BOPANNA, J. ( 1 ) THE point for consideration in this petition is whether the petitioners could challenge the validity of the elections held under the provisions of the Karnataka Zilla parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats of 1983 (in short the Act) without availing themselves of the specific remedy provided under Rule 10 of the Karnataka Mandal panchayat (Election of Pradhan and upapradhan) Rules, 1987. Certain facts which are not controverted may be noted before going to the rival contentions of the parties. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are the elected members of the Mandal Panchayat. There are 22 elected members in that Mandal panchayat and two nominated members. 19 members belong to Congress-I Party, three to Janatha Party and two are nominated members. It transpires that the first meeting of the members of the Mandal Panchayat was fixed at 11. 00 a. m. on 21. 04. 1987. That meeting, according to the petitioners was attended by only 10 members including the nominated members. But these petitioners so also certain other members who have filed their affidavits in support of the petitioners' case were physically prevented from attending the meetings by the supporters of janatha Party with a view to defeat the chances of Congress-I Party members including the petitioners being elected, though they had a commanding majority. Their specific allegations are against respondent-5 who is a M. L. A. , respondent-3 who is the Pradhan and Respondent-4 who is the Upapradhan. According to the petitioners, respondent-5 though he had no voting right and could not participate in the proceedings of the Mandal Panchayat, he threatened the authorities and took an active part in promoting disturbances at the main gate and thereby prevented the petitioners and other members who would have voted for the petitioners from participating in the elections for the posts of Pradhan and upapradhan. The allegations made by the petitioners are of very serious nature. It transpires that respondents-3, 4 and 5 managed to get a huge mob armed with cycle chains, Chilly powder and soda bottles etc. , and this mob physically prevented the petitioners and their supporters from entering the meeting hall. Two women members who accompanied the petitioners to attend the meeting were stopped, stripped naked and chased on the street by the fiendish mob. The entire village was aghast by the mob fury created by the 5th respondent. , and this mob physically prevented the petitioners and their supporters from entering the meeting hall. Two women members who accompanied the petitioners to attend the meeting were stopped, stripped naked and chased on the street by the fiendish mob. The entire village was aghast by the mob fury created by the 5th respondent. Thus about 14 members were prevented from entering the meeting hall under the threat of bodily injury and criminal intimidation and they have sworn these facts in their affidavits which are produced as annexures-Cl to C-10. ( 3 ) IN the return filed by the contesting respondents they have raised various disputed questions of facts. They have submitted that the petitioners have deliberately absented themselves and therefore, they cannot be permitted to approach this Court directly to raise contentions which require detailed investigation by cross-examination and that it would be highly unsafe to decide the rights of the parties only on the basis of the affidavits on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case; that there is no collusion between the Prescribed Officer and the contesting respondents as alleged by the petitioners; that in any event, the petitioners' remedy is to file an election petition since the election has already been concluded and the results have been declared. On these contentions, the first question that requires to be considered is-" (1) Whether the petitioner could be permitted to approach this Court under article 226 of the Constitution when they have alternative remedy under Rule 10 of the Election Rule?" Jurisdiction is conferred on the Munsiffs who is competent to entertain the election petition to declare the election of the returned candidate as void if he is satisfied that the result of the election had been materially affected by the improper reception of a vote or rejection of a vote or by non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or any of the Rules. " ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri K. O. Channabasappa is that this Rule is only applicable to cases mentioned therein and not to a case where certain extraordinary events have taken place as in this case where the Prescribed Officer was completely stopped from functioning as such by the fiendish mob and was not in a position to take effective steps to conduct the elections in accordance with law. He has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of HAYAT BEIG v. MUNIVENKATE gowda and ORS - 1972 (1) Mys. LJ. 121 - in support of this contention. A Division Bench of this Court was considering similar Rule framed under Section 30 of the Mysore village Panchayat (Election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1959. Section 30 (2) of the Mysore Village Panchayat Local boards Act, provided that any dispute relating to the validity of the election of the chairman or Vice-Chairman shall be decided by the Prescribed Officer and that decision of the Prescribed Officer shall be final. Rule 17 of the provided that any members of the Panchayat may challenge the validity of the election of the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, within seven days from the date of publication of the result of election under rule 12, by filing an election petition, together with a deposit of Rs. 100/- as security, for costs, before the Munsiff within whose territorial jurisdiction the Village panchayat is situate. ( 5 ) RULE 18 provides that upon receipt of such a petition, the Munsiff shall, after such enquiry as he deems necessary, pass an order confirming or amending the declared result of the election or by setting aside the election. In conducting such enquiry the munsiff shall follow the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as far as possible. ( 6 ) THE Act and the Rules are altogether silent as regards the grounds on which the election of a Chairman or Vice-Chairman can be set aside. The question is, whether in the absence of such a provision, the munsiff could set aside the election on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 5. It is in this context, a Division Bench of this Court in Hayat Beig v. Munivenkate gowda and ors (1972 (1) Mys. L. J. observed:"in India there is no common law relating to elections and election petitions. In respect of elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures, the Parliament has enacted the representation of the People act, 1951. Section. 