JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---By this writ petition, the petitioner, who is a tenant, challenges the constitutional validity of clauses 4 and 5 of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Rent Control Order''), as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 2. The petitioner is a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. The respondent Nos. 2 to 5 formed a joint Hindu family and owned the building, which has been let out to the petitioner since 1974 at Rs. 5,300/- per month. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 (hereinafter called as the respondents) wanted a higher rent, but as the petitioner did not agree, they filed an application under Clauses 4 and 5 of the Rent Control Order for fixation of fair rent at Rs. 3.50 per sq.ft. or in the alternative at Rs. 20,000/- per month. The petitioner opposed the application on several grounds, one of them being that as Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A of the Rent Control Order have been struck down by a Division Bench of this Court in (Omprakash Mulchand Khatri v. Fattelal Maganlal Company)1, 1986 Mh.L.J. 414 clauses 4 and 5 cannot stand. This contention did not find favour of the Rent Controller, in view of the judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in (Oyaldas Topandas v. Shrikant Ganpatlal Gupta)2, 1986 Mh.L.J. 706 which, later, came to be affirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 141 of 1986 by a Division Bench of this Court on 3rd October, 1986. The Rent Controller over-ruled the objection raised by the petitioner, and the petitioner, therefore, by this writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, questions the validity of the order and challenges the vires of clauses 4 and 5, mainly on the grounds that a Clauses 6, 7 and 7A of the Rent Control Order have already been struck down, and as they provided certain guidelines for fixation of fair rent, which no longer exist, the Rent Controller would be left with absolute and arbitrary power to fix rents in the guise of that rent being a fair rent. It is also contended that the letting of the houses was originally controlled by certain provisions of the Rent Control Order which have been since struck down, and as there is no control on the letting in the existing provision, no restriction can be placed on the contractual rent and the contractual rent cannot be interfered with. 3. It is first necessary to understand what was the provision in the Rent Control Order which related to the fixation of rent and other terms. Under Chapter II, there are several clauses which provide for determination of fair rent. Under Clause 4, when on a written application by the landlord or tenant, the Controller has reason to believe that the rent of any house with in his jurisdiction is insufficient or excessive, as the case may be, he shall hold such enquiry as may be necessary and record a finding. This is the main provision which authorises the Controller to hold an enquiry, if he has reason to believe that the rent is either insufficient or excessive. Under Clause 5, the Rent Controller, upon consideration of all circumstances of the case, including any amount paid before the 1st December, 1952, by the tenant by way of premium or any other like sum in addition to rent, the Rent Controller shall determine the fair rent to be charged for the house, if he finds that the rent of the house is insufficient or excessive. These are the only two clauses which bear upon the question whether the rent is insufficient or excessive and upon such a preliminary finding being recorded, he has to proceed to determine the fair rent. What are the norms to be followed in determining the fair rent are laid down in Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A. These three provisions have been struck down by a Division Bench of this Court on Omprakash's case, 1986 Mh.L.J. 414, following the reasoning in (Prabhakar Tanhaji Rokde v. State of Maharashtra)3, 1985 Mh.L.J. 548, where it was noticed that the House Rent Control Order had become completely outdated and continued to fail to take into account the changed conditions between 1949 and 1985, and the felt necessities of time. In reaching the conclusion the Division Bench relied upon the ratio of (Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh)4, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121 and declared clauses 6(1) and 7(1) of the Rent Control Order as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Division Bench made certain observations, on which Shri Mehadia, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied, in para-9 of the Judgment, which are as follows : ''It is contended that as a result of striking down Clauses 6(1) and 7(1) as violative of Article 14, the whole H.R.C. Order or in any case whole Chapter relating to fixation of rent should be struck down. We do not agree. The HRC Order deals with many facets of landlords-tenant relationship and fixation of fair rent is but one of them and is a separate part of the scheme. Even different provisions relating to fixation of fair rent are separable. Clause 4 refer to the