JUDGMENT B. N. Misra, J. 1. Challenge in this writ Petition is to the rejection of the petitioners' application to appear at the competitive examination for recruitment to the post of Munsif in U. P. Nyayik Seva, by the U. P. Public Service Commission, respondent no. 1 (hereinafter called the Commission), on the ground that the application was received beyond the last date fixed by the commission. 2. In the month of May 1986, the Commission, issued an advertisement that a competitive examination shall be held sometime in October, 1986 for selection of candidates for appointment to the post of Munsif in the U. P. Nyayik Seva. The closing date for the receipt of the application in the Commission office was 14-7- 1986. In page 2 of the advertisement it was, inter alia, stated: "Closing date for the receipt of application in commission office will be July 14, 1986. Applications received after this date will not be entertained". In page 3 of the advertisement it was stated : "2. Applications complete in all respects must reach the Secretary (Department No. A-1/E-2/86-87) Public Service Commission, U. P. Allahabad 211001 at the Commission's Office on or before July 14, 1986. No application received after this date will be accepted. Incomplete applications and applications not on the prescribed form at, even if received within time, may be summarily rejected. Decision of the commission will be final in this regard." The petitioner who is an Advocate filled up the application form and despatched it by Registered Post from Bijnor on 4-7-1986 addressed the Secretary of the Commission at Allahabad. In support of this averment the petitioner had filed Annexures 1 and 2 which are photostat copies of the registration receipt and the endorsement on the envelope respectively. Admittedly the petitioners' application was received beyond the closing date. On 30-7-1976 he received the form back from the commission office with the remark that the application had not been accepted as it was received beyond the closing date (Ka-1 Badhit, Aswikar). According to the petitioner as he had despatched the application form 10 days before the closing date, the Commission was obliged to accept it as he could not be held responsible for the delay in delivery by the postal authorities. According to the petitioner as he had despatched the application form 10 days before the closing date, the Commission was obliged to accept it as he could not be held responsible for the delay in delivery by the postal authorities. It is pointed out that application forms of one Virendra Vir Singh and one Radhey Shyam were despatched on 7-7-1986 and 8-7-1986 respectively but they had been accepted by the Commission. The petitioner has also stated that the postal authorities being the agents of respondent no. 1, he should not be made to suffer on account of the negligence of the postal authorities. He has accordingly prayed that writ of mandamus should issue to the Commission to accept the application form of the petitioner for the competitive examination. It may be mentioned here that by virtue of an interim order of this court dated 19-9- 1986, the petitioner has been permitted to appear in the P.C.S. (Judicial) examination and it has been observed that his candidature should be subject to the decision in the present writ petition. In its counter affidavit the Commission has stated that the application form of the petitioner was received in the Commission office on 25-7-1986 after expiry of the last date and as such it was sent back to the petitioner as time barred. It is pointed out that the application of Virendra Vir Singh was received in the Commission office on 9-7-1986 and that of Radhey Shyam on 11-9-1986. As these applications had been received before the closing date, they had been accepted. 3. In rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has reiterated that the delay in receipt of his application form in the Commission office was not on account of any negligence on his part and that he should not be made to suffer or held responsible for the negligence of the postal authorities. 4. The relevant portion of the advertisement issued by the commission extracted earlier would show that the Commission had quite clearly notified that the closing date for the receipt of the applications was 14-7-1986, that all applications completed in all respects must reach the Secretary of the Commission on or before the aforesaid date and that the applications received after the closing date would not be accepted. In the present case there is no dispute that although the application form was despatched by the petitioner from Bijnor on 4-7-1986, it was received in the Commission office on 25-7-1986 after the expiry of the closing date. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has urged that as there was no negligence or default on the part of the petitioner, there can be no justification for rejection of his application merely because it reached the Commission after expiry of the last date. As despatch of application forms by post was recognised by the Commission as one mode of delivery of application form from the candidates to the Commission, the postal authorities became the agents of the Commission and delivery to the postal authorities would amount to receipt by the Commission. In support of this contention reliance is placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1974, Allahabad Law Journal, 470. The facts of the case before the Full Bench are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. That was a case of remission of rent by the tenant to his landlords. The amount of rent due to be paid by the tenant to the landlords was a petty sum of Rs. 35/- and after discussing several cases of the Supreme Court and of the courts in England and keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Full Bench finally came to the conclusion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tenant respondent could not be said to have committed a default under section 3 (1) (a) of the Act in respect of the payment of Rs. 35/- which he sent to the plaintiffs-landlords by a money order well within time but which had reached the landlords after the expiry of thirty days. " 5. On careful consideration we are of the opinion that the principles enunciated in respect of landlord and tenant in the aforesaid Full Bench decision do not have any application to the facts of the present case. In our view the facts and circumstances of the present case do not warrant application of the law of contract. " 5. On careful consideration we are of the opinion that the principles enunciated in respect of landlord and tenant in the aforesaid Full Bench decision do not have any application to the facts of the present case. In our view the facts and circumstances of the present case do not warrant application of the law of contract. We have already stated that in the present case the Commission had clearly notified that the closing date for receipt of applications completed in all respects was 14-7-1986 and that applications received beyond that date were not to be accepted. Therefore, even if we were to hold that the advertisement was to be construed as an offer, as the term is understood in the law of contract, the said offer was clearly notified to lapse owing to the passing of time. Acceptance cannot be said to have been completed on mere despatch. It would have been complete only if it had reached the offer or before the offer had lapsed on expiry of the time prescribed. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Commission has filed the photostat copy of the judgment of this Court in writ petition no. 11224 of 1921 (?), wherein the very same points urged in this case had been advanced before the Court. The question as to the agency of the postal authorities and the legal implications following receipt of an application after expiry of the closing date have been discussed in great detail. The Court finally held that an application received by the Commission after expiry of the closing date was liable to be rejected. With great respect we agree with the principles enunciated in the said decision which have full application to the facts of this case. On consideration and for the reasons stated above, we hold that the Commission acted rightly in rejecting the petitioners' application which was received after expiry of the closing date. 7. Further no right can be said to have accrued to the petitioner by virtue of the interim order dated 19-9-1986 passed by this Court as it was made clear that the permission to appear at the examination granted to the petitioner was subject to the decision in the writ petition. As the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ petition, he cannot succeed on the basis of the interim order. 8. As the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ petition, he cannot succeed on the basis of the interim order. 8. In the result this writ petition is dismissed. The interim order dated 19-9-1986 shall now stand vacated with the dismissal of the writ petition. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.