JUDGMENT - G.H. GUTTAL, J.:---In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner G. Chandrashekhar Reddy---a student of the College of Engineering, Ternanagar, in District Osmanabad, seeks an order directing respondent No. 1---Marathwada University, Aurangabad---that he be held eligible for admission to the first year engineering course at the above mentioned college which is respondent No. 2 to this petition. I. The Petitioner's Case 2. The petitioner passed the Xth standard examination from Boy's Town School, Hyderabad, in Andhra Pradesh in March, 1982. The course of XIIth standard education in Andhra Pradesh is known as the Examination of the Board of Intermediate Education. It comprises of two years' course which corresponds to XIth and XIIth standards of the Maharashtra State Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board. He passed the two years' examination course in March, 1984. He was admitted to respondent No. 2---Engineering College of Ternanagar, in July 1985. The admission was subject to the grant of eligibility certificate by the Marathwada University-respondent No. 1. The petitioner was allowed to appear for the first semester examination of the first year in Engineering held by respondent No. 1 in November, 1985. He passed in some subjects and failed in some. 3. On 21st October, 1985, about a month before the first semester examination referred to above, respondent No. 1 informed respondent No. 2 where the petitioner was reading that he was not eligible for admission to the College of Engineering affiliated to the Marathwada University. The reason assigned by the University was that the petitioner had not secured 50% marks in Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together at the Examination of the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh. This communication was in reply to the letter No. CDE/85-86, dated 13-10-1985 by Principal of respondent No. 2. The petitioner represented his case to the University but it was rejected by respondent No. 1 by letter No. Ex/Elig/SNS-102/85-86/49372-75, dated 6th March, 1986, which is impugned in this petition. 4. The examination of the second semester commenced on 26th April, 1986. This petition was filed on 23rd April, 1986. The petitioner appeared for the second semester Examination pursuant to this Court's interim order made on 24th April, 1986. 5. 4. The examination of the second semester commenced on 26th April, 1986. This petition was filed on 23rd April, 1986. The petitioner appeared for the second semester Examination pursuant to this Court's interim order made on 24th April, 1986. 5. On 18th September, 1980, the Standing Committee on Equivalence of the Examinations (of the respondent No. 1) recommended to respondent No. 1 that the two years' course of the Board of Intermediate Education, Hyderabad, be recognised as equivalent to the XIIth standard examination held by the Maharashtra Higher Secondary Certificate Examination Board for the purpose of degree course. The Academic Council and the Executive Council accepted this recommendation soon thereafter. Pursuant to the powers conferred by the Marathwada University Act of 1974, respondent No. 1 has framed ordinances out of which Ordinance 310 and Ordinance 183 are relevant. Ordinance 310(2) reads as under:--- "(1) ............ (2) For admission to Engineering Degree Course a student must have passed the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination with English as one of the subjects of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education or an examination recognised as equivalent thereto, with 50% aggregate marks (45% marks in the case of Backward class students i.e. Scheduled Caste, Schedule Tribe, Denotified Tribes, Nomadic Tribes and other Backward class students) in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together." (Emphasis supplied). The petitioner had notice of this Ordinance presumably through the printed application form. 6. Ordinance No. 183 proclaimed by respondent No. 1 provides that no student who has not produced his final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term after joining the College will be granted the term. Clause (ii) of the Ordinance also provides for the grant of provisional eligibility certificate to the candidates "found prima facie eligible according to the norms laid down" by the University. Such provisional eligibility certificate may be granted to the candidate if he is "found prima facie eligible according to the norms laid down" by the Marathwada University. Clause (ii) also goes on to provide that provisional eligibility certificate is granted on condition that the candidate shall obtain a final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term. Such provisional eligibility certificate may be granted to the candidate if he is "found prima facie eligible according to the norms laid down" by the Marathwada University. Clause (ii) also goes on to provide that provisional eligibility certificate is granted on condition that the candidate shall obtain a final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term. Clause (iii) of Ordinance 183 reiterates that a student who fails to obtain final eligibility certificate till the end of the first term (a) shall not be granted the term and (b) shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examinations. 