JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) IN broad daylight, on 7-2-1981, Kedar was shot at and killed. Eye-witnesses have deposed against the appellant and the question is whether they are to be believed. The question also is if there is any other evidence on which the verdict returned by the trial Court against the appellant on the charge of murder of kedar can be sustained. ( 2. ) THE appellants defence is that he is falsely implicated and by none else than his own brother who has deposed in this case as P. W. 6. Indeed, he examined defence witness also who deposed having witnessed the occurrence and has named the culprit as one Babu Kachhi of village Kohar, since deceased. However, we are required, primarily, to assess the prosecution evidence and answer the question if prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. ( 3. ) IT is necessary first to indjcate some salient features of the investigation of the case because appellants grievance is that he has been framed up and investigation has been partisan and not open, independent and impartial. Not only eye-witnesses, appellants counsel Shri Gupta has submitted, all the key-witnesses are members of the same family and no independent witness has been examined to prove the occurrence. There is no explanation forthcoming as to why even those persons who deposed as eye-witnesses were not examined by the, Police on the date of occurrence itself though they were available on that date and Police had come to the spot on the same date for investigation. Counsel has further submitted that the investigation was conducted in such slip-shod manner that the spot map came to be prepared not by the Investigating officer and not given indeed in his presence, but by the village Patwari and that too more than two weeks after the occurrence. Though much reliance is placed on the ballistics Examiners report, counsel submits, no precaution was taken to seal the gun seized, to exclude the possibility of manufacturing evidence and indeed, no explanation is also forthcoming as to why it was sent to the Ballistics Expert more than five weeks after its seizure. Several lapses afore-mentioned, which counsel has pointed out, obviously indent the credibility of the investigation. In this connection, suffice it to note at this stage the view expressed in a Bench decision of Gauhati High Court in Bhanda gam, 1984 Cri. Several lapses afore-mentioned, which counsel has pointed out, obviously indent the credibility of the investigation. In this connection, suffice it to note at this stage the view expressed in a Bench decision of Gauhati High Court in Bhanda gam, 1984 Cri. L. J. 217, when one of us (Dr. T. N. Singh, J.), speaking for the Court, observed that if presumption of innocence is a fundamental tenet of our criminal jurisprudence, it has its own basic facet which is manifested in the anxiety of courts to ensure a fair trial, based on fair procedure. The accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt based not only on the evidence produced in the case, but based also on infraction of any procedural safeguard enjoined by law in the matter of conduct of investigation as well as prosecution. Indeed, in a case where the accused is indicted on a charge of murder, exposing him to extreme penalty, the duty of the Court to see if the evidence produced in the case is tainted in any manner assumes signal significance. ( 4. ) AT this stage, we may also note another important submission of learned counsel which rocks the substratum of the prosecution case. Counsel submits that the prosecution bears the unmistakable impress of the witnesses being partisan and interested on account of their changing versions at different stages. It is also his submission that material witnesses either do not corroborate each other or they mutually contradict each other in material particulars. What is not disputed is that the dead body was found in front of the house of one Baburam, but no ground was taken to examine him or to give any explanation for omitting him and indeed his other immediate neighbour, such as Ramsanehi, has not been examined. These features of the prosecution, it is rightly submitted, may very well turn out to be the Achillies heel in this case for the prosecution. ( 5. ) WE have no doubt that we have to examine the evidence of the witnesses, bearing in mind the general criticism levelled against their testimony. These features of the prosecution, it is rightly submitted, may very well turn out to be the Achillies heel in this case for the prosecution. ( 5. ) WE have no doubt that we have to examine the evidence of the witnesses, bearing in mind the general criticism levelled against their testimony. Indeed, we suffer in this regard a constitutional compulsion because of what is observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of STUP vs. Manoharlal, AIR 1981 SC 2073 , that when conviction for a charge of murder is challenged, appellate Courts duty is not to adopt a "computerised approach", but to screen, scan and sift evidence diligently and critically so as not to ignore the "human factor". Indeed, the proces of appreciation of evidence, howsoever objective it has to be, depends to some extent on the predilection of the Judge who may have his own perception of the factors which motivate