JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner Surya Praksh was given appointment on daily wages on May 16, 1981 with respondent No. 1, Rajasthan Co-operative Spinning Mills, Ltd., Gulabpura, District Bhilwara. 2. On June 15, 1982 he was put in the Scale No. 3 on the post of Lower Division Clerk on probation. This period of probation was extended for a further period of three months. His services were terminated on March 31, 1983. An Industrial Dispute was raised and the matter was referred to the Labour Court, Udaipur vide Notification dated February 28, 1986. In the Labour Court, the petitioner admitted that he had not passed the Secondary Examination and had wrongly informed the authorities about his passing that examination in second division. The learned Judge Labour Court opined that the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of his misconduct and he was not entitled to any relief under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act (for short 'the Act' here in after). The learned Judge in view of that finding did not interfere with the order of termination of services of the petitioner. 3. Feeling aggrieved by the Award of the Labour Court dated March 1, 1986, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Mr. Mridul, learned Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned Award of the learned Judge Labour Court on two grounds. Firstly, that no inquiry was conducted before terminating the services of the petitioner and as such the principles of natural justice were violated. Secondly, that the termination of services for whatever reason it might be amounted to retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act and therefore the provisions of Section 25 of the Act were attracted in the matter and noncompliance of those provisions make the order of termination of services invalid. 5. The pertinent question calling for determination is whether the petitioner has any legal right which requires to be enforced by this Court in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. The petitioner was put in the Scale of Lower Division Clerk in pursuance of his information that he had passed Secondary Examination in the year 1981-82 in second division. 6. The petitioner was put in the Scale of Lower Division Clerk in pursuance of his information that he had passed Secondary Examination in the year 1981-82 in second division. As stated earlier, the petitioner had given in writing on January 22, 1985 before the learned Labour Judge that he had not produced the certificate for passing the secondary examination and that he had in fact not passed that examination. He prayed for mercy on the ground that he belonged to a poor family and he may be forgiven for the mistake committed by him. 7. If a person is liable of such a mistake so as to mislead the authorities by falsely representing that he had passed the Secondary Examination and getting an order which placed him at an advantageous position and then admitted the true position, where was the necessity for any regular inquiry. True it is that the petitioner had for the first time before the labour Judge admitted his mistake in writing but that would not mean that prior to that he was not guilty of any misconduct, it a person tells a lie and reveals the truth after a long gap, that will not entitle him to any advantage for the period he continued telling a lie and misguiding the authorities concerned. 8. The purpose of a regular inquiry is to afford an opportunity to the person proceeded against for leading defence. 9. In the present case the only point for consideration was whether the petitioner had passed Secondary Examination so as to entitle him to continue in service. This is an admitted position that he had not passed that examination and therefore no useful purpose would have been served by initiating an inquiry. With such a deplorable conduct of the petitioner, the argument that the principle of natural justice was violated is not available to him. 10. Mr. Mridul has referred to the principles enunciated in the cases of Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1212 and Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. S.M. Boraiah and Anr., (1984) 1 SCC 244 to substantiate his contention that the case of the petitioner is covered by the definition of the term "retrenchment" given in Section 2(oo) of the Act and the provisions of Section 25F are attracted in the matter. 11. 11. The principles enunciated in the above referred cases is that the expression "termination of service" for any reason what so ever covers every kind of termination of service except those not expressly included in Section 25F or not expressly provided for by other provisions of the Act such as 25FF and 25FFF. 12. With all these principles in mind, the question to be determined would however be as to whether a person liable of such a gross misconduct so as to have an advantage for himself by misguiding the concerned authorities by telling a lie is entitled to any relief. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution and for any other purpose and not to establish a right which does not exist. The purpose of vesting power with High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is to give relief to a person whose fundamental right has been infringed. But if no right exists this Court will not in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction issue any writ or direction for establishing any right which a person is not legally entitled to. In other words, there should exist some right, the infringement of which may be set right by the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. Writ jurisdiction is an equity jurisdiction. If a person seeks equity, he should come with clean hands. A person taking resort to such a lie can have no sympathy from the Court. A person like the petitioner who had cheated and misguided his employer by his false statement, does not deserve the discretionary remedy from this Court. 14. We are unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that what ever be the conduct of the petitioner, technically he could have claimed relief for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. When the petitioner bad no right to remain in service, there arises no question of infringement of any right. It is the existence of a right which requires enforcement of that right and not the enforcement of a claim based on false statement and misrepresentation to the employer. 15. When the petitioner bad no right to remain in service, there arises no question of infringement of any right. It is the existence of a right which requires enforcement of that right and not the enforcement of a claim based on false statement and misrepresentation to the employer. 15. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the learned Judge, Labour Court has rightly taken into consideration the undesirable conduct of the petitioner, in justifying the action of respondent No. 1, terminating the services of the petitioner. 16. The writ petition has no merits and is dismissed summarily.Writ dismissed. *******