7. The Examination of the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh which has been recognised by respondent No. 1 as equivalent to the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination (XIIth standard) of Maharashtra Board is a two years' course which is equivalent to the combined courses of XIth and XIIth standards. The first year course is known as 'Paper-I' and corresponds to XIth standard. The second year course is known as "Paper-II" and corresponds to XIIth standard. In the first year course, Paper-I of the Board in Andhra Pradesh, the student is not examined in practicals. The practicals are held as part of Paper-II examination. In the corresponding course in Maharashtra, practicals are held in each of the two years namely; XIth standard and XIIth standard. The syllabi for Papers I and II of the Board of Intermediate Education Andhra Pradesh, taken as a whole correspond to the XIIth standard or Higher Secondary Certificate Examination in Maharashtra. Some subjects taught in XIIth standard in Maharashtra are not taught in the first year examination Paper-I---of the Board of Intermediate Education in the Andhra Pradesh. The Regulations of the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh annexed to the affidavit of the Registrar of respondent No. 1 reveal that the two year course of the Board in Andhra Pradesh is an integrated course in secondary education. The results are based on consideration of the performance of a candidate during both these years. The Regulations of the Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh annexed to the affidavit of the Registrar of respondent No. 1 reveal that the two year course of the Board in Andhra Pradesh is an integrated course in secondary education. The results are based on consideration of the performance of a candidate during both these years. The marks which the petitioner secured in Paper-I (XIth standard) and Paper-II (XIIth standard) are as under:--- Paper I Paper II Subject ----------------------------------------------------------- Maximum Marks Maximum Marks Marks obtained Marks obtained Maths 150 073 150 067 Physics Theory 50 023 50 028 Physics Practical 50 029 Chemistry Theory 50 020 50 020 Chemistry Practical 50 035 250 116 350 179 295/600 = 49.1% 8. Two facts must be borne in mind before we set out the points raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner. Firstly, the petitioner has not pleaded that he was granted provisional eligibility certificate. Secondly, he has not pleaded that the percentage of marks, secured by him at the Examination calculated by respondent No. 1 for the purpose of admission is not correct. He has not stated in the petition as to how the percentage of marks calculated by respondent No. 1 is illegal. However, by consent of Counsel for the University, the petitioner was permitted to urge this point, though the requisite, factual information has not been set out in the petition. II. Points Urged 9. Mr. Khandare, learned Counsel for the petitioner, who argued with care and preservance, urged two points:--- (1) Respondent No. 1---Marathwada University---permitted the petitioner to appear for first semester Examination. The University did not take the action referred to in Ordinance 183. Having permitted the petitioner to appear for the first semester Examination, respondent No. 1 is now estopped from urging that the petitioner is not eligible for admission to the Engineering course. (ii) The calculation of percentage of marks for the purposes of Ordinance 310 has been made on the basis of "extra weightage" given to the marks in Mathematics at the Examination of Board of Intermediate Education of Andhra Pradesh. The students who have passed XIIth standard examination from a college in Maharashtra receive marks out of 100. If the "extra weightage" is not ignored the candidates who passed the Examination of the Maharashtra Board of Higher Secondary Certificate Examination receive an advantage which is denied to the petitioner. The students who have passed XIIth standard examination from a college in Maharashtra receive marks out of 100. If the "extra weightage" is not ignored the candidates who passed the Examination of the Maharashtra Board of Higher Secondary Certificate Examination receive an advantage which is denied to the petitioner. The computation of percentage for the purposes of Ordinance 310 should be made by ignoring this inequality caused by the "extra weightage". If this is done, the petitioner secures 50% of the marks in the three subjects in question. III. Ordinances Nos. 310(2) and 183 Construction 10. The Ordinances in question have been proclaimed in exercise of the statutory authority of the University. The true meaning and effect of these Ordinances is important for determining the questions arising in this petition. Ordinance 310(2) lays down that for the purpose of admission a student "must have acquired certain qualifications". They are: (i) Higher Secondary Certificate Examination with English as one of the subjects; (ii) 50% of aggregate marks in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together; (iii) the above marks must have been secured at the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination held by the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education or an "examination recognised as equivalent thereto". The word used is 'must' and not 'may'. Therefore, the draftsmen of the Ordinance meant that a student must possess these qualifications. 11. Ordinance No. 183 is closely related to Ordinance No. 310, inasmuch as , it gives effect to a basic requirement of Ordinance No. 310. The subject of this Ordinance is eligibility certificate. It is a certificate issued by the University of Marathwada to students seeking admission to its courses. Ordinance 183(ii) empowers the Registrar to issue a provisional eligibility certificate if the applicant is 'prima facie' eligible according to the norms laid down by the University. Then it enjoins the candidate to obtain final eligibility certificate. For this purpose a dead-line is fixed. The dead line is "the end of the first term". Thus, while Ordinance 310(2) prescribes the minimum qualifications for entry into the course. Ordinance 183(ii) demands of a student that he shall produce final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term. Fixing of this dead-line is consistent with the imperative character and content of the two Ordinances. The draftsmen of the Ordinances have not left the interpreter in any doubt of their intent. Ordinance 183(ii) demands of a student that he shall produce final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term. Fixing of this dead-line is consistent with the imperative character and content of the two Ordinances. The draftsmen of the Ordinances have not left the interpreter in any doubt of their intent. Clause (iii) of