JUDGMENT 1. THE defendant-appellant was sued for ejectment by the plaintiff-respondent in 1957 on the allegation that he was a tenant under the plaintiff and committed default in payment of rent for the suit-premises since February, 1955 and was accordingly liable to be evicted. Under section 17 (1) of the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the defendant, if he was a tenant, was required to deposit in Court or to pay to the landlord, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him, the amount of rent in arrears with interest and also to continue to deposit or pay month by month the amount of current rent and on his failure to do so, the Court, under Section 17 (3) of the Act, was to strike out his defence against the delivery of possession. The defendant, within the aforesaid period of one month, filed an application in the trial court contending that he was never a tenant under the plaintiff but was occupying the suit-premises as a co-sharer of the plaintiff and the defendant accordingly prayed in the application that "it may be put on record that the provisions of Section 17 of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, 1956, or any provisions thereof is not applicable to the present case". In his written statement also, the defendant reiterated that he was not a tenant but was occupying the suit-premises as a co-sharer thereof. 2. IN view of the frame of the application and the prayer therein, the trial Judge thought that no action on the application was called for and accordingly took no action. Strangely enough, the plaintiff-landlord herself filed an application thereafter under Section 17 (2)contending that since the defendant denied relationship of landlord and tenant, that issue was required to be determined so that "arrears of rent and damages in lieu of rent due by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the premises in suit be ascertained and determined by the Court for deposit before the Court in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act". Since compliance with Section 17 (1) protects the tenant from eviction and non compliance therewith renders his defence liable to be struck out, it is difficult to understand as to how the plaintiff could at all be anxious for deposit by the defendant in accordance with Section 17 (l. This application, however, was not pressed by the plaintiff when the same was called on for hearing. The plaintiff having thus not pressed his application under Section 17 (2), the Court ordered that the issue in the suit relating to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, which was to be taken up for hearing along with the said application, would be decided along with the other Issues at the trial. The Court thereafter proceeded to try the suit in due course and decreed the suit on 16. 6. 1959 on the finding that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit-premises and defaulted to pay rent for a period of more than fifteen months. In assailing the judgment and decree with his usual forceful felicity, Mr. R. N. Mitra, the learned Counsel for the defendant-appellant, has developed his argument in the following manner. Mr. Mitra has urged that even though the defendant in his application referred to above did not pray for any positive action to be taken or for any relief to be granted by the Court, the nevertheless categorically raised therein a dispute as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the plaintiff. Mr. Mitra has argued that it has now been authoritatively settled by this Court in the Division bench decision in Biswanath v. Annapurna (65 CWN 149), approving the earlier single-Judge decision in Ganesh v. Manmatha (6 3 CWN -Notes - 26), that a dispute as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was also "a dispute as to. the amount of rent payable by the tenant" within the meaning of section 17 (2) of the Act, as it stood then before its substitution by the Amending Act of 1959 coming into effect on and from 29. 2. the amount of rent payable by the tenant" within the meaning of section 17 (2) of the Act, as it stood then before its substitution by the Amending Act of 1959 coming into effect on and from 29. 2. 1960 and, therefore, as held in a later Division Bench decision in Upendranath v. Sasthi (83 CWN 662), the Court was obligated to decide that dispute at an earlier stage and committed an error of law in deferring the decision thereof to the final hearing. Mr. Mitra has submitted that even if such dispute; which was to be decided before the hearing, was decided against the defendant and he was held to be a tenant, the defendant would have, been entitled to deposit the entire rent as determined and in that case under Section 17 (4) no decree for eviction could be passed against him on the ground of default. Section 17 (2) as it stood then when the instant suit was filed and disposed of, before the same was substituted in 1960 by the Act of 1959, provided as hereunder : - "if in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1)there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the court shall determine, having regard to the provisions of this Act, the amount to be deposited or paid to the landlord by the tenant in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1)". 3. A liberal construction of the expression "any dispute as to the amount current payable by the tenant" in Section 17 (2) quoted above, would not have covered a dispute as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. Going by the letters, it would not have been possible to hold that where a defendant, sued as a tenant in a suit for ejectment, categorically disputes that he ever was or is a tenant, he is neverthless raising "a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant", as in that case the defendant, stricto sensu, is not raising any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by him, but is disputing that he was ever a tenant and thus disputing that he was ever under any obligation to pay any rent at all. But this Court in Biswanath v. Annapurna (supra), approving the earlier decision in Ganesh v. Manmatha (supra), discarded the literal construction and preferred to adopt a purposive approach to the provisions of section 17 (2) so that a defendant, who has denied the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant but has eventually been found to be a tenant, may come within the protective provisions of Section 17. 