S. N. SAPRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Regular First appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dt. July 25, 1985 passed by the court of Shri O. P. Dwivedi, Additional District Judge, Delhi, thereby decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of possession and also for mesne profits amounting to Rs. 5,400. 00 against the appellants/defendants. ( 2 ) SHRI Shyam Surider Seth, plaintiff (who is respondent in this appeal) filed a suit No. 491 of 1984 against the present appellants (defendants in suit) for recovery of possession of the portion of property bearing No. 1/1553- 1554, forming part of property No. 1/1553- 55 and 1551-52 (Part) (New), Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi as shown in red colour in the plan and for recovery of Rs. 5,400. 00 on account of use and occupation charges/mesne profits. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the plaint, the plaintiff/respondent is the owner of property bearing No. 1/1553-551/2 and 1551-52 (Part) (New) Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. The respondent purchased the property in public auction held on 20-11-1962 as he was the highest bidder. The sale certificate with respect to the said property was issued by the Managing Officer, Department of Rehabilitation, Government of India, New Delhi in exercise of its power under S. 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act) on Mar. 31, 1981 and the same was duly registered with the Sub Registrar, Delhi According to plaintiff/respondent, the appellants/defendants are unauthorised occupants in portion of the property bearing No. 1/1553-1554 forming part of the aforesaid property. The appellants failed to deliver the vacant possession of the property to respondent. Defendants are also liable to pay mesne profits for use and occupation. The cause of action, according to the plaint, arose in favour of respondent on Mar. 31, 1981 when the certificate of sale was issued in favour of respondent. ( 4 ) THE appellants/defendants filed their written statement and raised various preliminary objections. The appellants alleged that plaintiff/respondent had no locus standi to file the present suit as plaintiff was neither the owner nor purchaser of the aforesaid properties. 31, 1981 when the certificate of sale was issued in favour of respondent. ( 4 ) THE appellants/defendants filed their written statement and raised various preliminary objections. The appellants alleged that plaintiff/respondent had no locus standi to file the present suit as plaintiff was neither the owner nor purchaser of the aforesaid properties. It was further alleged by,the appellants that plaintiff has no cause of action and the suit was not maintainable against the appellants as they were the lawful owners and occupants of the property in suit in their own rights as they were in occupation since the year 1950. It was specifically stated by the appellants that as they were in actual physical possession continuously for more than the statutory period of 12 years, thus they had become the owner of the property in question by adverse possession. Defendants also alleged that the suit was barred by limitation. ( 5 ) ON the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed : "1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the property in dispute ? 2. Whether the defendants have been in occupation of suit property for a period of more than 12 years ? If so, have they perfected their title by adverse possession ? 3. Whether the suit is properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction 4. Whether the suit is time barred 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover any mesne profits. If so, at what rate and what amount ? 6. Relief. " ( 6 ) LEARNED Additional District Judge, Delhi dealt at length with the evidence led by the parties and after discussing the same the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. Learned Additional District Judge decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and held that plaintiff , is the owner of the property in suit, as has been shown in the plan Ext. Public Witness 1/2. Learned Additional District Judge decided Issue No. 2 against the present appellants and held that though the appellants had been in occupation of the disputed portion for a period of more than 12 years but they had not perfected their title by adverse possession. Issue No. 3 was decided against the present appellants and the learned Additional District Judge held that the period of limitation in the present case began to run with effect from Mar. Issue No. 3 was decided against the present appellants and the learned Additional District Judge held that the period of limitation in the present case began to run with effect from Mar. 31, 1981 when sale certificate Ext. Public Witness 1/1 was issued by the Government in favour of the plaintiff and, therefore, the suit was within," limitation as the same was filed on Feb, 1 1984. Issue No. 5 was decided in favour of plaintiff and the present appellants were found liable! to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 150. 00 per mensem. ( 7 ) THE first point which arises for consideration in the present appeal is as to what was the nature of possession of the appellants in respect of property in suit. If it was adverse possession, then whether appellants had acquired title by adverse possession before the filing of the suit. ( 8 ) MR. S. N. Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants, has argued that a specific plea was taken by defendants in the written statement where it was pleaded that the appellants were inoccupation of the property in dispute since 1950, and that in any case possession of the appellants had been established for a period of more than, 12 years before filing of the suit, and the learned Additional District Judge has held that appellants were in accupation since long. He urges that there is sufficient evidence on record to show that at least from the year 1959, the appellants were unauthorised occupants of the property in question. He further submits that respondent served a notice Ext. D. 1dt. Mar. 28,1967 through his counsel upon the appellants. In this notice, the respondent categorically recognised that the appellants were holding the property in question as unauthorised occupants. Mr. Kumar thus contends that if the this date i. e. Mar. 28,1967, is taken as the date of possession even then, the appellants have acquired the title in the property by adverse possession as the suit has been filed after a period of 12 I years. ( 9 ) MR. Kumar has taken us to the documents Exts. D. 3 and D. 4. These documents show that appellants were unauthorised occupants in the property in question. Ext. D. 3 has been issued by the; Accounts Officer (N) on Mar. 7,1967 and the appellants have been described as unauthorised occupants. ( 9 ) MR. Kumar has taken us to the documents Exts. D. 3 and D. 4. These documents show that appellants were unauthorised occupants in the property in question. Ext. D. 3 has been issued by the; Accounts Officer (N) on Mar. 7,1967 and the appellants have been described as unauthorised occupants. Similarly, in the letter dt. Nov. 5,1966 by which the provisional possession of the property No. 1/1553-55 1553-55 was given to the respondent by Managing Officer, appellants M/s. Dr. Bhargava and Company has been described as unauthorised with respect to the property No. 1553. ( 10 ) MR. Kumar urges that principles of law regarding adverse possession are well settled. In case of trespasser the adverse possession is open and hostile the day he enters the property. He urges that it is only in case of permissive possession, the person (licencee or tenant) has to show an overt act or as to when his possession became adverse. Mr. Kumar submits that in the present case the possession of the appellants, at no stage, was permissive so under law appellants are not required to show as to how they came into possession and they have not to show or allege any overt act. The present case is a clear case of adverse possession, according to learned counsel for the appellants, as admittedly the appellants were unauthorised occupants for a continuous uninterrupted period of more than 12 years and as such they have perfected their title. The possession of the appellants, he urges, constitutes in the circumstances of the case adverse pos- session. ( 11 ) IN support of his contentions, Mr. Kumar has relied upon several judgments which are Secy. of State v. Bommadevara Venkatanarasimha Naidu, AIR 1920 Mad 295, Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. , AIR 1931 PC 186; Secy. of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, AIR 1934 PC 23; Srish Chandra Nandy v. Ramji Bechar Das, AIR 1936 Pat 179; Peruvaniyan Krishna Kurup v. Chowwakaran Razhukkath Pokki, AIR 1936 Mad 598; Munnalal v. Mst. Kashibai, AIR 1947 PC 15; M. V. S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 ; Padminibai v. Tangavva, AIR 1979 SC 1142 ; Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537 . Kashibai, AIR 1947 PC 15; M. V. S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 ; Padminibai v. Tangavva, AIR 1979 SC 1142 ; Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537 . ( 12 ) IN AIR 1934 PC 23 (supra) their Lordships held : "the nature of the requisite possession must necessarily vary with the nature of the subject possessed. The possession must be kind of possession of which the particular subject is susceptible. The Crown in the case of a fishery belonging to it exercises its rights by granting leases or licenses to fish; it does not itself fish. Consequently the granting by a person other than the Crown of leases or licenses to fish in the case of a fishery which prima facie belongs to the Crown is evidence of the usurpation by that person of the distinctive rights of the Crown and is thus most significant evidence of adverse possession. "in Peruvaniyan Krishna Kurup v. Chowwakaran Razhukkath Pokki, AIR 1936 Mad 598, it was held as under : "it was therefore incumbent upon Akkal Kannan Nair to reduce the property to his possession or call upon the tenant to attorn to him, but he never did so. The possession of the tavazhi through its tenant Kannan must be deemed to be adverse from the date of sale. Akkal Kannan Nair never reduced the property to possession by calling upon the tenant to attom to him or otherwise. The tenant continued to pay rent to Lakshmi Amma. So from 1907 until 1927 for a period of over 20 years defendant 1 was paying rent to Lakshmi Amma and therefore possession of the property through the tenants continued with the tavazhi without any interruption and there was thus an open, and adverse enjoyment of the property for over a period of 12 years by the reception of rent through Kannan and afterwards Chokru and defendant 1, and the plaintiff s rights have become barred either under Art. 137 or under Art. 144, Limitation Act, whichever, Art. is taken. "in Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. "in Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. , AIR 