Judgment :- SREEDHARAN, J. These Criminal Miscellaneous Cases have come before us on a reference made by Sankaran Nair, J. Reference Order reads as follows : "Learned Counsel for petitioners submits that very important points of law arise in this case, such as that whether a banker could be liable for an offence under Section 406. Post this before a Division Bench for admission." 2. Criminal M.C. No. 488 of 1987 is by two petitioners, who are accused in C.C. No. 16 of 1987 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Ernakulam. Crl.M.C. No. 493 of 1987 is by one petitioner who is the first accused in C.C. No. 228 of 1986 on the file of the same court. Petitioners in Crl.M.C. 488/87 are charged with offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with S. 34 of the Penal Code. Petitioner in Crl.M.C. 493 of 1987 also, along with others is charged with offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 of the Penal Code. They seek to have the complaint pending before the trial court quashed by this court in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 3. For understanding the true case set up by the petitioners, it is necessary to know the circumstances under which the complaints happened to be field. The first petitioner in M.C. No. 488 of 1987 and the sole petitioner in Crl.M.C. 493 of 1987 was the Managing Partner of a Partnership Firm, M/s. Samarias Finance. It had many branches in various parts of the country. The 2nd petitioner in Crl.M.C. 488 of 1987, was the Manager of Ernakulam Branch of the firm. The firm published many advertisements canvassing depositors. Many advantageous benefits, which were not or which could not have been granted by nationalised or scheduled banks, were offered by this firm. Fascinated by those offers, a large number of people deposited their lives' earnings with this firm. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the deposits received by the firm amounts to 18 to 19 crores of rupees. By the enactment of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1984, the firm found it difficult to carry on its business. They were forced to convert the firm into a Public Limited Company. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the deposits received by the firm amounts to 18 to 19 crores of rupees. By the enactment of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1984, the firm found it difficult to carry on its business. They were forced to convert the firm into a Public Limited Company. The new company floated by the first petitioner in Crl.M.C. 488 of 1987, is "Samarias Housing Finance Ltd." That came into existence in 1984 and it is said that the business of the firm was taken over by the limited company. When the depositors asked for return of their money, the company found it impossible to repay the amount. Some of the depositors approached Criminal Courts. C.C. Nos. 16 of 1987 and 222 of 1986 are two out of those many cases. 4. The complaint in C.C. No. 222 of 1986 contains the following allegations. The 4th accused a caused the complainant to give term deposits and open S. B. Accounts with the Samarias Finance in complete trust that the complainant's money would be safe and would be repaid by the Samarias Finance represented by the aforesaid accused when the complainant would demand back the deposits. The complainant deposited a total sum of Rs. 33,807,37/- at the Ernakulam Branch of Samarias Finance. The complainant on warrantee of the term deposits demanded payment of the amount. She also demanded the amounts due under the S. B. Account with interest thereon. The complainant went to the Ernakulam Branch Officer of Samarias Finance and made several demands for payment of the money before the then manager, 4th accused and the present acting manager, 3rd accused. So far no payment is made. The complaint was intimated that they have no fund to make payments due to the complainant. The complainant entrusted the amounts fully trusting that the accused would pay back the amounts with interest thereon on demand. The accused by denying the payments have violated the conditions of the agreement of payment of amounts and thus committed the criminal breach of trust an cheating. The accused are doing the business of banking and in that capacity they have made these acts with the common intention of committing offence of defrauding the complainant. The accused thus have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with S. 34 of the Penal Code. 5. The accused are doing the business of banking and in that capacity they have made these acts with the common intention of committing offence of defrauding the complainant. The accused thus have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with S. 34 of the Penal Code. 5. While dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal P.C., where the prayer is to quash the complaint, this court is only to read the complaint and see whether on the allegations made therein, an offence has been alleged to have been committed. The court is to see whether on taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, an offence under the Penal Code is made out. If an offence is made out, then this court would not be justified in quashing the proceedings pending before the trial court. It is also well established that the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used very sparingly only to prevent abuse of process of court. