ORDER S.K. Dhaon, J. - The Regional Transport Authority, Jhansi (hereinafter referred to as the Transport Authority) in its meeting held on 19th October, 1985, resolved that no holder of permit will be permitted to place a vehicle of a model more than 20 years old. It directed its secretary to notify to the existing permit holders that they should conform to the aforesaid decision by 31st January, 1986, failing which proceedings would be drawn up for cancelling their respective permits. The petitioners, who were holders of stage carriage permits and who had placed their vehicles more than 20 years old under their respective permits, felt aggrieved and preferred appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal). The Tribunal by its order dated 12th February, 1987, dismissed the appeals of the petitioners and others, who felt aggrieved by similar resolutions, by a common judgment. Hence this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Each of the petitioners holds separate stage carriage permits for a particular transport vehicle. Sub-section (3) of section 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads : - (3) "The regional transport authority, if it decides to grant a stage carriage permit, may grant the permit for a service of stage carriage of a specified description or for one or more particular stage carriage and may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach any one or more of the following conditions, namely " (Underlining by me). 3. There now remains no controversy as to whether "specified description" will include in its sweep the model of the vehicle. In Subhash Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 800 :(1980 All LJ 352) the Supreme Court while dealing with sub-section (3) of Section 48, observed : - "We are clear that a later model is a better, safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description." 4. The only submission made by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that sub-section (3) of Section 48 empowers the Transport Authority to impose a condition of the model only with respect to the vehicles placed under a permit granted for a service of stage carriage. The only submission made by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that sub-section (3) of Section 48 empowers the Transport Authority to impose a condition of the model only with respect to the vehicles placed under a permit granted for a service of stage carriage. Such a power does not extend to a vehicle covered by a permit for one or more particular stage carriages. It is emphasised that the year of the make of the vehicle is not one of the conditions enumerated in clauses (i) to (xxiii) to subsection (3) of section 48. The submission further is that the Transport Authority cannot take resort to clause (xxiii) of sub-section(31 of Section 48 which provides that it may impose any other conditions which may be prescribed as the State Government has admittedly not framed any Rules with regard to the year of the make of the vehicle. This submission is founded on the definition of "prescribed" in sub-section (21) of Section 2 of the Act which provides "prescribed by rules made under this Act." 5. In.sub-section (20) of Section 2, a permit is defined to mean : the document issued by the relevant authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage. Sub-section (33) of Section 2 defines a "transport vehicle" to mean: "public service vehicle or a goods vehicle." In sub section (25) of section 2 "Public service vehicle" means "any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage." In sub-section (29) stage carriage means "a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey." Section 46 reads : - "An application for a permit in respect of a service of stage carriages or to use a particular motor vehicle as a stage carriage (in this Chapter referred to as a stage carriage permit) shall, as far as may be, contain the following particulars : - (b) the number of vehicles it is proposed to operate in relation to each route or area and the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle.............. (d) the number of vehicles intended to be kept in reserve to maintain the service and to provide for special occasions..........." Rule 50 of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) provides that every application for a permit in respect of a transport vehicle or a private stage carriage shall be in one of the following forms that is to say (i) in respect of a particular stage carriage in Form P. St. P.A. (ii) in respect of a service of stage carriages in Form P.St.S.A. A perusal of the aforementioned forms indicates that the only difference between the permit in respect of a particular stage carriage and a permit in respect of a service of stage carriage is that in the case of the former permit is to be granted only in respect of one transport vehicle while in the case of the latter a permit will cover more than one vehicle. 6. The interest of the travelling public is the sheet-anchor round which the entire machinery of the Act rotates, safety and security of the travelling public are thus the prime factors with which the Act is concerned. We have already seen that the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules do not make any distinction between the transport vehicles to be placed either under a permit for a particular stage carriage or under a permit for the service of stage carriages. The incidence of a stage carriage permit in both the cases is the same. In both the cases the holder of the permit is authorised to pick up and set down passengers from stage to stage oil payment of hire which is to be realised from an individual passenger. The hazard of the journey in so far as the passenger is concerned will be the same. It is immaterial to a passenger as to whether the vehicle, which he is using, is for a particular stage carriage permit or is earmarked for a service of stage