width of power to determine fair rent, clause 5 to the mechanics of determination and clauses 6 and 7 to the norms on the basis of which determination is to take place. It is not our view that in such a social legislation, fair rent cannot be legally determined. Indeed in our view it is necessary to do so. We have found fault merely with the norms of fixation and nothing else. Those provisions are clauses 6, 7 and 7-A. However, it does seem to us that these provisions are in extricably mixed up with each other and are inseparable. If Clauses 6 (1) and 7 (1) are empugned, the remainder cannot be enforced without making alterations and modification. To make such alteration would mean judicial legislation which is impermissible. As an inevitable result Clauses 6 (2), 7 (2) and 7A are also struck down as unconstitutional along with Clauses 6 (1) and 7 (1).'' (Emphasis supplied). 4. The submission of Shri Mehadia was that in the opinion of the Division Bench, the provisions of Clauses 4 and 5 are inextricably mixed up with Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A which, obviously, is not the import of the observations. The mixing up was of Clauses 6 (2), 7 (1) and 7-A with Clause 6 (1) and 7 (1) and not of clauses 4 and 5 with Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A of the Rent Control Order. The mixing up was of Clauses 6 (2), 7 (1) and 7-A with Clause 6 (1) and 7 (1) and not of clauses 4 and 5 with Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A of the Rent Control Order. Shri Mehadia pointed out that in the final paragraph (para-12), the Division Bench said that it was needless to mention that the State Government has ample power to fix appropriate norms for fixation of fair rent and substitute clauses 6, 7 and 7-A by appropriate Clauses, and it was hoped that the decision in respect of the H.R.C Order in general and relevant provisions in particular will be taken soon by the State Government. It is difficult to see what these observations have to do with the question of validity or otherwise of the provisions of Clauses 4 and 5 which the Division Bench declined to strike down. It appears to me that the Division Bench recorded a positive finding that Clauses 4 and 5 were separable and could not be struck down. 5. Reference was made in the course of the arguments to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Oyaldas's case, 1986 Mh. L.J. 706 The decision, which arose for consideration before the learned Single Judge, was whether in the absence of any criteria, Clause 5 is unworkable for determining the fair rent of the house, and the learned Judge pointed out that in answering the above question, it must be seen that a proceeding for fixation of fair rent of the house under clauses 4 and 5 of the Rent Control Order is a judicial or, at any rate, a quasi-judicial proceedings, and a duty is, therefore, cast upon the Rent Controller to act judicially in determining the fair rent of the house which is clear from the fact that this order is appealable under clause 21 (1) of the Rent Control Order, and he, therefore, cannot act arbitrarily in the said proceeding because absence of arbitrariness is a since qua non of a judicial determination which must be judicious. The learned Single Judge by way of illustration, pointed certain circumstances which fell for being taken into consideration, and finally concluded with the observations from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes Eleventh Ediction at page 350......where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially to its execution. Cui. bus jurisdiction data, est, eaquoce concessa esse vindenture, sine cuibus jurisdiction esolicari non potuit.'' In view of the learned Single Judge, the Rent Controller was competent to decide the application for fixation of fair rent under Clauses 4 and 5 even though Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A are struck down by this Court. As already pointed out in Letters Patent Appeal No. 141 of 1986, decided on 3-10-1986, the view of the learned Single Judge was endorsed. 6. The learned Assistant Government Pleader, Shri G.D. Patil referred to a judgment of a learned Single Judge in (Dr. R.K. Verma v. State of Maharashtra)5, Writ Petition No. 960 of 1987, decided on 29-6-1987, where at the stage of admission, the learned Judge, after considering the dicta in the cases of Omprakash and Oyaldas (cited supra) found that Clauses 4 and 5 of the Rent Control Order were workable. It seems that the question of vires of Clauses 4 and 5 was raised in that writ petition as being arbitrary and therefore, violative of Article 14. But in the speaking order passed by the learned Judge, dismissing the petition there was no particular reference to the objection regarding the vires. But, evidently, from the reasoning given by the learned Judge, it follows that he was not impressed by the argument that vires could be questioned on the ground of arbitrariness. The view taken in these cases was affirmed by another Division Bench in (M/s. Chimandas Ashokkumar v. Purushottamdas)6, Letters Patent Appeal No. 117 of 1986, decided on 10-6-1987, and it is not, therefore, possible to agree with Shri Mehadia that clauses 4 and 5 of the Rent Control Order cannot stand independently of clauses 6, 7 and 7-A which have been struck down. 7. 