Ordinance 183 lays down the consequences of the failure to produce the final eligibility certificate. If a student fails to obtain final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term, he "shall not be granted that term". Thus, the two Ordinances read together contain an imperative command that the student must be eligible for admission according to the norms laid down by the University which in the circumstances mean the basic minimum qualifications referred to in. The design of Ordinances is that there shall not be any student in the University who does not possess the minimum qualification prescribed by Ordinance 310(2) and should there be one who has been provisionally admitted he shall not be granted the first term unless he produces the final eligibility certificate. The language used by the draftsmen of the Ordinances clearly spells out a command that in all situations, the requirement of minimum qualifications and eligibility certificate shall be fulfilled. One test for determining whether the Ordinances are mandatory is to consider the consequences of its disobedience. If a candidate does not produce the eligibility certificate, the consequence provided is that he shall not be granted the term. 12. In our opinion, the draftsmen of the Ordinances have deliberately used the word 'must' to mean an imperative command. They have deliberately provided the consequence of dis-regarding Ordinance 310(2) by enacting Ordinance 183 which empowers the University to refuse to grant the term. The two Ordinances read together admit of no exception nor do they leave any discretion to the authorities. 13. The Ordinances read together require that a candidate has to secure aggregate marks of 50% in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together. We will explain the meaning of the word "aggregate" in a later part of this judgment. IV. Estoppel---Application to this Case 14. It is an admitted position that the petitioner has not been granted provisional eligibility certificate. Admittedly, the final eligibility certificate has not been granted by respondent No. 1. We will explain the meaning of the word "aggregate" in a later part of this judgment. IV. Estoppel---Application to this Case 14. It is an admitted position that the petitioner has not been granted provisional eligibility certificate. Admittedly, the final eligibility certificate has not been granted by respondent No. 1. By letter dated 21st October, 1985, written by respondent No. 1 the Principal of the College where the petitioner was learning was informed that the petitioner was not eligible for admission to the first Engineering Course on the grounds already stated. Thus the University has taken the step which it was expected to take under Ordinance 183. Its role in regard to the grant of eligibility certificate concluded with the issue of that letter. These facts should be borne in mind for considering whether respondent No. 1 is now estopped from urging the ineligibility of the petitioner for admission on the ground that he has not secured 50% of aggregate marks in the three subjects. 15. The consent of estoppel may be first spelt out. We quote the principles of estoppel from "Administrative Law" by H.W.R. Wade (Fifth Edition, p. 232). "The basic principle of estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation of fact causes another to act to his detriment in reliance on the truth of it, is not allowed to deny it later, even though it is wrong. Justice here prevails over truth." The limits of the doctrine of estopped must always be borne in mind. To quote H.W.R. Wade again (Page 233) : "In public law the most obvious limitation on the doctrine of estoppel is that it cannot be invoked so as to give an authority powers which it does not in law possess. In other words, no estoppel can legitimate action which is ultra vires." Finally, the power of the Authority is the limiting factor. Again at page 235, H.W.R. Wade : "It has often been laid down that no amount of waiver or consent can extend a public authority's powers or validate action which is ultra vires". These are the basic principles which govern the application of the rule of estoppel. 16. The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 1 represented to him a certain fact. Respondent No. 1 represented to the petitioner the facts which have been referred to in Ordinance 183. These are the basic principles which govern the application of the rule of estoppel. 16. The petitioner alleges that respondent No. 1 represented to him a certain fact. Respondent No. 1 represented to the petitioner the facts which have been referred to in Ordinance 183. Respondent No. 1 represented that the petitioner could appear for the Examination of the first semester provided he obtains the eligibility certificate. This was well within the authority of respondent No. 1. But there was no representation by respondent No. 1 that they have given up the requirement of eligibility for admission laid down in Ordinance 310(2). The representation was that the petitioner may, subject to the production of the eligibility certificate, appear for the examination. If the doctrine of estoppel is applied, all that respondent No. 1 may now be required to do is that the petitioner student should be allowed to appear for the examination. They cannot be prevented from urging that the petitioner is not eligible for admission to the course because no such representation was made by them. Secondly, the representation which respondent No. 1 is supposed to have made has not been acted upon to the petitioner's detriment. In this case the question of detriment do not rise because the petitioner benefited by such representation and in fact appeared for the first semester examination. 