her age mentioned in the school register and in her application form was 20 years? Taking into account her real age, she would be disqualified. Would she be allowed to take advantage of that wrong by making use of her wrong age mentioned in the school register and the application form? Mr. Naik was fair enough to say that it was the duty of the University not to allow any such candidate to take advantage of his or own wrong and to run away with an admission in the college by understating his or her age. This would be the duty of the public body, he conceded. The question then arises : What would the position in the reserve case? In this case, by mistake, lesser age was shown by the plaintiff's parents resulting in her uncalled for disqualification. What was it that prevented her from satisfying the University that was a mistake on the part of her parents. Was there any principle of estoppel involved? None : He had to concede that. 11. To my mind, the view taken by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. What was it that prevented her from satisfying the University that was a mistake on the part of her parents. Was there any principle of estoppel involved? None : He had to concede that. 11. To my mind, the view taken by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. In my opinion, not only the university but even the courts below have themselves by the considerations of technicality and have failed to see that the fundamental function of every public body is doing elementary justice and observing canons of fair play. 12. The fallacy in the reasoning of the trial Court has already been indicated above. The learned judge has blamed the young student for the acts of omissions on the part of her parents. The learned judge has rightly inferred that the parents must have been aware of the mistake that had crept in the school register vis-a-vis the plaintiff's birth date. He might be even justified in inferring that the failure on the part of the partners to get the birth date corrected might not be solely due to their inadvertance. An inference is possible that it was the desire of the parents to confer benefit upon their child which benefit generally springs from slashing of the child's age; in the educational field in the matter of employment, in the matter of dates of retirement and, last but not the least, in the marriage market. The inference drawn by the learned Judge that the plaintiff's father must have been aware of her true age might perhaps be a justified inference. The very fact that immediately upon getting reply of rejection form the University, the plaintiffs father rushed to the village Panchayat for getting her birth certificate, which disclosed her true age, is certainly indicative of the fact that he was aware of her true age and still was unenthusiastic about getting the same reflected in the school register because the mistake that had crept in the school register was normally beneficial for the plaintiff. But the question is as to whether the young innocent girl should be condemned for such an act of omission on the part of her parents. When she took admission in her primary school, she could not have been aware of her true date of birth. In fact there is no reason to believe that she was ever aware of her real birth date. When she took admission in her primary school, she could not have been aware of her true date of birth. In fact there is no reason to believe that she was ever aware of her real birth date. To punish the child for the mistakes of the parents is not justice; it is vengeance. Public bodies cannot be allowed to be guided by considerations of bengeance. 13. The learned Judge has thereafter observed that his conclusions would have been different if the plaintiff's parents were uneducated persons and belonging to communities such as tribal communities. To my mind, the learned Judge was wrong in applying such considerations to the facts of the present case. No doubt, the Court should be more liberal towards the youngsters whose parents are uneducated or are members of tribal communities; but that doesn't mean that the students of the other communities and innocent children of educated parents should be subjected to harsh technicalities and should be punished with the motives of vengeance. The Court was called upon to interpret a particular rule by which the university was guided. If sticking fast to that rule resulted in irreparable damage to the young student's career, the Court must consider whether the rule was so inelastic, so very harsh and so very mandatory that the men who manned the university had become helpless in the matter of sympathetic treatment to a budding student. This function has got to be shared by the Court as well. Nice distinction is sought to be made for interpretation of the rule for students whose parents are educated persons and those whose parents are illiterate tribals. The distinction might be germane for some other purpose; not for the purpose of the interpretation of any rule. The learned Judge has thereafter observed as follows :--- "It is not the case of the plaintiff that they (her parents) did not see her interest and rather her parents themselves have taken the initiative to see good of the plaintiff and hence she cannot deny and refute the acts of her parents done on her behalf when she was a minor unless and until it is specifically allowed by the provisions of law to deny or refute the attaining the age of majority within the stipulated time." I fail to see as to from where the learned judge got this principle of law. In the first place, the principle is not relevant; in the second place, it is not correct. The principle relied upon by the learned judge is in the nature of the principle of estoppel which principle has no basis so far as the present case is concerned. It is not as if that by informing her age to be lesser than what it is, the plaintiff has taken advantage from the University or from the College. It is not as if that if she had stated her correct age, admission would have been refused to her. Further, it is not as if that the University has in any way prejudiced itself by anything done or represented by the plaintiff. The principle as formulated by the learned judge is neither accepted nor relevant in the context of the facts of the case. The further mistake of the learned Judge lies in his view that some larger social good is to be achieved by meting out the punishment to the plaintiff. That would have been so if the plaintiff's conduct suffered from some moral turpitude. Such a case cannot even be alleged against the plaintiff; at the most it can be said that the plaintiff's parents had failed in their duty in the matter of correcting the school Register; but there is no basis for the view that the plaintiff was a party to such a mistake or even that she was aware of any such mistake on the part of her parents. 