80-A of the said Act provides for trying election petitions by the High Court. Sections 100 and 101 state the grounds for declaring an election to be void. In respect of elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures, the Parliament has enacted the representation of the People act, 1951. Section. 80-A of the said Act provides for trying election petitions by the High Court. Sections 100 and 101 state the grounds for declaring an election to be void. If the High Court is of the opinion that on the date of the election, a returned candidate was not qualified, or was dis-qualified, to be chosen' to fill the seat under the Constitution or under the representation of the People Act, or that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate, or that any nomination has been improperly rejected the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Further, if the High court is of the opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper acceptance or any nomination, etc. , or by any non- compliance with the provisions of the constitution or the Representation of the people Act, or of any Rules or orders made thereunder, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. It is thus seen that under the Representation of the People act, for setting aside the election of a returned candidate on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of the constitution or the Representation of the people Act, or any Rules made thereunder, it has to be established that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected. "it was urged by Sri P. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the first respondent that since section. 30 (2) of the Act read with Rule 17 provides that any dispute relating to the validity of the election of a Chairman or vice-Chairman shall be decided by the munsiff, he has got the jurisdiction and power to declare an election void if it is established that any of the relevant rules have not been followed. If Mr. 30 (2) of the Act read with Rule 17 provides that any dispute relating to the validity of the election of a Chairman or vice-Chairman shall be decided by the munsiff, he has got the jurisdiction and power to declare an election void if it is established that any of the relevant rules have not been followed. If Mr. Subba rao's contention is accepted, the Munsiff has to declare the election of a returned candidate void for non-compliance with the provisions of a Rule like Rule 5, while he has no power to declare the election void if corrupt practice is established or if certain fundamental bal ot papers etc. , are violated. Such a situation could not have been contemplated by the farmers of the act. Under the Act, the Government has the power to make Rules and thereunder provide the grounds for declaring the election of the returned candidates void. It appears to us that the Rule making authority has by oversight omitted to frame a Rule stating the grounds on which the election of a returned candidate shall be declared to be void. In the absence of any such Rule, we fail to see how the exercising his powers under Section. 30 (2) read with Rules 17 and 18 of the Rules can try an Election Petition. The Munsiff under the Act exercises his powers not as a Court but a Tribunal. He has no inherent powers of a Court. Therefore, the Munsiff could not have set aside the election of the petitioner,. I have excerpted extensively from this decision since it was contended by Mr. K. O. Channabasappa learned Counsel for the petitioner that this ruling must be made applicable to the facts of this case since Rule 10 of the relevant rules, does not provide any remedy to the aggrieved candidates who were not permitted to vote in the elections of the Mandal Panchayats on account of the law and order situation created by the unruly elements who took over the control of the elections and prevented the Prescribed officer from conducting the elections in accordance with the rules. That takes me to the election Rules framed for the proper conduct of the Mandal Panchayat Elections. That takes me to the election Rules framed for the proper conduct of the Mandal Panchayat Elections. Rule 4 provides that the election of Pradhan and Upapradhan shall be held in the first meeting after the constitution or reconstitution of the Mandal Panchayat, on such date as the prescribed officer may fix and he shall thereupon send to every member notice of the date so fixed. ( 7 ) SUB-RULE (2) of Rule 4 provides that at any time before noon on the day proceeding the date so fixed, any member may give notice in writing addressed to the Prescribed officer of a motion that another member be chosen as the Pradhan and Upapradhan, as the case may be, and the notice shall be seconded by a third member and shall be accompanied by a third member and shall be accompanied by a statement by the member whose name is proposed in the notice that he willing to serve as Pradhana or upapradhana if elected ; Provided that a member shall not propose his own name or second a motion proposing his own name, or proposes or second more than one motion. ( 8 ) SUB-RULE (2) says that such notice shall be delivered to the Prescribed officer in person by the candidate, proposer or seconded and a notice not so delivered in person shall not be valid, and Sub-rule (5) says that the motions, which