a witness to depose in a particular manner. The informant is cousin brother of the deceased and there is no doubt that his evidence suffers serious infirmities. Indeed, the very fact of his lodging the FIR at Police Station is itself rendered doubtful on the evidence of his wife p. W. 4. Her evidence is that she did not know who had lodged the FIR but she knew it for certain that until Police had come to the site, her husband had not left the village. The doubt could have been cleared if prosecution had examined Chowkidar Munna who, as per FIR Ex. P/1, had accompanied the informant to the Police Station to lodge the FIR. In this context, it is also noteworthy that P. W. 1 deposed having received information in the field from his co-villager Babu about the occurrence of Kedars murder in the village, but this Babu even was not examined. However, the most important aspect of his evidence which taints the testimony of the eye-witnesses as well is that in the course of his evidence in the Court, he gave two different versions as to the source of his knowledge about the appellant being the culprit. In examination-in-chief, he deposed that Babu had told him that the appellant had killed Kedar having shot at him with his licensed gun. In examination-in-chief, he deposed that Babu had told him that the appellant had killed Kedar having shot at him with his licensed gun. In the cross-examination, he said that he got this information only at the spot from P. W. 2, Govindi, deceaseds uncle. Another serious infirmity which his evidence suffers is that of an important omission in his statement made before the Police which amounts to contradicting the evidence in Court. He did not state that to the Police that he had met Govindi near the dead body of Kedar and from him he learnt that the appellant had shot at and killed Kedar. He did not also state to the Police that he had also met near the dead body his wife P. W. 4 though he deposed that fact in his evidence. We find sufficient strength in the contention of Shri Gupta that this witness deliberately avoided Babu because he was not examined in Court and leaned more on his relations P. Ws. 2 and 4 to make them eye-witnesses though he did not speak about them in his Police statement and indeed even in the F. I. R. Because of the serious infirmity from which the evidence of this witness suffers, we have no hesitation to reject his testimony, but we are also inclined to take the view that his evidence has affected the testimony of other witnesses such as P. Ws. 2 and 4. True, he is not an eye-witness, but he still is the key-witness having posed as the informant and being father of the child witness Puran, PW. 5, indeed, the star-witness in this case, whom he could influence. ( 6. ) BEFORE we read the evidence of Puran (P. W. 5), we would like to read first bhikam (P. W. 3), above-named Govindis son, and another cousin of the deceased. He also deposed as an eye-witness, but in the FIR, no knowledge is attributed to him and even in his Police statement, the informant is silent about him as he is about Govindi (P. W. 2) and Dhanwanti (P. V. 4 ). He deposed that at around 3. 00 O clock on the date of occurrence, he was suting on Baburams Chabutara. There, Puran (P. W. 5), Ram Vilas (not examined), Mahesh (not examined), were keeping him company in playing marbles. He deposed that at around 3. 00 O clock on the date of occurrence, he was suting on Baburams Chabutara. There, Puran (P. W. 5), Ram Vilas (not examined), Mahesh (not examined), were keeping him company in playing marbles. Deceased Kedar was coming towards the field when the appellant coming from the other side, challenged him. The appellant had a 12 bore S. B. B. L. gun which he aimed at Kedars chest and shot him down and then he fled towards the pond. The woman folk immediately came on the spot. Dhanwanti was among them, but there was none else there except him and Puran. He contradicts his own father Govindi who deposed that he also came to the spot on hearing a gun being fired and he saw the appellant fleeing the place. This witness not only deposed that he did not see then his father, but also deposed that their house was 200 paces away from the place of occurrence and his house was not visible from there. Indeed, it is in his evidence that house of Ramsanehi (not examined) was at a distance of ten paces from the place of occurrence and that there were inmates present in the house of Baburam and ramsanehi though where they were at that time he could not say. He admitted that his statement was recorded by Police two days after the occurrence. It is also his evidence that he fled to his house and was there for about half an hour and he had no talk with anybody during that period. Thus, he contradicts P. W. 1 who had deposed that he had met Bhikam and Govindi at the spot. P. W. 1, in his evidence admitted that he lived with his uncle Govindi in the same house and it is clear, therefore, that all the main witnesses. P. Ws. 2, 3, 4 and 5 belong to the same family and they lived in the same house, and it is indeed in the evidence of P. W. 3 that from that house, the place of occurrence was not visible. What seriously impairs his testimony is the fact rather that though he was available on 7-2-1981, his statement was not recorded on that date itself by the Police