14. The mistakes in the reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge are also referred to above. I have mentioned above the view taken by the learned Judge to the effect that no mistake was committed by the officers of the University in being guided by the date of the plaintiff's birth mentioned in the school register as also in the application form, Exh. 71. I have pointed out about that the initial order of the officers dated 24-12-1985 rejecting he application for eligibility certificate could not be cavilled at. The question was about the attitude of the officers towards the plaintiff's second application pointing out the error in the school register. In the first place, it was open for the University to verify whether it was a real mistake or not. The question was about the attitude of the officers towards the plaintiff's second application pointing out the error in the school register. In the first place, it was open for the University to verify whether it was a real mistake or not. But secondly, the very fact that the birth register was maintained by the village Panchayat shows the plaintiff's age to be 8-8-1968 should have led the officers to the conclusion that the age mentioned in the School Register was a mistake. In this matter it is a well known legal position that entries made in the birth register were conclusive; not the entries made in the School Register. When there is a conflict between two entries, the entries in the Birth Register must prevail. This is the settled position of law. Not only the Court but the University officers should have known this. 15. But all that apart, the view of the officers of the University and the Court was and is not based upon any fact finding. The view appears to be that once the student makes a statement of her age in the application form for admission, that statement is permanently binding upon the student. I do not see any justification for such view at all. The present case is one such where the student stands to lose by stating her age to be lesser than her real age. But I have mentioned above the diametrically opposite position where the student gets the benefit of by understatement of her age. Suppose the maximum qualifying age was prescribed and the student had crossed that age limit; such student would obviously be disqualified. In order to avoid the disqualification the student might mention in the application form her age to be lower than her real age. Surely the University will not allow the student to take advantage to take advantage of such device of making false statement and running away with it after reaping the advantage. Once the University learns about the real age, the university would be duty bound to revoke the eligibility certificate. This means that the age stated in the application form is not necessary final and conclusive. There is no reason why the same position should not prevail in the contrary circumstances such as the present one. This is a case of understatement of the age, against the student's interest. This means that the age stated in the application form is not necessary final and conclusive. There is no reason why the same position should not prevail in the contrary circumstances such as the present one. This is a case of understatement of the age, against the student's interest. There is no reason why the student should be bound by such a statement unless, of course, some element of estoppel or moral turpitude was involved. In the absence of such moral turpitude, making the student suffer such a life-long damage will be penalty very much disproportionate to the mistake committed by her parents. No legal system governed by the principles of justice and fair play should allow any public institution to impose such disproportionate penalty among the budding youngsters. What the learned Judge has lost sight of is that the mistake of the officers (respondent Nos. 1 2), lay not in their initial order of rejection but in the insistence upon refusal to see the truth. I am tempted to use even a somewhat harsh expression. It can be legitimately said that by refusing to see the reality, the officers of the University betray that they have conducted themselves in this affair by wearing blinkers on their eyes disabling them from being circumspect. The learned Judge has observed that University follows the rules and the University cannot be blamed on that account. What the learned Judge has lost sight of is that no such rule is produced before the Court which made the officers of the University helpless in the matter of saving the student from ruin and disaster. Moreover, the Learned Judge should have considered: Are the rules meant to stiff and strangulate justice and fair play? If any such rules are produced and relied upon before the Court the Court would be duty-bound to strain each of its sinews to interpret them as directory and not mandatory. But a difficulty in the present case is that no such rule is even produced. I repeat, there may exist a rule that no student would be permitted to appear for the particular examination unless he or she has attained the age of 17 on a particular date. This position is conceded. But a difficulty in the present case is that no such rule is even produced. I repeat, there may exist a rule that no student would be permitted to appear for the particular examination unless he or she has attained the age of 17 on a particular date. This position is conceded. But the existence of any such rule which binds the student hand and foot to the age mentioned in the School Register or in the Application form is either conceded or proved. If there existed any such rule, it would have been interpreted in the context of various other rules to ascertain whether it was of such inelastic character as is assumed by the learned Judge. The learned Judge seems to have misunderstood