have been moved and duly second shall be put to vote one by one in the order in which they have been moved and decided if necessary by division. If any motion is carried by a majority of members present the Prescribed officer shall without putting to vote later motions declare that the member proposed in the motion which has been carried has been chosen as the Pradhan or Upapradhan. If any motion is carried by a majority of members present the Prescribed officer shall without putting to vote later motions declare that the member proposed in the motion which has been carried has been chosen as the Pradhan or Upapradhan. So in this case, the contention of the petitioners is that the prescribed Officer could not have followed the rules prescribed for accepting the motions, scrutinizing the motions and for putting up those motions to vote in view of the law and order situation that prevailed at that time and without even being any motions on behalf of the petitioners, since they were prevented from entering the meeting hall along with their supporters, no election petition could be filed under Rule 10 on the ground of non compliance with any of the provisions of the act or Rules and that Rule would not be applicable to the facts of this case. ( 9 ) IT should be noticed that the provisions of the Rule which come up for consideration by the Division Bench in HAYAT BEIG's case were silent as to the grounds on which the election of a successful candidate could be challenged. The Division Bench noticed the provisions of the Representation of people Act as also the provisions of the karnataka Municipalities Act and found the lacuna in the rule framed by the authorities under the karnataka Village Panchayat and local Boards Act. That lacuna, in my view, was removed by the legislature when they framed Rule 10 of the Election Rules under the Zilla Parishades Act. It is settled rule of construction of a statute that when a subsequent legislation is made by the legislature in the same field, that legislation covers the lacuna or removes the lacuna found in the earlier statute if it is pointed out by the Courts at the time of interpretation of the earlier statute. So, the legislature is deemed to have noticed the lacuna in the earlier statute and brought about the necessary changes to meet the situation caused by the lacuna in the earlier statute. The very fact that the election petition was dismissed by this Hayat Beig on the point of jurisdiction shows that the legislature was aware of the situation caused by Rule 18 of the Election Rules framed under the Mysore village and Local Boards Act. The very fact that the election petition was dismissed by this Hayat Beig on the point of jurisdiction shows that the legislature was aware of the situation caused by Rule 18 of the Election Rules framed under the Mysore village and Local Boards Act. That is the reason in Rule 10 of the Rules in question, the legislature has borrowed the very words as found in the relevant provisions of the representation of People Act. The words used in the Representation of People Act are similar to the words found in the relevant rule 10 framed under the Zilla Paraishades act. Therefore, the words in Rule 10 cover cases arising out of non- compliance with the provision of th Act or the Rules made thereunder. It is common ground that this is not a case where there had been an improper reception or rejection of a vote. So the dispute has to come squarely with the meaning of words 'non- compliance' with the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The Act and the Rules provide for the proper conduct of the elections. I have already referred to Rule 4 which prescribes the procedure while conducting the elections. Section 43 of the Zilla Parishades Act, provides for holding of the first meeting of the Zilla Parishades, It reads as under : section 43 - "election of pradhan on establishment of Mandal panchayat etc. (1) on the establishment of Mandal panchayat for the first time under this act, or on its reconstitution or establishment under Section 132 or on its reconstitution on the expiry of the term of the members of Mandal Panchayat, a meeting of the Mandal Panchayats shall be called within four weeks from the date of commencement of the term of office of the members of the Mandal Panchayat under Section 40 by the Prescribed officer who shall himself preside over the meeting, but shall have no right to vote and the meeting shall then proceed to elect the Pradhana. " section 51 provides for the quorum for a meeting and the procedure for holding the meeting. " section 51 provides for the quorum for a meeting and the procedure for holding the meeting. So in the light of the provisions of section 43 read with Section 51 and read with Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules, a procedure is fixed for the holding of the meeting by the prescribed Officer and in that meeting only the Prescribed Officer could have put to vote the motions of the candidates who were desirous of contesting the officers of pradhan and Upapradhan. Therefore, the words 'non-compliance' with the provisions of the Act and the Rules would only be referable to Section 43 and 51 of the Zilla parishades Act and Rules 4 and 5. Thus interpreted, the Munsiff will have jurisdiction to decide any dispute which arises on account of the non-compliance with the statutory provisions of Section 43 read with section 51 and also the provisions of Rules 4 and 5. ( 10 ) IT is however contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the intention of the legislature in framing Rule 10 of the Election Rules should be ascertained with reference to the provisions of Section 18 of the Zilla Parishads Act. Under Section 18 of the Zilla Parishads Act, the Munisiff is empowered to go into the allegations of disqualification of a member of the Mandal Pancnayat on account of the fact that he had committed a corrupt practice or his agent or any other person with the consent of the candidate had committed such corrupt practice; that his nomination is improperly rejected; that the result of the election in so