and it becomes doubtful, therefore, if he was regarded as an eye-witness. What seriously impairs his testimony is the fact rather that though he was available on 7-2-1981, his statement was not recorded on that date itself by the Police and it becomes doubtful, therefore, if he was regarded as an eye-witness. The other fact which impairs his testimony is that in his Police statement, he gave a different version and did not pose as an eye-witness, but said that he was frightened and he fled and he heard report of the gun when he reached near Ramsanehis door-step. Although his evidence is that he returned to the site after staying back at home for half an hour, he stated still that till he was at the site, other villagers had not come there. Saying this, he fatally and crucially contradicts the star witness Puran (P. W. 5) whose evidence, we will read in due course, but at this stage even relevant part thereof, we may note that about 50 villagers had assembled at the place of occurrence within 10 to 15 minutes. He deposed that he had seen Kedar fleeing towards the pond and reaching the pond and said that the pond was about 300 paces from the place of occurrence. The village patwari (P. W. 19) has, however, given evidence that the pond was at-a distance of half a mile. These are some of the salient features of his evidence which impair his veracity and we must say, therefore, he is not a reliable and trustworthy witness. ( 7. ) DHANWANTI (P. W. 4) who is wife of P. W. 1 and mother of P. W. 5, also deposed in the case and some part of her evidence, we have already noted above. WE read now her evidence to appreciate her account of the occurrence and how she corroborates or discredits the other witnesses. Indeed, we have also to see if she is herself at all reliable. Her evidence is that she was standing on the threshold of her house and on hearing the report of the gun on the date of occurrence, started running towards the place of occurrence when she saw her son Puran coming from that side. He told her that the appellant had killed his uncle and had fled away. Her evidence is that she was standing on the threshold of her house and on hearing the report of the gun on the date of occurrence, started running towards the place of occurrence when she saw her son Puran coming from that side. He told her that the appellant had killed his uncle and had fled away. But, she also deposed that she herself saw the appellant fleeing towards the pond and also said categorically that he was carrying a S. B. B. L. gun. She was examined by the Police not on the date of occurrence but, as in the case of other key witnesses, on the following date and then she gave a different version that she was busy working inside the house. When she was confronted with that statement, she insisted in her evidence that she was standing on the threshold when she saw her son Puran running towards her and she met him after walking ten paces from her door-step. That she is not a witness of truth is evident because she placed the pond at a distance only of 20 paces from Baburams door-step where the dead body was lying and indeed, she also deposed that she saw appellant reaching bank of the pond. Although she deposed that she saw appellants back only when he was running, but she still insisted that she had even then seen his face. We do not think if we need read further her evidence as the several improbabilities which bristles her testimony must convince us that her evidence must also be discarded as unreliable and untrustworthy. ( 8. ) PURAN (P. W. 5) indeed is star-witness who was 11 years old on the date of deposition. To appreciate his evidence, we have to bear in mind the judicial precaution sounded from time to time. Before we discuss decisions cited by Shri Gupta, we consider appropriate rather to inform ourselves of the view of the Apex Court that in appreciating the evidence of a child-witness, the Court is required to examine carefully whether such a witness can be said to be a "witness of truth" and not a witness of imagination as most children of tender age are. (See Suresh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, air 1981 SC 1122 ). (See Suresh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, air 1981 SC 1122 ). We may also note few decisions of the Privy Council laying down the legal guideline for appreciating the evidence of a child-witness. In Bhojraj vs. Sitaram, AIR 1936 PC 60, the possibility of a child witness being tutored easily was noted and it was observed : "the real tests are how consistent the story is with itself, or withstands the test of cross-examination and how far it fits in with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case". In Mohd Sugal Esa vs. King, AIR 1945 PC 3. it was observed that it was sound rule of prudence not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of child-witness, whether sworn or unsworn. Shri Gupta has cited the case of abbas Ali Khan vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Lahore 667, and has relied particularly on the following passage which is extracted therein from Dr. Kennys The Outlines of Criminal Law : "children are a most untrustworthy class of witnesses, for, when of a tender age, as our common experience teaches us, they often mistake dreams for reality, repeat glibly as of their