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the complaints proceed on the basis that the accused are doing the business of banking. Therefore, it is contended that the relationship between the complainant and the accused is that of a customer and a banker. When money was deposited with the bank, the banker became the owner of the money. He can make use of the same for his own purposes. That will not subject him to any proceedings under the Penal Code for offences punishable under Sections 407, 409 or 420. In support of this argument the learned Counsel relied on a large number of decisions but we shall refer to a few of them. 7. In Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney General of the Province of Quebec, AIR 1947 PC 44 the validity of the enactment which sought to confiscate the amounts lying in deposits in bank under accounts which were not operated for more than 15 years came up for consideration. While holding that the Provincial Act invaded the field of banking and hence incompetent. Their Lordships observed that the relationships between the banker and the customer who pays money into the bank is that of debtor and creditor with the superadded obligation which arise out of custom of bankers to honour customer's drafts. While holding that the Provincial Act invaded the field of banking and hence incompetent. Their Lordships observed that the relationships between the banker and the customer who pays money into the bank is that of debtor and creditor with the superadded obligation which arise out of custom of bankers to honour customer's drafts. Their Lordships stated that once the deposit is made there remains only a debt due from the banker to the customer. In Santhosh Kumar v. The King AIR 1952 Cal 193 : (1952) Cri LJ 552), it was stated : "The relationship between a depositor and a bank is the simple relationship of a creditor and a debtor. A depositor who deposits money in a bank in his current account is nothing more than a creditor and it cannot be said that there has been any entrustment to the bank for any particular purpose. The bank is of course liable to refund the money to the depositor when the depositor calls for it, but the money deposited belongs to the bank and the bank is entitled to deal with it as it likes." Reliance was also placed on the decision in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha (1982) 1 SCC 561 : (1982 Cri LJ 819). In that case the accused started a scheme known as 'money circulation scheme' by accepting money deposits from public, investing them in high risk investment, earning huge unaccounted profits and paying to the depositors interest at a rate which was higher than the agreed rate in a clandestine manner. The question that came up for consideration was whether there was any violation of the provisions of the Prize Chits and Money Circulations Schemes (Banning) Act, 1976. Their Lordships held that the Scheme did not violate the provisions of that Act. In that decisions the liability under the Penal Code of a person who receives deposits from the public describing himself as a banker was not dealt with. 8. The learned counsel then relied on some of the observations seen in Sheldon's Practice and Law of Banking, 10th Edition. In Chapter X of that book under the heading 'Relation of Banker and Customer', it is stated : "The banker when he receives money from a customer does not hold the money in a fiduciary capacity. To say that money is "deposited" with a banker is likely to cause misapprehension. In Chapter X of that book under the heading 'Relation of Banker and Customer', it is stated : "The banker when he receives money from a customer does not hold the money in a fiduciary capacity. To say that money is "deposited" with a banker is likely to cause misapprehension. What really happens is that the money is not deposited with but lent to the banker, and all that the banker engages to do is to discharge the debt paying over an equal amount when called upon. The true relationship between the two parties was admirably described by Lord Cottenham in Foley v. Hill, (1848) 2 HLC 28. "Money", said his Lordship, "When paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money of the principal; it is then the money of the banker, who is bound to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for it. The money paid into the banker's is money known by the principal to be placed there for the purpose of being under the control of the banker; it is then the banker's money; he is known to deal with it as his own; he makes what profit he can, which profit he retains to himself, paying back only the principal, according to the custom of bankers in some places, or the principal and a small rate of interest, according to the custom of bankers in some places ........ That being established to be the relative situations of banker and customer, the banker is not an agent or factor, but he is a debtor". 9. In the light of the above statements of law, the learned Counsel submits that the petitioners are bankers and the deposits received by them from their customers will make them only debtors and they can make use of the money deposited with them for their own purposes. It is further submitted that no prosecution for offences under the Penal Code will lie against them. We are not impressed with this argument them. The decisions cited by the learned counsel were rendered in relation to bankers who were legally entitled to do the banking business. In the case of the petitioners, they were not legally permitted to do the banking business. They described themselves as 'Financiers' and they might have done the business in the nature of banking. The decisions cited by the learned counsel were rendered in relation to bankers who were legally entitled to do the banking business. In the case of the petitioners, they were not legally permitted to do the banking business. They described themselves as 'Financiers' and they might have done the business in the nature of banking. They might have made representations to the public that they are bankers. That representation cannot make them legally entitled to all the rights of a banker. The petitioners lured the public into the belief that their deposits are safe at their hands. That representation to the public will not confer on the petitioners, the legal rights of a banker. It is now virtually conceded that the petitioners collected the deposits amounting to 18 or more crores of rupees. Even if the petitioners are treated as bankers which they are not, they are duty bound to return the money to the customers when demanded. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has no case that the petitioners are in a position to repay the deposits. In the petition it is stated : "Now a stage has come where it is nearly impossible for the petitioners to repay immediately all the debts however, earnestly he may aspire to do so." 10. In New Bank of India Ltd. v. Pearey Lal, AIR 1962 SC 1003, dealing with the relationship between a banker and a customer, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held : "The transaction, as evidenced by the two receipts, was primarily one of entrustment of the amount to the Bank for transmission to Calcutta. After the purpose for which the moneys were entrusted was carried out, in the absence of further instructions the defendant did not cease to be a trustee. So long as instructions were not given by the plaintiff for appropriation of the amounts the Bank continued to hold the amounts transmitted for and on behalf of the plaintiff and there is no evidence that the plaintiff gave instructions or acquiesced in the opening of a fixed deposit account after the same reached Calcutta. It is immaterial that the bank purported to open fixed deposit account in the name of the plaintiff with the amounts received at its head office at Lahore. That course of action was adopted without the consent of the plaintiff and it could not bind the plaintiff. It is immaterial that the bank purported to open fixed deposit account in the name of the plaintiff with the amounts received at its head office at Lahore. That course of action was adopted without the consent of the plaintiff and it could not bind the plaintiff. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the amount delivered by the plaintiff to the Bank at Lahore remained in trust even after it reached Calcutta, and it was not held by the Bank, in deposit for the plaintiff within the meaning of the scheme sanctioned by the High Court of East Punjab." In Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1962 SC 1764, another Constitution Bench had to consider the relationship between a banker and a customer. In that case certain German firms agreed to pay amounts to the appellant, a resident of India, by way of final settlement of his claim for compensation in respect of certain contracts for supply of machinery from Germany. An account was opened in the name of the appellant in a Bank in Germany and the amounts settled were credited to that account on certain conditions that the amounts were to be repaid only to the firms as price of new machineries to be supplied by them on production of import licence from Government of India. The appellant was not to operate the account except for the said purposes. In such a situation, the court held : "Now the law is well settled that when moneys are deposited in a bank, the relationship that is constituted between the banker and the customer is one of debtor and creditor and not trustee and beneficiary. The banker is entitled to use the monies without being called upon to account for such user, his only liability being to return the amount in accordance with the terms agreed between him and the customer. And it makes no difference in the jural relationship whether the deposits were made by the customer himself or by some other persons, provided the customer accepts them. There might be special arrangement under which a Banker might be constituted a trustee, but apart from such an arrangement, his position qua Banker is that of a debtor, and not trustee." Their Lordships proceeded further to state, depending on the facts of that case. There might be special arrangement under which a Banker might be constituted a trustee, but apart from such an arrangement, his position qua Banker is that of a debtor, and not trustee." Their Lordships proceeded further to state, depending on the facts of that case. "The account was opened in the Bank with a view to effectuate the arrangement between the German firms, and the appellant, which was that the amounts were to be repaid to the depositors as price of new machineries to be supplied by them and the appellant was not to operate on it except for that purpose. The Bank was informed of this arrangement and took the deposits with notice of the rights of the parties there under. Under the circumstances the Bank has really only custody of the money as if it were a stakeholder, with a liability to hand it over to the person who would become entitled to it under the arrangement. On these facts it cannot be said that there is a deposit in a commercial sense of the word. It would be more correct to say that the Bank holds the money under a Special arrangement which constitutes it not a debtor, but a sort of stakeholder." These decisions establish that the relationship between a banker and a customer can also be something other than that of debtor and creditor. So the actual relationship in a given case depends on the facts of that case. In the instant case we have held, the petitioners were not legally entitled to do the banking business. It is true that they were describing themselves as Bankers. On