far as it concerned a returned candidate, has been materially affected, by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent; or by the improper receiption, refusal or rejection of any vote or receiption of any vote or receiption of any vote which is void; or by non-compliance with the provisions of this Act or of any rules or orders made, thereunder, the Munsiff shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Further under sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, if in the opinion of the munsiff, any agent or a returned candidate has been guilty of any corrupt practice, but the munsiff is satisfied,- (A) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders and without the consent of the candidate, (b) that the candidate took all reasonable measures for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election and (c) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agent. then the Munisiff may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void. "mr. Channabasappa contents that in case of election dispute pertaining to a member of the Mandal Panchayat the Munsiff has a very wide jurisdiction and that is the reason the legislature has enumerated the various grounds on which the election of a member of a Mandal Panchayat could be challenged under Section 18 of the Act whereas in the case of elections of Pradhan and upapradhan Rule 10m is silent and an inference that should be drawn by this Court is that jurisdiction of the Munsiff is limited under Rule 10 and that jurisdiction could be exercised only in three cases enumerated in rule 10. Thus construed he says that the circumstances which prevented the prescribed Officer from holding the elections are not covered by Rule 10. In this connection, the interpretation to be adopted in the case of statutes dealing with the elections will have to be noticed. The supreme Court in the case of dhartipakar MADAS LAL agarwal v. SHRI RAJIV GANDHI (A. I. R. 1987 SC 1577) has observed as under:-"before we consider various paras of the election petition to determine the correctness of the High Court order we think it necessary to bear in mind the nature of the right to elect, the right to be elected and the right to dispute election and the trial of the election petition. Right to contest election or to question the election by means of an election petitions is neither common law nor fundamental right instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Right to contest election or to question the election by means of an election petitions is neither common law nor fundamental right instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. There is no fundamental or common Law right in these matters. This is well-settled by catena of decisions of this Court in N. P. Ponnuswami v returning Officer 1952 SCR 218 : ( AIR 1952 SC 14 ), Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (AIR 1954 SC 240), Jyoti Basu v. Debi ghosal (1982)3 SCR 318 : AIR 1982 SC 983 ). These decisions have settled the legal position that outside the statutory provisions there is no right to dispute an election. The Representation of the people Act is a complete and self contained Code within which any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute must be found. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to be extend as permissible by Section 87 of the Act. The scheme of the Act as noticed earlier would show that an election can be questioned under the statute as provided by Section 80 on the grounds as contained in Section 100 of the act. Section 83 lays down a mandatory provision in providing that at election petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts and set forth full particulars of corrupt practice. The pleadings are regulated by Section 83 and it makes it obligatory on the election petitioner to give the requisite facts, details and particulars of each corrupt practice with exactitude. If the election petition fails to make out a ground under section 100 of the Act it must fail at the threshold. Allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature of criminal charges, it is necessary that there should be no vaguness in the allegations so that the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet. If the allegations and vague and general and the particulars of corrupt practice are not stated in the pleadings, the trial of the election petition cannot proceed for want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to avoid a fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Court to scrutinize the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strict manner. The emphasis of law is to avoid a fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the Court to scrutinize the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strict manner. " ( 11 ) SO the principle that could be gathered from this ruling of the Supreme court is that persons who are aggrieved by the actions of the Returning Officer or the prescribed Officer under this Act, must look to the provisions of the Act itself or the rules framed thereunder for the necessary reliefs. Outside this Act, they have no right to challenge the actions of the authorities functioning under the Act. If the Prescribed officer has not performed his duty as in this case the aggrieved persons must look for the remedies under the Act and the Rules and not outside the same. If I were to accept the contention of Mr. K. O. Channbasappa that the words 'non-compliance of the provisions of the Act apd Rules' will not give him any right to challenge the election before the munsiff, then there is no remedy for a person who is aggrieved by the actions as in this case as alleged by the petitioners. The legislature would not have intended such an anomalous situation. That would be a fallacious proposition of law. If a remedy is expressly prohibited under the statute that remedy cannot be avoiled of under Article 226 of the Constitution as observed by the supreme Court in a recent case reported in air 1986 SC page 18% (UNION OF INDIA and ANOTHER v. SHOROMANI gurudwara PRABHANDHAK committee