JUDGMENT M. P. Menon, J. 1. The petitioner, an employee of the Union Bank of India, challenges Ext. P1 order suspending him from service, pending "investigation/enquiry". The order is said to be no longer in force: according to the Bank, it has been revoked after the petitioner was found guilty at the enquiry and a penalty of witholding three increments was imposed on him. Yet counsel would suggest that a pronouncement by this court, on the legality of Ext. P1, is absolutely essential. 2. The ground of attack is that under the industry wide settlement dated 19-10-1966, a bank employee could be suspended only after the framing of charges against him and the ordering of an enquiry into the charges; it is complained that no charges had been framed, and no enquiry ordered, by the time Ext. P1 was issued. 3. The law relating to an employer's power to suspend an employee-or a master's power to forbid a servant from working-is now well settled. The power to suspend is not an implied term in any contract of employment: it has to be found either in the express terms of the contract, or in statutory prescriptions governing the same. Even in the absence of express contract or statutory authorisation, however, an employer can keep out an employee from work, but then, he will be bound to pay full wages for the period of such non employment. The law of master and servant recognises the employer's right to hire and fire, but not to keep the contract of employment itself in suspension. In his own interest, the employer may keep away the employee from the work-place, but such a unilateral decision will not relieve the former of his obligation to perform his part of the contract, namely, to pay wages to the latter during the period he is so kept out. Of course, this position, as already observed is subject to contract or any law having an impact on its terms. 4. Ext. P1 issued on 13-6-1984 was in the following terms:- "Certain acts of omission and commission amounting to gross misconduct on the part of Mr. N.A. Prabhu during his tenure as Head Cashier 'C'/Clerk, Manjummel Branch, have come to light. Pending completion of the investigation/ enquiry in the matters Mr. N. A. Prabhu is hereby suspended from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. N.A. Prabhu during his tenure as Head Cashier 'C'/Clerk, Manjummel Branch, have come to light. Pending completion of the investigation/ enquiry in the matters Mr. N. A. Prabhu is hereby suspended from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. During the period of suspension, he will be paid subsistence allowance as per rules." It is not disputed that charges were framed and served on the employee only later and that the enquiry to find out whether he was guilty of them or not was instituted still, later. 5. The contract between the Bank and its employees, in matters relating to disciplinary action, suspension etc., is contained in Chap.19 of the settlement dated 19-10-66. Paragraph 19.1 of the settlement provides that "............a person against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall in the first instance, be informed of the particulars of the charge against him and he shall have a proper opportunity to give his explanation as to such particulars. Final orders shall be passed after due consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances. With this object in view, the following shall apply." Paragraphs 19.11 and sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Para.19.12 are also relevant. They read:- "19.11 When it is decided to take any disciplinary action against an employee such decision shall be communicated to him within three days thereof, 19.12 The procedure in such cases shall be as follows:- (a) An employee against whom disciplinary action is proposed or likely to be taken shall be given a charge sheet clearly setting forth the circumstances appearing against him and a date shall be fixed for enquiry, sufficient time being given to him to enable him to prepare and give his explanation so also to produce any evidence that he may wish to tender in his defence. He shall be permitted to appear before the Officer conducting the enquiry, to cross examine any witness on whose evidence the charge rests and to examine witness and produce other evidence in his defence. He shall also be permitted to be defended. (i) (x) by a representative of a registered Trade Union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry. He shall also be permitted to be defended. (i) (x) by a representative of a registered Trade Union of bank employees of which he is a member on the date first notified for the commencement of the enquiry. (y) where the employee is not a member of any trade union of bank employees on the aforesaid date, by a representative of a registered Trade Union of employees of the bank in which he is employed; OR (ii) at the request of the said union by a representative of the state federation or all India Organisation to which such union is affiliated; OR (iii) with the Bank's permission, by a lawyer. He shall also be given a hearing as regards the nature of the proposed punishment in case any charge is established against him. (b) Pending such inquiry he may b2 suspended but if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided to take no action against him he shall be deemed to have been on duty and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowance and to all other privileges for the period of suspension; and if some punishment other than dismissal is inflicted the whole or a part of the period of suspension, may, at the discretion of the management, be treated as on duly with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages, allowances etc And the argument is that it is only after the giving of a charge sheet and the fixation of a date for enquiry under 19.12(a) that the suspension "pending enquiry" in 19.12(b) can be ordered. 6. Assuming for a moment that the above is the only way in which the relevant terms of the settlement could be understood, the present is admittedly a case where Ext. P1 suspension was followed by an enquiry, and therefore the suspension was not unauthorised or invalid at least after the decision to hold the enquiry was taken. And it is difficult to think that this part of the suspension was also invalid, because the earlier part was unauthorised. At the most, therefore, the petitioner could only claim full wages and allowances for the said part, but not a declaration that he was invalidly kept out of employment for the whole period. 