JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 15-3-1984 passed by the Additional Judge to the District Judge, Neemuch in C. S. No. 16-A of 1981 whereby it has been held that the petitioners have to pay court fee on Rs. 41200/- being the value of the truck in question. ( 2. ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to this petition are these. According to the suit instituted by the petitioners Baldeo and his son Tulsiram, the truck bearing registration no. MPU 6248 initially belonged to one Kannu Bhai Gujarati. It was purchased by the petitioner Baldeo, his younger brother, the N. A. Nandlal and the N. A. 2 Mangilal, who had all contributed towards its price Rs. 33051/ -. The purchase was in the name of nandlal. The permit to ply the truck was not transferred in the name of Nandlal. ( 3. ) THE petitioners and the other vendors plied the truck for some period and ultimately on 24-9-1978 it was agreed amongst the three vendors the petitioner No. 1, nandlal and Mangilal that the last two would be paid Rs. 4,000/- each and the title to the truck would pass to petitioner No. 1. All the relevant papers, on payments as agreed, were handed over to the petitioner No. 1 which he surrendered through Daryavsingh r/o Mandsaur to the R. T. O. on 28-9-1978 as the truck was not road-worthy. Subsequently, a sum of Rs. 22,000/- was spent by the petitioners on the truck and it was made road-worthy. ( 4. ) LATER Nandlal lodged a report with the Javad Police on 17-11-1978 that the truck had been stolen and later he filed a complaint on 21-11-1978 therein stating that the occurrence was of 15-9-1978. The J. MF. C. Javad sent the complaint to the Javad police for investigation and ordered the seizure of the truck in case it was found to be the subject of theft. ( 5. ) THE police found that there was no case of theft. As there was a dispute between the two brothers regarding the truck the same was seized on 27-11-1978 from the possession of petitioner No. 2 Tulsiram and the matter was reported to the Court for orders. ( 6. ) THE petitioner No. 1 and Nandlal both applied for interim custody of the truck. As there was a dispute between the two brothers regarding the truck the same was seized on 27-11-1978 from the possession of petitioner No. 2 Tulsiram and the matter was reported to the Court for orders. ( 6. ) THE petitioner No. 1 and Nandlal both applied for interim custody of the truck. The learned trial Magistrate ordered it to be handed over in the Supratnama of Nandlal on his furnishing security in the sum of Rs. 75,000/ -. N. A. No. 3 Hiralal is the surety. ( 7. ) IN the suit, the petitioners contend that the truck which is in custodia legis belongs to them and they are entitled to receive it from the Court of the J. M. F. C. Javad. They have claimed declaration of title to the truck. Apprehending interference with their possession of the truck when they are placed in possession thereof, they have also claimed injunction. For jurisdiction the suit has been valued at Rs. 41,200/- that being the value of the truck. For the relief of declaration fixed court fee of Rs. 300/- has been paid and valuing the relief of injunction at Rs. 200/- court fee of Rs. 20/- has been paid. , ( 8. ) THE learned lower court held that the suit being for declaration with consequential relief of injunction is governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (for short the Act) and court fee is payable on the value of the truck. ( 9. ) THE point for consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be allowed. ( 10. ) SECTION 7 (iv) (c) of the Act reads thus :- 7. "computation of fees payable in certain suits - The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows :- (iv) in suits - (c) for a declaratory decree and consequential relief :-to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed; according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal, with a minimum fee of twenty rupees. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought :. . . . " Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides for suit for mere declaration where no consequential relief is prayed for. In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought :. . . . " Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides for suit for mere declaration where no consequential relief is prayed for. It may be pointed out that the section does not sanction every form of declaration but only a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property. The proviso to the section provides when a suit for mere declaration will not be maintainable. A suit for mere declaration under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act is governed by Article 17 (iii) of schedule II of the Act and a fixed court fee of Rs. 30/- is payable. ( 11. ) SECTION 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 providing for valuation for purposes of court fees and jurisdiction to be the same is in these terms :-"where in suits other than those referred to in Section 4, Court Fees Act, 1870 section 7 paragraphs v, vi and (ix) and paragraph x, clause (d) court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870 