1931 PC 186, it was held : "now there is undoubted authority for the proposition that where a person without any colour of right wrongfully takes possession as a trespasser of the property of another, any title which he may acquire by adverse possession will be strictly limited to what he has actually so possessed. The maxim tantum prescriptum quantum possessum is rigorously applied to him. And it has been held in the case of mines that there is ho presumption in law that the possession of a part of a seam infers possession of the whole seam, much less of all the seams in the mineral field in which part of a seam has been worked. On the other hand, possession is a question of fact and the extent of the possession may be an inference of fact. "in Rajinder Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2537 (supra) it was held as under : "it is very difficult to view the act of taking illegal possession of immovable property or continuance of wrongful possession, even if the wrong doer be a party to the pending suit. as a "dealing with" the property otherwise than by its transfer so as to be covered by S. 52 of the T. P. Act. The prohibition which prevents the immovable property being "transferred or otherwise dealt with" by a party is apparently directed against some action which would have an immediate effect, similar to or comparable with that of transfer, but for the principle of lispend ens. Taking of illegal possession or its continuance neither resembles nor is comparable to a transfer. They are onesided wrongful acts and not bilateral transactions of a kind which ordinarily constitute "deals" or dealings with property (e. g. contracts to sell ). They cannot confer immediate rights on the possessor. Continued illegal possession ripens into a legally enforceable right only after the prescribed period of time has elapsed. It matures into a right due to inaction and not due to the action of the injured party which can approach a Court of appropriate jurisdiction for redress by a suit to regain possession, the relief against the wrong done must be sought within the time prescribed. This is the only mode of redress provided by law for such cases. It matures into a right due to inaction and not due to the action of the injured party which can approach a Court of appropriate jurisdiction for redress by a suit to regain possession, the relief against the wrong done must be sought within the time prescribed. This is the only mode of redress provided by law for such cases. S. 52 of the T. P. Act was not meant to serve, indirectly, as a provision or a substitute for a provision of the Limitation Act to exclude time. Such a provision could and would have been there in the Limitation Act, where it would appropriately belong, if the policy behind the law was to have such a provision. "in Padminibai v. Tangavva, AIR 1979 SC 1142 it was held as under : "we have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the courts below that Tatya had acquired title by remaining in exclusive and open possession of the suit lands adversely to Padmini Bai for a period far exceeding 12 years, and this possession was never interrupted or disturbed. He had thus acquired ownership by prescription. " ( 13 ) MR. G. S. Vohra, learned counsel for respondent has contended that the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellants as the appellants have not specifically pleaded the same in their written statement. The next contention of Mr. Vohra is that the appellants have not made out a case of adverse possession. According to him, there are various shades of unauthorised occupation and mere long, continuous and uninterrupted possession does not mean or amount to an adverse possession. There is nothing on record to show that the possession of the appellants was hostile and mere unauthorised occupation does not constitute adverse possession. At no stage, according to Mr. Vohra, the appellants asserted their rights as owner in the property and there was no overt act on the part of the appellants though they were unauthorised occupants. Mr. Vohra submits that after the partition of India in 1947, displaced persons coming from West Pakistan occupied the properties left by Muslims who migrated to areas now forming part of Pakistan. ( 14 ) MR. Mr. Vohra submits that after the partition of India in 1947, displaced persons coming from West Pakistan occupied the properties left by Muslims who migrated to areas now forming part of Pakistan. ( 14 ) MR. Vohra further contends that the possession of the appellants in the property in question even under law, could not be an adverse possession as the evacuee property formed part of the Central Compensation Pool for fulfilling the objects of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder and also for rehabilitation of the displaced persons. Under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the property vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. As such he urges the property in question vested in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and as such the plea of adverse possession cannot be raised by the appellants. ( 15 ) MR. Vohra has relied upon the. judgments in Shree Ambarnath Mills Corpn. Bombay v. D. B. Godbole, AIR 1957 Bom 119 ; Mt, Bhago v. Deep Chand Harphul, AIR 1964 Pandh 187; and Premendu Bhusan Mondal v. Sripatiranjanchakravarty. AIR 1976 Cal 55 . ( 16 ) BEFORE applying the laws laid down by the aforesaid judgments and considering the respective contentions of learned counsel for parties, one fact is to be