the basis of that representation, parties deposited huge amounts with them. A banker is bound to return the money deposited when it is asked for. The petitioners admit that they are not in a position to return the money. But at the same time they want to rely upon their rights as bankers to get themselves extricated from the clutches of criminal law. This cannot be allowed. The petitioners who have collected very huge amounts from public should not be allowed to flout the law by relying on niceties and intricacies of law. 11. But at the same time they want to rely upon their rights as bankers to get themselves extricated from the clutches of criminal law. This cannot be allowed. The petitioners who have collected very huge amounts from public should not be allowed to flout the law by relying on niceties and intricacies of law. 11. When S. 405 which defines "criminal breach of trust" speaks of a person being in any manner entrusted with property, it does not contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain event. The person who transfers possession of the property to the second party still remains the legal owner of the property and the person in whose favour possession is so transferred has only the custody of the property to be kept or disposed of by him for the benefit of the other party, the person so put in possession only obtaining a special interest by way of claim for money advanced or spent upon the safe keeping of the thing or such other incidental expenses as may have been incurred by him. The depositors when they handed over the money to the accused, parted with possession, only for the petitioner to return the same on demand. When demands have been made, petitioners failed to return the amounts. So prima facie, the petitioners before us have committed the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Penal Code. 12. Mr. K. Sudhakaran, the learned Advocate General, submitted that the complaints in these two cases sufficiently bring out the commission of offence punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 read with S. 34 of the Penal Code. With his usual candour, learned Advocate General submitted that even if their is an iota of doubt on that aspect, this Court as also the Supreme Court, as constitutional courts, should take note of the changing times and the new devices or methodologies adopted by persons to deceive the public and the interpretation of the provisions of the Code should meet the new challenges aforesaid and should be in accord with the changing pattern of life. Learned Advocate General went to the extent of submitting that the House of Lords in England has gone to the extent of asserting the existence of a residual power in the higher courts to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law and to conserve safety and moral welfare of the citizens of the State from novel and unprepared for attacks which are against public policy. It was suggested that the offences committed, as in the instant case, are "social crimes" or "public crimes" or "repugnant to public policy and public welfare". In this regard, learned Advocate General asserted that the decision of House of Lords in Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecution, 1962 AC 220 is a pointer in casting a duty on constitutional courts, the High Court and the Supreme Court of India to take into account the gravity of the fraud committed by unscrupulous persons (financiers) in the State, in luring the public to deposit their entire earnings with them and in the result completely throwing up their hands in despair. The facts in Shaw's case 1962 AC 220 are as follows :- When Street Offence Act, 1959 came into operation it was no longer possible for prostitutes to ply their trade by soliciting in the street. It became necessary for them to find some other means of advertising their services. The appellant published a booklet called "Ladies Directory". It contained the names, addresses and telephone numbers of prostitutes. With the help of the Directory persons could get in touch with the prostitutes over telephone. Thus they could offer their services. The purpose of the publication was to assist the prostitutes to ply their trade, even in spite of the prohibition contained in the Act. The prostitutes paid for the advertisements and the publisher of the Directory derived profits. When he was prosecuted the contention raised by him was that the acts done by him will not fall or constitute an offence under any law in force. Repelling that contention, Lord Viscount Simonds observed : "The fallacy in the argument that was addressed to us lay in the attempt to exclude from the scope of general words acts well calculated to corrupt public morals just because they had not been committed or had not been brought to the notice of the court before. It is not thus that the common law has developed. It is not thus that the common law has developed. We are perhaps more accustomed to hear this matter discussed upon the question whether such and such a transaction is contrary to public policy. At once the controversy arises. On the one hand it is said that it is not possible in the twentieth century for the court to create a new head of public policy, on the other it is said that this is but a new example of a well-established head. In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of law a residual power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of the State, and that it is they duty to guard it against attacks which may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for. That is the broad head (call it public policy if you wish) within which the present indictment falls. It matters little what