4. BUT assuming that, as held in Biswanath v. Annapurna (supra)and in Ganesh v. Manmatha (supra), the defendant in this case in denying the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant did in law raise "a dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant" within the meaning of Section 17)2) as it stood before 1960 when the suit was instituted and disposed of and, therefore, the Court was required to determine the dispute and to afford opportunity to the defendant to deposit all rent in arrears, if the defendant was found to be a tenant, the same would not have helped the defendant in any way. Because Section 17 (4), as it stood then, clearly provided that though no decree for eviction was to be passed against a tenant making deposit in accordance with the determination under Section 17 (2), yet the tenant would not have been entitled to any such relief if "he has made default in payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months" and it has been held in this case that the tenant made default in payment of rents for more then fifteen months, a finding which Mr. Mitra has not been able to dispute. Mr. Mitra has, however, drawn our attention to the fact that the provisions of Section 17 (4) have thereafter been amended by the amending Act of 1969 to provide that a tenant shall be disentitled from any relief under Section 17 (4) only "if, having obtained such relief once in respect of the premises, he has again made default in the payment of rent for four months within a period of twelve months". And Mr. And Mr. Mitra has urged that this amendment having come into force during the pendency of this appeal, the beneficial provisions thereof would be available to the defendant in this case and he admittedly not having obtained any relief under Section 17 (4) once before in respect of this premises, would be entitled to enjoy the protections thereunder. 5. BUT assuming, though not deciding, that the provisions of Section 17 (4) as amended in 1969 can be made applicable to this proceeding, section 17 (4) as amended in 1969 can apply only when Section 17 (2)as already amended in 1960 by the Act of 1959, as referred in Section 17 (4) itself, has been complied with. The relevant portion of Section 17 (2), as amended in 1960 by the Act of 1959, is as hereunder : - " If in any suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1)there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the tenant shall, within the time specified in sub-section (1), deposit in court the amount admitted by him to be due from him together with an application to the court for determination of the rent payable. No such deposit shall be accepted unless it is accompanied by an application for determination of the rent payable. On receipt of such application, to court shall. . . . . " 6. SECTION 17 (2), as quoted above, can now apply only when there is "an application to the court for determination of the rent payable" and it appears that the provisions "can have no manner of operation unless the defendant files such an application. Section 17 (2), as it stood before the amendment of 1960, did not require any such application for the determination of the rent payable by the defendant. Such an application for determination of rent being now a condition precedent to the operation of Section 17 (2), it may be little difficult to understand as to how a defendant, who denies the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant, and therefore denies that he over was or is under any obligation to pay any rent, can still apply for the determination of the rent payable by him as a tenant. But even then, a later Division Bench decision of this Court in Tirthapati v. Paresh Nath (ILR 1967 - 1 Calcutta 449) has held (at 454), following the earlier Division Bench decision in Biswanath v. Annpurna (supra)decided under Section 17 (2) as it stood before th 1960-Amendment, that a dispute, as to the existence of relationship, of landlord and tenant would still be a dispute under Section 17 (2) as amended in 1960. The observations in rather recent' Division bench decision of this Court in Mohini Mirchandani v. K. L. M. Royal Dutch Airlines (87 CWN 263 at 268) are also to the effect that the expression ' dispute as to the amount of rent payable" in Section 17 (2), even as the Section now stands after the amendment in 1960, "is wide enough to cover a dispute about the relationship of landlord and tenant". As we have already indicated, such a wider construction of Section 17 (2) resulting from a purposive approach would clothe the provisions with greater amplitude and would protect even those tenants who have denied the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant but have eventually been found to be tenants and we would govern ourselves by this construction adopted by the Division Benrhs of this Court in Biswanath (supra), in Trithapati (supra) and in Mohini Mirchandani (supra), while construing Section 17 (2), as it stood before as well as it stands after the 1960 - Amendments. As pointed out by us in Sarashi -bala v. Monorama (90 CWN 538 at 594-95), following a series of decisions of the Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative ( AIR 1969 SC 1320 at 1328), in Murlidhar Agarwala (AIR 1974 SC 1984 at 1929-30), and in Nataraja Studios (AIR 1981 SC 5 37 at 543), those Rent Laws being welfare [legislations enacted for the purpose and social objective of protection of tenants, our interpretation must be inspired and imnued with such objective of giving protection to the tenants and if two or more interpretations are possible, then the interpretation which is protective or more protective of the interest of the tenants must be preferred to the one protective or more protective of the interests of the landlords. But we nevertheless feel that "an application for determination of the rent payable" is very much a condition precedent for the application of Section 17 (2) as it now stands after the 1980 - Amendments. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while a defendant in a suit for ejectment may still raise a dispute as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant in his application under Section 17 (2)as it now stands, he must nevertheless apply therein for determination of the rent payable by him, in case he is eventually held to be a tenant in the determination of that dispute. As already indicated, such a stand may not appear to be quite logical; but, as is well-known, law is not always logic. 7. IN the case at hand, the defendant at no stage made "an application to the Court for determination of the rent payable" which is a sine qua non for the operation of Section 17 (2) as amended and, therefore he not having complied with Section 17 (2) as amended, by such an application for determination of rent, can not invoke the provisions of Section 17 (4) as amended, even if the provisions of section 17 (4) as amended during the pendency of this appeal were available to him. He can at best be said to have invoked the provisions of Section 17 (2) as it stood before the 1960-Amendments; but as already noted, even if he was given an opportunity to comply with the determination under Section 17 (2), as it stood then, he would not have been entitled to any benefit of protection against eviction under Section 17 (4) as it stood than, for his having committed default for more than four months within a period of twelve months. 8. THE point urged by Mr. Mitra, therefore, fails and he having urged no other point in support of this appeal, the same also fails. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and confirm the judgment and decree under appeal with this modification that the defendant shall be allowed time till 31st January, 1987 to vacate the suit-premises failing which the plaintiff-respondent shall be entitled to recover possession thereof in execution of the decree under appeal. In the facts and circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs in this appeal.