as in force for the time being in the Madhya Pradesh, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. " ( 12. ) IN the decision in Usha Singhais case 1983 M. P. W. N. 15 it has been pointed out that where the valuation of the suit under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act is apparently arbitrary the court can direct to put reasonable valuation and pay court-fees even before written statement is filed and the valuation is therein objected to. In this very connection the D. B. decision in Hazi Subanual Haqs case, 1983 JLJ S. N. 55 is also pertinent. It relates to a suit for declaration and injunction in relation to a truck. ( 13. ) ACCORDING to the opinion given by V. R. Newaskar J. on difference of opinion between T. P. Naik and Shivdayal, JJ. in a suit for declaration without the consequential relief court-fee is payable under Art. 17 (iii), Schedule II of the Act and not under section 7 (iv) (c) and it is a different matter that the suit is not maintainable without the consequential relief. in a suit for declaration without the consequential relief court-fee is payable under Art. 17 (iii), Schedule II of the Act and not under section 7 (iv) (c) and it is a different matter that the suit is not maintainable without the consequential relief. (vide 1967 MPLJ 242 = 1967 JLJ 350 ). ( 14. ) IN the D. B. decision in Panjabraos case 1971 JLJ S. N. 69 it has been held as under :- "although Court-fee is payable on the claim as framed in the plaint and not on the claim as it ought to be framed because the question of court-fee is distinct and separate from the question of maintainability of the suit as framed. In order to decide whether a suit is covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of Article 17 (3) Schedule II of the Court-Fees Act, Court must look to the substance and nature of the claim and not to the language or the form in which the relief claimed is framed. No doubt, the Court-fees Act is a fiscal enactment and has therefore, to be construed strictly and any ambiguity or doubt arising out of interpretation has to be resolved in favour of the subject, that does not prevent the Court from looking to the substance and not the very form of a suit. It logically follows that the suit as framed for a declaration simpliciter under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act would not be maintainable unless the plaintiffs were further to claim the grant of a perpetual injunction to restrain the State Government from recovering the amount due. In the circumstances, the claim would be governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act and court-fee is payable by the plaintiffs on the amount which they are seeking to avoid. " ( 15. ) IN the F. B. decision in Santoschandras case, 1970 MPLJ 363 = 1970 JLJ 290 , the D. B. decision in Baldeo Singhs case (supra), was distingushed and it was pointed that where it is necessary for a plaintiff to avoid an agreement or a decree or a liability imposed, it is necessary for him to avoid that, and unless he seeks the relief of having that decree agreement, document or liability set aside, he is not entitled to a declaration simpliciter. In such cases the question of Court-fee has to be determined under Section 7 (ivkc) of the Act. If the plaintiff is not bound by that decree or agreement or liability and if he is not required to have it set aside, he can claim to pay court-fees under any of the sub-clause of Article 17, Schedule II of the Act Where the declaration prayed for, if given, involves the granting of the consequential relief, such as the cancellation of a document or the avoidance of decree, the plaintiffs will be deemed to have prayed for the consequential relief and the suit will fall under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act and will not be governed by Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II. ( 16. ) IN the decision Shamsher Singhs case AIR 1973 S. C. 2384, it has been pointed out that in deciding whether ad valorem court fee under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act is payable, the substance of relief claimed in the plaint is to be seen. Therein the suit (hough framed as one for mere declaration, was in substance a suit either for setting aside the decree or for a declaration with consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing it. It was held that the suit was governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. ( 17. ) IN the instant case, the petitioners in addition to the relief of declaration, have also claimed the relief of injunction. The question to be considered is whether the relief of injunction is a consequential relief so as to attract that applicability of Section 7 (iv) (c)of the Act or is otherwise. The expression "consequential relief in Section 7 (iv) (c) of the act means some relief which would flow directly from the declaration given, the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a "substantial relief". In this connection the decision in Purshottam Dass case AIR 1978 Delhi 114 may usefully be perused. ( 18. In this connection the decision in Purshottam Dass case