AND OTHERS.) while dealing with the provisions of the Land acquisition Act. So this Court should give such a construction to the words of a Rule 4 of the Rule so as to enable the parties aggrieved to approach the authorities constituted under the Act to decide the dispute that could be raised touching the validity of the election to the office of pradhan and Upapradhan of Mandal panchayat if they had been held without complying with the provisions of the Act. The ruling of the Division Bench in Hayat beig should be applied to the facts and circumstances of that case is also established by the subsequent ruling of the Division bench in KALLIAH NAGIAH v. BASAPPA tirakappa and ORS (1978 (2) Kar. LJ. 378 ). The ruling of the Division Bench in Hayat beig should be applied to the facts and circumstances of that case is also established by the subsequent ruling of the Division bench in KALLIAH NAGIAH v. BASAPPA tirakappa and ORS (1978 (2) Kar. LJ. 378 ). In that case, an election of a Chairman was challenged before the District magistrate who was the election Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966. "the ground for challenge was that Assistant Secretary who was only placed incharge could not have exercised the statutory power of voting which the district Marketing Officer only could exercise and his vote had materially affected the result of the election and hence rendered the election invalid. Though neither the Act nor the rules provided on what ground an election to the office of the Chairman of the marketing Committee could be set aside, the district Judge as Election Tribunal could set aside an election on any of the well accepted grounds and one of such grounds is that that disobedience of, or non-compliance with,, any statutory provisions governing such election, has materially affected the result of such election. " In this case the Division Bench has also ruled that enunciation of Law made by a learned single Judge in CHANNE COWDA and ANR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA and ors (1975 (2) Kar. LJ. 235) laid down the correct law. In channe Gowda's case venkataramaiah, J. as he then was observed :"although there are no provisions in the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, corresponding to Sub-section 100 and 101 of the Representation of the People act, 1951, setting out the grounds on which the election to a Co-operative society can be set aside, it is open to the registrar or the Arbitrator to rely as far as possible upon the large volume of judicial precedents under the election law and to decide the disputes relating to election on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. But while doing so he should steer clear of principles which are contrary to or not warranted by the Act. But while doing so he should steer clear of principles which are contrary to or not warranted by the Act. "the Division Bench also considered the earlier decision of the Division Bench in hayat Beig and the learned Judges commented on the decision of Hayat Beig as follows:"when once the Division Bench held in Hayat Beig's case that the result of the election had not been shown to have been materially affected by any non-compliance with any law, there was no need for the division bench to go into the question whether the Munsiff, functioning as the election Tribunal, could set aside an election in the absence of any specific statutory Provision taking down tax of rounds on which an election could be set aside. So, in our opinion, what the division bench in Hayat Beig's case had said on this point, is obiter dictum and hence is not binding on us. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by Venkataramiah, J. in channe Gowda's case that even in the absence of any express statutory provision laying down the ground on which an election can be set aside, an Election tribunal can set aside an election on any of the well accepted grounds and one of such grounds is that disobedience of, or non-compliance with, any statutory provision governing such election, has materially affected the result of such election. "therefore, the weight of authority appears to be in favour of conferring jurisdiction on the munsiff to decide the election disputes which arise on account of the non-compliance with the provisions of the statute and the Rules. In my view the extraordinary circumstances in this case would not give a right to the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this court when there is a statutory authority constituted under the Act to decide the disputes relating to the election of the office of the Pradhan and Upapradhan. More over on the material on record, the allegations made by the first respondent in the counter affidavit shows that the petitioners along with the other members had given their consent to the election of respondents 3 and 4. A xerox copy of the letter was produced before this court at the time of arguments and therefore it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no reliance could be placed on that letter. A xerox copy of the letter was produced before this court at the time of arguments and therefore it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no reliance could be placed on that letter. I would not have placed any reliance on that letter but for the fact that there is a reference to that letter in one of the returns filed by the contest respondents. In the statement of objection of Respondent-3 it is averred :"at the time of party meeting the 2nd petitioner along with other members of the Mandal Panchayat who also belonging to Congress I candidates have given the representation recommending the 3rd and 4th respondent to contest for the election of Pradan and Upa Pradhan. Annexure r-1 is the true copy of the said representation. On the basis of the said representation the Congress I party has given the ticket to the 3rd and 4th respondents to contest for Pradhan and upa Pradhan, accordingly they have contested the election and elected in the said election. Now the petitioners have filed the above writ petition alleging that he is one of the