17. The authority of the respondent No. 1 in the matter of eligibility of candidates and the grant of provisional eligibility certificate is circumscribed by Ordinance 183 and Ordinance 310. Clause (i) of Ordinance 183 is couched in a commanding language and enjoins the University that no student who has not produced his final eligibility certificate before the end of the first term after joining a college shall be granted the term. Under Clause (iii) a student who fails to obtain the final eligibility certificate shall not be granted that term. Not only this but the clause goes on to say that such a candidate shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examination of the University. The University, therefore, does not possess any discretion of waiving the production of the eligibility certificate. There is a mandate of Ordinance 310 that no such student shall be granted the term. Not only this but the clause goes on to say that such a candidate shall not be allowed to appear for the respective examination of the University. The University, therefore, does not possess any discretion of waiving the production of the eligibility certificate. There is a mandate of Ordinance 310 that no such student shall be granted the term. While he may be permitted to appear for the examination on production of a provisional eligibility certificate, the Ordinance requires that the student shall produce the final eligibility certificate before the end of the term. These provisions leave no discretion to relax the requirement of eligibility certificate which, in turn, is based on the acquisition 50% of aggregate marks in the three subjects. Thus, acceptance of the argument of the petitioner would result in the enlargement of the authority of respondent No. 1 and would clearly offend the law of estoppel. Ordinance 310(2) lays down the basic minimum qualifications for admission to the first year of Engineering course. The petitioner and the respondent No. 1 are equally bound by this Ordinance. No scope for exceptions or relaxation is discernible from a reading of this Ordinance. To hold that the respondent No. 1 cannot now insist upon the eligibility certificate based upon the marks at the Intermediate Examination of the Board of Andhra Pradesh to is confer on respondent No. 1 the authority to relax Ordinance 310(2). The University does not possess such an authority. The doctrine of estoppel does not operate to extend the powers of the University to transgress the Ordinance. Therefore, application of the rule of estoppel to the facts of this case would result in conferring on the Respondent No. 1 a power which does not possess. 18. In our opinion, therefore, there was no representation by respondent No. 1 that they would give up the requirement of the eligibility certificate. Even if they did, that would be beyond their powers. Consequently, therefore, the doctrine of estoppel has no application. Secondly, in the context, of the authority of respondent No. 1 under Ordinance 183 and Ordinance 310(2), the application of the doctrine of estoppel would result in the enlargement of the authority of respondent No. 1 granted to it by the statutory ordinances. 19. Three judicial authorities have been cited in connection with this point. Secondly, in the context, of the authority of respondent No. 1 under Ordinance 183 and Ordinance 310(2), the application of the doctrine of estoppel would result in the enlargement of the authority of respondent No. 1 granted to it by the statutory ordinances. 19. Three judicial authorities have been cited in connection with this point. (Dileep v. The Marathwada University)1, 84 Mh.L.R. 454 was the case of a student who had secured 37% of aggregate marks in his B.A. examination of the Bombay University. First of all, he joined that New Law College in Bombay, where the University had not fixed the minimum number of qualifying marks for admission to the Degree Course in Law. He came to Aurangabad and sought admission to the Law College. Meanwhile, the Marathwada University had fixed minimum of 45% of marks for admission to the Degree Course in law. In that case, the question which fell for consideration was different. The petitioner was denied admission because of a purely fortuitous circumstance that the University of Bombay had not framed the Rules requiring minimum marks for admission which it was required to do pursuant to a resolution of the Bar Council of India. In our opinion, this judgment has no application to the facts of this case. 20. In (Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra)2, A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 376, Shri Krishan---the appellant before the Supreme Court, was permitted to appear for the examination. The eligibility to appear for the examination depended upon the minimum number of days of attendance of the classes. Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University which fell for consideration before the Supreme Court did not refer to the qualifications for admission to a course but to eligibility to appear at the examination. Having permitted the appellant in that case to appear at the Examination, it was held that the University had no power to prevent him from seeking the results of his examination. The reason for the Supreme Court's view was that the process of appearance at the examinations under Ordinance X had worked itself out and presented a fait accompli. In the present case the facts are different. In our opinion, the judgment has no application so far as this submission of the petitioner is concerned. We will have occasion to refer to this judgment a little later when we consider the second submission made by Mr. Khandare. 21. In the present case the facts are different. In our opinion, the judgment has no application so far as this submission of the petitioner is concerned. We will have occasion to refer to this judgment a little later when we consider the second submission made by Mr. Khandare. 