own knowledge what they have heard from others, and are greatly influenced by fear of punishment, by hope of reward, and by desire of notoriety". ( 9. ) BEARING in mind the above guidelines, we approach now P. W. 5 and read immediately what was put to him by the trial Court to test his understanding. He was asked if he knew the consequences of deposing falsely and he answered "kuchh nahin". This gives us an insight into the character of this witness for considering the question as to whether he can be regarded as a "witness of truth". If he had no fear of punishment for perjury for giving false evidence, as a rule of prudence, he cannot be accepted to have remained uninfluenced by the hope of reward or even by the desire of notoriety which Dr. Kenny has referred in the extract afore-quoted. Indeed, he has also not been corroborated in material particulars by other key-witness P. W. 4 or the eye-witness, P. W. 2. His evidence, as we have noted earlier, is that with 10 or 15 minutes of the occurrence, about 50 persons had assembled there which is not supported by P. W. 2. Kenny has referred in the extract afore-quoted. Indeed, he has also not been corroborated in material particulars by other key-witness P. W. 4 or the eye-witness, P. W. 2. His evidence, as we have noted earlier, is that with 10 or 15 minutes of the occurrence, about 50 persons had assembled there which is not supported by P. W. 2. He also contradicts P. W. 4 saying that his father (P. W. 1) went to lodge report on being told by him that appellant had shot and killed Kedar while, as noted earlier, P. W. 4 made a categorical statement to the contrary. Indeed, the inherent improbability which appears in his version of the occurrence makes it difficult to accept him as a witness of truth. The fact also is that his account of the occurrence is not corroborated by the other eye-witness P. W. 2. The child has deposed that when his uncle (deceased) was accosted by the appellant, he was scared and he fled and took a round of the Chabutara and again fled towards his house. It was when he was running that he was shot at. It would only mean that he was shot at the back; while in his evidence, one Dr. M. K. Khare, autopsy surgeon (P. W. 18) deposed that the entry wound was in the chest. This material discrepancy in his evidence which is contradicted by medical evidence totally destroys, in our opinion, his testimony and it is not necessary for us to read further his evidence except that he makes the appellant say to the dying man, "aur DETE HAIN". Can we still believe him ? ( 10. ) THOUGH the two eye-witnesses P. Ws. 2 and 5 we have found unreliable and we have discarded their testimony, but still it remains to be seen if the two circumstances of discovery of the empty cartridges at the behest of the appellant and the Ballistics experts opinion have any value and whether on that evidence, the appellants conviction can be upheld. First, the question of empty cartridge. The evidence of seizure makes interesting reading and we have no hesitation to accept Shri Guptas contention that there could be no question of discovery as the evidence has disclosed that the place of concealment was already known to the Police. P. W. 7 witnessed seizure list (Ex. First, the question of empty cartridge. The evidence of seizure makes interesting reading and we have no hesitation to accept Shri Guptas contention that there could be no question of discovery as the evidence has disclosed that the place of concealment was already known to the Police. P. W. 7 witnessed seizure list (Ex. P/7) and his evidence indeed, in reply to Courts question is that first the chowkidar who had come to his house had told him about the empty cartridge and later, appellant informed the Investigating Officer about that. Indeed, it is also in his evidence that the Chowkidar who had come to call him had told him that appellant had spoken about the cartridge to the Investigating Officer and he was required, therefore, to go there. He further deposed that the cartridge was not embedded in the earth, but was lying open on the ground. The evidence is also there that the place of discovery was near a pond and due to rains the pond used to be flooded and indeed, there were rains that year. Hakim Singh (P. W. 8) is another witness of discovery who signed the seizure memo (Ex. P/7) and the statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Ex. P/6. like Kaptan (P. W. 7 ). He corroborated the other witness and stated further that all hough the cartridge was sealed, the witnesses were not asked to put signatures on the wrappers in which the cartridge was sealed. Reading Exs. P/6, P/7 and the evidence of the two witnesses P. Ws. 7 and 8, we entertain no doubt at all that the Investigating officer and the accused were already present at the place where the alleged discovery was made and the witnesses were called there to merely complete the formality. In Ex. P/6 itself, it is stated that information about the discovery was given at the place of occurrence and indeed, not at the Police Station. That apart, the two witnesses did not prove the statement ipsissima verba which was recorded in Ex. P/6. The evidence of two witnesses is only that as per Ex. P/6, there was a writing on which they had signed and the writing was about the discovery of an