borne in mind. At the time of partition of the country in 1947 thousands of displaced persons came to India from areas which now form part of Pakistan. Similarly, thousands of persons left India and migrated to the areas which now form part of Pakistan. The properties left by the migrants were occupied by the displaced persons in India. Various enactments including Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act came into existence for the administration of evacuee properties, for its disposal and for rehabilitation of displaced persons. Such evacuee properties were occupied by displaced persons and others. The Government of India or the Department of Rehabilitation recognised some occupants as tenants and started realising rent from them before such properties were put to public auction or otherwise transferred. In other cases, the occupants were treated as unauthorised occupants and from them, the licence fee was charged. ( 17 ) THE first contention of Mr. Vohra that no specific plea with regard to the adverse possession has been taken by the appellants in their written statement is without any substance. In other cases, the occupants were treated as unauthorised occupants and from them, the licence fee was charged. ( 17 ) THE first contention of Mr. Vohra that no specific plea with regard to the adverse possession has been taken by the appellants in their written statement is without any substance. In paras 2 and 6 of the preliminary objections of their written statement the appellants have taken a specific plea that they have become the owners of the premises in dispute on the basis of the their being in actual physical possession continuously for more than the statutory period of 12 years. They have also alleged that they have become the owners by adverse possession and that they had been enjoying the peaceful uninterrupted and without objection the disputed premises to the knowledge of the plaintiff for a period of more than 12 years. ( 18 ) ADVERSE possession means the hostile possession, that is, a possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of true owner. It follows that where a wrong doer is not permitted by law to advance any hostile title to the true owner, his possession cannot be adverse to the true owner. A person inducted as licencee must continue to be regarded as licencee until by some overt act he disclaims. It has been held in M. V. S. Manikayala Rao v. M. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 that the question of adverse possession is a question of fact . Thus a person who claims title on the basis of adverse possession must establish the same by unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of title of the true owner. In case of permissive possession, the person who is in| possession, must allege and prove some overt act. ( 19 ) NOW coming to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen as to how the appellants came into possession in the property in question. There is sufficient documentary evidence which has been proved to throw light on this question. It has been stated above, that at the time of partition of India in 1947, the evacuee properties were occupied by displaced persons. Some of them were recognised as tenants and the other unauthorised occupants by the Government. The Department of rehabilitation charged licence fee from the unauthorised occupants. It has been stated above, that at the time of partition of India in 1947, the evacuee properties were occupied by displaced persons. Some of them were recognised as tenants and the other unauthorised occupants by the Government. The Department of rehabilitation charged licence fee from the unauthorised occupants. The premises in question were originally occupied by M/s. Snow White Ice Factory who were the tenants. This is so mentioned in the survey reports dt. Mar. 7, 1967 which is Ext. D. 3. Dr. Bhargava (appellant) has been shown as unauthorised but the name of M/s. Snow White Ice Factory is also mentioned under the name of appellants. In the document Ext. D. 4 which is dt. Nov. 5, 1966 whereby provisional possession of the property in question was given to the respondent, Dr. Bhargava and Company (appellants) have been shown unauthorised occupant. But there is an important fact in this document. While the appellants have been shown unauthorised occupants but under that it has been mentioned "rent is being paid in the name of Snow White Ice Factory". Amount of rent is Rs. 25. 00 per mensem. In the survey report dt. Mar. 4, 1967 Ext. D. 2 M/s. Snow Ice Cream Factory has. been mentioned as the occupants of the property No. 1553 and the rate of rent has been mentioned Rs. 25. 00. The appellants have filed more documents on the record. It appears that M/s. Snow White Ice Factory were lawful occupants under the Custodian on the payment of Rs. 25. 00 as rent per mensem. M/s. Snow White Ice Factory gave the premises to the present appellants on licence basis or sublet the premises. In premises No. 1554 M/s. A. G. Industries have been shown as tenant on the payment of Rs. 50. 00 as rent per mensem in Ext. D. 2. The defendant has been shown in Ext. D. 3 as unauthorised occupant under M/s. A. C. Industries. Similarly, in document Ext. D. 4 in respect of property No. 1554, M/s. A. C. Industries have been shown as tenant at the rate of Rs. 50. 00 per mensem. Ext. DX. 3 is an affidavit filed by Kailash Chand Bhargava in which he has stated that the power connection installed at 12, Church Road, Kashmere Gate be transferred in favour of Dr. D. 4 in respect of property No. 1554, M/s. A. C. Industries have been shown as tenant at the rate of Rs. 50. 