7. Shri Mehadia referred to another Division Bench ruling in (Kasturchand Motilal v. Haridas)7, 1957 Nagpur Law Journal 477 in support of his argument that clauses 4 and 5 of the Rent Control Order cannot stand independently and urged that the view taken in that case was not placed before the later Division Benches. While dealing with the provisions of Chapter-II, Clauses 4 to 7 of the Rent Control Order, it was observed there as follows : ''The procedure prescribed can be summarised as follows: when an application is filed before the Rent Controller by an tenant or a landlord for fixation of fair rent, the Rent Controller has to arrive at a preliminary finding as to whether the rent paid is insufficient or excessive. If Clause 4 is read by itself it may appear that no limitations are placed on the powers of the Rent Controller to come to this conclusion and he may hold such inquiry as he considers necessary to arrive at this preliminary finding. But in our view Clause 4 cannot be read by itself alone. It has to be read along with Clauses 5, 6 or 7 as the case may be, to avoid inconsistency.'' I really see no inconsistency in the observations made by the later Division Benches and the observations quoted above. If the scheme of Chapter-II is scrutinised and properly understood, clauses 4 and 5 deal with the situation prior to determination of the fair rent. The preliminary enquiry is only with a view to finding whether the rent is insufficient or excessive, and not about fixation of fair rent which is to be done at the stage of provisions of clauses 6 and 7. The Court was dealing in that case with the contention regarding the limitless jurisdiction conferred on the Rent Controller in fixation of fair rent and it was in that respect that the reference was made to the reading together of clauses 4 and 5 with other clauses, in order to avoid inconsistency. Once the provisions of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A are struck down, the question of inconsistency can hardly arise, and this was the view taken by this Court on Omprakash's case when it said that the provisions of clauses 4 and 5 are separable with the clauses which were sought to be struck down. 8. Once the provisions of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A are struck down, the question of inconsistency can hardly arise, and this was the view taken by this Court on Omprakash's case when it said that the provisions of clauses 4 and 5 are separable with the clauses which were sought to be struck down. 8. A perusal of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A would show how the fair rent is to be determined, once the finding about the insufficiency or excessiveness of the rent is reached and different considerations then arise in respect of premises let out either before or after 1st April, 1940, depending upon whether they are occupied wholly or mainly for purposes of residence or otherwise, and provide for the agreements raising the rent were to be recognised if they fall in line with the requirements of Clauses 6 and 7, by virtue of the provisions of clause 7-A. 9. Another contention, which was raised on behalf of the petitioner was that there will be absence of guide-lines, due to the deletion of Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A, but as I have pointed out, the guide-lines were merely in the matter of fixation of rent, and not in the matter of ascertaining whether the rent was insufficient or excessive, and as pointed out by the Court in its earlier rulings, a judicial determination was possible in determining the fair rent, even in the absence of the artificial standards afforded by Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A. There is no room for the apprehension that unlimited and arbitrary power is conferred on the Rent Controller in the matter of determination of fair rent, if Clauses 6, 7 and 7-A are made. 10. With regard to the contention that when the control of letting is taken away by virtue of the striking out of Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, in view of the decision in(Vidarbha Bhadekaru Sangh, Akola v. State of Maharashtra) 8, 1986 Mh.L.J. 882 the main object for which the C.P. Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act and the Rent Control Order were brought into existence will be taken away, and it cannot serve any purpose because even regulation of rent would become impossible. It may be pointed out that the provisions of Chapter II of the Rent Control Order deal with fixation of rent and other terms, while Chapter III deals with collection of information and letting of accommodation. The provisions of these two Chapters cover different fields and are separable and Chapter II can stand even without Chapter III. The argument, therefore, that the rents can not be regulated in the absence of control of letting, is entirely untenable. 11. In view of the above reasons, I see no merit in the writ petition. It is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed. -----