JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been preferred against the judgment passed by the 1st appellate Court on 29th April 1986. Trial Court directed that the defence which is available under section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act. 1950. will not be available to the defendant on account of the default committed by him in the matter of payment of the rent. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant. Plaintiff's suit was dismissed in default on 21st October. 1982. The defendant deposited the amount upto the time of dismissal of the suit, even after the dismissal of the suit, taking into consideration that application for the restoration has b,-en filed. Defendant deposited the amount in advance upto 11st December 1983. Counsel for the defendant non-petitioner at the time of the presentation of the application for restoration made a note on the application that he is having no objection if the case is restored. Inspite of this fact the court considered it proper that the suit should not be restored and fixed the date for the reply and thereafter for necessary further proceedings. Restoration application thus proceeded for the purpose of enquiry about the sufficient cause but the enquiry was not compacted. On 15th March 1984, the Court reviewed its own order and passed the order that the counsel for the non-petitioner defendant has made an endorsement on the application as such, the case should be restored to its original number. The case was restored. An application was moved that there is a default in the payment of rent for the months of January, February March and April 1984 and, as such the defence which is available to the defendant under section 3 should be struck of. That application was accepted by the court below. However, on appeal, the appellate Court set aside the order holding that the provisions of Section 13 (5) are directory in nature and, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the defence should not be struck off Being aggrieved with the decision of the first appellate court, this revision has been preferred by the present petitioner before this court. 3. First of all Mr. Maloo appearing on behalf of the present petitioner submitted that section 13 (5) is mandatory in nature. The second contention of Mr. 3. First of all Mr. Maloo appearing on behalf of the present petitioner submitted that section 13 (5) is mandatory in nature. The second contention of Mr. Maloo is that there was no sufficient ground for the condonation of the delay if any. 4. On behalf of the defendant it was submitted that there was a collusion between the plaintiff and his counsel and which is evident from the note made by the counsel on the application for restoration. The second contention is that the Court has not accepted the endorsement earlier and directed enquiry to deal with the matter but the Court has failed to er quite into the matter and after a period of more than one year the Court had no jurisdiction to review its own order and to accept the endorsement made in the year 1982 as a basis for the restoration. It was also submitted that Section 13 (5) is directory in nature. 5. I have beard the rival contentions of both the parties, and have perused the record of the case. 6. Mr. Maloo, counsel for the petitioner has cited before me the case reported in 1986 RLR 236= 1986 (I) W.L.N. 451), (1) Firm Kripa Ram Y. Vijay Kumar. This court has assumed that no indulgence can be granted to a tenant in view of the mandatory provisions of sub-section 15) of Section 13 of the Act. This Court has considered the matter and held that bare reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 13 of the Act of the State of Rajasthan is indicative of the fact that the provisions are mandatory particularly in the light of sub-clause (3) of Section 13. In the case of (2) Nihal Chaad v, Sn.t. Dhapu: 1)83 RLR 397, this Court had the opportunity to consider the complete case law and held that the beneficial legislation should be considered for the benefit of those for whose benefit it has been enacted and the provisions were held directory. Section 13 (5) provides that if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against the eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. Section 13 (5) provides that if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Sub-section (4) on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against the eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. Clause (4) provides that the tenant shall deposit in Court or pay to the landlord the amount determined by the Court under sub-section (3) within 15 days from the date of such determination or within such further time not exceeding three months as the case may be extended by the Court. It casts further duty also on the tenant to continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord monthly rent subsequent to the period upto which determination has been made by the 15th of each succeeding month. The suit once dismissed comes to an end and if it is restored after a period say 15 months or 15 months, clause (4) of section 13 will not apply at all. Clause (4) of Section 13 applies only when there is a suit pending. If the suit is not pending the tenant has no right to deposit the amount in the Court as referred to in sub-clause (1) of Section 13, The suit was dismissed on 1st December 1982 and it has been restored on 15th March 1984. How there can be a default when the suit was not pending, as the tenant had no right and no opportunity to deposit the rent in the court. The word 'deposit' as used in sub-section (4) means that the tenant shall continue to deposit in Court the monthly rent month by month subsequent to the period upto which the determination has been made during the pendency o' the suit. In this case the suit was dismissed on 21st October, 1982. The tenant deposited in advance the rent upto December 1983 The Court cannot assist the Shylock and cannot come at the rescue of the Shylock by interpreting the law in a way which will defeat the beneficial legislation which has been enacted for the benefit of the down trodden and the weaker sections of the society. One can understand the difficulties of a tenant and one must put himself in the same footing as the tenant while interpreting the beneficial legislation. We, in our Constitution, talk of Socialist Republic of India. One can understand the difficulties of a tenant and one must put himself in the same footing as the tenant while interpreting the beneficial legislation. We, in our Constitution, talk of Socialist Republic of India. The Socialist Republic needs the protection of the weaker sections. In fact, it is the duty of the State, may be of a protective nature to provide shelter place and bread to all the citizens of the country and for that purpose if necessary the property of the property holders who are holding the property and who are multiplying the property at the costs of the exploited class can be taken away and should be taken away. We should understand that Chapter-III has been amended and right to property has been taken out of the fundamental rights and now new article 300-A has been inserted. Thus, there is no fundamental right to hold the property to earn out of the property at the cost of the needy person. If we interpret this law, taking note of it I am of the view that the view taken by my brother Justice G.M. Lodha in the case of Nihal Chand (supra) is the correct view and the provisions of section 13 (4), (5) are directory in nature and not mandatory in nature. The case of Nihal Chan,i (supra) has not been brought to the notice of the court while deciding the case of firm Kripa Ram (supra). I am further fortified in taking this view from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ganesh Prasad Sah Resari and another v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta : AIR 1985 SC 964 . Taking note of the fact that there is a divergent opinion about the provisions of Clause (5) of Section 13, 1 might have considered of making a reference to the larger bench for the decision on this point. I am deciding this revision petition on the point after the restoration of the suit it is re instituted and renumbered. if the restoration period is taken into consideration then there will always be delay and the landlord will always get advantage of Clause (4). Clause (4) provides for depositing the amount which cannot be deposited as the suit was not pending. After the restoration one may say that the period should be condoned and the deposit process must start. if the restoration period is taken into consideration then there will always be delay and the landlord will always get advantage of Clause (4). Clause (4) provides for depositing the amount which cannot be deposited as the suit was not pending. After the restoration one may say that the period should be condoned and the deposit process must start. There should be a fresh determination of the dues because the Court cannot take the note of the fact what has happened in the intervening period and there may be dispute about it. Clause (4) only comes into operation after the determination of the rent under Clause (3) on the first date of hearing. Clause (3) cannot come into operation after the restoration and there should be a determination of the dues of the intervening period and only thereafter clause (4) comes into operation, because the dispute of the intervening period cannot be resolved without the aid of the court. For this reason I am not referring this revision petition to the larger bench. The revision petition is dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******