JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - The petitioner by means of this petition has challenged the order dated 22nd April, 1981, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation allowing the revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. A dispute arose between the petitioner and the Forest Department of Uttar Pradesh relating to three plots of land situate in village Lachhmipur, Tappa Bhari Bhainsi, Pergana Haveli, district Gorakhpur. The three plots were plot Nos. 2/6, 13 and 14/1. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, has urged that he is confining his case in the present petition only for plot No. 13. 3. The petitioner claimed that the aforesaid plots were grove land and she was Bhumidhar of the same. The stand taken on behalf of Forest Department was that the trees standing on the said plots constitute 'forest' and thus the said land vested in the state after abolition of Zamindari thus proceedings were taken under the Indian Forest Act for declaring the said land as reserved forest. The petitioner, therefore, filed on 10th April, 1956, Civil Suit No. 990 of 1956, for declaration that she was the Bhumidhar of the said plot and for permanent injunction restraining the State Government from declaring the said land as reserve forest and also from dispossessing the petitioner. On 31st January, 1970, the trial court decreed the suit to the extent that the petitioner was declared to be Bhumidhar in possession of plot No. 13 and the State Government was restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff over it. However, in respect of the other plots the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved as against that, both the petitioner and the State Government preferred the appeal before the first appellate Court on 28th October, 1971. The Additional District Judge by judgment dismissed the appeal of the State Government in respect of plot No. 13 and also dismissed the appeal of the petitioner in respect of other two plots, viz. plot No. 2/6 and 14/1. The petitioner thereafter filed a second appeal before this Court being second Appeal No. 462 of 1972, which was dismissed on the 1st March, 1979. plot No. 2/6 and 14/1. The petitioner thereafter filed a second appeal before this Court being second Appeal No. 462 of 1972, which was dismissed on the 1st March, 1979. It has been recorded in the said judgment and the said fact has also been stated in the writ petition itself that for plot No. 13 after the suit being decreed by the trial court and appeal of the same being dismissed no second appeal had been preferred by the State before this Court. The learned Standing Counsel has urged that in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that Second Appeal No. 3436 of 1972 has been filed by the State Government and is pending before this Court. This fact was strongly refuted by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the rejoinder affidavit. I send for the file referred to in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit and it has been intimated that there is no such second appeal of Gorakhpur but there is one relating to Varanasi, which was decided much earlier. However, we are not concerned with any second appeal of Varanasi. Therefore, the fact stated in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit cannot be accepted. Even in the aforesaid second appeal before this Court it was specifically recorded that the State has not preferred any second appeal as against the judgment of the first appellate court relating to plot No. 13. Thus, the dispute inter se between the parties in civil court became final when the appeal was decided as aforesaid. It seems proceedings were undertaken by the petitioner for plot No. 2/6 by way of Special Leave Petition before Hon'ble Supreme Court which was admitted on 2nd May, 1979. However, since the petitioner has confined his case to the plot No. 13 one fact clearly emerges is that after the judgment and order of the first appellate court dispute inter se between the parties became final when the appeal of the State Government was dismissed on 28th October, 1971. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in effect his-, application before the Consolidation Officer was not under Section 9, but under Section 12 of the Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that in effect his-, application before the Consolidation Officer was not under Section 9, but under Section 12 of the Act. According to him, he did not desire any adjudication of the right between the parties as the right became final by virtue of the decision by the civil court, which was much before the initiation of proceedings under the Act. It was further urged that the said application was duly served along with the affidavit on the Forest Department on the 26th September 1979. The said application of the petitioner was filed along with the application for condonation of delay. After hearing counsel for the parties the Consolidation Officer by his order dated 7th November, 1979, condoned delay and admitted the said application for hearing on merits. Aggrieved against the said order, respondents Nos. 4 and 5 filed a revision before the Deputy Director under Section 48 of the Act. The said authority in revision finally allowed the revision and set aside the judgment of the Consolidation Officer by means of order dated 22nd April, 1981, which is the impugned order in the present case. 5. