JUDGMENT S.D. Agrawala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The property in dispute is a shop, situated in Mohalla Hathi Khana, Fatehgarh. The petitioners are the landlords of the said shop. Naresh Chandra, who has been impleaded as respondent No. 3, is the tenant of the said premises. 3. The landlords filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) for release of the accommodation in dispute. This application was contested by Naresh Chandra. Ultimately, the Prescribed Authority found that the need of the petitioners-landlords was bonafide. It was further found by the Prescribed Authority that Naresh Chandra had an alternative accommodation available with him, which is situated in Sabzi Mandi in the neighbourhood of the shop in question and that Naresh Chandra could shift his business in the said shop. 4. Aggrieved by the decision of the Prescribed Authority, Naresh Chandra filed an appeal before the District Judge. This appeal was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. Against the judgments of the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge, Naresh Chandra filed a writ petition in this Court, being Writ No. 11133 of 1984. This writ petition came up for final hearing before Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J, who, by his judgment dated 3rd October, 1985, dismissed the petition. Naresh Chandra made a prayer to this Court for grant of time to deliver possession. This Court granted four months' time to Naresh Chandra to deliver the possession to the landlords. 5. In pursuance of the order of this Court, Naresh Chandra did not deliver possession and now Mangali Prasad came on the scene, who is the own father of Naresh Chandra. He filed a suit No. 46 of 1986 in the court of Munsif, Fatehgarh, seeking an injunction for restraining the petitioners from taking possession of the property. On 23rd January, 1986, the Munsif passed an order maintaining status quo. 6. Since the Munsif was also the Prescribed Authority, an application was made before him for enforcement of the release order under Section 23 of the Act. Mangali Prasad also filed objections in the proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. On 23rd January, 1986, the Munsif passed an order maintaining status quo. 6. Since the Munsif was also the Prescribed Authority, an application was made before him for enforcement of the release order under Section 23 of the Act. Mangali Prasad also filed objections in the proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority (Munsif) heard the counsel for the landlords as well as Mangali Prasad at great length and, ultimately, by an order dated 23rd February, 1987 held that Mangali Prasad was never a tenant of the property in dispute. Consequently, the objection filed by Mangali Prasad were dismissed and the release order was directed to be enforced. The effect of this order was that the initial order passed in favour of Mangali Prasad in the Suit No. 46 of 1986 also ceased to have any effect. 7. Mangali Prasad, however, challenged the order dated 23rd February, 1987 again in this Court by means of a writ petition. This petition was also dismissed on 27th February, 1987 by Hon'ble O.P. Mehrotra, J. 8. After this Court dismissed the petition of Mangali Prasad, Mangali Prasad adopted a very unique procedure by now filing a suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Farrukhabad, being Suit No. 77 of 1987. The reliefs claimed in the suit were to the effect that he be declared a tenant in possession of the shop in question and that the order passed in the case under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act as well as the orders passed by the appellate court be declared null and void. The effect of this relief was that what Mangali Prasad sought was that the judgments delivered by this Court dismissing the two petitions be also declared as null and void by the Court. 9. In this suit, an application was made for grant of a temporary injunction restraining the landlords from proceeding with the enforcement of the release order. The Civil Judge, whose name is Hari Singh, passed an order directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession of the shop in dispute and issued notice for fixing 18th March, 1987 for hearing and disposal. This order was passed on 3rd March, 1987. The Civil Judge, whose name is Hari Singh, passed an order directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession of the shop in dispute and issued notice for fixing 18th March, 1987 for hearing and disposal. This order was passed on 3rd March, 1987. The landlords immediately filed the present petition in this Court challenging the order dated 3rd March, 1987 on the ground that the proceedings in Suit No. 77 of 1987 were nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and as such were liable to be quashed. He, consequently, further sought to quash the order dated 3rd March, 1987. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for parties. 11. Learned counsel for petitioners has contended that Suit No. 77 of 1987 filed by Mangali Prasad is nothing, but an abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has urged that no specific relief has been sought in the writ petition for quashing the proceedings in the Suit. No relief has been further sought for quashing the injunction order passed in Suit No. 46 of 1986 and that the petitioners have an alternative remedy by way of filing an appeal against the order dated 3rd March, 1987 and, as such, this Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12. I will deal first with the technical objections raised by learned counsel for the respondents. 13. In paragraph 16 of the petition, it has been categorically stated that proceedings in Suit No. 77 of 1987 are liable to be quashed. The relief, which has been sought, is a writ of prohibition from proceeding with Suit No. 77 of 1987 as it is not maintainable in law. In my opinion, after reading paragraph 16 along with the relief claimed, it is clear that the petitioners have sought for a relief of quashing the proceedings in Suit No. 77 of 1987. 14. In regard to second technical objection, since the Prescribed Authority was also the Munsif, in which Suit No. 46 of 1986 was pending and the objection of Mangali Prasad was dismissed under Section 23 of the Act, impliedly the interim order dated 23rd January, 1986 ceased to have any effect. This is also clear from the conduct of Mangali Prasad himself. This is also clear from the conduct of Mangali Prasad himself. If what is urged is correct then where was it necessary for Mangali Prasad to file a fresh suit in the court of Civil Judge and obtain an injunction order. Mangali Prasad, therefore, clearly understood that there was no order in his favour left protecting him from eviction in pursuance of a decree which had become final. 15. In regard to the last technical objection, it is not disputed that an appeal lies, but the mere fact, that there is an alternative remedy, does not absolutely bar the filing of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is always in the discretion of the High Court whether to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or, not even though an alternative remedy is available depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, seeing the lengthy proceedings, which have already been taken for the eviction of Naresh Chandra from the property in dispute, the interest of justice demands that the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. Learned counsel for petitioners has relied upon my own decision in Smt. Raj Kumari Kapoor v. Civil Judge, 1987 Allahabad Weekly Cases, 235 wherein I have held that it is open to High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the proceedings in a suit where it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. 17. The question, therefore, which has to be examined is whether Suit No. 77 of 1987 is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. 18. It is clear from the facts stated above that the release application of the landlords was allowed and after due contest, the case became final upto the High Court. Thereafter, Naresh Chandra's father woke up and started objecting the release order passed in favour of the landlords. Those proceedings also came up to the High Court and became final. Mangali Prasad initially tried to succeed in the court of Munsif, Fatehgarh. When he failed, he filed another suit now in the court of the Civil Judge, Fatehgarh. Thereafter, Naresh Chandra's father woke up and started objecting the release order passed in favour of the landlords. Those proceedings also came up to the High Court and became final. Mangali Prasad initially tried to succeed in the court of Munsif, Fatehgarh. When he failed, he filed another suit now in the court of the Civil Judge, Fatehgarh. In my opinion, this is one of those rare cases where the filing of the present suit is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court of the highest order. Civil Judge has acted most arbitrarily in granting an ad interim injunction order staying the order of the Prescribed Authority directing enforcement of the release order, which had been confirmed by the High Court. 19. In the result, I allow the petition, quash the order dated 3rd March, 1987 passed by the Civil Judge, Farrukhabad in Suit No. 77 of 1987. I also quash the proceedings in Suit No. 77 of 1987, Mangali Prasad v. Mahadevi pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Fatehgarh. The petitioners shall be entitled to costs from the respondents No. 2 and 3, which I assess at Rs. 500/- each. It is further directed that the Prescribed Authority shall enforce the release order forthwith and, if required, police force may be provided for the purpose. 20. A copy of this judgment may be given to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within four days.