21. The case nearer to the facts of this case is (Dilip Singh Yadav v. The Pracharya and Adhikshak Sri Lal Bahadur Shastri Smarka Rajkiya Ayurved Maha Vidyalaya, Handi and others)3, A.I.R. 1986 Allahabad 158. The Allahabad High Court observed: "The condition precedent for admitting him was that he must have passed Intermediate Examination of the U.P. Board of equivalent examination in Sanskrit. This is the requirement of law. There is no estoppel against law. The argument fails." We follow the decision of the Allahabad High Court because it is based on the doctrine of estoppel followed everywhere. Since the doctrine of estoppel cannot be involved to enlarge the authority of a public body, the Allahabad High Court rightly held that there is no estoppel against law. V. RULE OF AVERAGES---REMOVAL OF WEIGHTAGE ARE EXTRANEOUS NOTIONS 22. Coming to the second point urged by Mr. Khandare, the substance of his argument is this: In the XII standard examination held by the Maharashtra Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education, the marks for the subjects of Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry are out of 100. All subjects have thus equal "weightage". In the Examination held by the Intermediate Board of Hyderabad, the paper in Mathematics carries 150 marks and the papers of Physics and Chemistry carries 50 marks during each year. The extra weightage given to Mathematics by the Board of Intermediate Education, Hyderabad, should be ignored because this "unequal weightage" deprives the students from Andhra Pradesh of the opportunity of equal evaluation for the purpose of computation of marks under Ordinance 310(2). As a part of this submission, it is said that Ordinance 310(2) refers to "equivalence of examinations" and not "equivalence of marks". Therefore, according to Mr. Khandare, the marks in Mathematics should be reduced "out of 100" so that the weightage is equalised. As a part of this submission, it is said that Ordinance 310(2) refers to "equivalence of examinations" and not "equivalence of marks". Therefore, according to Mr. Khandare, the marks in Mathematics should be reduced "out of 100" so that the weightage is equalised. In support of this submission strong reliance is placed on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in (A.R.G.V. Shriniwas Reddy v. The Marathwada University and others)4, (Writ Petition No. 195 of 1986, decided on 25th July, 1986, by M.S. Jamdar and M.S. Ratnaparkhi, JJ.), reported in 1986(3) Bom.C.R. 347 . In that case the petitioner Shriniwas Reddy had passed the Intermediate Examination of the Board in Andhra Pradesh in 1984 and obtained the following marks: Mathematics 141 out of 300 Physics 84 out of 150 Chemistry 72 out of 150 ------------------ Total: 297 out of 600 ------------------- We have calculated by the process adopted by the petitioner the percentages which he may receive if the maximum marks in each subject are calculated as out of 150. By the process of "equalisation" by bringing the marks to out of 100, he gets 150 out of 300 bringing the percentage to 50%. By equalising the maximum marks and the marks obtained for Physics, Mathematics and Chemistry, he gets 225 out of 450 which makes 50%. 23. The rationale of the judgment in Shriniwas Reddy's case (supra) must be examined before we proceed to consider its acceptance. Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., observed : "In calculating the percentage of aggregate marks required for admission to the engineering degree course as per Clause (2) of Ordinance 310, the University committed a basic error of ignoring the position that while in the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination held by the Board of Higher Secondary Education in the State of Maharashtra the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics are given equal weightage, in the sense, that in each of these subjects the maximum number of marks is the same, viz. 100." The judgment then goes on to argue : "This extra weightage given to the paper of Mathematics has to be ignored". 100." The judgment then goes on to argue : "This extra weightage given to the paper of Mathematics has to be ignored". The judgment spells out the reason for adopting this course by observing : "If this is not done, it would operate as favourable discrimination in favour of the students showing better performance in Mathematics." Finally, the rationale of their view is found in the following sentence : "It must be remembered that the equivalence is of the examinations and not of the percentage as mentioned in the relevant clause of the Ordinance". 24. Thus, analysing the judgment of the Division Bench, we find that in their opinion 50% marks secured by a candidate in the three subjects, where the maximum marks for each subject are 100, is not equivalent to 50% of the marks secured by a candidate where the weightage is "disproportionate" as in the examination of Intermediate Education Board of Andhra Pradesh. That is why they held that the marks obtained by the candidate who appeared in the examination of Intermediate Education Board should be ascertained "on uniform basis". Only then the percentage of aggregate marks "for the purpose of Ordinance 310" can be arrived at. Finally, they held that this method would require that the three subjects are "treated equally" as is done in the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination of Maharashtra. The Division Bench then proceeded to justify its view on the basis of a rule characterised by them as "rule of averages" which contemplates removal of "disproportionate weightage". 25. We have given careful, anxious and respectful consideration to the view taken by Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ. For this purpose we postponed the judgment till this date. However, with respect, we are unable to agree with the view held by them. We owe some reasons for this dissent. The reasons are in paragraphs 26 to 32 below. 26. While construing Ordinance 310(2), Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., observed: "Equivalence of examinations and not of marks is of significance". This is undoubtedly so. But by resorting to the method adopted by them for calculating 50% of aggregate marks they have, in reality, tried to equalise the percentage of marks and not of the examinations. 