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision of the respondents mainly on two grounds. Firstly, it held that since the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the civil court for adjudication of her rights by filing a suit and the matter was taken up right upto Hon'ble Supreme Court where one of the matter is still pending she cannot now be permitted to raise such a dispute before the consolidation authorities. The second ground was, condonation of delay granted by the Consolidation Officer was not justified on the facts of this case. 6. It is suffice to say in respect of the first ground that the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed an error in holding that the question cannot be gone into before consolidation authorities in view of submission by the petitioner before the Civil Court. In respect of plot No. 13, as aforesaid, and as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner dispute in respect of the same between the parties became final prior to the initiation of consolidation operations, but when subsequent to that consolidation proceedings is initiated if is incumbent upon the parties to apply to the authority for correction of records in pursuance to the said decree. Mere submission of a party before the civil court does not exclude the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities to adjudicate the rights of the parties if application which is made by the petitioner is entertain able under law under the Act. If there is dispute in respect of the right of the parties pending or if finally adjudicated the question regarding the correction of records after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act is bound to be taken by the authorities under the said Act. Thus, the finding of the revisional authority that consolidation courts have no jurisdiction on account of the petitioner's submission before the civil court authority is completely misconceived. Thus, allowing oi the appeal on the first ground is not sustainable. 7. Coming now to the second ground I find from the judgment given by the revisional authority, it has been recorded that on 26th October, 1979, the Forest Department sought time for replying the application for evidence and 7th November, 1979 was the date fixed by the Consolidation Officer. 7th November, 1979, was not the date fixed for hearing of the case but on that date the said authority finally passed orders. It was urged before the revisional authority by the Forest Department that if that would have been the date for hearing then an affidavit in reply to the said application must have been filed and on account of this the department could not file any affidavit in reply to controvert the facts stated in the said affidavit. This state of facts, as urged on behalf of the respondents, before the consolidation authority was found to be correct by the revisional authority. A further finding has been recorded by the revisional authority on account of finally deciding the said application on 7th November, 1979 that the Consolidation Officer has not accorded any opportunity to the Forest Department to file affidavit in reply to the said application. 8. After recording this finding it is clear that the respondents did not get the opportunity for rebutting the affidavit in respect of the condonation of delay application and thus further finding by the revisional court on the merits of the condonation of delay could not be sustained. 8. After recording this finding it is clear that the respondents did not get the opportunity for rebutting the affidavit in respect of the condonation of delay application and thus further finding by the revisional court on the merits of the condonation of delay could not be sustained. The proper course open before the revisional authority was to have grunted time to the respondents to file a reply and then should have disposed of the said application himself or to have remanded the case before the Consolidation Officer. Thus, in the lack of any opportunity to the respondents I feel that the proper course would have been that the revisional authority after affording opportunity to have decided the said application himself. 9. The finding recorded, for the aforesaid reason, by the Deputy Director in revision, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. It has also been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the present application was an application under Section 12 of the aforesaid Act and not an objection under Section 9. This was strongly refuted on behalf of the state, Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged, after adjudication of rights inter se between the parties by the civil court the consolidation court cannot question the rights of parties. Even this argument has been seriously challenged by the learned Standing Counsel. However, these are all arguments to be raised in case the application for condonation of delay is finally decided by the revisional authorities and is found to be maintainable and is not rejected on account of its being filed late. This question cannot be gone into at this stage. Since this case is being remanded before the revisional authority for deciding the application for condonation of delay afresh after giving opportunity to the State (Forest Department) it would be open to the parties to raise such question after the disposal of the said application in case the application of the petitioner is entertained. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the order dated 22nd April, 1981, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 22nd April, 1981, is hereby quashed and the case is remanded before the said authority for deciding the question of condonation of delay afresh after giving opportunity to the learned counsel for the state. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the order dated 22nd April, 1981, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 22nd April, 1981, is hereby quashed and the case is remanded before the said authority for deciding the question of condonation of delay afresh after giving opportunity to the learned counsel for the state. While considering the question of limitation the revisional authority shall also consider if it is an application under Section 9 or under Section 12 of the Act. The writ petition is thus allowed. There will be no order as to costs.