JUDGMENT K.C. Agarwal, J. - This is a plaintiffs' appeal under Order 43 Rule l(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment of the Civil Judge, Pilibhit, dated 31st May, 1985, partly dismissing the application for injunction made by the plaintiff-appellants. 2. The brief facts of the case are these. The plaintiffs claim themselves to be the owners over the trees situated in the plots detailed at the foot of the plaint which are situated in village Bailha Muhal Surkh Zadeed, district Pilibhit. They alleged that they are the owners of the trees standing on the land to the extent of the shares disclosed in paragraph 9 of the plaint and that defendant nos. 1 and 11, Ejazul Hasan Khan and Haji Mohammad Shamsul Hasan Khan, respectively, who were the joint owners of the trees standing on the plots aforesaid along with the trees standing on the plots aforesaid along with the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 9 were threatening to cut away the trees and, therefore, they were liable to be injucted from doing so. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant no. 1 Aijazul Hasan Khan along with defendants 1 and 11 had cut down 300 trees standing on the aforesaid plots recently without the consent of the plaintiffs and other co-owners and, as such, they were entitled to injunction restraining the defendants from either cutting, removing, selling, selling or transferring the same. 3. The plaintiffs also moved an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction. This application, which has numbered as 6-5, was supported by an affidavit. The notices were issued and ex parte injunction was granted on 1-4-1985 whereby defendants 1 and 11 were restrained from interfering with the trees standing on the plots in dispute and were also restrained from cutting them. 4. Defendants 1 and 11 filed their written statements denying the title of the plaintiffs over the trees standing on the land in question. They asserted that by means of the two deeds, the plots underneath the trees had been gifted or donated to the Bhudan Committee and that neither had the plaintiffs nor the defendants any right over the same. The trees standing on the plots donated belonged to two waqfs of one of which defendant no. They asserted that by means of the two deeds, the plots underneath the trees had been gifted or donated to the Bhudan Committee and that neither had the plaintiffs nor the defendants any right over the same. The trees standing on the plots donated belonged to two waqfs of one of which defendant no. 1 was the Mutawalli whereas defendant 11 was the Mutawalli of the other waqf. In both the written statements, the assertion that either defendant no. 1 or defendant no. 11 intended to cut away the trees was denied. Paragraph 24 of the written statement of defendant no. 1 is as under : "That it is wrong that the defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 11 are in collusion or they are trying to cut away the trees." To the same effect was the plea raised by defendant no. 11. The defendant no. 1 while denying the right of the plaintiffs over the trees claimed that none of the parties had any share in the Waqfs created in favour of the Allah Tala. Both the defendants 1 and 11 filed objections contesting the application for interim injunction. 5. The trial court, as stated earlier, initially granted interim injunction in its entirely. But subsequently, vacated the same partly by holding that the plaintiffs had no prima facie case and connection with the plots of Haji Mohammad Shamsul Hasan Khan, defendant 11 and as such, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the confirmation of the injunction granted on 1-4-1985 as against the said defendant. While doing so, the trial court held : "Since the ex parte injunction dated 1-4-1985 has been passed also regarding the plots comprising exclusive share of Sri Shamsul Hasan Khan and therefore, the order dated 1-4-1985 is bound to be modified and the trees standing on the plots held and occupied by Shri Shamsul Hasan Khan is bound to be excluded, from the scope of ex parte injunction order dated 1-4-1985. 6. Against the order of the Civil Judge partly vacating the injunction order, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs. 7. In the impugned judgment, the court below had given a direction that the defendants 1 and 11 would be at liberty to cut down and sell trees after having obtained permission of the Forest Department under the Rules provided they deposit 12 of the sale price received from the same. 7. In the impugned judgment, the court below had given a direction that the defendants 1 and 11 would be at liberty to cut down and sell trees after having obtained permission of the Forest Department under the Rules provided they deposit 12 of the sale price received from the same. The price deposit will be paid to the plaintiffs if they ultimately win the suit. 8. Submitting in support of the appeal, Sri Swami Dayal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs urged that as the trees standing on the land were joint, the court below committed an error in modifying the interim injunction dated 1-4-1985 and in rejecting the application in so far as it sought the prayer as against defendant no. 11. 9. We have gone through the record and find from the written statements of the two defendants as well as the plaint that there is a serious dispute between the parties with regard to the title of the trees standing on the land. The plaintiffs claimed that they were the owners of the trees standing on the plots, the details of which have been given at the foot of the plaint whereas defendants 1 and 11 asserted that the trees belonged to the two Waqfs created by their predecessors-in-interest. On the state of facts, it was not possible for the court below her for us in the High Court to hold that the plaintiffs had no prima facie case in their favour. The fact that the Court below granted the injunction against defendant no. is indicative that it was satisfied about the prima facie case of the plaintiffs. The injunction against defendant 11 was denied on the finding the plaintiffs did not claim ownership on the trees of the waqf of which defendant no. 11 Shamshul Hasan Khan, was the Mutawalli. To that extent the court below may be right but in the absence of any division or disclosure of the trees which belonged to the Waqfs of defendant no. 11, it was not possible for the Civil Judge without taking evidence and carefully scrutinising and considering as to which of the trees belonged to the said defendant 11 and which others belonged to the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 10. In the written statement of defendant no. 11, it was not possible for the Civil