person who filed the nomination for the said election and other persons who have recommended 3rd and 4th respondent also filed the affidavit and vakalath in favour of the petitioners in the above writ petition. Hence the truth of representation before the party and the affidavit before this Hon'ble Court requires examination through the evidence. "this averment obviously refers to this alleged consent given by the petitioners in their letter dated 19-4-1987 and I have only referred to this letter with a view to establish that there are some serious disputes with regard to the main questions of facts which cannot be gone into under Article 226. Therefore, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to invoke the jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff who is the election tribunal under the Act and have this matter adjudicated before him without being influenced by any of the observations made by me in this order. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners touches upon the validity of Rule 10 of the Rule. Mr. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners touches upon the validity of Rule 10 of the Rule. Mr. K. O. Channabasappa maintained that Section 43 (1) of the Act, provides for the election of pradhana only and not that of the election of pradhana only and not that of the upapradhana, therefore, the legislature could not have exercised its rule making power under Rule 4 providing for the election of the Upapradhana. No doubt under Section 43 (1) of the Act, it is only the election of Pradhana that is provided for by the duly elected members of the Mandal panchayat. But if the section is read as a whole there could be no doubt that Section 43 (1) also contemplates the election of pradhana and Upapradhana. Section 43 (2) specifically provides that the dispute relating to the election of a Pradhana and upapradhana under Sub-section (1) shall be decided by the Prescribed Judicial Officer. This is further clear by the provisions of section 284 of the Act. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 284 the Government may after previous publication make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. So if Section 43 (1) is read with Section 43 (2) and also with section 284, the intention of the legislature is clear. It provides a machinery not only for the election of the Pradhan but also for the election of the upapradhan and the machinery for resolving the disputes relating to the election of Pradhan and Upapradhan. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in a similar situation had observed as follows :"the Court will always allow the intention of a statute to override the defects of wording but the Court's ability to do so is limited by the recognised canons of interpretation. The Court may, for example, prefer an alternative "construction which is less well" fitted to the words but better fitted to the intention of the Act. But here, for the reasons given by the learned Judge, there is no alternative construction; it is simply a case of something being overlooked. The court cannot legislate for a cases omissus. To do so would be to usurp the function of the legislature (see major and St. Mellond rural District Council v. Newport corporation 1952 AC 189 ). Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. The court cannot legislate for a cases omissus. To do so would be to usurp the function of the legislature (see major and St. Mellond rural District Council v. Newport corporation 1952 AC 189 ). Where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. Even where the meaning of the statute is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word, interpolation is improper, since the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the statute (see crawford's 'constitution of Statutes', 1940 edn. P. 269 extracted in S. Narayanaswami v G. Pannerselvam, AIR 1972 SC 2284 at p. 2290, para 20 ). Undoubtedly, the court cannot put into the Act words which are no expressed, and which cannot reasonably be implied on any recognised principles of construction. That would be a work of legislation, not of construction, and outside the province of the Court (see kamalaranjan v. Secy, of State AIR 1938 pc 281 at P. 283 ). Similarly, where the words of the statute are clear it would not be open to the Court in order to obtain a desired result either to omit or add to the words of the statute. This is not the function of the Court charged with a duty of construction. This approach has, however, undergone a sea change as expressed by Denning, LJ. in Seafort court Estates ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All er 155 at P. 164 wherein he observed as under: 'when a defect appears a "judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament. . . and then he must supplement the written words so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of legislature. . . . . . A judge should as himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the national of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the national of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. ' ( 13 ) IT is obvious that in Section 43 (1) of the Act, there is an omission of the word 'upapradhan' and this Court could supply the omitted word to give full effect to the intendment of the Legislature. ( 14 ) ONE more contention that requires to be noticed is whether if the petitioners file an election petition, it would be barred by time. Whether the petition would be barred by time would be a matter for consideration by the learned Munsiff, in the light of the relevant rules of the Karnataka Mandal panchayat (Election of Pradhan and upapradhan) Rules, 1987. It is open to the petitioner to take all contentions in support of the plea that he could not have filed the election petition within time without obtaining the certified copy of the declaration declaring the result of the election. ( 15 ) WITH these observations, this petition is dismissed reserving liberty to the petitioners to work out their rights before the appropriate forum. Writ Petition Dismissed. --- *** --- .