the legal position to such an extent that he has gone to the length of holding that any other decision on the part of the contesting respondent would be tantamount to their transgressing or over-stepping the bounds of the rule. It has further observed that the Court had no jurisdiction to consider even the question whether the rule is ultra vires the powers and duties of the University. To my mind, the learned Judge was very much wrong in taking such a view. It is not only open for the Court to examine the question whether the rules are within the bounds of the University powers or not, but it is infact an obligation of every Court to enquire into that question whenever the occasion so demands. But the point is that embarking upon that investigation was not even called for. If upon proper interpretation of the rules it could be seen that the contesting respondents have the power in their hands to over look the mistake that had crept in the School Register and in the plaintiff's Application Form (Exh. 71), it would be the duty of the respondents to exercise that power. This is a clear case where the power is coupled with the duty; duty towards the young student having great aspirations for future. 16. The learned Judge has further observed that University was incompetent to correct the date of plaintiff's birth in the School Register. Nobody has called upon the University to do so. All that the University was concerned with was to ascertain the plaintiff's age from the correct evidence available. 16. The learned Judge has further observed that University was incompetent to correct the date of plaintiff's birth in the School Register. Nobody has called upon the University to do so. All that the University was concerned with was to ascertain the plaintiff's age from the correct evidence available. University could see that correct evidence was something that was stated in the Birth Register. University should have accepted that evidence. No burden was required to be shouldered by the University in the matter of correction of the various School Registers; that function could have been well let to the plaintiff's parents and the respective school authorities. 17. I have mentioned above that relevant rules are not produced by the University and in the absence of production of such rules it is really difficult to express any judicial opinion on their validity. But fundamental principles to be borne in mind by the men who man the public bodies are--- (a) that the rules are for men; men are not for rules; and (b) that all the acts of public bodies have got to be informed by the principles of justice and fairplay. Normally speaking , no rule bereft of the basic principles of justice and fair play would be countenanced by the Court of law. Either the rule will be appropriately interpreted so as to read into it the requirements of justice and fairplay or if the language of the rule admits of no such reading down, the Court will normally think seriously whether the rule ought not to have been struck down. The responsibility of the educational institutions such as universities is even higher still. They must further see to it that unless the youngster is found to be guilty of moral turpitude, his educational career is fostered, not ruined. Their duty is to nurture their career; not damage it. 18. I must hasten to add that though this is a statement of the fundamental law relating to the functioning of the public institutions, the instant case can be decided upon on the narrow ground that no such rule as mandates such unjust result has been brought to the notice of the Court at all. 18. I must hasten to add that though this is a statement of the fundamental law relating to the functioning of the public institutions, the instant case can be decided upon on the narrow ground that no such rule as mandates such unjust result has been brought to the notice of the Court at all. Reasonable inference should be that no such rule exists and if there is no such rule which disabled the University from conniving at the mistake in question, it was incumbent upon the contesting respondents, in the context of the facts of the case, to connive at and to condone the mistake that had crept in the plaintiff's application, Exh. 71, as regards the date of birth. For no fault on her part she happened to state her wrong age in the application form; she hastened to point out the mistake to the University and her correct age gave a right to her to appear for the examination. There is no reason why the contesting respondents should not have allowed her to correct the mistake. 19. The question yet arises as to what relief can be granted to the plaintiff. By an interlocutory order of the Court, she was allowed to appear for the examination held in the year 1986; but it was ordered that the results of the examination should not be declared, year 1986 elapsed because the Court could not give justice expeditiously. One full year of the student was wasted because since her results were not declared she could not fill in for the next year. I learnt that she has appeared for the examination held in 1987 after this Court ordered declaration of the results. One previous year of the student is totally wasted, career wise. 20. For all the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed. The decree of dismissal of the suit passed by both the courts below is set aside and the plaintiff's suit is decreed as follows:-- It is held that the plaintiff is entitled to the Eligibility Certificate from the University, as prayed by her. She is entitled to the grant of the terms during which time she had attended the college and on the basis of which she was allowed to appear for the examination held in the year 1986, the result whereof have been withheld by the University. She is entitled to the grant of the terms during which time she had attended the college and on the basis of which she was allowed to appear for the examination held in the year 1986, the result whereof have been withheld by the University. As a consequential relief, it is ordered that the University shall declare the result of the plaintiff forthwith. 21. In view of the quite unjustifiable and hyper-technical stand taken by the University, the University, represented by defendants Nos. 1 2, is directed to pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout. Order Accordingly. -----