00 per mensem. Ext. DX. 3 is an affidavit filed by Kailash Chand Bhargava in which he has stated that the power connection installed at 12, Church Road, Kashmere Gate be transferred in favour of Dr. Bhargava and Company who were carrying on the business in H. No. 1554, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. Ext. DX. 1 is the photostat copy of the receipt issued by Mr. Kailash Chand Bhargava in favour of Dr. Bhargava and Company showing the payment of rent as Rs. 25. 00. These documents show that the appellants were not the trespassers but the appellants came into possession of the suit property as licencees or sub-tenants through the lawful occupants under the Custodian. Thus, the possession of the appellants was permissive. It is settled law that the appellants whose possession was permissive cannot claim title on the basis of adverse possession unless they show specific overt act and assertion on their part that they. disclaimed the title of the true owner. They must allege and prove that as to when and under what circumstances, their possession became adverse. This requires a definite overt act and assertion on the part of the appellants. This has neither been pleaded nor proved by the appellants. We are of the view that the appellants have not made out a case of adverse possession. ( 20 ) WE find that there is nothing on record to show any hostility on the part of the appellants against the title of the true owner. Accordingly we hold that the possession of the appellants in respect of the property in suit was not adverse till the sale certificate Ext. Public Witnessl/1 dt. Mar. 31, 1981 was issued in favour of the respondent. ( 21 ) THE contention raised by Mr. Vohra that under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the right, title and interest of an evacuee in the evacuee property vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances is not necessary to be dealt with as we have held that the possession of the appellants was not adverse possession prior to the purchase of the property by the respondent from the Government. ( 22 ) THE next submission made by learned Counsel for the plaintiff is with regard to the point of limitation. He urges that the suit is hopelessly time barred. On this he has raised two contentions. The question of limitation is directly connected with the question of adverse possession and we have given our findings on the question of adverse possession but we will like to deal with the question of limitation also. ( 23 ) MR. Kumar in the first place urges that admittedly the appellants were unauthorised occupants of the property in question for a period of more than 12 years and the suit filed by the respondent after a period of 12 years is time barred. He contends that though the limitation in case of a suit filed by the Government is 30 years from the date when the possession of a person becomes adverse but in case of the person who purchases the property from the Government the period is 12 years from the date when the third person occupied the property unauthorisedly. No fresh period of limitation starts from the date of the purchase of the property by a purchaser from the Government. If the period of 12 years has already expired prior to the purchase of the property by the purchaser from the Government, then the suit will be time barred. Mr. Kumar has placed reliance on Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, (1904) ILR 32 Cal 129; Annada Mohan Roy Chowdhury v. Kina Das, AIR 1924 Cal 394; (Ayyagari) Venkata Suryanarayana v. Makka Venku Naidu, AIR 1926 Mad 1155 and Vyas Gopichand v. Mattoolal, AIR 1971 Raj 237 . ( 24 ) IN Annada Mohan case (supra) it was held that where a purchaser of land from Government sued to recover possession within the period of 60 years (the period prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1908 for the suits by Government) but within the period of 12 years from the date of purchase,. the suit was barred by limitation. In other words, it was held that suit filed by the purchaser of land from Government beyond the period of 12 years from the date when the possession of the occupant became adverse was time barred. the suit was barred by limitation. In other words, it was held that suit filed by the purchaser of land from Government beyond the period of 12 years from the date when the possession of the occupant became adverse was time barred. The period of limitation of 12 years was not to commence from the date of purchase but from the date when the possession of the third person became adverse. It was also held that in such cases the Government should file a suit and recover possession then transfer the same to the purchaser. ( 25 ) AFTER relying upon these judgments, Mr. Kumar further relies upon the Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition page 86 where it has been stated that the mere fact that the result of the statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle the Court not to give it effect. Mr. Vohra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the period of limitation should be 12 years from the date of purchase of a property by a purchaser from the Government and not from the date when the possession of third person becomes adverse. He submits that the views expressed in the aforesaid judgment with regard to the period of limitation are not rational. We are unable to accept arguments of Mr. Vohra and in our view the period of limitation of 12 years in case of a suit on the basis of a title under Art. 