AIR 1978 Delhi 114 may usefully be perused. ( 18. ) IN the decision in Durg Singhs case, 1982 JLJ S. N. 72, it has been pointed out that where the transaction is void it is not necessary for the plaintiff to seek setting aside of the document and there is no question of seeking consequential relief expressly or impliedly and such relief is redundant. As to what is consequential relief it has been stated thus :- "a consequential relief means a relief which flows directly from the declaration sought for, such as the plaintiff will be able to claim in an ordinary suit by virtue of the title sought to be declared. A relief flowing from the relief for declaration and not capable of being claimed independently of it, it is a consequential relief and on refusal to grant the declaration, the other relief is also liable to be refused. Here in the present case, if the alleged document, said to have been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation, is declared a nullity, the plaintiff automatically gets the title to the land in dispute and it would be wholly unnecessary for her to claim a further relief of declaration of her title. " According to this decision where the plaintiff is out of possession, relief of possession is certainly consequential relief and has to be suitably evaluated for payment of court-fee. ( 19. ) IN connection with the question as to a relief being consequential or not the following observations in Sainik Nagar Durga G. N. S. Samitis case 1983 MPWN 66 are apposite :-"it will appear from the pleadings in the plaint that plaintiff claimed to be owner as also in possession of the suit land. On this basis it claimed two distinct reliefs, one for declaration of title and the other for preventive injunction. The relief of injunction in fact was not consequential to the relief of declaration because even without claiming the declaration relief, plaintiff could have brought the suit on the same pleadings seeking the relief of injunction only. These were two distinct and separate reliefs. The relief of injunction though related to the question of plaintiffs title, was not consequential to the declaration. " The test is whether the relief is dependent or is a distinct one. ( 20. These were two distinct and separate reliefs. The relief of injunction though related to the question of plaintiffs title, was not consequential to the declaration. " The test is whether the relief is dependent or is a distinct one. ( 20. ) IN the decision in Usha Singhais case (supra) it has been held that injunction sought to the effect that the defendant be restrained from enforcing her right as wife is not consequential to the declaration that marriage is null and void. ( 21. ) IN the decision in Ratlam Bone Mills case 1981 (1) MPWN 82 , where Art. 17 (i)of Schedule II of the Act was attracted it was pointed out that the relief of injunction claimed was not consequential but was redundant and did not change the complexion of the suit. In the decision in Chief Inspector of Stamps case, AIR 1945 All 111, despite claim for possession, the suit was held governed by Article 17 (i) Schedule II of the Act. ( 22. ) IN the instant case, property is in custodia legis and the possession is held by the Court for the benefit of the party which is ultimately found to be entitled to it. It cannot, therefore, be held that the property is not in the possession of the petitioners and they are bound to claim the relief of possession as a consequential relief. The relief of injunction claimed is not a consequential relief within the meaning of the expression as used in Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act. The relief of injunction claimed in the instant case is incidental or distinct and separate and, therefore, the suit is not governed by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act add as valorem court-fee on the relief of injunction was not payable. This relief of injunction stands separately valued by the petitioners. I find that the petitioners have paid proper court-fees. The decision in Hazi Subanual Haqs case (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In that case the truck was not in custodia legis and the injunction sought was to restrain the defendants from taking its possession from the bank in whose possession the truck was. ( 23. I find that the petitioners have paid proper court-fees. The decision in Hazi Subanual Haqs case (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In that case the truck was not in custodia legis and the injunction sought was to restrain the defendants from taking its possession from the bank in whose possession the truck was. ( 23. ) AS a result of the foregoing discussion I find that the impugned order holding that ad valorem court-fee on the value of the truck was payable by the petitioners is erroneous and deserves to be set aside. ( 24. ) IN the result, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The parties are directed to bear their costs in this Court, as incurred. The record be sent back to the learned lower Court immediately. The parties are directed to appear thereon 19-1-1987. Revision petition allowed.