26. While construing Ordinance 310(2), Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., observed: "Equivalence of examinations and not of marks is of significance". This is undoubtedly so. But by resorting to the method adopted by them for calculating 50% of aggregate marks they have, in reality, tried to equalise the percentage of marks and not of the examinations. Now it is common ground that the examination of the Intermediate Board of Education of Andhra Pradesh was recognised as equivalent to the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination of Maharashtra as far back as in 1980. The process of equalisation was completed in 1980 and there was no question of equalisation of two examinations. To reproduce the words of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishnan's case (supra) "the process of equivalence of examinations had worked itself out" in 1980. What the judgment under reference did was to equalise the marks and percentages. We thus see antithesis between the statement that the equivalence of examinations is of significance and the process of calculation resorted to by them. 27. The concept of equality of examinations does not fall for consideration at the stage of compliance with Ordinance 310(2). Ordinance 310(2) has two essentials: (i) the candidate must have passed the examination "recognised as equivalent to" the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination Board in Maharashtra and (ii) the marks obtained by him in Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry taken together should be 50% in the aggregate. When the University commenced the scrutiny of the application of the petitioner, it did not have to "equalise the examination" for that job was completed in 1980. All that it had to do was to see whether the petitioner had acquired 50% of marks in Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry taken together. The Marathwada University recognised the Andhra Pradesh Intermediate Board of Education as equivalent to the Higher Secondary Certificate Examination of Maharashtra. What criteria went into this recognition is not known because no material is placed before us nor was it placed before Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ. But the Resolution of the Standing Committee dated 18-9-1980 which is part of the proceedings of this writ petition amply proves that the syllabus of the examination held by the Intermediate Board of Education was considered by the University. Secondly, the University took into account the fact that the examination of Intermediate Board of Education an integrated course of the two years. Secondly, the University took into account the fact that the examination of Intermediate Board of Education an integrated course of the two years. The examinations in the two years together made the certificate examination. Thus at the stage when the examination of Intermediate Board of Education, Andhra Pradesh, was recognised, the relative merits of the syllabi and the opinion of an expert namely: the Dean of the Faculty of Science was considered. It is then that the examination was recognised as equivalent to the examination of Higher Secondary Certificate Examination of Maharashtra Board. For these reasons, while construing Ordinance 310(2) at the stage of admission of a candidate to a college the consideration of equivalence does not arise because it is an accomplished fact. The only fact which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner has secured 50 percent of aggregate marks. 28. It is useful at this stage to understand the meaning of the English word "aggregate". It is necessary to refer to the meaning of this word because the Ordinance refers to it and in our opinion, it does not permit introduction of notions like the rule of averages. The Oxford Universal Dictionary (1981) assigns the following meaning to the word "aggregate": "(a) to collect or form into an aggregate to unite, (b) (informal) to amount to (a total) aggregation---noun". In the Law Laxicon by Venkataramaiya, 1986, 2nd Edition, the meaning of the word "aggregate" has been assigned on the basis of Wharton's Law Laxicon. The meaning of this expression "aggregate" is : "A collection of individuals units or things in order to form a whole". Thus, the word "aggregate" is a word of common use. When the Ordinance uses the word "aggregate" it means aggregate or the total. It means the union of all the figures forming the marks in the different subjects. For this reason the idea of equalisation introduced in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, referred to above, is not a part of what the framers of the Ordinance intended. The concept of "equalisation" based on what has been characterised as "rule of averages" or the concept of "removal of weightage" are extraneous to the application and meaning of the word "aggregate" employed in the Ordinance. 29. The rules of averages has been resorted to in an attempt to remove the inequality supposed to have been created by "unequal weightage". The concept of "equalisation" based on what has been characterised as "rule of averages" or the concept of "removal of weightage" are extraneous to the application and meaning of the word "aggregate" employed in the Ordinance. 29. The rules of averages has been resorted to in an attempt to remove the inequality supposed to have been created by "unequal weightage". No authority of any academic writer or of judicial decision in support of this method of equalisation has been shown to us nor was it placed before Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ. We are not equipped with the expertise to apply our notions of evaluation of the performance in the academic examinations on the basis of such a rule. The academic specialists whose minds have gone into the recognition of the examination and framing of the Ordinances are the best persons to calculate the marks in accordance with plain meaning of the Ordinance. They have understood what is meant by "aggregate". They have taken a common-sense view of that word to mean the total or sum of the marks. This was not only natural but the inevitable course in the circumstances of the case. 30. The judgment then introduces the idea of ignoring "extra weightage" given to the subject of Mathematics in the examination held by the Intermediate Board of Education, Andhra Pradesh. In para 8 of the judgment, there is a