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not commence from the date of the purchase of the property by the purchaser from the Government but from the date when the possession of the occupant becomes adverse. If the property has been purchased from the Government by a person and a third person was in adverse possession of that property for a period of more than 12 years prior to the purchase of the property then the suit of the purchaser will be time barred. However, this will not help the appellants as we have held that the possession of the appellants was not adverse in the present case. ( 26 ) SECONDLY, Mr. Kumar contends on the question of limitation, that even otherwise the suit is time barred as therespondent became owner of the property when his bid was accepted. He contends that the sale certificate Ext. ( 26 ) SECONDLY, Mr. Kumar contends on the question of limitation, that even otherwise the suit is time barred as therespondent became owner of the property when his bid was accepted. He contends that the sale certificate Ext. Public Witness l/1 issued under S. 20 of the Act, though it is dt. Mar. 31, 1981 but the same takes effect from Jan. 16, 1964. This is the date when the highest bid of the respondent was accepted by the Government. He contends that under the provisions as contained in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, the issue of sale certificate was a mere formality and the purchaser became the owner when his bid was accepted. He submits that even the provisional possession was given to the respondent by the Government vide document Ext. D. 4 and he became entitled to receive rents from the tenants who are occupying the property. Mr. Kumar has also invited our attention to the notice Ext. D. l which was given by the respondent on Mar 28,1967 to the appellants. Mr. Kumar submits that in this notice the respondent has clearly alleged that he had purchased the premises along with other property from the Ministry of Rehabilitation Government of India in an open auction and that the same had been given to him with effect from Jan. 16, 1964. He, therefore, submits that the respondent became the owner of the property with effect from Jan. 16,1964 and he could file the suit against the unathorised occupants i. e. appellants when his bid was accepted. Reliance had been placed on Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1994 : it was held as under :- "the passing of title thus presupposes the payment of price in full and the question is at what stage this takes place. Obviously, there are several distinct stages in the sale of property. These are : (a) the fall of the hammer and the declaration of the highest bid (b) the approval of the highest bid by the Settlement Commissioner or Officer appointed by him (c) payment of the full price after approval of the highest bid; (d) grant of certificate and (e) registration of the certificate. These are : (a) the fall of the hammer and the declaration of the highest bid (b) the approval of the highest bid by the Settlement Commissioner or Officer appointed by him (c) payment of the full price after approval of the highest bid; (d) grant of certificate and (e) registration of the certificate. The first and last in this series, namely, the fall of the hammer and the registration of the certificate are not critical dates for this purpose and they have not been suggested as the starting point of title. It is also clear that till payment of full price title is in abeyance for the rules themselves say that if the price is not paid the auction purchaser has no claim to the property. Under S. 65 of the Civil P. C. title is deemed to commence from the date of auction and not when the sale becomes absolute. Sale becomes absolute under the Code after the period of thirty days, during which sale may be asked to be set aside, has passed. When that time has passed and no application to set aside the sale has been made the sale becomes absolute (O. 21, R. 92) and a certificate then issues (O. 21, R. 94 ). Under the corresponding section of the Code of 1882 (S. 316) the certificate was required to bear the date of the confirmation of sale and title vested from the date The amendment of the Code in 1908 now ante dated title, by a fiction, to the date of auction. It was further held : "it seems to us that the matter must be considered on general principles. In this case the highest bid was of the respondent and he paid the full price before the sale in his favour was confirmed, the sale certificate, though issued later, mentioned the date of the confirmation of the sale in his favour. The tenant was asked to attorn to the purchaser from the date of confirmation of sale and thus possession was also delivered on that day. Title, therefore, was not in abeyance till the certificate was issued but passed on the confirmation of sale. The tenant was asked to attorn to the purchaser from the date of confirmation of sale and thus possession was also delivered on that day. Title, therefore, was not in abeyance till the certificate was issued but passed on the confirmation of sale. The intention behind the rules appears to be that title shall pass when the full price is realised and this is now clear from the new form of the certificate reproduced in Jaimal s case, 66 Pun LR 99 : (AIR 1964 Punj 99 ). No doubt till the price is paid in full there is no claim to the property, but it seems somewhat strange that a person who had paid the price in full and in whose favour the sale