Judge without taking evidence and carefully scrutinising and considering as to which of the trees belonged to the said defendant 11 and which others belonged to the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 10. In the written statement of defendant no. 2 as well, there was only vague assertion without a clearcut commitment about the trees which belonged to the said defendant exclusively. The written statement of the said defendant if read along with that of defendant no. 1 and the plaintiff's plaint, would lead to the conclusion that the plaintiffs could not be said to have no prima facie case. As to what is prima facie case has been considered in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethocon Ltd., 1975 AC 396 as under: "Your Lordship should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expressions as "a probability "a prima facie case," or a strong prima facie case" in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried." 10. In our opinion, in the absence of the division of the plots amongst the plaintiffs and the defendants, it was not possible to hold that the plaintiffs did not have any prima facie case. 11. As to that, the governing principle is that the court should first consider whether in the background of the controversy involved in the present case, it appears to us that the proper approach of the court below should have been that if the plaintiffs were to success at the trial in establishing their right to a permanent injunction, they would be compensation by an award of damages for the loss the would have suffered or sustained as a result defendants 1 and 11 containing to down was sought to be enjoined between the time of the trial. It was difficult to compensate the plaintiffs for damages in cart the suit ultimately was decreed. 12. It was difficult to compensate the plaintiffs for damages in cart the suit ultimately was decreed. 12. The protection of property from damage or destruction pending litigation is an established power of equity, and in function should be granted to preserve property right is status quo, until a final adjudication of the right or title to the property. The trial court at the stage when an application for infunction is tried, attempts to preserve the property unite the right is settled or until the main suits disposed of on merits, while dealing with the desirability of granting an injunction by directing the parties to maintain the status quo, is has been said in Corpus Juris Secundum Volume 43 A, Page 66 : "Probability of success. An injunction to preserve the status quo will ordinarily be granted where there appears to be a substantial question between the parties and a reasonable ground to believe that complainant may ultimately be successful in his claim, but it need not clearly appear that complainant will ultimately succeed, it being sufficient if he makes out a prima facie right. However, the dispute must be based on something more than a mere unsupported claim asserted by plaintiff, and an injunction should not be granted where a reasonable possibility of success is not shown." 13. As stated above, the object or purpose of the injunction is to preserve and keep things in the same state or condition. The injunctive relief by means of interlocutory order is ordinarily preventive or protective in character. 14. From the facts as they appear from the record and the pleadings of the parties, it appears to us that the trial court was wrong in rejecting the injunction application as against defendant 11. 15. Before us, charts were given by the counsel for defendants 1 and 11 as well as the plaintiffs claiming individual rights over the trees standing on the plots with a reference to papers, the details of which could be found from the same. At this stage, we are not in a position to give any concluded finding on the rival claims of the plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants 1 and 11 on the other. This may require oral and documentary evidence. It would be premature to prejudge the issue. 16. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. At this stage, we are not in a position to give any concluded finding on the rival claims of the plaintiffs on the one hand and defendants 1 and 11 on the other. This may require oral and documentary evidence. It would be premature to prejudge the issue. 16. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. We set aside the judgment of the court below to the extent that it rejected the application of the plaintiffs for the grant of interim injunction against defendant no. 11. However, we wish to clarify that if due to any natural reason or other similar circumstances, trees fall down, the defendants 1 and 11 would apply to the court concerned to which the case would be transferred to permit them to out and remove them and, thereafter, deposit the price of the removed trees in the court which will be disbursed or given to the party to succeeds. The cutting or removal of the trees would further be subject to any Act or Rules which might have been passed or framed by the U.P. State Litigation. Our order will not be read as permitting defendants 1 and 11 cutting the trees in defines of the provisions of the law. We do not approve of other conditions which had been laid down by the court below in as it appears to us that to out and remove the trees on the conditions mentioned the rein would be cumbersome and will not serve any purpose. 17. Over and above what we have said above, we are of the view that the suit is one which must be expeditiously decided out of turn. The District Judge, Pilibhit is directed to take necessary steps in that regard and if needed, the same may be transferred to some other court than that of the Civil Judge. The court should try any decide the suit within six months of the presentation of a certified copy of this order. 18. We wish to mention that the impugned judgment of the Civil Judge dated 31-5-1985 was not given effect to and the position as it was on the date of passing of the inter locutory remained in force. On account of the stay order dated 10-6-1985, defendants 1 and 11 both had been restrained from cutting the trees. 18. We wish to mention that the impugned judgment of the Civil Judge dated 31-5-1985 was not given effect to and the position as it was on the date of passing of the inter locutory remained in force. On account of the stay order dated 10-6-1985, defendants 1 and 11 both had been restrained from cutting the trees. This is also a ground which has been taken into account by us while deciding this appeal along with other grounds which have been disclosed above specially when we are giving direction to the District Judge to get the suit itself decided within six months.