clue as to how this is done. In the case of students of Higher Secondary Certificate Examination of Maharashtra the students are required to state in the form "the marks secured by him out of 100 in each of three subjects". Thus, it appears, Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., considered that the student of Intermediate Board of Education, Andhra Pradesh, should convert his marks into a "out of 100". If this is not so, the reference to out of 100 marks secured by the student in Maharashtra was unnecessary. If such conversion is made the following position emerges so far as the case of the petitioner is concerned. Paper Paper-II ------------------------------------------------------ Subjects Max. Marks Out of Max Marks Out of Marks obtained 100 Marks Obtained 100 Mathematics 150 73 48.3 150 067 44.6 Physics 50 023 46.0 50 028 56.0 theory Physics 50 029 58.0 Practicals. Chemistry 50 020 40.0 50 020 40.0 theory. Chemistry 50 035 70.0 Practicals. Paper Paper-II ------------------------------------------------------ Subjects Max. Marks Out of Max Marks Out of Marks obtained 100 Marks Obtained 100 Mathematics 150 73 48.3 150 067 44.6 Physics 50 023 46.0 50 028 56.0 theory Physics 50 029 58.0 Practicals. Chemistry 50 020 40.0 50 020 40.0 theory. Chemistry 50 035 70.0 Practicals. 134.3 268.6 Average 44.7 53.7 Aggregate (44.7+53.7) 2= 49.2% But the judgment of the Division Bench lays down no such method of equalisation by "removal of the extra weightage". There is no clue in the judgment as to what method exactly was chosen by Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., to resort to the methodology of equalisation. Even if the method which can be guessed from the judgment is accepted, the result does not make 50% of the aggregate marks to the petitioner. In other words, the Division Bench judgment does not help us to decide on the exact methodology for the purpose of calculation of the percentage of marks. 31. We have gone through the facts of the case of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 195 of 1986 to understand whether he expected the above mentioned method. The petitioner did not claim that his marks should be converted to out of 100 as in Maharashtra. He calculated the percentages by accepting the "extra weightage" which was not what Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ., did. In para 4 of his petition the petitioner calculated the percentage of marks of each subject on the basis of maximum marks of 300 for Mathematics and 150 each for Physics and Chemistry. Thus, "removal of the weightage" was not a part of his case. In fact, he wanted the benefit of the extra weightage given in the intermediate Examination of Andhra Pradesh. 32. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view held by Jamdar and Ratnaparkhi, JJ. The Division Bench has extended the decision in Shri Krishnan's case, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 376 to the cases like the one before us and held that the University having permitted the petitioner to appear for the examination was not competent to deny the eligibility certificate. We propose to analyse the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishnan's case in order that we understand it correctly. Shri Krishan was to appear for Part II examination in law in April, 1973. Forms were sent in December, 1972. We propose to analyse the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishnan's case in order that we understand it correctly. Shri Krishan was to appear for Part II examination in law in April, 1973. Forms were sent in December, 1972. Provisional certificate of attendance and not of eligibility was granted. He appeared for the examination but the result was withheld as his provisional certificate of attendance and (not eligibility for admission) was cancelled in July, 1973, a month after the examination was held. Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University lays down that such provisional certificate as to attendance of lecturers "can be withdrawn at any time before the examination". In this context, the Supreme Court held that once the candidate is allowed to appear for the examination without withdrawal of the certificate of attendance, the "statute has worked itself out" and he cannot subsequently be refused admission to the examination. Now the distinction between Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University and Ordinances 183 and 310 of the Marathwada University must not be lost sight of. If we do this, the perspective will be lost. Ordinance X of the Kurukshetra University did not refer to the qualifications for admissions to a course of education. But it refers to the eligibility to appear at the examination by reason of attendance of the classes. Shri Krishan possessed the basic qualification for admission to the college. But he was deficient in attendance of the classes. This is the distinguishing feature which makes the ratio inapplicable to the case before us. Therefore, the question of basic minimum marks which made a candidate eligible for admission to the college did not fall for consideration before the Supreme Court. VI. Limits of Judicial Interference 33. Lastly, one must bear in mind that the Supreme Court in cases decided not so long ago has cautioned us against venturing into area where the courts do not possess the expertise. Academic bodies like the University examine the equivalence of courses of different Universities and evolve criteria for recognition and equivalence of examinations. As in this case, the syllabi are studied analytically and criteria are laid down. Academic bodies like the University examine the equivalence of courses of different Universities and evolve criteria for recognition and equivalence of examinations. As in this case, the syllabi are studied analytically and criteria are laid down. In (Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University and another)5, A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court 1448, the Supreme Court observed : "It is for each University to decide the question of equivalence of examinations