is also confirmed and who is placed in possession should only acquire title to the property from the date on which a certificate/ is issued to him. There may conceivably be a great deal of time spent before the certificate is granted. In this case the tenant was told to attorn from Oct. 3, 1956 because nothing remained to be done except the ministerial acts of issuing the certificate and getting it registered. Therefore, so far as the title was concerned, it must be deemed to have passed and the certificate must relate back to the date when the sale became absolute. The tenant himself paid rent for 2 days to the Custodian and deposited rent for the use of the new landlord from Oct. 3, 1956. His defence originally was that he had tendered the rent from Oct. 3, 1956 and even sent it by money order but the landlord refused to receive it. He thus acknowledged the new landlord and attorned to him from Oct. 3,1956. It was only when the decision in the Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries case, AIR 1958 SC 289 , was given that he changed his stand. That case, however, did not decide the precise point on which he rested his new defence. The rullings on which he relies also erroneously accepted the decision of this Court in the Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries case, AIR 1958 SC 289 to have decided the point when title commences. As has been rightly pointed out in Jaimal s case, 66 Pun LR 99 : AIR 1964 Punj 99, the point was at large. The rullings on which he relies also erroneously accepted the decision of this Court in the Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries case, AIR 1958 SC 289 to have decided the point when title commences. As has been rightly pointed out in Jaimal s case, 66 Pun LR 99 : AIR 1964 Punj 99, the point was at large. In our judgment, the landlord in the present case could maintain the proceedings for ejectment. We agree generally with the observations of Tek Chand J. In Roshan Lal Goswami v. Gobind Ram, 65 Pun LR 852 : AIR 1963 Punj 532, that the landlord s right to bring a suit for ejectment need not necessarily depend on the issuance of the certificate. In this case, the landlord had paid the full price, his bid was approved and he had received a certificate mentioning the date of confirmation. In our judgment, he obtained title on the date of confirmation of the sale and could demand rent from that date as indeed he was informed and he himself understood to be the true state of affairs. "mr. Kumar has also relied on Mt. Mahmudunnissa v. Sayed Zahid Raza, AIR 1925 Oudh 20. In Shiv Nath v. Mela Ram 1969 Ren CR 494 (SC) it has been held that in suit for ejectment by auction purchaser before obtaining sale certificate normally the auction purchaser does not acquire title in the property before he pays the purchase money and obtains document of transfer in his favour but the case of transfer by the Managing Officer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and the Rules thereunder stand on a different footing. The facts of the case are that the eviction petition was filed under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as the eviction could be sought against tenant on the ground, as mentioned in S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In this case, it was held that the giving of provisional possession by the Managing Officer of the property will really mean delivering symbolical possession of property with the result that the direction to the tenant to pay rent to him would in effectamount to a direction to attorn to him. ( 27 ) MR. In this case, it was held that the giving of provisional possession by the Managing Officer of the property will really mean delivering symbolical possession of property with the result that the direction to the tenant to pay rent to him would in effectamount to a direction to attorn to him. ( 27 ) MR. Kumar further contends that after auction of the property by the Managing Officer under the Act, the property ceases to vest in the central pool and the Managing Officer has no power whatsoever to cancel the bid after the same has been accepted. He has placed reliance on the judgment in Mohd. Yusuf v. Union of India, (1970) 72 Pun LR (D) 241. In this case, it has been held that S. 20 of the Act provides for transfer of the property out of the compensation pool and one of the methods is to dispose of the same by public auction. Once the public auction has taken place in exercise of power under S. 20 of the Act then the property no longer forms part of the compensation pool. It has been held further that until the sale is set aside under R. 92 the exercise of power by Managing Officer under S. 19 is not permissible because the property has been taken out of the compensation pool and his jurisdiction ceases the moment the property was put to public auction. ( 28 ) MR. Vohra, on the other hand, urges that the sale certificate Ext. Public Witness 1/1 though mentions that it will take effect from Jan. 16, 1964 but this is just by way of fiction and a fiction cannot take place of a fact. He submits that Art. 65 of the Limitation Act is very clear. He contends that the respondent did not become the owner of the property in question till the sale certificate was issued in his favour. Moreover, the property was still under the management of the Managing Officer even after the same was put to public auction. In support of his contention, he has invited our attention to the statement of Public Witness 2 Shri S. B. Lal who was an official of