label is given to the offending act. To one of your Lordships it may appear an affront to public decency, to another consider that it may succeed in its obvious intention provoking libidinous desires it will seem a corruption of public morals. Yet others may deem it aptly described as the creation of a public mischief or the undermining of moral conduct. The same act will not in all ages be regarded in the same way. The law must be related to the changing standards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the popular will but having regard to fundamental assessments of human values and the purposes of society. Today a denial of the fundamental Christian doctrine, which in past centuries would have been regarded by the ecclesiastical courts as hearsay and by the common law as blasphemy, will no longer be an offence if the decencies of controversy are observed. Today a denial of the fundamental Christian doctrine, which in past centuries would have been regarded by the ecclesiastical courts as hearsay and by the common law as blasphemy, will no longer be an offence if the decencies of controversy are observed. When Lord Mansfield, speaking long after the Star Chamber had been abolished, said that the Court of King's Bench was the custos morum of the people and had the superintendence of offences contra bonos mores, he was asserting, as I now assert, that there is in that court a residual power, where no statute has yet intervened to supersede the common law, to superintend those offences which are prejudicial to the public welfare. Such occasions will be rare, for parliament has not been slow to legislate when attention has been sufficiently aroused. But gaps remain and will always remain since no one can foresee every way in which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order of society. Let me take a single instance to which my noble and learned friend Lord Tucker refers. Let it be supposed that at some future, perhaps, early, date homosexual, practices between adult consenting males are no longer a crime. Would it not be an offence if even without obscenity, such practices were publicly advocated and encouraged by pamphlet and advertisement ? I say, my Lords, that if the common law is powerless in such an event, then we should no longer do her reverence. But I say that her hand is still powerful and that it is for Her Majesty's judges to play the part which Lord Mansfield pointed out to them." Another decision which was brought to our notice by the learned Advocate General was Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857. Their Lordships observed : "Learned Counsel invited our attention to a passage from the report of the Indian Law Commissioners quoted at page 274 of Ratanlal's Law of Crimes (18th Edition). It is enough to say that though this quotation may be valuable as a matter of history, it cannot be a legitimate guide for the construction of the Section. That construction must be based on the meaning of the words used, to be gathered according to the ordinary rules of interpretation and in consonance with the generally accepted principles of exercise of criminal jurisdiction. That construction must be based on the meaning of the words used, to be gathered according to the ordinary rules of interpretation and in consonance with the generally accepted principles of exercise of criminal jurisdiction. It is not necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the Indian Penal Code at the present day in accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible, unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular Section to indicate the contrary. We are not unmindful of the above decisions which have highlighted the duty of the courts and the reserve power vested in them to invent new heads of public policy which should be tailored to suit public welfare or social welfare and present "social crimes". But, as at present advised, we doubt whether, in view of the specific provision, contained in Art. 20(1) of the Constitution the Courts in this country will be in a position to make a dynamic or pragmatic approach to remedy the evil which was projected by the learned Advocate General. This is a fit case for legislative reform. 13. We can take judicial notice of the fact that a large number of persons and institutions styling themselves as bankers and financiers sprung up in recent times and lured the public to deposit with them large amounts of money by promises of very high returns. The fact that the public were gullible cannot be a reason to tolerate or take a pedantic approach towards such social crimes. It is a matter of common knowledge that innocent persons have deposited their lives' earning with these institutions. They were not controlled by any authority. Nor did they come into existence under the provisions of any law. After collecting the deposits from the innocent public they closed down their business. The poor depositors are left at large. They are not getting anything back from such institutions. Some of the desperate depositors approached the criminal courts. They were not controlled by any authority. Nor did they come into existence under the provisions of any law. After collecting the deposits from the innocent public they closed down their business. The poor depositors are left at large. They are not getting anything back from such institutions. Some of the desperate depositors approached the criminal courts. The attempt on the part of the perpetrators of this scheme then was to put forth the plea that they were doing the business of banking, that they are bankers, that the deposit created only the relationship of debtor and creditor and that they are not to be proceeded under criminal law. The courts are not to countenance such an argument. 