empty cartridge from a place near the pond. ( 11. That apart, the two witnesses did not prove the statement ipsissima verba which was recorded in Ex. P/6. The evidence of two witnesses is only that as per Ex. P/6, there was a writing on which they had signed and the writing was about the discovery of an empty cartridge from a place near the pond. ( 11. ) IN the premises aforesaid, the alleged "discovery" of empty cartridge cannot be accepted in any view of law and fact and that being the position, it is not necessary at all for us to ask for any assurance from the Ballistics Experts report. If the cartridge goes, there would be no point in considering the report of the Ballistics Expert given in respect to that cartridge being fired from the gun seized from appellants possession. However, Shri Gupta having addressed us at a great length, on the credibility of the said report, we may say a few words on that as well. We agree with him that the Ballistics expert (P. W. 21) has not given either in his evidence or in the report (Ex. P/15) the relevant datas on which this Court would be enabled to form a judicial opinion on the acceptability of the view expressed by the said Expert. In Ex. P/15 it is stated that "photomicrograph of matching position of Kc-1 with TCAA-1 was taken and points of similarities were marked". True, the photographs have been exhibited as well, but what were the "similarities" which the Expert had noticed, to that he has not deposed in his evidence. His only evidence is that the empty cartridge Ec-1 had on its cap some marks of scratching and he said nothing more than that. However, the important aspect of his evidence is that to the two searching and categorical questions asked in cross-examination, he admitted that on the wrapper in which the gun was sealed, there was impression only of Mehgaon Police Station and he did not confirm that the wrapper also bore any signature of any witness. ( 12. ) BECAUSE Shri Gupta cited case-law in support of his contentions of the different aspects of the weakness of the prosecution case, it becomes our duty to note atleast the decisions of the Apex Court and we read first, therefore, the decision bearing on the question of the value of Ballistics Experts opinion. ( 12. ) BECAUSE Shri Gupta cited case-law in support of his contentions of the different aspects of the weakness of the prosecution case, it becomes our duty to note atleast the decisions of the Apex Court and we read first, therefore, the decision bearing on the question of the value of Ballistics Experts opinion. It is the case of State of gujarat vs. Adam Fateh Mohmed Umatiya, 1971 (3) SCC 208 . We have no doubt that in this case, their Lordships took great pains to speak a great deal on the subject. Their lordships approved the views expressed by Major Sir Herald Burrard, in his book "the identification of Firearms and Forensic Ballistics", 3rd Edition at pages 133 and 134. The Expert is required to carry out experiment with the gun of the same make or batch with similar cartridges and if that is not done, his evidence would be tainted because of possibility of existence of "family likeness" must be kept in mind. What is required is to look for "finer markings which are of primary and vital importance and identification based solely on one or two major markings without any finer stariations as well should be regarded with with suspicion". Indeed, the mere opinion of the Expert that the striker scrapes on the test cartridges and on the empty cartridges were not identical, but similar would not suffice unless he further said that they were "identical". Learned author, we have noted, has observed at p. 136 of his Book that "merely some similar ejector marks by themselves are of no serious value in establishing true identification". Accordingly, we have no doubt that the "similarities" in the scrapes referred in his opinion by the expert in the instant case would not make his report acceptable as a piece of valuable opinion about identification of the seized gun and the cartridge as incriminating articles by which the offence can be brought home to the appellant. ( 13. ) SOME other decisions which support his contention and are relevant to the question considered, cited by Shri Gupta, may now be noticed. In G. B. Patel, AIR 1979 sc 135 , it was held that the delay in recording statements of a material witness by the police Officer "casts a doubt or suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and woof of the prosecution story". In G. B. Patel, AIR 1979 sc 135 , it was held that the delay in recording statements of a material witness by the police Officer "casts a doubt or suspicion on the credibility of the entire warp and woof of the prosecution story". In case of witnesses who are alleged to have seen the occurrence and are available easily, their Lordships held, non-examination of such witnesses would place a burden on the prosecution to offer an explanation for the lapse. The D. B. Judgment in the case of Bhagwan, AIR 1955 Pepsu 33, is relied on rightly to support the contention that recovery from a place accessible to all, as in the instant case, was useless and such recovery, even if said to have been made under Section 27 of the evidence Act, cannot be considered as circumstance against the accused. See also Kora ghasi, AIR 