7. And it is difficult to think that this part of the suspension was also invalid, because the earlier part was unauthorised. At the most, therefore, the petitioner could only claim full wages and allowances for the said part, but not a declaration that he was invalidly kept out of employment for the whole period. 7. It seems to me, however, that the terms of the settlement could be understood in a different manner, if the endeavour is to ascertain to what extent or in what manner they are designed to alter the principles or the law relating to suspension, as noticed earlier. 8. Para.19.1 embodies the settled rule in industrial law that before punishing an employee for misconduct, he should be told of the charges against him and given an opportunity to explain his position. The other provisions of Chap.19 of the settlement are made "with this object in view". Para.19.11 stipulates that when it is decided to initiate disciplinary action against an employee, it should be communicated to the delinquent. And Para.19.12, divided into sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), is supposed to deal with the "procedure" for such disciplinary action. Sub-paragraph (a) Provides, among other things, that (i) a charge sheet shall be served on the delinquent; (ii) a date for enquiry shall be fixed; and (iii) sufficient time shall be given to him to submit an explanation and adduce evidence. Sub-paragraph (b), though made part of Para.19.12 relating to "procedure", has really nothing to do with the procedure for disciplinary action. It deals with suspension pending enquiry and it is well known that such suspension is not punishment, or even a necessary step for imposing a penalty, like a charge and an enquiry into it. It stands outside the disciplinary proceedings, outside the procedure to be followed in such proceedings, and also outside the disciplinary power of an employer impliedly stemming from the contract of employment. The object of Sub-paragraph (b) is to specifically confer a power on the employer to suspend an employee, and to take a decision regarding wages and other benefits due to him during the period of suspension, after the completion of the disciplinary proceedings, and depending on its outcome. Except in cases where it is imposed as a substantive punishment, suspension is ordinarily part of a holding-up operation by the employer, pending a decision as to whether an employee should be punished. Except in cases where it is imposed as a substantive punishment, suspension is ordinarily part of a holding-up operation by the employer, pending a decision as to whether an employee should be punished. In other words, sub-paragraph 19. 12.(b) can be construed only as a separate and distinct arrangement under which parties have agreed that pending a decision by the employer on the complaints received, detected or levelled against an employee, he can be kept out of employment without wages. What is involved is a variation of. the general principle by consent of parties; and in the context in which it appears, and having due regard to the scope of Chap.19 as a whole, "pending enquiry" in 19. 12(b) has to be construed as pending the disciplinary action referred to in Para.19.11. Any other construction of the clauses in the settlement will have the effect of treating suspensions pending enquiry as part of the procedure for disciplinary action: a concept unknown to law, and industrial relations in general. It is difficult to imagine that the banking industry and the bank employees wanted to provide for such a new dispensation when the settlement was made. 9. Asa matter of fact Para.19.1, 19.11 and 19.12 of the settlement are reproductions of the directions contained in Para.51 of the "Sastri Award", The Desai Award which followed it, and the subsequent settlements between the parties which replaced the awards, did not materially alter the rules of procedure laid down by the Sastri Tribunal. However, counsel was unable to cite a single decision construing the (identical) provisions of the Sastri Award to mean that there could be no suspension of a bank employee before the framing of charges and the institution of an enquiry. There is no doubt an averment in the writ petition that that has always been the practice in the Union Bank, but that is specifically denied in the respondents' counter affidavit. There is no doubt an averment in the writ petition that that has always been the practice in the Union Bank, but that is specifically denied in the respondents' counter affidavit. An attempt was however made to rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in P. R. Nayak v. Union of India ( AIR 1972 SC 554 ) where the Supreme Court, by a majority, and differing from the views taken earlier, held that R.3 of the All India Services (Discipline And Appeal) Rules, 1969 permitted suspension of an officer governed there by "Only after disciplinary proceedings with respect to a definite charge or charges against him were actually initiated or started, and not merely when they were in contemplation", The rule in question there authorised the concerned government to suspend an officer. "If, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case the Government which initiates disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the service against whom such proceedings are started.................." The argument was that suspension was possible when disciplinary proceedings were under contemplation, and the Court rejected it by pointing out that the intention as conveyed by the language of the rule was that (i) there should be a member of the service against whom proceedings are started and (ii) the suspension itself was to depend on the nature of the charges. Therefore without starting the proceedings by the framing of definite charges, suspension was not possible. Even assuming that the clauses of a settlement could be equated to the mandatory provisions of a statute so as to invite this Court's interference in the present proceedings, it is clear that the language of Para.19.12 is different from that of R.3 seen above. I am thus unable to uphold the challenge to Ext. P1. The Original Petition fails. It will stand dismissed, but without costs.