Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1987 DIGILAW 380 (CAL)

SUJATA SENGUPTA v. .

1987-12-03

SUSANTA CHATTERJI

body1987
SUSANTA CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE substituted defendant/petitioners have come to this Court challenging order No. 81 dated 13. 4. 87 passed by the learned Munsif, third Court, Sealdah, in title suit No. 289 of 1976. By the impugned order the learned Munsif has rejected the substituted defendants' application under Section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act raising certain disputes for determination and for granting reliefs. The original defendant did not take any step under Section 17 (2) of the Act and after his demise the present petitioners were substituted and thereafter filed an application under Section 17 (2) and/or 17 (2a) (b), of the said Act. The main contention was, however, raised that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants. After considering the submissions of the respective parties and upon consideration of the materials on record the learned Munsif rejected the said application holding, inter alia, that the substituted defendants have no right to file an application under Section 17 (2) and/or 17 (2a) (b) of the said Act and in particular in the instant case the original defendant did not avail of any opportunity and after contesting the case for a substantial period he died and thereafter the petitioners have been substituted defendants long after the statutory period of limitation cannot file the purported application and the same cannot be entertained. The learned Munsif, however, has held that the rejection of the petition under Section 17 (2) of the Act as filed by the defendants will not be a bar to the determination of the dispute of relationship of landlord and tenant at the time of trial being aggrieved the substituted defendants have filed this revisional application. ( 2 ) MR. Ganguly, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has mainly argued that in a beneficial legislation the interpretation of the statute must be made liberally. ( 2 ) MR. Ganguly, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has mainly argued that in a beneficial legislation the interpretation of the statute must be made liberally. Looking to the definition of tenant as envisaged in Section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the petitioners will have certain rights and the same rights cannot be denied and the substituted defendants who became the tenants within the definition of Section 2 (h) of the said Act are entitled to the privileges including the rights to file an application under Section 17 (a) of the said Act for determination of the dispute and/or for reliefs consequent thereto. In support of his contention, he has relied upon a recent decision reported in A. I. R. 1987 S. C, 1010 wherein it has been found that Section 17 (3) of the said Act is not mandatory, but directory. He has further relied upon a decision reported in 91 C. W. N. 792 (Shefali Addya vs. Sunil Kumar Mondal ). It was held therein that a statutory tenancy, like a contractual tenancy, is heritable and after the death of a statutory tenant all his heirs, inherit the estate of a deceased tenant and are to be substituted in place of the deceased tenant. It was pointed out further that the substituted defendants who are heirs ordinarily residing with the tenant are entitled to protection of Section 17 (2), (2a), (4) and 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He has also drawn the attention of his Court to a decision reported in 1982 (II) C. H. N. 88 (Dr. Narendra Lal Dutta Banik vs. Sarojendra Nath Ghosh ). It was found therein that a right has been given to the tenant under Section 10 read with Section 8 of the Act to apply for fixation of fair rent. Section 2 (h) of the Act clearly says that 'tenant' includes a person who continues in possession after termination of the tenancy. Since the petitioner is a tenant of the disputed premises and inasmuch as he is possessed of the tenant's estate in that property, in view of Sections 10 and 8 of the Act, it must be held that he can apply for fixation of fair rent of the disputed premises though his tenancy has been determined by a notice to quit. By referring to the aforementioned reported decision, Mr. Ganguly has tried to formulate his points that the petitioners by coming within the mischief of the definition clause of 'tenant' in West Bengal Premises. Tenancy Act have their independent rights and after appearance in the suit they are entitled to the privilege by filing an independent application under Section 17 (2) and/or 17 (2a) (b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act praying for determination of the dispute and/or seeking reliefs they are otherwise entitled to. His main contention is that the court below has not acted properly and liberally construing the interpretation of the beneficial legislation and there is irregular exercise of the jurisdiction. ( 3 ) MR. Dutta, learned Advocate contested the revisional application on behalf of the opposite party landlord. It was submitted that the petitioners cannot have any larger rights than the original tenant. After his demise the petitioners have been substituted. In support of their contention they have relied upon a case reported in A. I. R. 1972 Cal. 404 (Babulal N. Shukla vs. Jeshankar N. Shukla ). It is found there the scope of Order 22 Rule 4 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure vis-a-vis the rights of the substituted defendants, It was pointed out that a legal representative substituted in place of a deceased defendant cannot be permitted to make out a new case afresh in another written statement at this stage. He has to take up the suit at the stage at which it was left when the original party died and to continue it. The only right he has to make is a defence appropriate to his character as a legal representative of' the deceased defendant. His case is on a different footing than the addition of a new defendant which is governed by Order l Rule 10. Therefore only the order for substitution would be served on the substituted defendant and no fresh writ of summons could be issued for service on the substituted defendant. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned lawyers of the respective parties and upon consideration of the materials on record, it appears to this Court that the right of the substituted defendants is limited and a substituted defendant cannot claim any larger right than the original defendant. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the learned lawyers of the respective parties and upon consideration of the materials on record, it appears to this Court that the right of the substituted defendants is limited and a substituted defendant cannot claim any larger right than the original defendant. It is true that, within the definition clause of Section 2 (h) of the said Act a substituted defendant would be deemed to be a tenant being entitled to the right and privileges. The conception of heir of deceased defendant tenant is also limited in terms of the definition that those persons must ordinarily be residing with the tenant. Apart from such definition, these substituted defendants cannot place on record any defence beyond the right claimed by the original defendant in his defence. The originals defendant/tenant did not file any application under Section 17 (2) of the said Act and/or did not raise any determination to be decided within the scope of the said provision. Long after his demise the substituted defendants stepped into the, shoes of the original defendant to contest the suit. The said substituted defendants cannot be permitted to file an independent Section 17 application beyond the scope of defence of the original defendant and beyond all the period of limitation. In my view there is no right of the substituted defendants to file an independent application under Section 17 (2) of the said Act. ( 5 ) CONSIDERING this aspect of the matter, this Court does not find any irregularity and/or illegality in the impugned order. The learned Munsif has, however, found that the defendants have raised dispute as to the relationship of landlord and tenant. He has, however, kept that question upon to be determined at the time of trial. Apart from such point being left open, the- petitioners have also right to challenge any interlocutory order after the disposal of the suit before the appellate forum in view of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. With this observation, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. Hence, the revisional application is rejected. Since the suit is of the year 1976, it is all the more desirable that the learned Trial Court will take all the endeavour for expeditious disposal of the suit. Application rejected.