1983 SC 360 . We think that in the facts and circumstances of the case, reliance of the learned counsel on Mahmood vs. State of U. P. , AIR 1976 SC 69 is of signal relevance inasmuch as duty of the prosecution to take precautions to eliminate possibility of fabrication in dealing with sealed articles has been stressed therein by their lordships emphatically. The weapon of offence was seized, put in a box and sealed by the Investigating Officer with his seal and the box remained with him. The evidence of the Expert of the finger-prints on the weapon was rejected because of that lapse of the prosecution. ( 14. ) WHAT is to be done when the spot map is prepared by "draftsman" was considered in the case of Santa Singh, AIR 1956 SC 526 , and it was held that the witnesses of the occurrence who helped preparation thereof must be examined in such a case and indeed only then, the Draftsmans evidence would be legal and admissible. In the instant case, the spot map (Ex. P/20), on its face, does not show who were the witnesses who helped the Patwari (P. W. 19) in preparing the spot map. In his evidence, he deposed that the map was prepared on a requisition received from the Police Station and the person who had indicated the place of occurrence signed the Panchanama which he had prepared separately. P/20), on its face, does not show who were the witnesses who helped the Patwari (P. W. 19) in preparing the spot map. In his evidence, he deposed that the map was prepared on a requisition received from the Police Station and the person who had indicated the place of occurrence signed the Panchanama which he had prepared separately. Evidently, neither the Panchanama was proved nor the witnesses were even named by him and indeed, they did not depose in the trial to meet the requirements specified in Santa Singh (supra ). We have no doubt, therefore, that the spot map Ex. P/20 is useless, but non-preparation of proper spot map and proof thereof, in the instant case, have seriously impaired the investigation and prosecution. The Bench decision in the case of Public Prosecutor vs. Subba Reddi, AIR 1939 Mad 15, cited by Shri Gupta, may also be referred inasmuch as it has been held therein that when the Investigating Officer already knew what the accased was going to disclose by calling witnesses and recording the statements of the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence act, a futile exercise was merely undertaken because such a Panchanama would not meet the requirement of Section 27 and would be wholly inadmissible in evidence. ( 15. ) TO do jastice to the submissions of the State Counsel, we cannot afford to miss counsels stress on the circumstances, of what he said, appellants abscondence. Although there is no evidence in this case of appellants going underground to evade justice, the settled law indeed is that mere abscondence is a very weak circumstance and it cannot be the sole basis for conviction under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. See P. M. Godse, (1969) 3 SCC 741 ; Datar Singh, (1975) 4 SCC 272 . In the instant case, however, on facts, the admitted position is that the appellant came and surrendered himself in the trial Court. His strained relationship with his brother P. W. 6 is duly established on latters own admission and his being named in the FIR also makes his surrender in Court understandable and that too not belatedly but before the trial began. ( 16. ) STATE Counsel has also stressed that the defence failed to prove its case. His strained relationship with his brother P. W. 6 is duly established on latters own admission and his being named in the FIR also makes his surrender in Court understandable and that too not belatedly but before the trial began. ( 16. ) STATE Counsel has also stressed that the defence failed to prove its case. Indeed some suggestion was made by defence counsel that dacoits had come to the village and Kedar was their victim and indeed, even if we accept that trial Court rightly rejected the sole evidence of D. W. 1 that culprit was not the appellant, but one Baburam (since deceased), that would not avail to prosecutions benefit. This, we say on the authority of Sharad (infra) wherein it has been held that prosecution must stand or fall on its own leg and a false plea or a false defence may only be called into aid in order to lend assurance to a case which is proved independently on other evidence and circumstances. ( 17. ) IT has also been contended that we should not reject the testimony of the eye-witnesses but the serious infirmities in their evidence, discussed above, has left us with no option. Indeed, we have done what we are required to do constitutionally in such cases. In Sharad (supra), their Lordships observed that close relatives of the victim have a tendency to exaggerate and it is Courts duty to examine their evidence with "great care and caution". ( 18. ) WE sum up now and say the final two words - not guilty. On our appreciation of evidence, we have no hesitation to hold that the verdict rendered against the accused is not sustainable in law and that is accordingly set aside. The sentence passed against him by the trial Court is also set aside and we direct that he shall be set at large forthwith if he is not required in connection with any other case. Order accordingly.