and it would not be right for the Supreme Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the University because it is not a matter on which the Court possesses any expertise. The University is best fitted to decide whether any examination held by a University outside the State is equivalent to an examination held within the State having regard to the courses, the syllabus, the quality of teaching or instruction and the standard of examination. It is an academic question in which the Court should not disturb the decision taken by the University." In (Principal, Patna College, Patna and others v. Kalyan Srinivas Raman)6, A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 707 the candidate had not completed the attendance in lectures, practicals and tutorials as required by the Regulations. The Regulations required 75 percent attendance in the lectures, practicals and tutorials. The candidate contended that the percentage of 75 should be calculated after taking into account the lectures, practicals and tutorials collectively and not individually. The University successfully urged before the Supreme Court that the attendance of 75% has to be fulfilled with reference to the individual subject like lectures, practicals and tutorials. Rejecting the construction urged by the candidate which was accepted by the High Court, the Supreme Court held : "It is hardly necessary to emphasise that in dealing with matters relating to orders passed by authorities of educational institutions under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court should normally be very slow to pass ex parte interim orders, because matters falling within the jurisdiction of the educational authorities should normally be left to their decision, and the High Court should interfere with them only in the interests of justice. Even on the merits, we think we ought to point that where the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by the Academic Council of a University, the High Court should normally be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of two constructions, and it would generally not be expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulation appears to the High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it is pleased to accept." (Emphasis supplied) 34. There is one more judgment of the Supreme Court which cautions us against interference in such cases by introducing our own notions. In (K.P. Ganguly v. University of Lucknow and others)7, A.I.R. 1984 Supreme Court 186 the High Court dealing with the case of admission to post- graduate course in M.D./M.S. relied on the fact that in view of the increase in population and orthopaedic cases, the college must have persons with special qualifications. The High Court went on to hold that the candidate holding a diploma must be treated as having special qualifications. The Supreme Court's caution was in these words : "The High Court could not devise its own criterion for admission. Since the academic body has made the marks obtained in M.B.B.S. examination the criterion, admission had to be made by such a criterion. The High Court could not have introduced its own notions in such an academic matter. The High Court was not competent to do so and had no jurisdiction to import its own ideology". 35. Having regard to these judgments and other material referred to above by us we are of the opinion that the introduction of a new mode of arriving at the aggregate marks referred to in Ordinance 310(2) is totally foreign to the true meaning of Ordinance 310(2). The rule of average may in some cases appear to be reasonable but Ordinance 310 requires "aggregate marks". The meaning of the word "aggregate" leaves no alternative but to compute the marks on the basis of simple addition and calculation of the percentage. The Ordinance does not refer to any other notion of calculation of marks. The rule of average may in some cases appear to be reasonable but Ordinance 310 requires "aggregate marks". The meaning of the word "aggregate" leaves no alternative but to compute the marks on the basis of simple addition and calculation of the percentage. The Ordinance does not refer to any other notion of calculation of marks. For instance, the words "after equalisation" and "removal of extra weightage" do not occur after the words "aggregate". Introducing this notion is, in our opinion re-writing Ordinance 310(2). While the ultimate function of interpretation of statutes and instruments is left to the courts, we do not possess the authority to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the draftsmen of the Ordinance. It is not open to us to introduce these notions into the cases which are primarily within the domain of academic bodies like the University. VII. Conclusions and Order (i) The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked in the circumstances of this case because the application of that doctrine to the facts of this case would result in the enlargement of the powers of the University. The doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked so as to give a public authority the power which it does not possess. (ii) Having regard to the facts of the case, there was no representation made by the University to the petitioner that they would not require the eligibility certificate from the petitioner. Nor has the petitioner acted to his detriment by virtue of any representation made by the University. The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable. (iii) The word "aggregate" simply means the "total" or "sum" of the marks secured by a candidate in different subjects. The rule of averages or the notion of removal of weightage relied upon by the petitioner is extraneous to the construction of Ordinance 310(2) and has no application. (iv) Since the petitioner has not secured 50% of aggregate marks in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics taken together he is not eligible for admission to the Engineering Course of respondent No. 1. O R D E R The petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order at no costs. Petition dismissed. -----