14. On going through the complaint in C.C. No. 222 of 1986, we are convinced that it brings out an offence triable by criminal court. When such an offences is borne out it is not open to this court to quash the complaint in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The same is the position with respect to the Police charge in C.C. No. 16 of 1987. In these circumstances we do not find any merit in these Criminal Miscellaneous Cases. They are accordingly dismissed. 15. Before parting with the case, we must deprecate the casual manner in which the trial court had dealt with the cases before it. Warrant for the arrest of the 1st accused in C.C. No. 16 of 1987 was issued on 7-4-1987. The address of the first accused was given as A. G. Abraham, Director, Samarias Finance Limited, Head Office, Samarias House, 29 Luz Avenue, Madras-690004. It was returned with the endorsement of the police constable that he made enquiries about the accused at the office of the Samarias Chit Fund, Ernakulam, that he is understood to be staying in Madras, that the address at Madras is not known and that there is no time for making further enquiries. This endorsement made by the police constable has been counter-signed by the Sub-Inspector, Central Police Station. From the endorsement it is evident that neither the Police Constable nor the Sub-Inspector of Police had noted the address of the accused given in the warrant of arrest. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is seen to have accepted the endorsement made by the police officers without demur and issued a fresh warrant of arrest on 21-4-1987. From the endorsement it is evident that neither the Police Constable nor the Sub-Inspector of Police had noted the address of the accused given in the warrant of arrest. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is seen to have accepted the endorsement made by the police officers without demur and issued a fresh warrant of arrest on 21-4-1987. The address of the accused shown therein was the same as in the earlier warrant. That warrant was also returned with the endorsement that the accused could not be seen at Ernakulam and that there is no time left for getting the passport for going to the place of residence of the accused for making enquiries. This endorsement was also counter-signed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Central Station, Ernakulam. It is regrettable to note that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate accepted this endorsement also without any difficulty. By this, the accused could keep away from the court. 16. We would like to draw the attention of the Government to the situation created by the breakdown of a large number of firms and institutions which carried on business of accepting deposits from the members of the public describing themselves as bankers, financiers etc. They were offering very huge interest on deposits. On account of their advertisements, publicities and other inducements, they could collect very large amounts. They secreted or diverted all these amounts by adopting many dubious methods. After so concealing or diverting these deposits, they managed to get the business to reach a grinding halt. Considering the nature of the evil, that should be remedied and the devices adopted by the large number of firms and institutions and methodologies, adopted by them as voiced by the learned Advocate General, that the assets have been secreted and put beyond trade, and attempts are being made to stultify all proceedings, civil and criminal, it is for the State Government to take serious note of the matter and bring about appropriate legislations which will be effective, besides bringing the offenders to book and will also enable the various depositors to get the return of their amounts. This may be possible, if special legislations are enacted to trace the amounts from the very inception of acceptance of the deposits and to follow them wherever they are diverted and in whichever form they are concealed at present. This may be possible, if special legislations are enacted to trace the amounts from the very inception of acceptance of the deposits and to follow them wherever they are diverted and in whichever form they are concealed at present. It will also be useful to consider whether it is not expedient in the interests of justice to establish Special Courts, and if necessary, to adopt summary procedure to deal with such offences and also to afford sufficient, speedy and effective remedy to the various depositors for the return of their amounts without much cost and hardship. We would stress this aspect, since, a large number of depositors may not even afford to initiate legal action nor can withstand the long legal battle. We are distressed to note that steps in this regard are moving only at a very slow pace. This is hardly enough. The matter should move with electric rapidity. 17. We have voiced our concern on the different aspects that were highlighted before us, in detail, during the course of argument and we have also emphasised the need to take urgent steps in the matter, in paras 12, 13 and 16 herein above. We should say, it is for the State Government to bestow its anxious consideration on various aspects of the complicated issues involved in the matter and to take or pursue appropriate effective steps. 18. The above Crl.M.Cs are dismissed. Issue photostat copies of this order to counsel on both sides on usual terms. The Registrar shall send a copy of this order forthwith to the Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala, for information and appropriate action. Petitions dismissed.