carriage. On the contrary, if a vehicle covered by a permit for a particular' stage carriage breaks down during course of the journey a passenger travelling therein will suffer greater hardship than a passenger travelling in a vehicle covered by a permit for a service of stage carriages. On the contrary, if a vehicle covered by a permit for a particular' stage carriage breaks down during course of the journey a passenger travelling therein will suffer greater hardship than a passenger travelling in a vehicle covered by a permit for a service of stage carriages. In the latter case, it is expected that the vehicle will be replaced without any loss of time. That may not be possible in the former case. The position will, therefore, become anomalous if the contention of the learned counsel is accepted that the Transport Authority is powerless to impose a condition regarding the model of the vehicle in the case of a transport vehicle covered by permit for a particular stage carriage. Such a construction should be eschewed. In my opinion, it is implicit in subsection (3) of section 48 that the Transport Authority to a vehicle covered by permit for a particular stage carriage (sic). 7. In order to advance the object of the Act sub-section (3) of Section 48 can be slightly restructured without doing violence to the legislative intent. The words of a specified description can be and should be read after the words "for one or more particular stage carriages." The Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammad, AIR 1981 SC 1744 construed the words any date due before the commencement of this Act to mean, "any date due at and before the commencement of this Act." Speaking for the Court, Chandrachud, C.J. observed:- "We would normally hesitate to fashion the clause by so restructuring it but we see no escape from that course since that is the only rational manner by which we can give a meaning and content to, so as to further the object of the Act." 8. The terms and expressions defined in Section 2 will apply only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context as the opening words of the section indicate. We have already seen that in sub-section (21) of Section 2 prescribe means "prescribed by rules made under the Act." The question is whether in clause (xxiii) of sub-section (3) of section 48 the Legislature while authorising the Transport Authority to impose any other condition which may be prescribed intended to mean that the conditions to be imposed must be prescribed by Rule. In the context and in the setting of the various conditions enumerated in sub-section (3) of Section 48 it appears to me that that was not the legislative intent. The Transport Authority has been authorised to impose any other condition which is analogous to the 22 enumerated conditions. Any condition which has a rational or proximate relationship with the object or purpose of the legislation can be imposed by the Transport Authority. The ultimate test is as to whether the condition imposed is in the public interest or not. Of course, when we talk of public interest we mean the interest of the travelling public. 9. Section 51 relates to the grant of contract carriage permits. Sub-section (2) of the said provision is analogous to sub-section (3) of section 48 which is concerned with the grant of stage carriage permits. Sub-section (2) of section 51 provides : - "The Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, attach in the permit any one or more of the following conditions : ........................" The 10th condition enumerated in section 51(2) is worded in the same fashion as the condition No. (xxiii) in sub-section (3) of section 48, namely, any other condition which may be prescribed. 10. In Subhash Chandras case (supra) (1980 All LJ 352) clause (x) of sub-section (2) of section 51 came up for consideration- In that case the regional transport authority concerned had imposed a condition that a contract carriage vehicle should not be more than seven years from the date of registration during validity of permit. The Supreme Court held that such a condition could be imposed under the aforementioned provision. It also held that such a condition was not ultra vires section 51(2) as it had nexus with statutory purpose, that is, human safety. The Supreme Court also held that the source of the power of the particular condition No. 18 in that case imposed by the Transport Authority was section 51(2)(x). This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Bhatia, AIR 1983 SC 988 . The Supreme Court also held that the source of the power of the particular condition No. 18 in that case imposed by the Transport Authority was section 51(2)(x). This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of S. K. Bhatia, AIR 1983 SC 988 . The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable that in the instant case the condition of the model as imposed by the Transport Authority is also sustainable under clause (xxiii) of sub-section (3) of section of the Act even in the absence of a rule framed by the State Government in this behalf. 11. In sum, the source of the power of the Transport Authority while imposing the condition of the model in the case of the petitioners is sub-section (3) of Section 48 as well as clause (xxiii) of Section 48. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that in view of the fact that a new vehicle costs more than rupees two lakhs and also keeping in view the fact that Jhansi is rather a backward region, it would be appropriate that the impugned order of the Tribunal is modified to the extent that instead of the petitioners being called upon to replace their existing vehicles of higher model within a period of three months from 12th February, 1987 the period should be extended to five months from 12th February, 1987. This request appears to be reasonable. The order of the Tribunal is modified to that extent. 13. This petition has no merit. It is dismissed summarily.