the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Mr. Lal has stated that sale in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled vide order dt. Oct. 11, 1969. In support of his contention, he has invited our attention to the statement of Public Witness 2 Shri S. B. Lal who was an official of the Ministry of Rehabilitation. Mr. Lal has stated that sale in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled vide order dt. Oct. 11, 1969. Then the respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi and the same was accepted vide judgment dt. Dec. 6, 1979. He has also placed reliance upon judgment in case Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L. J. Johnson, AIR 1958 SC 289 wherein their Lordship of Supreme Court has held as under: " It is clear from the rules and the conditions of sale set out above that the declaration that a person was the highest bidder at the auction does not amount to a complete sale and transfer of the property to him. The fact that the bid has to be approved by the Settlement Commissioner shows that till such approval which the Commissioner is not bound to give the auction purchaser has no right at all. It would further appear that even the approval of the bid by the Settlement Commissioner does not amount to a transfer of property for the purchaser has yet to pay the balance of the purchase money and the rules provide that if he fails to do that he shall not have any claim to the property. The correct position is that on the approval of the bid by the Settlement Commissioner, a binding contract for the sale of the property to the auction purchaser comes into existence. Then the provision as to the sale certificate would indicate that only upon the issue of it a transfer of the property takes place. Condition of sale No. 7 in this case, furthermore, expressly stipulated that upon the payment of the purchase price in full the ownership would be transferred and a sale certificate issued. It is for the appellants to show that the property had been transferred. They have not stated that the sale certificate was issued, nor that the balance of the purchase money had been paid. In those circumstances, it must be held that there has yet been no transfer of the salt pans to respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The appellants cannot, therefore, claim the benefit of S. 29 and ask that they should not be evicted. Mr. In those circumstances, it must be held that there has yet been no transfer of the salt pans to respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The appellants cannot, therefore, claim the benefit of S. 29 and ask that they should not be evicted. Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas contended that the sale certificate will in any event be granted and that once it is granted, as the form of this certificate shows, the transfer will relate back to the date of the auction. It is enough to say in answer to this contention that assuming it to be right, a point which is by no means obvious and which we do not decide, till it is granted no transfer with effect from any date whatsoever takes place and none has yet been granted. " ( 29 ) THE facts in the case Bishan Paul v. Mothu Ram, AIR 1965 SC 1994 (supra) are different from the facts in the present case. In that case, it was held that till the price is paid in full, there is no claim in the property. In that case, price in full was paid. Moreover, the petition for eviction in that case was filed under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. In the present case, the suit has been filed by the respondent on the basis of title and not as landlord against his tenant. Moreover, in the present case, the bid was cancelled vide order dt. Oct. 11, 1969. It was only in pursuance to acceptance of the writ petition filed by the respondent in 1979, that the sale certificate was issued. ( 30 ) THE facts in case Shiv Nath v. Mela Ram, 1969 Ren CR 494 (SC) (supra) are distinguished as the facts of that case are different from the facts of the present case. In that case, the eviction petition was filed by the plaintiff against the tenant. In the present case, the suit for possession has been filed against unauthorised occupant on the basis of title. As already stated, that the sale in favour of the respondents was cancelled. Moreover, under the Delhi Rent Control Act for filing eviction petition against the tenant the grounds are available under S. 14. For most of the grounds of eviction, landlord can file an eviction petition against the tenant though he may not be the owner. As already stated, that the sale in favour of the respondents was cancelled. Moreover, under the Delhi Rent Control Act for filing eviction petition against the tenant the grounds are available under S. 14. For most of the grounds of eviction, landlord can file an eviction petition against the tenant though he may not be the owner. ( 31 ) WE are thus of the view that in the present case, the plaintiff could not file the suit on the basis of title against the unauthorised occupant (appellants) till the sale certificate Ext. Public Witness 1/1 was issued by the Government in his favour. In other words, the cause of action for filing the suit by the present respondent on the basis of title against the appellants has arisen only when the sale certificate was issued by the Government. We hold that the suit filed by the respondent against the appellants was not barred by imitation. ( 32 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal of the appellants is hereby dismissed with costs of this appeal.